HomeMy WebLinkAbout1987-1092.Howes.88-08-26ONTARlO EMPLOY&OELA CO”RONNE
CRO~NEMPLOYEES DEL’ONTAARIO
GRIEVANCE CQMMISSION DE
SETTLEMENT REGLEMENT
BOARD DES GRIEFS
1092/ 87
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before.
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
‘.
Between:
Before:
OPSEU (Rot&t Howes)
:
and
The Crown in Right of Ontario
.(Ministry of Transportation) .
M.V: Watters : Vice Chairman.
J.D. McManus Member
L. Turtle Member
For the Grigvor: i’. Rothstein
Counse 1
Gowling & Henderson
Barristers and Solicitors
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For the Employer: K. Cribbie
Staff Relations Officer
Human Resources Branch
Ministry of Transportation
Hearing: June 9,~ 1988
Grievor
Employer
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DEAN
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il The grievor in this proceeding is ; Senior Construction Technician with
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the Ministry of Transportation. This position involves survey inspection,
II quality assurance testing and the undertaking of various acts all related to
I the construction of public highways vithib the Central Region of the Ministry.
Generally, 1 ,~ the grievor is assigned to a p{oJect until its completion,
foll.wing which he would ordinarily be ditected to another project. These
assignments can be of some duration. II It yould be inaccurate. however, to
consider the grievor as having a “fixed” iblace of work in that his stay at a
particular site is always time-limited.
I/ IFn the period April 6 to June 24,
1987, he was assigned to a project locate’; at Brock Road in Pickering,
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during
which time he was generally responsible for overseeing the construction being
performed by private contractors. Jj During the course of this and other
projects, Ii the grievor’s automobile was required to perform the job. Par the
period of this placement, II the grievor’s headquarters was designated as Baldwin
II which wss approximately seventy (70) kildmeters from the site.
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)I In the period April 6 to April 27.1 1987, the grievor was permitted to
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travel to and from the job site on an “o&shift” basis, that is, as part of
his regular work day. Ji As such, his travel time was covered by the straight II time rate paid for his normal hours of v&k.
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He did, however, receive
additional compensation for the mileage and was entitled to claim for
an afternoon meal. The grievor did not express any complaint for the
compensation received in this initial period of the project.
This grievance was filed as a’ result of the grievor’s claim that he was
not compensated appropriately during a subsequent period on the. project, this
being between April 27 and June 24, 1987. On or about the former date, the
employer, for reasons which are addressed below, decided that it wanted the
grievor to be on-site for eight hours each day rather than the six hours as
was previously the case. This change necessitated that the grievor travel
“off-shift’! with the travel to be compensated for as overtime. At or about
this same time, the employer prepared a weekly cost comparison which was filed
vith this board as Exhibit ‘4’. This document compared the cost of having the
grievor stay on-s,ite with the cost of his commuting from and to the designated
headquarters on a daily basis. The totals arrived at were as a result of the
use of the mileage, overtime and meal allowance rates provided for in the
collective agreement and through the use of an “average” rate for overnight
accommodation as established by the’employer. A summary of the cost
comparisons is as follows:
Kilometer
Rate
27.5 cents
22 cents
18 cents
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Cost of Remaining, Cost of Commuting Weekly Differential
On-Site
$404.70 $447.50 $42.80
$393.81 $408.45 $14.64
~. $385.89 $380:05 ($5.84)
s‘clear from these figures thatit uas of less expense to the
Ministry to require the grievor,.to remain on-site while the first two
kilometric rates were in effect. These were the.rates that would, more likely
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than not, be used in that the project peri’od being discussed ~89 close to the I I
commencement of the fiscal year. i! ,I
iI The above-mentioned cost compariaoti was discussed with the grievor. He
II was informed that the Ministry would prefer that he stay on-site and was Ii
advised that if he continued to commute his travel expenses (travel time,
I! mileage, meals) could not exceed the calculated cost of staying on-site.
iI Notwithstanding this information, the grievor decided to commute. For expense
the kilometers were subsequently reduced so account purposes,
that his total travel costs would amount that he vould have
II received if he had remained on-site during the work week. This grievance
arose because of the employer’s to pay for all of the travel
It was argued
occasioned by the decision to commute.
