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HomeMy WebLinkAboutEmployer 14-11-13IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN: Algonquin College of Applied Arts and Technology -and- Ontario Public Service Employees Union Local 415 Employer grievance re: union release time Lorne Slotnick, Arbitrator Representing the Employer – Jock Climie Representing the Union – Wassim Garzouzi Hearing – Ottawa, Ont., October 20 and 21, 2014 [2] PRELIMINARY AWARD This is an employer grievance seeking payment of an invoice for more than $200,000 from the union, related to release of employees for union business. The union has refused payment. This decision addresses the union’s preliminary objection that the grievance is untimely. Background facts Algonquin College is a large community college based in Ottawa. Local 415 of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union represents roughly 800 academic employees at the college. Under the collective agreement between OPSEU and the College Employer Council for the Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology covering academic employees, the union at each college is allowed to release some employees from their regular duties to perform union business. The college continues to provide these employees with their regular pay and benefits, and the union is required by the collective agreement to reimburse the college in accordance with a formula. The relevant portions of the collective agreement read as follows: Article 8 – Union Business … 8.04 B In recognition that resolution locally as referred to in 8.04 A may not be possible for a variety of reasons, the parties agree to the following basis for reduction in teaching or work assignments to facilitate assistance to employees and the Union Local in the administration of this Agreement and the business directly pertinent thereto: (i) In each College, there shall be a reduction of up to 30 teaching contact hours per week (as selected by the Union Local) that would otherwise have been assigned. For these hours the Union Local shall reimburse the College for 25% [3] of the base salary portion of the first 15 hours. The Union Local shall reimburse the College for 50% of the base salary portion of the next 15 hours. In the case of a Librarian or Counsellor, three hours of work or assignment shall be deemed equivalent to one teaching contact hour for the purpose of this Article only. For the purposes of workload calculation, each teaching contact hour shall be credited as 2.17 workload hours to be recorded on the Standard Workload Form (SWF). (ii) In each College there shall be a further reduction of up to 35 teaching contact hours per week (as selected by the Union Local) that would otherwise have been assigned. For these hours the Union Local shall reimburse the College for 100% of the base salary portion. In the case of a Librarian or Counsellor, three hours of work or assignment shall be deemed equivalent to one teaching contact hour for the purpose of this Article only. For the purposes of workload calculation, each teaching contact hour shall be credited as 2.17 workload hours to be recorded on the SWF. 8.05 A The Union Local President shall advise the College President by June 1 of each year of the employee(s) to have a reduced teaching or work assignment pursuant to the provisions of 8.04 and the College shall arrange the reductions effective for the academic year commencing September 1 subject to the availability of a suitable replacement or substitute for the employee(s) concerned and the efficient operation of the College. 8.05 B The regular salary, pension contributions, sick leave entitlements, group insurance benefits, and other fringe benefits of employees with a reduced teaching or work assignment pursuant to 8.04 shall continue to be paid by the College and the Union shall reimburse the College as provided for in 8.04. Even though Article 8.05 A requires the union to advise the college once a year by June 1 of who it wishes to be released for union business, at Algonquin the practice has been for the union to notify the college by June 1 of release time for the fall semester, and by December 1 for release time in the winter semester. The union has not used release time in the spring and summer. The evidence of both parties is that Algonquin has occasionally invoiced the union local for release time, and the union has provided the reimbursement after an invoice has been forwarded. More detail on the historical practice is below. [4] By the summer of 2013, however, the college had not sent an invoice for release time for seven semesters from the winter of 2010 to the winter of 2013. The parties met on September 3, 2013, to discuss several issues related to release time. A few days before the meeting, the college sent to the union a tally of what it felt the union owed for those seven semesters. There was no invoice forwarded at that time. The total was $208,362.70. At the September 3 meeting, the union advised the college that it would not be paying. The college then sent an invoice for the same amount on September 30. The union did not pay, and the college reminded the union on October 23 that it had not received a response. The union responded two days later, saying that it would not pay any bill that predated the fall 2013 semester. The college then filed the grievance that is now before me, dated November 6, 2013. The union argues that the grievance is out of time and must be dismissed on this preliminary motion. The parties agree that the time limits for filing a grievance under this collective agreement are mandatory and, while they