HomeMy WebLinkAbout2000-0888.Sud.01-03-01 Decision
ONTARIO EMPLOYÉS DE LA COURONNE
CROWN EMPLOYEES DE L’ONTARIO
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION DE
SETTLEMENT RÈGLEMENT
BOARD DES GRIEFS
180 DUNDAS STREET WEST, SUITE 600, TORONTO ON M5G 1Z8 TELEPHONE/TÉLEPHONE, (416) 326-1388
180, RUE DUNDAS OUEST BUREAU 600, TORONTO (ON) M5G IZ8 FACSIMILE/TELECOPIE: (416) 326-1396
GSB #0888/00
OPSEU#00U148
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
AMAPCEO
(Shiv Sud)
Grievor
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of the Environment)
Employer
BEFORE Randi Hammer Abramsky Vice Chair
FOR THE Steve Barrett, Counsel
GRIEVOR Sack Goldblatt Mitchell
Barristers and Solicitors
FOR THE Lucy McSweeney, Counsel
EMPLOYER Legal Services Branch
Management Board Secretariat
HEARING December 15, 2000.
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AWARD
This grievance concerns the proper interpretation of Article 24.13, the parental
leave section, of the collective agreement. Specifically, at issue is whether Employment
Insurance (EI) benefits received by the employee, which are “clawed back” under the
Employment Insurance Act due to the employee’s “higher income”, must be paid to the
employee by the Employer under this provision so as to maintain the employee’s salary at
93%.
Facts
The facts are not in dispute. The grievor, Mr. Shiv Sud, went on a twelve week
parental leave beginning September 8, 1998 and ending on November 27, 1998. Pursuant
to Article 24.14 of the collective agreement, Mr. Sud received 93% of his salary from the
Employer during the first two weeks of the leave. Then, during the next ten weeks, he
received a combination of EI benefits and salary totaling 93% of his regular weekly pay.
In all, during his leave, Mr. Sud received EI benefits of $4130, less income tax, for a net
EI benefit of $3450.00. There is no question that during the period of the parental leave,
Mr. Sud received EI benefits and salary equal to 93% of his regular weekly pay.
When Mr. Sud filed his income tax statement for 1998, he was reassessed by
Revenue Canada for a portion of the EI benefits that he had received during his parental
leave because he was a “higher income” earner, with a net income of more than
$48,750.00. His annual salary for 1998 was $56,924.92. Because his net income
exceeded $48,750.00, that triggered what is referred to as the “claw back” provision
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whereby a portion of the EI benefits received (30%) must be repaid under the
Employment Insurance Act. Although Revenue Canada collects the money, the
repayment is not a tax. It is a repayment of a portion of the benefit. In Mr. Sud’s case,
he was required to pay back $1239.00 of the EI benefits that he received during his
parental leave.
Article 24, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
Article 24 - PREGNANCY LEAVE, PARENTAL LEAVE AND EMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE TOP-UP.
24.13 In respect of the period of parental leave, payments made according to the
Supplementary Employment Benefit Plan will consist of the following:
(a) for the first two (2) weeks, payments equivalent to ninety-three percent (93%) of
the actual weekly rate of pay for his/her classification, and shall also include any
increases in salary that he/she would have attained had he/she been at work during
the leave of absence as they are, or would have been, implemented; and
(b) for each week up to a maximum of ten (10) additional weeks, payments
equivalent to the difference between the sum of the weekly Employment
Insurance benefits the employee receives for the week and any other salary earned
by the employee during the week, and ninety-three percent (93%) of the actual
weekly rate of pay for his/her classification, and shall also include any increases
in salary that he/she would have attained had he/she been at work during the leave
of absence as they are, or would have been implemented…
Arguments of the Parties
The Association asserts that because Mr. Sud’s EI benefits were reduced pursuant
to the Employment Insurance Act’s “claw back” provisions, he did not receive the full
benefit of Article 24.13. It asserts that an additional payment by the Employer must be
made so that he receives 93% of his salary during his parental leave, as required by
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Article 24.13. In the Association’s view, the purpose of Article 24.13 is to ensure that an
employee who takes parental leave receives payments equivalent to 93% of their actual
weekly rate of pay for their classification, through a combination of EI benefits, any other
salary earned, and a payment by the Employer. In its view, to the extent that the
employee’s EI benefits are reduced, the Employer is required to recalculate its payment
to make up the shortfall and ensure that the employee receives 93% payment. It submits
that the Employer’s obligation under Article 24.13 can only be determined after the
repayment obligation under the Employment Insurance Act has been assessed. It argues
that it is only after that point that it can be determined what EI benefits the employee
actually received.
