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HomeMy WebLinkAboutPark 14-03-06 IN THE MATTER OF AN ABITRATION BETWEEN ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 479 and ROYAL OTTAWA HOSPITAL GROUP and IN THE MATTER OF THE GRIEVANCE YUNA PARK BEFORE: Brian Langille, Sole Arbitrator APPEARANCES: For the Union: Raphael Laframboise-Carignan, Counsel For The Employer: Michelle O’Bonsawin, Counsel A hearing in this matter was held in Ottawa on December 3, 2013 and January 10 and 21, 2014. AWARD This is a job posting grievance involving a standard type competition clause under which the job is to be awarded to the senior employee if factors of “skill, ability, experience, and the relevant qualifications” are “relatively equal”. Initially there were two senior grievors who claimed that the job had inappropriately been granted to a junior employee but one of those grievances was settled. The junior employee who was award the job is Ms. Stephanie Cantin and the more senior employee who was unsuccessful in the job competition is Ms. Yuna Park, the remaining grievor. The job which was posted and which is in issue here is “Regular Part Time 0.4 Pharmacy Technician” at the Royal Ottawa. The position is an important and technical one mainly involving dispensing drugs and the 0.4 indicates that it is 0.4 of a full time position. The employer is a large hospital and it has, as one would expect, a sophisticated set of human resource policies and procedures. These were followed in this case and as a result there was a formal call for, and vetting of, applications followed by a formal, standardized, interview process, all well processed, well documented, and carried out by senior and experienced interviewers in accordance with the established procedures which have been used many times. It was agreed by the Hospital that all who were granted an interview were “qualified” and thus equal in that regard. (As we shall see this is an interesting point to which we shall return.) The evidence put before me concerning the interview process was, as is normal in these cases, quite voluminous and provided by those who took part in it, both interviewers and interviewee. It is quite clear that Ms. Cantin was ranked significantly higher than the grievor on the basis of this process. That is, they were found to be not “relatively equal” in terms “skill, ability and experience”. As a result Ms. Cantin got the job. But, as I understand the Union’s position, it is not so much what the Hospital did in terms of evaluating the applicants, or in “running” the interview process, but rather what it did not do which lies at the heart of its case. In large part the union’s case is that the employer relied exclusively on the interview process and did not seek out other information potentially relevant to the issue at hand under the competition clause. In particular the employer did not seek out, for example, performance appraisals from supervisors or, it was said, other relevant information concerning the applicants. This is particularly significant because both the grievor and the successful applicant were actually doing the very job being posted, albeit in a part-time capacity, and were seeking “more hours” in that very job. It is also true that the grievor had been in the position much, much longer than the successful applicant (4.5 years as opposed to 1 month). In staking its claim on this basis the Union relied on a series of decisions by arbitrators which do express sometimes quite strong views about “over’” or “sole” reliance on an interview process and the disregarding of other relevant evidence. One of the concerns expressed in those cases is that there is a danger that the employer will end up evaluating the ability to do well in an interview about the job, as opposed to the ability to do the job well. (Or, as one arbitrator put it, the ability to “talk the talk” as opposed to “walk the walk” – see Arbitrator Bendel in North York General Hospital v SEIU 92 CLAS 43 at para 40. Before turning to this point it is important to note that there is a large background factual circumstance and context which is in play in this case and it is this: the job of Pharmacy Technician is one which, in common with many in the Health Professions, is undergoing change. It is being upgraded in terms of skills and responsibility and thus qualifications. It is being “professionalized”. This is because of an overall restructuring in Pharmacy which has resulted in a ripple or “knock-on” effect downward as Pharmacists take on new tasks and thus need to delegate more of the technical aspects of their previous job to those such as Pharmacy Technicians. As a result, those positions are being upgraded. All of this is happening under the Registered Health Professions Act of Ontario. The transition period here runs until 2015 by which time all Pharmacy Technicians at the Hospital must have taken the relevant training at an educational institution accredited by the Ontario College of Pharmacists and be registered with the College. Ms. Park, the grievor, is caught up in the middle of this transition. She was hired before the new regime and new set of qualifications were put in place and she is in the process of upgrading her qualifications in order to become registered. She has been in the process of obtaining, with the support of the Hospital, and through various courses at accredited institutions, the qualification now required. All the pre-existing Technicians employed at the Hospital have been taking, over time, the required courses. The evidence is that if there had been no internal candidates for this posting the Hospital would have sought only external candidates who were registered. The evidence is also that if by 2015 a current technician fails to become qualified and registered they will be re-assigned to the position of Pharmacy Assistant. Here the successful candidate had taken a full-time college program to obtain the qualification necessary for registration with the College. But, as noted already, the employer in this case treated all applicants for the job at issue here as “qualified” and eligible for an interview whether they had the qualifications necessary to become a Registered