HomeMy WebLinkAbout1996-0323.Davey.99-04-07EMPLOY& DE LA COURONNE
DE L’ONlAtW
COMMISSION DE
RCGLEMENT
DES GRIEFS
180 DUNDAS STREET WEST, SUITEBOO, TORONTO ON M5G 128
l&O, RUE DUNDAS OUESr; 8URGIlJ 600, TORONTO (ON) M5G I28
TELEPHONErrCfLtiPHONE : (416) 326-1388
FACSIMILEiliLkCOPIE : (416) 326-1396
GSB #0323/96
OLB #280/95
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before -
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Liquor Boards Employees’ Union
(Theresa Davey)
Grievor
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Liquor Control Board of Ontario)
Employer
BEFORE Daniel Harris Vice-Chair
FOR THE
GRIEVOR
Julia Noble
Legal Counsel
Ontario Liquor Board Employees Union
FOR THE
EMPLOYER
Michael G. Sherrard
Counsel, Ogilvy Renault
Barristers & Solicitors
HEARING April 1, 1999
The Proceedings
In this matter the Union, Ontario Liquor Boards Employees’ Union, grieves on
behalf of Theresa Davey that the Employer, The Liquor Control Board of Ontario
did not notify her that she had become eligible to participate in the pension plan.
Her eligibility had come about as a result of 1989 amendments to the Pension
Benefits Act, which allowed casual employees to enrol in the plan. The Union
says that the Employer owed a duty to the Grievor to advise her of those statutory
amendments. As a result of the failure of the Employer to discharge that duty, the
Grievor is said to have suffered additional costs due to the delay in buying back
past pension credits.
This is an interim award, which deals with the Union’s request, made at the end of
the second day of the hearing, for an order that the Employer produce the
following:
1 Copies of documentation or information which would confirm and verify that the LCBO
transmitted to the administrator of the pension plan, in accordance with Section 23 [sic]
of the Pension Benefits Act, the names and addresses of each casual employee of the
LCBO who was or who became eligible to become a member of the pension plan in
1988, 1989, 1990 and 199 1. Please provide copies of the documentation, if any, that was
provided to the administrator by the LCBO, and please advise the Union of the date that
this information was provided.
2. In the event that the LCBO cannot confirm that the information mentioned in paragraph
one above was forwarded to the administrator of the pension plan, please notify [counsel
for the Union].
2
The section of the Pension Benefits Act relied upon reads as follows:
25. ( 1 ) The administrator of a pension plan shall provide in writing to each person who
will be eligible or is required to become a member of the pension plan,
(4 an explanation of the provisions of the plan that apply to the person;
(b) an explanation of the person’s rights and obligations in respect of the
pension plan; and
cc> any other information prescribed by the regulations.
(2) The administrator shall provide the information mentioned in subsection (l),
(4 to each person who becomes a member within the prescribed period of
time after the date on which the pension plan is established;
(b) to a person who is likely to become eligible to become a member of the
pension plan, within the prescribed period of time before the date on which the
person is likely to become eligible;
cc> to each person who becomes eligible to become a member of the pension
plan upon becoming employed by the employer, within the prescribed period of
time after the date on which the person becomes so employed.
- (3) The employer shall transmit to the administrator the information necessary to
enable the administrator to comply with subsection (2) and shall transmit the information
in sufficient time to enable the administrator to comply with the time limits set out in that
subsection. R.S.O. 1990, c. R8, s. 25.
The Submissions of the Parties
The Union submitted that the issue between the parties is the extent of the
Employer’s obligation to notify casual employees of their right to participate in the
pension plan. Their failure to so advise the Grievor was said to be a breach of the
3
Employer’s duty under the collective agreement to act fairly, a breach of its duty
of care and a breach of section 25 of the Pension Benejits Act. The latter provision
was described as being encompassed by s.48( 12)(j) of the Labour Relations Act,
1995 which reads as follows:
48(12) An arbitrator or the chair of an arbitration board, as the case may be, has
power
. . .
ci> to interpret and apply human fights and other employment-
related statutes, despite any conflict between those statutes and
the terms of the collective agreement.
The Union submitted that although the grievance specifically referred to the anti-
discrimination provision of the collective agreement, it ought to be broadly
construed to provide for the disposition of the real issue between the parties, being
the-Employer’s failure to notify the Grievor of her right to participate in the
pension plan. The Union relied on USWA and Dunham Bush (Canada) Ltd.
(1964), 15 L.A.C. 270 (H.D. Lang).
Finally, the Union submitted that to deny the production of these documents
would be to decide the merits of the issue between the parties, which would be
inappropriate in these circumstances. The documents were said to be arguably
relevant to the issue between the parties.
4
The Employer submitted that there is no provision in the collective agreement that
adverts to pension benefits for casual employees. Without that nexus, it can not
fall to the Board to interpret s.25 of the Pension Benefits Act. The Employer said
no prohibited ground of discrimination was violated under article 2.1(b), the only
article referred to in the grievance; therefore, there was no violation of the
collective agreement. Accordingly, the Board was said to be without jurisdiction
to enforce s.25 of the Pension Benefits Act. The Employer relied on OPSEU
(Brummell) and the Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Health) GSB 158419 1
(B. Kirkwood); Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. And CA W, Local 1.520 (1992), 27
L.A.C. 4th 257 (Palmer); Haldimand-Norfolk Police Services Board and
Haldimand Norfolk Police Assn. (1993), 36 L.A.C. (4th) 248 (Palmer).
Reasons for Decision
At the outset of this hearing, the parties joined issue over the difference in their
views as to the duty of the Employer to notify its casual employees of the
legislative change that permitted such employees to participate in the pension plan
after January 1, 1990. The Union has submitted that documentation provided to
the pension administrator is arguably relevant to the determination of the
Employer’s duty.
5
I agree with the Union that to accept the Employer’s submissions as the basis upon
which to deny the requested production would be a de facto determination of the
central issue before the Board. At this stage of the proceedings it would be
inappropriate to make such a determination. The Union submits that the duties
breached are grounded in the collective agreement and are duties of care, or
fairness, owed by the Employer to the Grievor. Given that characterisation of the
issue, to deny production would foreclose the Union from presenting its case and
would amount to a decision on the merits. Such a decision on the merits would be
premature. The production requested is arguably’relevant to the issues before the
Board and ought to be ordered.
The foregoing is clearly without prejudice to the parties’ rights to argue the case at
its close. It is in the fullness of the evidence that the matter will be determined,
not as the result of a request for production.
In any event, this is not a matter where the merits of the Union’s case may be
disposed of as a preliminary issue. The evidence upon which such a determination
must rest is co-extensive with the evidence on the merits. This is not the same
situation as that in Brummell, supra, where the evidence related to discussions
taking place prior to the formation of the employment relationship. Rather, the
facts here arise in the employment context, resulting in the issues being less
amenable to being severed and dealt with as a preliminary matter, which was
implicit in the Employer’s resistance to accede to the request for production.
The Decision
The Employer is ordered to produce the material requested as set out above.
DATED at Toronto this 7th day of April 1999.
Daniel Harris, Vice Chair