HomeMy WebLinkAbout2002-1455.Cox.05-05-03 DecisionCrown Employees
Grievance Settlement
Board
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Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z8
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Commission de
règlement des griefs
des employés de la
Couronne
Bureau 600
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Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1Z8
Tél. : (416) 326-1388
Téléc. : (416) 326-1396
GSB# 2002-1455
UNION# 2002-0234-0066
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
(Cox) Union
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) Employer
BEFORE Felicity D. Briggs Vice-Chair
FOR THE UNION Scott Andrews
Grievance Officer
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
FOR THE EMPLOYER Greg Gledhill
Staff Relations Officer
Ministry of Community Safety and
Correctional Services
HEARING July 31 & August 11, 2003.
2
Decision
In September of 1996 the Ministry of Correctional Services notified the Union and employees at
a number of provincial correctional institutions that their facilities would be closed and/or
restructured over the next few years. On June 6, 2000 and June 29, 2000 the Union filed policy
and individual grievances that alleged various breaches of the collective agreement including
article 6 and article 31.15 as well as grievances relating to the filling of correctional officer
positions. In response to these grievances the parties entered into discussions and ultimately
agreed upon two Memoranda of Settlement concerning the application of the collective
agreement during the “first phase of the Ministry’s transition”. One memorandum, dated May 3,
2000 (hereinafter referred to as “MERC 1” (Ministry Employment Relations Committee))
outlined conditions for the correctional officers while the second, dated July 19, 2001
(hereinafter referred to as “MERC 2”) provided for the non-correctional officer staff. Both
agreements were subject to ratification by respective principles and settled all of the grievances
identified in the related MERC appendices, filed up to that point in time.
While it was agreed in each case that the settlements were “without prejudice or precedent to
positions either the union or the employer may take on the same issues in future discussions”, the
parties recognized that disputes might arise regarding the implementation of the memoranda.
Accordingly, they agreed, at Part G, paragraph 8:
The parties agree that they will request that Felicity Briggs, Vice Chair of the Grievance
Settlement Board will be seized with resolving any disputes that arise from the
implementation of this agreement.
It is this agreement that provides me with the jurisdiction to resolve the outstanding matters.
Both MERC 1 and MERC 2 are lengthy and comprehensive documents that provide for the
identification of vacancies and positions and the procedure for filling those positions as they
become available throughout various phases of the restructuring. Given the complexity and size
of the task of restructuring and decommissioning of institutions, it is not surprising that a number
of grievances and disputes arose. This is another of the disputes that have arisen under the
MERC Memorandum of Settlement.
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When I was initially invited to hear theses transition disputes, the parties agreed that process to
be followed for the determination of these matters would be virtually identical to that found in
Article 22.16.2 which states:
The mediator/arbitrator shall endeavour to assist the parties to settle the grievance by
mediation. If the parties are unable to settle the grievance by mediation, the
mediator/arbitrator shall determine the grievance by arbitration. When determining the
grievance by arbitration, the mediator/arbitrator may limit the nature and extent of the
evidence and may impose such conditions as he or she considers appropriate. The
mediator/arbitrator shall give a succinct decision within five (5) days after completing
proceedings, unless the parties agree otherwise.
The transition committee has dealt with dozens of grievances and complaints prior to the
mediation/arbitration process. There have been many other grievances and issues raised before
me that I have either assisted the parties to resolve or arbitrated. However, there are still a large
number that have yet to be dealt with. It is because of the vast numbers of grievances that I have
decided, in accordance with my jurisdiction to so determine, that grievances are to be presented
by way of each party presenting a statement of the facts with accompanying submissions.
Notwithstanding that some grievors might wish to attend and provide oral evidence, to date, this
process has been efficient and has allowed the parties to remain relatively current with disputes
that arise from the continuing transition process.
Not surprisingly, in a few instances there has been some confusion about the certain facts or
simply insufficient detail has been provided. On those occasions I have directed the parties to
speak again with their principles to ascertain the facts or the rationale behind the particular
outstanding matter. In each case this has been done to my satisfaction.
It is essential in this process to avoid accumulating a backlog of disputes. The task of resolving
these issues in a timely fashion was, from the outset, a formidable one. With ongoing changes in
Ministerial boundaries and other organizational alterations, the task has lately become larger, not
smaller. It is for these reasons that the process I have outlined is appropriate in these
circumstances.
The grievor, Daniel Cox, filed a grievance alleging an improper application of Article 20 of the
Collective Agreement. It is the grievor’s view that he was moved prior to other staff and prior to
all of the inmates being removed from his home institution.
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The facts were not in dispute. Mr. Cox worked at the Guelph Correctional Centre in the
Industrial Officer 2 classification. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement signed on
May 3, 2001, he received rights under Article 20 of the Collective Agreement. He was
surplussed on the common surplus date of November 21, 2001.
The grievor exercised his right to displace and he received an Industrial Officer 2 position at the
TRILCOR laundry in Milton. In February 2002 the GCC’s inmates were moved to other
institutions and Mr. Cox moved to TRILCOR in Milton shortly thereafter.
The TRILCOR shop at the GCC location remained open after the GCC inmates were moved and
operated without the use of any inmate labour. The Guelph Assessment and Treatment Centre
(“GATU”) remained open but its inmates were not used to work at TRILCOR. For that reason,
not all Industrial Officers were moved into their new positions.
It was the grievor’s position that he should not have been moved prior to other Industrial
Officers. Further, he alleged that the Employer’s decision to move him before other employees
was due to anti-union animus. Mr. Cox claimed that his order to move out of GCC came just
before an anticipated OPSEU strike. He also alleged that local management at Guelph did not
want him on the picket line and therefore ordered him to move.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on May 3, 2001, stated:
Employees occupying the transition cost centre positions will be surplussed on the same
date. These employees will have access to full Article 20 rights.
The employees will remain at their current work site until the date the institution no
longer houses any inmates or another date agreed to by the employer and the employee.
Upon mutual agreement employees may be temporarily assigned elsewhere until their
placement occurs.
In my view, the Employer has the right under paragraph 6 above to move employees once the
institution’s inmates are gone. While some inmates continued to be housed at the GCC location,
those inmates were from GATU and therefore the Employer could oblige the grievor to move to
his new position at TRILCOR in Milton.
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I have also considered the grievor’s claim of anti-union animus. In order for this Board to make
such a finding there must be clear and cogent evidence of the discrimination. Unsubstantiated
allegations are insufficient. Accordingly, the grievance is denied.
Dated at Toronto this 5th day of May, 2005.
Felicity D. Briggs
Vice-Chair