can be extended by agreement of the parties, they cannot be varied by an arbitrator. (This is by virtue of Article 32.03D of the collective agreement, which says Section 14(16) of the Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, 2008 shall not apply. That section, which mirrors Section 48 (16) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, gives arbitrators the discretion to extend time limits, but also allows the parties to specify in their collective agreement that the section does not apply.) The time limit for filing a grievance by the employer is contained in the first paragraph of Article 32.10, which reads as follows: [5] College Grievance 32.10 The College shall have the right to file a grievance with respect to the interpretation, application, administration or alleged contravention of the Agreement. Such grievance shall be presented in writing signed by the College President or the President's nominee, to the Union at the College concerned with a copy to the Union Grievance Officer within 20 days following the occurrence or origination of the circumstances giving rise to the grievance, commencing at Step 2. Failing settlement at a meeting held within 20 days of the presentation of the grievance, the Union shall give the College its written reply to the grievance in 15 days following the meeting. Therefore, the question in this preliminary motion is whether the employer grievance was filed within 20 days “following the occurrence or origination of the circumstances giving rise to the grievance.” The union says Algonquin had to file its grievance within 20 days from the September 3 meeting, when the employer was advised that the union would not pay for the release time. The college argues that the clock did not start running until after the invoice was issued and the union advised on October 25 that it would not pay the invoice; this makes the November 6 grievance timely. Evidence Five people attended the September 3 meeting at the college’s Pembroke campus – three from the union and two from management. I heard evidence from three of those who were present, and also received in evidence notes taken by a management representative, which the union witnesses agreed were an accurate reflection of the meeting. It is clear from the evidence, and not contested, that the union local’s chief steward, J.P. Lamarche, told the college at that meeting that the union would not pay for the seven accumulated semesters of union release. As noted above, the college had sent the union a tally [6] of $208,362.70 several days before with its basis for the number, but no invoice. At that point, there was no grievance and so the issue was not about grievance timelines; instead, the union’s argument arose from language in the collective agreement that it said required issues to be raised within 20 days after the situation came to the attention of the person complaining. This language had been the focus of disputes with the college over grievors who had been misclassified or placed on the wrong step of the pay grid; the college, in remedying the situation, was apparently unwilling to go back more than 20 days from when the complaint was raised, even where it acknowledged the violation. At the September 3 meeting, the union argued that this rule should apply to the college; thus, it was simply too late to collect on release time from seven past semesters, the most recent of which had ended several months prior. (This argument, I was advised, will be the basis of a second preliminary objection by the union if this objection on timeliness fails.) Mr. Lamarche testified that, at the meeting, Diane McCutcheon, the college’s director of labour relations, said she intended to send an invoice for the seven semesters, as per the tally she had sent out. Mr. Lamarche said he told her clearly that “we would not entertain paying that bill.” He quoted himself asking, “Would you ever pay a bill you didn’t think you have to pay?” Mr. Lamarche said he thought the college would file a grievance right away, but agreed he did not tell the college it ought to do so in order to preserve its rights. The September 3 meeting also discussed a semester-by-semester billing process for the future, and basic agreement was reached. Shawn Pentecost, who has been the union local’s treasurer since 2008 and who attended the September 3 meeting, also testified he expected a grievance, [7] but saw nothing until September 30, when Ms. McCutcheon sent an invoice for $208,362.70, along with the same calculations she had forwarded before the September 3 meeting. Mr. Pentecost said he contacted the local’s president, Patrick Kennedy, and was told that Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Lamarche would handle the matter. There was no further communication on the issue until October 23, when Ms. McCutcheon sent a message to Mr. Pentecost, copied to Mr. Lamarche and Mr. Kennedy, regarding the future billing process. She added, “On a related note, I have not had any response to my September 30th letter on the Local billing and amounts owed to the College. If there are any questions on the invoice or billing related matters, I would be happy to address with you.” Mr. Lamarche’s reply on October 25 confirms the union agreement to create a semester-by- semester billing process for the future, and adds: In terms of the other semesters that the college raised, I made it clear at the meeting that the Local would not entertain billing that predated the fall 2013 semester. In fact, I recall, quite clearly, indicating that if the college was expecting the Local to pay for bills that predated the fall 