In support of its contentions, the Union cites to Adrienne Duff and Treasury
Board, Public Service Staff Relations Board, File No. 166-2-17330 and Kathleen
O’Neill-Cole and Treasury Board, Public Service Staff Relations Board, File No. 166-2-
17880(1988), application for review dismissed [1989]F.C.J. No. 802. In those cases, the
Public Service Staff Relations Board determined that “[t]he amount of the U.I. benefits
which the employee is eligible to receive is the amount which remains after the
repayment calculation has been made.” It therefore ordered the Employer to adjust the
payment made to the grievor to ensure that the combination of unemployment insurance
benefits (after repayment calculation) which she received and the maternity leave
allowance payments which were paid to her by the employer when added together total
93% of the weekly rate of pay. In so ruling in O’Neill-Cole, the board disagreed with the
GSB’s decision in OPSEU (Dotzenroth) and Ministry of Correctional Services, GSB
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No.1167/85 (Forbes-Roberts), preferring instead, the reasoning of its own earlier
decision in Adrienne Duff. The Association also relies on Re LaBatt Brewing Co. Ltd.
And Brewery Workers Union, Local 300 (1982), 5 L.A.C. (3d) 164 (Larson), in which the
Board of Arbitration determined that a repayment of unemployment benefits led to a
corresponding increase in the Employer’s obligations.
Counsel for the Association also contends that Dotzenroth, upon which the
Employer relies, is distinguishable based on the differences in language in the two
collective agreements. It notes that whereas in Dotzenroth, the agreement refers to the
benefits that an employee is “eligible to receive” the AMAPCEO agreement refers to the
benefits that the employee “receives.” Counsel also submits that Dotzenroth was
wrongly decided because the Board clearly misperceived the nature of the “claw back”,
treating it as if it were a tax obligation. In the Association’s submission, the Board plainly
erred in concluding that the repayment was an income tax matter. Accordingly, it
submits that the decision should not be followed.
The Association further relies on the purpose of the provision – to maintain an
employee’s income at the 93% level through a combination of EI benefits and payments
by the Employer. It submits that to the extent that the EI benefits are reduced by
operation of the Employment Insurance Act, the purpose of the provision to maintain
income is subverted should the Employer’s obligation not be correspondingly increased.
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The Association also contends that a liberal interpretation should be afforded to
this benefit provision and that doubts should be resolved in favour of a claimant, citing
Re Abrahams and Attorney-General of Canada [1993] 142 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) and
Hills et al. v. Attorney-General of Canada [1988] 48 D.L.R.(4th 193 (S.C.C.)
The Employer contends Dotzenroth is binding as a decision of the Grievance
Settlement Board under E. Blake et al. and Amalgamated Transit Union, GSB No.
1276/87 et al. It argues that that the issue of “when” the calculation of benefits is made
was decided in Dotzenroth and controls the instant dispute. It submits that the language
difference between the two agreements is immaterial and that the rationale of the Board’s
decision applies equally to the words “eligible to receive” and “receives for the week.”
It further argues that the decision was properly decided since the repayment
obligation is triggered by the employee’s personal tax situation over which the Employer
has no control. It submits that the Board correctly determined that the Employer is not
responsible for an employee’s statutory obligations.
In terms of the federal cases decided by the Public Service Staff Relations Board,
the Employer contends that the language is different and does not refer to “for each
week” as in the AMAPCEO agreement. It also submits that in the LaBatt case, the
agreement referred to the “actual benefit, if any for which such employee is eligible
under the Unemployment Insurance Act …”, language which does not appear in the
parties’ agreement.
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In terms of the cases cited by the Union that determinations should be made in
favour of benefits, the Employer contends that the issue here is one of contract
interpretation, not interpretation of a statutory benefit scheme, and thus has no relevance
to the instant dispute.
Finally, the Employer submits that it fully met its obligation under Article 24 and
requests that the grievance be dismissed.
Decision
In E. Blake et al. and Amalgamated Transit Union, GSB No. 1276/87 et al.
(Shime, Chair), the Board determined that an earlier decision of the GSB was “directly on
point” and, as a decision of the Board, could not be reviewed unless there were
“exceptional circumstances.” It noted that in the private sector, ad hoc boards of
arbitration have a separate and distinct capacity to decide each case on its own merits and
that a standard of “manifest error” had been adopted to balance the interest of individual
decisionmaking with predictability. It then stated at p. 8: “But the Grievance Settlement
Board is one entity – it is not a series of separately constituted boards of arbitration” and
a decision of a panel is “the decision” of the GSB. It continued at p. 8:
Thus each decision by a panel becomes a decision of the Board and in our
opinion the standard of manifest error which is appropriate for the private
sector is not appropriate for the Grievance Settlement Board. The Act
does not give one panel the right to overrule another panel or to sit on
appeal on the decisions of the earlier panel. Also, given the volume of
cases that are currently administered by this board, the continuous
attempts to persuade one panel that another panel was in error only
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encourages a multiplicity of proceedings and arbitrator shopping which in
turn creates undue administrative difficulties in handling the case load.