The Union submitted had been previously authorized to
recei.ve’overtime when in this regard. on the
‘Travelling and Living Authoriration Report’ which was
filed with us as Exhibit ‘3’. which was effective as of April
6, 1987, contained the words: “Overtime 120 minutes per day (Outside of 8 hr.
working day)“. it further stated:
Mileage from H.Q. ~to Job Site Allowance. Reason for Overtime -
Car Used on Job”. “authorization” entitled the
grievor to receive this amount of travel !ime as overtime in the period Ii
subsequent to April 27th. The grievor, iii his evidence, stated that he
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discussed the cost comparison with his i?ediate supervisor, Mr. K. Gilchreat,
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and that he was told that vhile he would continue to receive compensation for
his travel, such would be limited to the amount shown on the comparison as the
cost for staying on-site. i
Mr. C. Watson, Construction Supervisor for the Central Region,
testified that Exhibit ‘3’ was not intended to serve as, and did not
constitute, authority to travel off shift on an overtime basis. Rather, its
purpose was to identify the amount that would be paid if overtime was
subsequently required. His evidence was that authqrity must be provided prior
to the employee performing the overtime work in question, and that such was
obtained pursuant to a process which went well beyond the mere signing of a
document such as Exhibit ‘3’.
After considering the conflicting positions, this board cannot find
that Exhibit !3’ constitutes the necessary authority to travel off shift on an
overtime \asis subsequent to April 27,‘1987. We are prepared to accept, and
indeed were given no reason to doubt, the employer’s evidence as to the
purpose for the form. In our estimation, the document did not preclude the
employer from engaging,in the cost c&paris& exercise, of which more will be
said shortly. It is apparent from the evidence that as of April 27th the
~grievor was aware that the employer required him to stay on the job for all of
the eight hours of his regular shift and that he would only be compensated for -~
travel up to the total,cost of staying on-site. Even if he had originally
thought otherwise, from this date on the giievor had no reason to believe that
he was authorized to recover two hours of overtime per day.
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Hr. Watson and Mr. Larry Brant, Maiager of Administrative
Serv:ices-Central Region, gave evidence as,:to the Ministry policy and practice
vis a vis the cost comparison process. Sbecifically the folloving documents
were presented to the board:
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(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
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Memo dated March 24, 1987 headed ‘J(ccommodation for Field Staff’
which established a regional averaie room rate of thirty-eight
dollars ($38.00) for purposes of cjlculating the respective
costs (Exhibit ‘5’);
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Ministry Directive dated March 11,11987 on the subject of
‘Compensation Rates for Use of a.Pfrsonal Car and Travelling
Expense Allowances’ (Exhibit ‘7’);
Ministry Directive dated February 2, 1987 on the subject of
‘Accommodation for Field Staff’ (Eihibit ‘8’);
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Ministry Directive dated July 17, 1986 on the subject of ‘Time
Credits While Travelling’ (Exhibit 1’9’); and, lastly,
Ministry policy relating to ‘Daily /and Weekend Coansuting’
(Exhibit ‘10’).
The relevant provisions of this last exhieit reed as fallows:
“3.06 Daily and Weekend Connnuting
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(1) Daily Commuting
(a)
(b)
(cl
II This section shall apply to those employees who are
required to work away from their headquarters for
periods exceeding one day.
Ii Travelling costs will be reidbursed on the basis of
distance (km) and travel time in accordance with the
Uinistry’s Travelling and Lidiog Expense Accounts
regulations and the Working Conditions contract for
those emp.loyees in the Bargaining Unit.
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Wherever the cost to commute’(distance plus travel time)
II exceeds the cost to maintain an employee at the job site
he shall be required to remain at the site.
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(e)
Managers shall review employee headquarters, establish
car pooling, and endeavour to assign staff in a manner
which will result in the least number of private cars in
use on Ministry business and the minimum cost to the
Ministry. This reviei+ shall be of a continuing nature.
An employee., who has been required ~to live at the job
site, may nevertheless elect to commute as a matter of
personal choice. In this case, a claim made up of distanc~e
travelled (at the appropriate rate), or travel time (vhere
applicable), or a combination of both, may be considered,
provided:
(i) the overall cost to commute cannot under any
circumstances, exceed the cost tb q ain&ain the
employee at’the job site, and
(ii .)~the employee will be available for work, during
the same hours as those employees who remain on
the job site unIess he is authorized,to travel
duiing working hours, in which case no claim for
travel time vi11 be entertained;
(f)
(d
(iii) the Manager considers the employee’s decision to
commute will not adversely affect the employee’s
performance.