2013 semester, it should review the time provisions of Article 32 of the collective agreement and its own practice in relation to said time provisions when providing responses to both individual grievances and union grievances. The next communication was about 10 days later, when the college filed the grievance now before me. Mr. Lamarche’s evidence was that the parties adhere to time limits through the grievance process “almost religiously.” Ms. McCutcheon agreed with that assessment. [8] On cross-examination, Mr. Lamarche was asked when the college should have filed a grievance; his reply was that a grievance should have been filed within 20 days of the September 3 meeting. However, as counsel for the college noted, at that meeting, the union told the college it was already out of time to collect the money. Asked when the college should have grieved if it wanted to be paid, Mr. Lamarche said release time is based on the standard workload form (SWF), and that technically the college should be sending an invoice once the SWF is expired. Failing that, he said, he would not speculate on what time should elapse before the college had to file a grievance, but he added that when an invoice was issued and the union said it would not pay, time starts running. However, Mr. Lamarche then pulled back from that statement, saying that once the college is aware that the union would not pay, it should act. He added that the college tally sent to the union before the September 3 meeting was in fact an invoice. However, he also said that even if the college had filed a grievance within 20 days of September 3, the union would not have to pay because the request itself was well more than 20 days after the college was aware it was owed the money. Mr. Lamarche said it is not the union’s problem if the college forgets to bill in a timely way. In her evidence, Ms. McCutcheon noted that the invoice she sent on September 30 had a 30-day payment deadline specified. Within that 30 days, she said, she reminded the union, via her message on October 23, that she had heard no response. She said the purpose of that message was to start a dialogue, since that had been the pattern in the past before the final amount was agreed. Asked why she would take that step when the union had already announced on September 3 that it would not pay, she replied that there was no invoice on September 3, and “things can change.” Even though the local union had said the college was out of time for [9] semesters that stretched back 3½ years, she said she was encouraged by the response of OPSEU head office in Toronto to a separate invoice she had sent out the same day (September 30, 2013) for Mr. Kennedy’s full-time release for five semesters going back to the fall of 2011. That invoice, for $242,836.40, was pursuant to a separate agreement with OPSEU that is not part of the collective agreement. Ms. McCutcheon said she had called OPSEU head office prior to sending her October 23 message to the local and was told the invoice for Mr. Kennedy’s release time was being processed for payment. That, she said, made her believe that the local would also pay its invoice despite what it had said on September 3. There was evidence about past practice. Mr. Pentecost agreed he had never issued a cheque for union release without an invoice, nor had he come up with a calculation of money owed and simply sent a cheque, although it was his understanding that the previous treasurer initiated discussion by sending his own calculation to the college. Payment was always pursuant to an invoice, he agreed. In the three invoices he dealt with prior to the current dispute, the union disagreed with each amount and paid only after discussion and revision of the calculation. In no case was there a 20-day timeline raised by the union, he agreed. More specifically, the evidence showed that Mr. Pentecost disagreed with some aspects of a calculation for the full 2007 calendar year of union release sent by the college in February 2008. Discussions ensued and an invoice for a revised amount was issued in April 2008, and was paid. Billing for union release for 2008 and 2009 was not discussed by the parties until early 2010; calculations went back and forth, invoices were issued for each year in March 2010, then there were further discussions, and the invoices were revised. The final invoice for 2008 is dated [10] November 24, 2010, and was paid only after that. The final invoice for 2009 is dated August 31, 2010, and again, paid only after that. Mr. Lamarche testified he was unaware of this history when he advised the college on September 3 that the union would not pay for the seven semesters. Parties’ arguments The union points to the undisputed fact that it told the college on September 3 that it was not paying. At that point, the union had been given the college’s calculation of $208,362.70, so the refusal to pay was not simply an abstract notion but rather a response to a specific number, the union argues. The union’s reasons at that point were based on the timelines under the collective agreement for raising issues. The college’s response was to do nothing, the union says: there was no discussion of the number and no communication from the college, only an invoice that came 27 days later. The union says it was clear that, unlike in the past, the parties were not discussing the number to arrive at a final amount that would be paid. Here, the union made it clear on September 3 – and the employer understood – that there would be no payment, and it was incumbent on the college to file a grievance within 20 days if it felt there was a violation of the