The Board concluded that the “manifest error” standard “is too lax a standard” but
recognized “that there may be exceptional circumstances where an earlier decision of this
board might be reviewed.” It would not delineate what constituted an “exceptional
circumstance” but stated that the onus is on the party seeking review to establish
exceptional circumstances.
The fact that Dotzenroth was an OPSEU case, while this one is an AMAPCEO
case is not determinative. Blake involved the Amalgamated Transit Union, not OPSEU
and its holding applies to all parties under the GSB’s jurisdiction. The real question is
whether Dotzenroth is “directly on point” or not. If it is, then, under Blake, it must be
followed in the absence of “exceptional circumstances.”
Dotzenroth involved an almost identical factual situation. The grievor went off
on maternity leave and, pursuant to the collective agreement, received a combination of
unemployment benefits and payments from the Employer totaling 93% of her weekly rate
of pay. It was undisputed that during the period of the leave the grievor received
payments in accordance with the collective agreement. Subsequently, the grievor filed
her tax return and received a Notice of Reassessment requiring her to pay back a portion
of the unemployment benefits she had received. The Union argued that to fulfill its
obligations under the collective agreement, the Employer was liable for the
unemployment benefits that the grievor was required to return, while the Employer
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maintained that it had completely discharged its obligations under the collective
agreement and was not liable for the grievor’s statutory obligations.
The wording of the collective agreement in Dotzenroth was as follows:
49.3.2 In respect of the period of maternity leave, payments made according to
the Supplementary Unemployment Benefit Plan will consist of the
following:
(a) for the first two (2) weeks, payments equivalent to ninety-three percent
(93%) of the actual weekly rate of pay for her classification, which she
was receiving on the last day worked prior to the commencement of the
maternity leave, and
(b) up to an a maximum of fifteen (15) additional weeks, payments
equivalent to the difference between the sum of the weekly UIC benefits
the employee is eligible to receive and any other earnings received by the
employee, and ninety-three percent (93%) of the actual weekly rate of pay
for her classification, which she was receiving on the last day worked
prior to the commencement of the maternity leave.
The Board determined as follows at p. 3:
The entire debate hinges of the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase in
Article 49.4.2(b) the “…U.I.C. benefits the employee is eligible to
receive…” (emphasis added). Put shortly, is “eligibility” determined at
the time of actual payment, or at the end of the taxation year? The union
maintains that the level of eligibility can only be determined after all tax
ramifications have been taken into account.
We reject this view. On its fact the language is clear. Article 49.3.2 (b)
speaks of U.I.C. benefits the employee is eligible to receive, not the
benefits she will ultimately prove eligible to have received.[emphasis in
original]
The Employer is required to supplement an employee’s U.I.C. benefits
plus any other source of income to maintain the 93% salary level. Income
tax ramifications are not the Employer’s responsibility. Having received
93% salary, how the recipient protects that income is up to her – just as if
she had received 100% salary. The Employer cannot be expected to
assume the role of tax shelter.
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Clearly, the Board determined the issue of “when” benefits are to be determined –
at the time of actual payment or at the end of the taxation year – and decided that it was
the time of actual payment. It disagreed with the Union that the level of eligibility can
only be determined after all tax ramifications have been taken into account.
The question is whether the differences in language between the two agreements
means that the decision is not “directly on point.” The AMAPCEO agreement contains
the following language:
24.13 In respect of the period of parental leave, payments made according to the
Supplementary Employment Benefit Plan will consist of the following
…
(b) for each week up to a maximum of ten (10) additional weeks, payments
equivalent to the difference between the sum of the weekly Employment
Insurance benefits the employee receives for the week, and any other
salary earned by the employee during the week, and ninety-three percent
(93%) of the actual weekly rate of pay for his/her classification, and shall
also include any increases in salary that he/she would have attained had
he/she been at work during the leave of absence as they are, or would have
been implemented; …
Thus, instead of “payments equivalent to the difference between the sum of the weekly
UIC benefits the employee is eligible to receive” as found in the OPSEU agreement, the
AMAPCEO agreement says “payments equivalent to the difference between the sum of
the weekly Employment Insurance benefits the employee receives for the week". While
the Board found that the OPSEU language clearly “speaks of the U.I.C. benefits the
employee is eligible to receive, not the benefits she will ultimately prove eligible to have
received”, I cannot conclude that the language is sufficiently distinct so as to disregard
the Board’s decision, particularly in the context of the provision as a whole.