When an employee elects to commute, rather than remain on the
job site, local management must document the comparative costs
showing the cost to remain on the job site (meals and
accommodation) versus the cost to commute including travel
time (if applicable), plus the coat of car usage or whatever
other mode of travel is used. An intermediate change in any
of the above rates will necessitate that local management
reconsider eath situation, e.g. if the employee is commuting
by private car, rate changes on reaching accumulations of
4,000 and 12,000 km may reqbire further review.
If an employee elects to commute,-where the cost to remain on
the job site is less, the employee will not be able to claim
the full cost of travel on the expense account (see (e)(i)
above). In such cases, the actual distance travelled must be
shown in the “Particulars” column of the expense account but,
it is auggested;the actual claim for payment could be made up
of a reduced number,of kilometers which when added to the cost
of travel time, would equal the cost to stay on the job site.”
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Y The Union in these proceedings did,not challenge the employer’s right
I to require an employee to remain on-site whenever the costs associated
Ii therewith are less than the coats to conrmyte. Similarly, the Union did not
take issue with the general concept of codt comparison. It vould appear from
II the evidence of the employer that the concept is one that has been used for a
considerable period of time in respect type of matter.
After reviewing all of the evidence and submissions, we conclude that
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the employer may take steps, in the exercise of its management rights, to
I/ limit or reduce the cost of carrying on i:a activities. The cited excerpts
I! from Exhibit ‘10’ reflect such an attempt.i Through the device of the cost
comparison, II the employer is able to determine the relative costs of the
II employee staying on-site in contrast to cyuting on a daily basis. When
I’ these costs are subsequently cotrmunicated.; the employee is confronted with an
election. I’ The employee may either remain pn the job site during the week, or
II subject to limited exception, elect to coTput= “as a matter of personal,
choice”. 11 We would categorise the latter decision as being “personal” in
II. nature in that it is taken in accordance w,rth the interests of the employee.
In most instances, the employer’s interesti presumably is to have the employee
1 . remain on-site with the consequent reduction in costs. As we consider this to II
be a valid objective, we are disinclined t’b rule that an employee, such as the
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grievor, can unilaterally enlarge the fin&ial obligation of the employer by
choosing to commute. Indeed, we find that’when the grievor efected to 1
commute, and thereby incur additional travel expense, he could not be
II considered as engaging in the “business of,the employer” for purposes of
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Article 22 (Kilometric Rates). Further, the board is not convinced that the
additional travel time can be viewed as “authorized by the ministry” under
Article 23 (Time Credits While Travelling). In respect of both benefits, this
grievor was clearly appFaised of the fact that the employer was unwilling to
incur the extra cost involved in commuting. Notwithstanding such knowledge,
he decided to travel to and from the work site on a daily basis. I” such
circumstances, we adjudge that the additional costs are fairly and properly
borne by the grievor.
The Union’s major concerns-with the cost comparison related to the
variables that were used in the determination that, in this case, the cost to
commute exceeded the cost to remain on-site. Two elements of the process were
challenged by counsel. First, it was argued that actual:accommodation costs
should be u,sed for the comparison rather than a regional average. It was
suggested that if an actual rate had been employed (such.as the $42.00 per
1 night charge at a Journey’s End Hotel near the site), the differential between
.the respective costs would have been decreased or entirely eliminated such
that the compensation payable to the grievor would have more closely
approximated the total costs of commuting. Second, the use of the
over time rate was questioned in that it cle,arly served to increase the travel
costs of commuting. The Union was suspicious of the motives of the employer
in requiring the grievor to work all eight hours of the shift. It was argued
that this change was largely motivated by a desire to increase the cost of
commuting which vould serve to decrease the costs payable by the employer.
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The Ilnion did not accept the allegation that the change was made for reasons
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relating to the needs of the job.
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Mr. Brent, in his evidence,
Ii statedjthat the average regional rate for
1 overnight accommodation was first established in 1982.
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Since then, it has
apparently been increased periodically sol/as to keep pace with inflation. He
viewed the present rate as a reflection of actual rates within the area of the
specific project in question. ; In this regard, he referred to a Ministry of
Government Services Hotel-Motel Directory,‘and cited four hotels in the i/
I vicinity of the site which had rates of 1:s~ than thirty-eight ($38.00)
dollars. Ii Yr. Brant was of the opinion thtt the use of this regional rate for
II purposes of the cost comparison was necessary for both regional uniformity and
administrative convenience.