Pharmacy Technician (as the successful applicant did) or were in the process of obtaining that qualification. As noted, the successful applicant entered the field as part of the new regime. She was hired with the relevant College training already in place. But both applicants were given an interview as the hospital treated both as having the relevant qualification. That is, applicants such as the grievor were not screened out on the basis of their “training in progress” status, they were screened in. I heard extensive evidence on the interview process. The panel was made up of The Director of Corporate Pharmacy Services (also referred to as the Chief Pharmacist), the Acting Vice President of Professional Practice, and a member of the Hospital’s Human Resources department. There is no need to review this evidence in detail. I am satisfied that those involved made a good faith and serious effort to construct an interview process or “tool” that would test the relevant knowledge, experience, and ability of those being interviewed. While counsel for the union was concerned to make some points about some of the questions, particularly those non- technical or “behavioral” ones, I do not think there is a real failure on any significant scale in this regard and in any case the main claim here is about what was not done, not what was done. The Pharmacy Department is a small one with a head, 4 registered Pharmacists, 9 regular part-time and one full time Pharmacy Technicians, and 2 casuals. There were four internal applicants for the job at stake here. The griever was ranked third of the four with an overall score of 65. The successful applicant scored 86. It is not the case that the grievor scored equally on the technical questions and thus suffered solely in comparison because or her responses to the non-technical questions. As indicated I have no substantial reason to doubt the validity of the scores in any case. The grievor also testified and she offered her testimony in a precise, quietly spoken, and dignified manner. But she was also forceful and effective in defending her record as an employee, and her efforts in pursuit of both the required external training and other avenues of self-improvement. But the key to this case lies in examining some very basic truths which cannot be avoided. First, I have found that the interview process was, in its fundamentals and on any reasonable standard, designed to be and was a fair and rational one. Second, I also cannot put much stock in Ms. Laframboise-Carignan’s able argument that the employer’s reliance on the interview process was fatal in this case. I say this for a number of reasons. First, while it is true that arbitrators have expressed legitimate concerns, sometimes in strong language, about over reliance on interviews it is also true, as always, that these remarks and these cases must be read in context. In this case there is the significant background factual circumstance to which I referred above – the upgrading of qualifications and the need for registration with the College. Second, it is my view that arbitrators must be careful in shaping the jurisprudence in this area because it has a direct impact on how responsible employers structure their human resource processes. In this regard arbitrators have, over the years, made very significant and proper demands upon employers to use a fair, rational, structured, and equal selection process. This has involved demands about both the content and the process of interviewing job applicants. This was largely, or at least in part, done in the name of avoiding employer or supervisor “discretion” or “favouritism” or even worse (invidious discrimination, for example) in the selection process. This was done as part of the overall arbitral task of imposing the rule of law and its allied idea of “reasonable contract administration”, as opposed to unfettered managerial discretion, in the workplace and is required because very significant employee entitlements based on seniority, are at issue. As a result employers such as the one in this case have created highly structured and formal processes in the name of seeking relevant information and in a formally fair and equal manner. While it is no doubt important to not mistake talent at interviewing for the real skill, knowledge and ability needed to do the actual jog it remains the case that the values of substantive rationality and procedural fairness are important ones for both employers and employees. Arbitrators should be careful, in my view, having now constructed a jurisprudence demanding processes which seek to maximize these values, in making new demands which might, if not properly considered, take us in the other direction. To these general considerations we need to add the following concrete facts in play in this particular case. This is a case where the Hospital has embarked on a program to support the transition all the existing Pharmacy Technicians to the new reality of Registration with the College. Although the grievor has been in the department much longer than the successful applicant this cannot be determinative or of any over-riding importance. This is because the successful applicant had the required accredited college course as a result of a full time enrollment in an accredited institution. That was a significant investment in time in order to acquire the relevant skills and knowledge for the job. The grievor did not have this full time educational experience but had been on the job, on a part time basis, and was working on a series of courses to achieve the same level. The simple fact is that the time spent in class at college on a full-time basis is now the obvious way of achieving the pre-requisites for registration under the new regime. Given that the grievor had and was pursuing a different path more or less required, in my view, that the employer devise an objective way of determining what the collective agreement requires – their relative “skill, ability, and experience” required for the job. I pause here to note also that “experience” here cannot be read as simply time on the job. That would be to confuse “experience” with “seniority” which is the separate and “tie-breaking” factor