collective agreement, the union says. The union argues that Ms. McCutcheon’s message of October 23 was simply a bid to get the grievance timelines restarted after they had already expired. Nothing had changed in the number and the union’s response to it since September 3. In fact, the union says, September 3 is [11] the latest the college can claim as the start of the time running; a claim for money owed from up to 3½ years prior is outside both the collective agreement and the Limitations Act, 2002. (The collective agreement under which the grievance was filed runs from September 2012 to August 2014. This argument is to be dealt with later if the union does not succeed on this preliminary motion.) The union draws an analogy to a situation where an employee incurs overtime or travel expenses for more than three years but does not submit any claim for payment. The employee schedules a meeting, sends receipts beforehand, and is advised by the employer that the claim is being filed too late. If that employee does nothing for more than 20 days, then raises the same issue, and is given the same answer, a grievance at that point is out of time. The union relies on Re Conestoga College and OPSEU [1998] O.L.A.A. No. 542 (Mikus), where the arbitration board dismissed the grievance as untimely where the grievor worked overtime, was not paid for it, and filed a grievance more than two years later. The board chair stated in that case that “the suggestion by the union that the time limits should not start to run until a grievor knows his claim has been denied is inconsistent with the very concept of time limits. In practical terms that would mean that an employee wait months and even years after the events giving rise to a grievance have occurred and would only be bound by the time limits when the grievance was denied.” Also referred to by the union were Re St. Lawrence College and OPSEU, unreported, March 30, 1998 (Keller), where a grievance relating to severance pay was ruled untimel y because it was [12] filed more than 20 days after the grievors were advised that the employer would not pay; and Re Fanshawe College and OPSEU, unreported, March 10, 1993 (Swan), which notes that parties are required to exercise some diligence in enforcing their rights. The union also points out that in some cases, such as Conestoga, the arbitrator points to the fact that the grievor is a steward and thus ought to know the time limits in the collective agreement; here, the employer’s director of labour relations is in the same position. Another case, Re Fanshawe College and OPSEU [2012] O.L.A.A. No. 652 (Parmar) points out that the parties have exempted some issues, such as discrimination and bullying, from the strict 20 day limit; not included, the union notes, are invoices for union release. Also referred to were Re Sifto Canada Corp. and CEP Local 16-O (2010) 198 L.A.C. (4th) 325 (Surdykowski) and Re First Air and CUPE [2005] C.L.A.D. No 496 (Knopf), both of which are mainly relevant to remedy. The union argues that past practice is immaterial here, as the employer was put on notice on September 3 that the union would not pay and an arbitrator has no discretion to extend time limits. Even if past practice is relevant, the union says, it was not followed here, since there is no indication that the employer previously waited anywhere near 3½ years before trying to collect payment for release time, and always acted within the term of the collective agreement when the amounts were incurred. In any event, the union says, this situation did not conform to past practice as there was no discussion once the employer sent its calculation. The college concedes that the grievance procedure time limits in the collective agreement are mandatory, and that an arbitrator has no power to extend them. (This, as the union points out, results from a last offer from the colleges in 2010 that was put to an OLRB-held vote pursuant to [13] the Labour Relations Act, 1995, and accepted; the employer offer included removing the discretion of arbitrators to extend time limits.) The college also concedes this is not a continuing grievance, because, while there was an ongoing debt being accrued, there was no ongoing or recurring breach of the collective agreement when money was not paid at the end of each semester since there is no requirement for the union to send a cheque at that point. This is to be contrasted with the employer’s obligation to pay wages and overtime each pay period. Because the collective agreement is silent on the procedure and timing for reimbursement of union release time, past practice is relevant, the college argues. The evidence shows that the past practice involved discussion and negotiation about a calculation or invoice before a final number is agreed and paid by the union. It is significant that there has never been payment before an invoice is issued, the college says. In the college’s view, the crystallizing event came after the invoice was issued and the union advised it would not be paying that invoice. That did not occur until late October, 2013, so that the filing of the November 6 grievance was within the 20 days specified in the collective agreement. This refusal to pay after the invoice was issued is the “occurrence or origination of the circumstances giving rise to the grievance,” to use the language of Article 32.10 of the collective agreement. Because this grievance is a complaint that the collective agreement has been breached, the college asserts, the union’s statement at the September 3 meeting that it would not pay for the seven semesters of release time cannot be the