With respect to the second concerni!of the Union, Mr. Watson testified
that in the period April 6 to 27, il 1987, the grievor’s travel time could be
II accosnnodated within the eight hour shift.) After the latter date, as noted
above, I the grievor was required to remainion-site for the duration of the
shift. It This necessitated that he therefore travel off shift. The board was Ii informed that this change occurred becaua: the grievor had not been requ.ired
to spend eight hours on-site during the eirly stages of the project. Once it
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reached full production, hovever, he was jequired to work hours approximating
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those of the contractors which meant thatjhis presence was required on the job
for a minimum of eight hours. Ii Six hours on-site was insufficient from the
perspective of the Ministry. (! While Mr. W;tsoo initially stated that it was
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just coincidence that the change occurred on the very day the cost comparison
took effect, he later conceded that the two events could be “tied together”.
He also agreed.with the suggestion that had the straight time rate been
utilised in the cost comparison, the respective totals would have been “fairly
close” or a “saw-off”. Mr. Brant indicated that in such circumstances, the
cost of commuting “could have been cheaper”.
The board cannot agree with,the submission that the employment of an
average rate for room cost invalidated the cost comparison. We find it
understandable why the employer would want to use such a rate across the
Central Region. We are also inclined to concur with the suggestion that an
undue administrative burden would be placed upon the employer were it required
to go into the field and select a particular hotel or motel with a specific
rate prior to the completion of the cost,comparison exercise. While the rate
used in this instance appeared to this board to be somewhat low, we were
presented with evidence as to there being four facilities in the area with
lessor daily rates. We are not prepared, therefore, to interfere with the
usage of the average rate. We note in this regard that a” employee who does
elect, or is required to stay on-site, wi.11 receive their actual Cost of
accommodation. I” summary, after reviewing the respective positions, we are
unwilling to require the employer to use an actual rate~for costs which are
prospective in nature.
Similarly, the board has not bee” persuaded that’the employer
improperly used the overtime rate for purposes of calculating’travel costs.
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I The substance of the evidence led for the employer was that once the project
!I got underway the grievor was required on-site for eight hours. This was a
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judgment that the employer was entitled td make.
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Ue cannot find any reason to
interfere with it. Clearly, the grievor did not possess a right under the
collective agreement to insist that he be /permAtted to travel on shift. /I In
our judgment, the employer can validly require an employee’to work the
entirety of their shift.
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If travel off shift is the result of such decision,
1; the employer is bound to pay for same at ihe appropriate rate. The rate for
1 this grievor pursuant to the award in Clements, 370184 (Samyels) v.9~ overtime.
II We therefore conclude that the employer was correct in using the overtime rate
II for purposes of calculating both the cost,,of commuting and the cost of staying
on-site. ‘I
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The Union argued that the reductioi of the kilometers actually
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travelled, so as to ensure that the grievbr’s entitlement did not exceed the
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cost of staying on-site, constituted a vidlation of the collective agreement.
II Specifically, counsel submitted that suchian approach served to decrease the
kilometric rate agreed to by the parties.; Hr. Brant, in his evidence,
described how this practice was applied akd stated that,
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in this case, it
resulted in the grievor’s claim being rediced by approximately thirty-one (31)
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kilometers per day. He expressed the opinion that it was more cost effective
II . to reduce this variable in that it is pait in cash rather than as accrued time
off. Travel time, in contrast, can be taken as compensating leave pursuant to
Article 13 of the collective agreement.
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The hoard does not. agree vith the position taken by the Union on this
aspect of the case. It assumas that the grievor was actually entitled to the
kilometers involved in commuting. We have previously found that he was not so
entitled on the basis of having tiade a personal decision. Such decision
advanced his interests as opposed to those of the employer. We think that the
grievor’s entitlement was properly limited to the cost of staying on-site.’
The adjustment of the kilometers travelled, while admittedly artific,ial, did
not .serve to reduce this entitlement.
For all of the above reasons, the grievance is denied.
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DATED at Windsor, Ontario,. this 26thday of August* 1988.
Michael V. Watters, Vice Chairman
L. Turtle, Member
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