in a competition clause case such as this. Experience here means not experience in the sense of seniority but experience in the sense of demonstrated command of relevant knowledge and ability to deploy it effectively. We do not say a worker is experienced to convey simply that they have been working for a long time, but rather to convey that they know what they are doing. There are several other problems with the union’s position. First, the evidence is that the sort of “other” non-interview evidence the union (and the cases relied upon) refer to either does not seem to exist, or has already been taken into account in this case. For example, there are no “supervisors” to consult or their reports to read, because there are no supervisors in the department at all. The cases relied upon by the Union also refer to “courses taken” as an example of other potential relevant non-interview material. Here courses taken were clearly taken into account and to the grievor’s benefit. But I think these are minor points which miss a rather large and important real-life reality. This is a small department. One of the interviewers was the leader of the department. In my view the Hospital was right to seek to “objectify”, as best it could, and spread among experienced managers, as much as it could, the selection process to choose of the right person - and precisely not rely upon the subjective observations of those (in this case a single person) in positions above those applying. It was to the grievor’s - and all other applicants’ - advantage that this approach be taken. Otherwise, on the facts of this case, the leader of the department could simply, in effect, chose (or greatly influence the choice of) the winner on the basis of their supervisory experience alone. As I indicate above, this is, in my view, in large measure what arbitrators have sought to avoid. So, if other non-interview evidence is said to be available it must be considered carefully and tested for its reliability and objectivity. For example, supervisor appraisals may vary quite a bit on these important dimensions from workplace to workplace. Moreover, and this is important in this case, there must in my view, be some onus on a union to show, in the teeth of a reasonably sound interview process, that there was actually some evidence relevant evidence, obtained in a procedurally fair and consistent manner, which should have been considered and which would have, or reasonably could have, made a difference. It cannot be enough to assert or speculate about the possible existence of such evidence. In this particular regard the following point should be made. The one concrete allegation or evidential point raised by the union and the grievor in this regard was that she was actually called upon to “cover” the shifts of the successful applicant after the hire. But this turned out to not be true. As a result there is no evidence, in my view, of anything relevant which could have been, but which was not, taken into consideration. I can also add that I have read with profit the cases relied upon by the union and, as always, the sometimes broad statements they contain have to be read in light of their facts. In most of the cases there was evidence tendered of other non-interview evidence – see Sudbury Regional Hospital (Burkett, 2002), Greater Niagara General Hospital (1997) 60 LAC (4th) 289 (Devlin) for examples. In some cases non-interview evidence was considered for some but not others. (See, for example, University of Toronto (1995) 52 LAC (4th) 387 (Burkett). That is an obvious procedural flaw in itself. Or, there were other important flaws in the interview process itself - see Association of Management Administrative and Professional Crown Employees of Ontario v Ontario [2008] OGSBA No. 122 (Dissanyake). And some of the cases involve promotions to lead hand or supervisory positions where the skills include dealing with and managing people, as opposed to, as here, technical processes. Here evidence of past success in that role, as opposed to class room learning about it, might be thought to be of more critical importance. Other of the cases seem to be decided on other grounds – see North York General Hospital (Bendel), supra. But it is not necessary to review these cases in detail because there is no evidence before me of other relevant information which could have been and should have been considered. All involved in the labour arbitration process are every familiar with “job posting” cases such as this one. In this case we followed the normal path of calling employer witnesses and having them explain how the interview questions were selected and weighted and then how they came to the various “scores” and thus ranking for each of the applicants. This is a painstaking if familiar process. It often reveals that the process was not perfect in all of its particulars. But perfection is not the standard and the overall question, aside from good faith and fairness in the design and administration of the process, is whether it sought to and did test, in a real and substantial way, for what the collective agreement sets out as the relevant criteria. Here the qualifications for the quite technical job were changing and required a series of courses which the grievor was undertaking over time and which the successful applicant has taken in full time study. Having heard all of the evidence I am not in a position to say that the employer’s interview tool did not test and test with reasonable accuracy the relevant knowledge, skills and experience of the applicants. In my view the evidence supports the conclusion that the process was aimed at this goal and I have been provided with no reason to call into question the conclusion of those who made the selection decision. The relevant judgement about the knowledge, skill, and experience about a quite technical and detail oriented job has been made, as I see it, in good faith and on the basis of an objective and appropriate process. And to reiterate, the Union has not made out its claim that the process ignored other relevant and available information. For these reasons the grievance is dismissed. Dated at Toronto this 6th day of March, 2014. Brian Langille. Arbitrator