crystallizing event because this was only a [14] statement of the union’s intention. Neither party can file a grievance over an anticipated breach of the collective agreement, the college argues. In support of this argument, the college refers to Re Sault College and OPSEU [2006] O.L.A.A. No. 568 (Howe). In that case, the grievor was told more than a year before the grievance was filed that the college would include vacation in her professional development leave, a position she disagreed with. In ruling that the grievance was timely, the arbitration board said (at paragraph 42) that “although these communications put the grievor on notice of what the College intended to do, that stated intention was not actually acted upon by the College until after the grievor’s return from PDL when the College denied her request for an additional two months of vacation in respect of the year she had been away on that leave. That denial was the circumstance which gave rise to the grievor’s complaint and which forms the subject matter of the grievance she filed on June 8, 2005, which was within twenty days of that denial.” A similar analysis is found in several other cases referred to by the college: Re Lafarge Canada Inc. and Teamsters Local 141 2000 CanLII 29560 (ONLA) (Herman), where the company argued that the time limit began to run when the grievor was advised he would not be receiving a certain payment, but the arbitrator concluded that the grievance did not arise until the grievor saw his pay stub without the payment; Re Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society and OPSEU Local 334 [1997] O.L.A.A. No. 557 (Stewart), a job posting issue in which the arbitrator ruled that the grievance crystallized when the employer advised who was the successful applicant, rather than when the grievor was advised she was not successful; Re Standard Bread Co. Ltd. and Milk and Bread Drivers (1963) 13 L.A.C.327 (Thomas), where the board said a grievor is not bound to anticipate a breach of the collective agreement, so that the grievance [15] crystallized only when the grievor received his pay cheque; Re Sunar Division of Hauserman Ltd. and USWA Local 3292 (1979) 23 L.A.C. (2d) 1 (O’Shea); and Re Canadian Broadcasting Corp. and CUPE (1985) 21 L.A.C. (3d) 389 (M. Picher). Here, the employer says the past practice shows clearly that the employer would not reasonably conclude it would not be paid until it issued the invoice and the union responded. Had the union been eager to pay before that, it could have requested an invoice, or forwarded its own calculation of what it owed, as had been done before, the college says. Decision It is no secret that these parties have a difficult relationship. The evidence indicated that 757 grievances were filed from 2008 to 2013, from a bargaining unit of about 800 academic employees. This is apparently the first grievance filed by the employer in at least the past several years. Even given the sometimes acrimonious relationship, there are some facts about this situation that are hard to fathom. For example, the union seems willing to risk being viewed as the labour relations equivalent of a “deadbeat dad” – a party that knows it owes money but simply refuses to pay. It appears the union’s actions are a sort of payback for the college’s perceived unfair and obstinate stand on other disputes between the parties. I note in passing that Article 8.05A provides for some circumstances where the college may refuse union release for particular employees. For its part, it is not clear why the college would wait more than three years before asking the union to pay for release time accumulated in 2010. Ms. McCutcheon mentioned high turnover among the college’s human resources staff – she is the third director of [16] labour relations in three years – but this hardly seems a persuasive reason for not providing a fairly straightforward calculation to the union more promptly. Nevertheless, it is not the arbitrator’s task to rescue the college from its own laxity if it has failed to follow the mandatory provisions of the collective agreement. Nor is it the job of the arbitrator to protect the union against the opprobrium that might result from wider knowledge of its refusal to pay a large bill for release time that it requested and used. Nor is the college’s position on unrelated grievances about classifications or grid placement relevant here. This preliminary motion is not to be decided on whether I believe fairness demands that the union pay, but rather on the basis of what is in the collective agreement. Specifically, the only issue to be decided here is whether the college filed the grievance as required by Article 32.10, that is “within 20 days following the occurrence or origination of the circumstances giving rise to the grievance.” As detailed above, the 20-day limit cannot be extended by the arbitrator; thus the issue comes down to whether the clock began to run on September 3, 2013, when the union advised the college it would not pay for the union release time accumulated over seven semesters, or whether it began to run once the union confirmed on October 25 that it would not pay the invoice sent out on September 30. In my view, the past practice of these parties with respect to payment for union release time is relevant. This is because the collective agreement contains no specific provisions on the procedure or timing for payment. It says only (in Article 8.04 B, set out above) that the union will reimburse the college in accordance with the formula contained in the article. At the time this issue arose, there were several features of the practice over