HomeMy WebLinkAbout1986-2779.Union.98-04-06gPgvc&EL4 CcurnNNE
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IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CRPWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIJZVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
OPSEU (Union Grievance)
Grievor
-and-
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Community and Social Services)
Employer
BEFORE
FOR THE
UMON
S.L. Stewart
G. Leeb
Grievance Officer
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
Vice-Chair
FOR THE
EMPLOYER
B. Loewen
Counsel
Legal Services Branch
Management Board Secretariat
HEARING April 1, 1998
DECISION
The matter before me relate6 to the 'keasonable effortstl
obligation under Appendix 9 of.the Collective Agreement. The
Employer has made application to vary an order restricting it
from proceeding with plans of care or transfer arrangements for
certain residents. This order was made earlier in these
proceedings, in a.decision of Vice-Chair Kaplan, dated September
29, 1997. At pp. 3-4, the decision states as follows:
In brief, having regard to the position of the parties, and to an appropriate balancing of interests, I denied the union's request that an order be issued terminating any further surplusing of employees pending the resolution of the case on its merits. However, I directed that the employer not inititate any plans of care or transfer arrangements for any residents of any of the facilities subject to this award where the inititation of such activity had not begun at the time of this award. Fut another way, the employer could continue with transfer arrangements for residents of the facilities where a substantive step other than the initial notification of facility closure or transfer has been given. This order
will remain in effect until the issue of the award on its merits, or until varied by the Vice-Chair assigned
tom hear the merits.
In that regard, and this provides another basis for my decision, the parties have agreed that this matter
should proceed on an expedited basis. It is
anticipated that the case will proceed almost immediately to a hearing and a decision will be issued before the
end of the year. The Registrar of the Board has been so informed, and will so schedule the case.
While the hearing in this matter did proceed on an expedited
basis, it has not been completed as anticipated. The Employer
has adduced its evidence and the Union is about to comence
leading evidence. At the presenC time, dzze to difficulties in
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scheduling a number of mutually.available hearing dates, it
appears that a decision may not be issued until the summer. This
situation has arisen notwithstanding the extraordinary efforts
that both Mr. Loewen and Mr. Leeb have made to expedite these
proceedings.
There was no dispute about the facts relevant to the
disposition of this matter. The EmployerPs request to vary the
order arises as a result of concern about the planning process
being completed in sufficient time to allow residents to be
placed in a community setting prior to the anticipated closing
date of the facilities. There is a particular concern in
relation to 66 residents of Prince Edvard Heights, which is
schedul.ed to close on March 31, 1999. There are a number of
steps involved in the transfer of a resident from an institution
to a community agency. The time from initial contact to the
completion of a transfer can take over a year. There may be
instances in which construction or renovation will be required in
order to accommodate the needs of a resident. However, after
commencing the planning process in January, 1997, the transfar of
forty residents from Prince Edward Heights was completed by
Ilarch, 1997. At the present time, now that planning is close to
or has been completed for those persons for whom transfers had
been inititated at the time the order was made, the Employer is
now in a position to be able to provide assistance in the
planning process for the remaining residents.
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In order to accommcdate ,the needs of the parties for an
immediate decision, the following reasons are brief. I would
note at the outset that the order of Vice-Chair Kaplan represents
a careful~ balancing of the interests of the parties in the
particular and somewhat unusual circumstances of this case. I
would also note that this is not the first challenge to this
order. Two days prior to hearing this application, I heard an
application by the Union to vary the portion of the order
allowing the Employer to continue to proceed with the surplusing
process I In a decision dated March 31, 1993, I rejected the
Union's application and upheld the Employer's position that the
status au0 in relation to its ability to continue to surplus
should continue to prevail. To now accept the Kmployer's
position would entirely upset the balance which the Employer
successfully argued should be maintained in relation to its
interests. To upset the balance vould properly require extremely
compelling circumstances.
. In response to Mr. Loeven's characterisation of the present
state of affairs as V1in!prisonmentH of residents, Mr. Leeb advised
that it is not the Union's position that any resident should be
prevented from leaving. He noted that residents have always left
institutions, at the request of the family or for other reasons,
and that the Union did not take the position that the order
should be interpreted as prohibiting such departures. Given this
clarification of the Union's position, in light of the
@lo5
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information before me, I am unable,to conclude that grounds for a
variance of the order have been established.