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The difference between “is eligible to receive” and “receiving for the week” is not
a material difference. It does not on its face indicate, as counsel for the Association
urges, that it refers to what an employee receives at the end of the day, after any
repayment is made. Although that is one possible interpretation, the one proposed by
counsel for the Employer – that it refers to the benefits received by the employee during
the week of parental leave – is equally plausible.
In addition, there are several phrases in Article 24.13 that indicate that it is the
period when benefits are received that matters, rather than the benefits ultimately
received at the end of the taxation year. First is the opening phrase “In respect of the
period of parental leave…” tying the benefit to a specific period of time – the period of
parental leave. Then, under Article 24.13(b), “for each week” for up to ten additional
weeks, the Employer must make “payments equivalent to the difference between the sum
of the weekly Employment Insurance benefits the employee receives for the week and
any other salary earned by the employee during the week, and ninety-three percent (93%)
of the actual weekly rate of pay for his/her classification…” [emphasis added]. The
language “for the week” and “during the week” appear to tie the calculation to the
specific week. If the “other salary” is earned by the employee at a time other than during
the week of parental leave, it is irrelevant to the calculation. Only if it is earned “during
the week” of parental leave does it factor into the calculation. Similarly, the fact that any
increases in salary which the employee would have “attained had he/she been at work
during the leave of absence” must be included in determining the employee’s “actual
weekly rate of pay” underscores that the calculation is based on what occurs “during the
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leave of absence.” If the increase occurs after the parental leave, it is not included in the
calculation.
Consequently, I conclude that the differences in the collective agreement
language are not material and that Dotzenroth is “directly on point.” It determined the
key issue in dispute – when the calculation is to be made – at the time of the leave or at
the end of the taxation year. Accordingly, this is not a straightforward contract
interpretation case. Instead, because Dotzenroth is “directly on point”, the issue is
whether there are “exceptional circumstances” which warrant a departure from that
decision.
The Association contends that in addition to the language differences, the
reasoning of the Board in Dotzenroth is plainly misguided because the “claw back”
provision has nothing to do with income tax ramifications. It asserts that the “claw back”
is a return of employment insurance benefits, not an income tax, and that the Board
clearly misunderstood the situation when it stated that “income tax ramifications are not
the Employer’s responsibility”, and thus rendering the decision invalid.
I agree that the language of the Board’s decision seems to confuse the issue, but
there is a tax element involved with the “claw back” of E.I. benefits. That is because the
“claw back” requirement is based on an employee’s net income – not gross income, and
an employee does have some control over their net income. For example, in Mr. Sud’s
case, if he had the ability to put $8,200.00 into RRSP contributions, he would have been
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below the “claw back” net income of $48,750.00. If he had union dues, child care
expenses, or attendant care expenses, or a business investment loss or moving expenses
or made support payments or had any other permissible deductions, his net income would
have been affected. To this extent, the Board’s conclusion that “[h]aving received the
93% salary, how the recipient protects that income is up to her…” makes some sense.
Moreover, a fair reading of the Board’s decision in Dotzenroth is that it decided
that the grievor’s statutory obligations, i.e., the claw back requirement, was not the
Employer’s responsibility. Having paid the 93% during the parental leave, the Employer
is not responsible for any further payment due to the employee’s statutory obligations
under the Employment Insurance Act, just as it is not responsible for an employee’s
obligation to pay income taxes on wages earned. That is the same issue as in the present
matter.
The primary difficulty that I have with Dotzenroth is that the purpose of the
provision – to maintain an employee on leave at 93% of their regular pay through a
combination of E.I. benefits and payments by the Employer – is not fulfilled because of
the subsequent claw back of E.I. benefits. Overall, I do prefer the reasoning of the
federal cases in Duff and O’Neill-Cole as well as the arbitration board in Labatt. But that
is precisely the kind of situation Blake seeks to avoid – persuading one panel of the Board
that another panel was in error. In this case, given the long-standing GSB jurisprudence
under Dotzenroth the requirements of Blake, clearer language is required to achieve the
result the Association seeks.
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As set out in Blake, supra, the onus of establishing “exceptional circumstances” is
on the party seeking review, in this case the Association. For the above-stated reasons, I
cannot conclude that “exceptional circumstances” were established, particularly since the
Board noted that it was a standard stricter than “manifest error.” Although I may well
have been persuaded to reach a different result were this an issue of first impression, as a
Vice-Chair of the Grievance Settlement Board I must abide by a decision of the Board in
the absence of “exceptional circumstances.” The decision of the Board in Dotzenroth is
“directly on point” and in the absence of “exceptional circumstances” controls this
dispute.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the grievance is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 1st day of March, 2001.
Randi Hammer Abramsky, Vice-Chair