the previous number of years that [17] were clear: first, money was never paid by the union until after an invoice was issued; second, there was always discussion and revision of the initial calculation until a final number was settled; third, the billing and payment were not semester-by-semester but rather for a period that lumped more than one semester together; and fourth, the discussion and payments occurred well after the release time debt was incurred. This past practice informs the reasonable expectations of the parties. Those expectations in turn provide guidance to an arbitrator in assessing when the circumstances giving rise to the grievance occurred or originated. The union declared twice that it would not pay for the seven semesters of union release time – once on September 3 and then again on October 25. No invoice was issued until September 30. Given the past practice, the union’s statement on September 3 was, in my view, an indication to the college that when it issued an invoice, it would not be paid. It was a statement to the college of what would happen after the college followed the normal procedure of issuing an invoice, which functions as the formal request for payment. This is analogous to a situation where an employer tells a union in advance that it will be imposing discipline on an employee for misconduct; or where a manager tells an employee that it will not pay overtime. In these situations, the bulk of the case law suggests that the time for filing a grievance does not start running when there is an anticipated breach of the collective agreement. The union and employee must wait until the employer formally acts. This is the conclusion reached by the arbitrators in the Sault College, Lafarge, and Standard Bread cases, among others, referred to by [18] the college. Applied here, the finding must be that forwarding the invoice on September 30 was the first formal action by the college. The Conestoga case relied on by the union may take a different view, although it is worth noting that the grievor in that case knew from his pay stub that he was not being paid overtime. To the extent that Conestoga does take a different view from the cases cited by the college, I prefer the approach of the Sault College case and the others cited in that decision. The arbitrator in Conestoga states that she disagrees with the argument that time lines start to run only when the grievor knows the claim is denied. However, that analysis simply encourages premature grievances, in my view. The two union witnesses in this case testified they expected a grievance from the college within 20 days of when the union said on September 3 that it would not pay. While I acknowledge this was a possibility (and it is also possible the union would have argued that the grievance was premature at this point as there was no invoice), the more reasonable expectation, given the past practice, was that the college would send an invoice rather than a grievance. That is exactly what the college did. Had the union said on September 3 that it agreed with the calculation and would be paying, I would expect that the payment would not be processed in any event until an invoice was issued. Therefore, for purposes of this preliminary objection, it is the issuance of invoice that is key to an assessment of the timeliness of the grievance. Further, in my view, once it issued the invoice, the college was entitled to wait for a reasonable amount of time, as it did, to see whether the union was serious about not paying. As Ms. [19] McCutcheon testified, the union has often changed its position on matters in dispute. This is, of course, no surprise in labour relations. In fact, the minutes of the September 3 meeting record some statements from the union representatives that might reasonably have led the college to believe that the union position was not firm; for example, there was some suggestion that the union wanted to check the practice at other colleges related to release time. The invoice itself had a payment deadline of 30 days, and within that 30 days – on October 23 – Ms. McCutcheon asked the union about the status of the bill. Two days later, Mr. Lamarche advised that the union was reaffirming its position “that the local would not entertain billing that predated the fall 2013 semester.” This wording in Mr. Lamarche’s e-mail is telling: by using the word “billing” and pointing out that the union had said it “would not entertain billing,” the message suggests that even the union regarded the invoice as a key element in the sequence of events. I disagree with the suggestion in Mr. Lamarche’s evidence that the calculation sent by the college before the September 3 meeting was an invoice; there is a very clear difference between a calculation and an invoice in the documents used over the years. The document forwarded prior to the September 3 meeting was not an invoice. The only invoice in 2013 was the one issued on September 30. Once the invoice was issued, there was no confirmation from the union that it would not pay until Mr. Lamarche’s message of October 25. Until that time, there was no actual refusal to pay the invoice, but only an anticipated refusal. That message of October 25, I conclude, is when the time for filing a grievance began to run. Because the grievance was filed within 20 days of that date, it is timely. [20] For the reasons above, my conclusion is that the grievance was filed within the time limit specified in the collective agreement. The union’s preliminary objection on timeliness is therefore dismissed. ____________________ Lorne Slotnick, Arbitrator November 13, 2014