The Ehployer's alternative position vas that if I were not
persuaded to vary the order to allow the planning process to
proceed, the circumstances are such that there is an interest on
the part of residents and community agencies that requires that
they be notified and advised of a right to participate in these
proceedings. Mr. Kaplan did not accept the Employer's position
in this regard when it was raised before him. Mr. Loewen
suggested that Mr. Kaplan's decision in relation to notice was
incorrectly decided and that even if it were correctly decided,
the circumstances have now changed. In particular, Hr. Loewen
emphasized that the date of anticipated closing in relation to
the release of the decision is now closer and the Bnployer is now
in a position to initiate and provide planning assistance. It
was further noted that the Union is seeking relief which goes
beyond simply declaratory relief. In that regard it was the
position of the Deployer that it would be inappropriate for me to
make any direction as to the type of relief being sought but that
I should direct that if the Union elects to continue to pursue
relief beyond declaratory relief, there is a requirement for
notice.
Both IW. Loewen and Mr. Leeb made reference to the
autborities which address the identification of interests which
I 94/09'98 09: 09 FAX 4165314626
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require notification of a right to participate in proceedings.
There are many cases in which the seminal decisions of the
Supreme Co'urt of Canada in Hooaendorn and the Court of Appeal in
Bradley have been considered. and applied. Of the cases that were
referred to me I found the analysis in Re John Noble Home and
Qntari.0 Nurses’ Association (1994), 39 L.A.C. (4th) 324
(Mitchniok) to be particularly helpful. While the factual
situation dealt with in that case is somewhat different from that
before me here, the considerations relating to what constitutes
an interest on the part of someone other than the party to the
collective agreement are clearly applicable. At p. 336 of that
award, after noting that a liberal view of what constitutes an
interest requiring notice may be justified on the basis of an
abundance of caution, it is concluded that such an approach "is
not really a ca~utious approach at all". The decision goes on to
note that the Virtually limitless 'I logical implications of the
directly affected test, with its consequential negative impact in
terms of cost and scheduling in a system that ie intended to be
sensitive to both. While considerations of natural justice must
prevail over considerations of cost and convenience, it is my
view that the restrained approach advocated in this awaxd has
particular relevance where the employer is the government. This
Employer is charged with the responsibility of dealing with many
interests. In many instances the manner in which the Collective
Agreement is interpreted in the arbitration process will, in a
general sense, affect the interests of persons to whom the
04:/06/98 09:OO FAX 4165314826
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government has obligations. That does not necessarily mean that
those persons have a legal interest in the proceedings that will
entitle them to notice and a right to participate in the
proceedings. Arbitrators have always been sensitive to concerns
expressed by employers about management by arbitration. A
scenario in which recognition of third party rights is liberally
construed in a case such as this has the potential for the
creation of government by arbitration. The Employer possesses
the responsibility and resources to ensure that the important
interests of the residents of the institutions it intends to
close are accommodated. I am not persuaded that those interests,
or the interests of community agencies, constitute a legal
interest in this proceeding, the purpose of which is to determine
whether there is a violation of the collective Agreement between
the Employer and the Union.
I am unable to view the foregoing considerations as properly
restricted to circumstances in which only declaratory relief is
sought. That is, I am not persuaded that notice is necessary if
the Union continues to seek relief beyond a declaration. While,
as the Courts have reminded this Board on a number of occasions,
it is the Board's obligation to provide relief that is fully
remedial, arbitrators are sensitive to their appropriately
limited involvement in a collective bargaining relationship in
fashioning remedial relief. As in all cases, such sensitivity
'will inform the Board's remedial order, in the event, of course,
0.!/06.f98 09:OO FM 4165314626
z
.
that it is ultimately determined that a violation of the
Collective Agreement has been established. The appropriate scope
of any remedial relief that may be ordered will, no doubt, be the
subject of submissions at the conclusion of the case.
In the result, the application of the Employer to vary the
order of Wr. Kaplan is denied. The order requested in connection
with the provision of notice is also denied. With respect to the \
Union's position in relation to planning proceeding where
requests are made, a position which is properly viewed as
resulting in a clarification of Mr. ~aplan's order, I ma.ke no
ruling with respect to Mr. Leeb's proposal for the establishment
of a process. This matter is appropriately left in the hands of
the-parties. I will, no doubt, be advised if the parties require
any assistance in this regard.
Dated at Toronto, this 6th day of April, 1998