HomeMy WebLinkAboutBannister 01-10-27
" .
.. ,-t
¡"
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION UNDER
-:
THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT
BETWEEN:
The Regional Municipality of Halton
AND:
Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 261
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE GRŒV ANCE OF PENNY BANNISTER
ARBITRATOR:
Marsha J. Faubert
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE UNION:
Mitch Bevan, Grievance Officer
Kerry Jennings, Staff Representative
Janet Bell, Advisor
Penny Bannister, Grievor
FOR THE EMPLOYER:
Carolyn Kay-Aggio, Counsel
Ingrid Johnston, Director of Resident Care
Joan Thompson, Manager of Resident Care
John Rushton, Senior Staff Relations
Consultant
Heard in Milton and Oakville, Ontario on November 2, 2000, and January 22, 23,
February 27, and April ~, 2001.
AWARD
The grievor is a Registered Practical Nurse (RPN) who has worked for the employer
since 1990 in a facility named Allendale, a home for the elderly. On September 21, 2000,
the employer suspended the grievor without pay pending an investigation into "the
defàcing of a posted memo :fÌ'om Allendale's Administrator, Ms. Margaret Strecker".
The following day, the grievor filed a grievance, claiming "unfair and unjust discipline"
and "harrassment (sic) of union executive officer".
'The employer ended its investigation on October 10,2000, and in a letter of that date, the
employer's Director of Resident Care, Ingrid Johnston, advised the grievor of her
conclusions. Specifically, she found that the grievor had "significant involvement in the
defàcing of the memo", an,d that this had been confirmed by a forensic documents
examiner. Ms. Johnston concluded that this action was "insubordinate and in direct
conflict with the behaviour we expect :from our employees". She imposed a disciplinary
suspension of one week without pay (although the grievor takes the position that she lost
sixty-two hours of pay), which was considered to have been served :from September 21 to
28. Ms. Johnston advised the grievor that she would be reimbursed for the remaining
days of the suspension, with the exception of the period between September 29 to
October 3, 2000. The employer later reimbursed the grievor for these latter dates.
At the hearing, the employer argued that the grievor was the author of a number of
comments added to the Strecker memorandum and reposted for viewing by the
.~
. .
J '.
-:
2
employees. It asks that the grievance be dismissed, as the discipline imposed was
-:
warranted by the circumstances of the case.
, '
The grievor denies that she had any involvement in the alteration of the Strecker
memorandum, and asks that the discipline imposed on her be set aside. The union has
also put forward several arguments in the alternative. First, it argues that the comments
added to the Strecker memo were not insubordinate in nature, and thus the discipline
should not be upheld even if! am persuâded that the grievor Was the author of the
comments, as alleged by the employer. The union has also argued that the discipline
imposed was excessive, having regard to the grievor's unblemished work record and the
circumstances of the case. Finally, the union argues that the suspension pending
investigation was unnecessary and inappropriate, and asks for a declaration to that effect.
The circumstances leadfug to the posting of the Strecker memorandum were not in
dispute, and can be summarized as follows~ The union and the employer were involved
in discussions relating to pay equity. The employer and union members of the pay equity
committee met in August 2000 to develop terms of reference. Further meetings
scheduled to take place on September 20 and 21,2000. In the inte~ the employer
became aware of possible changes to the union representatives on the committee, and was
of the view that the meetings should be postponed until the membership issue was settled.
The employer wasconcemed about having to begin the process all over again with a
newly composed committee.
3
The grievor was not a member of the pay equity' committee, but she is, a union steward
-"
and member of the union executive, and testified that she had access to information about'
the pay equity process by reason of her membership on the union executive.
The delay of the meetmgs was a significant issue for both parties; I heard evidence ftom
witnesses for both parties with respect to discussions with the Pay Equity Commission
staff and within the union leading up to the decision to postpone the meetmgs. The
'employer's decision to postpone the meetings" became knoWn in the wdrkp1ace;and a
petition asking that ,the meetings proceed as scheduled was circulated among the
employees. Seventy-seven of the approximately 370 employees of the facility signed the
petition. The grievor was invo lved in' circulating the petition, which was faxed to a
number of people, including Margaret Strecker, on September 19,2000.
The employer deCided to, continue with its plans to defer the meetings, but concluded that
the staff should be provided with more information about its decision. Beginning at
approximately 7:00 p.rn. on September 19, Margaret Strecker posted a memo in various
locations in both buildmgs of the facility (referred to here as "Martin House" and "the
main building"), explaining this decision. Although Ms. Strecker did not testifY, her
movements that evening were documented in records of card access between the two
buildings, and there is no issue with respect to the time of day when the memos were
posted.
. ,
. .
4
From the card access records, it appears that Ms. Strecker posted the memo in the main
--
building before 7:06 p.m., when she left that building. She entered Martin House at 7:09
p.rn. At some point on her journey, she encountered Janet Bell, another union steward
who works as an RPN on the tlllrd floor at Martin House. Ms. Bell was also suspended,
without pay for her suspected involvement in the alteration of the memo. Ms. Bell did
not recall that Ms. Strecker gave her a copy of the memo when they met while goîng
towards Martin House, but thought that Ms. Strecker had left a copy of the memo at the
unit where Ms. Bell worked. Ms. Strecker left Martin House by 7: ISp.m.
Hand printed (upper and lower case) comments were added to the memo sometime
before .11:00 p.rn. that night. Photocopies of the altered memo (reproduced at Appendix
A) were posted in two locations; one by the time clock in Martin House, and the other in
the main building. The two altered memos were identical. The employer has never
recovered the version of the altered memo containing the original printing.
Ms. Bell confirmed that she saw a photocopy of the altered memo by the time clock in
the basement of Martin House when s~e left at the end of her shift, 11 :00 p.rn. Joan
Thompson, the manager of resident care for Martin House, observed the memo at 9:30
a.m. on the following day, September 20. She took a copy of it, intending to take it to the
main 'building to show to Ms. Johnston.
While on her way to the main building, Ms. Thompson encountered another employee,
Heather Brown, who had removed the other photocopy of the altered memo from a board
5
in the main building. The evidence does not establish when the altered memo was posted
in the main building.
Ms. Johnston learned of the changes to the memo from Ms. Thompson. She testified that
she found the comments "quite disturbing", since they interfered the employer's
communication with the staff. She also felt that the comments demeaned the employer's
message to the sta£t: and would have the effect of creating tension with the staff. She
considered the comments to be insubordinate.
At first, Ms. Johnston thought the printing on the altered memo was that of Ms. Bell,
whose printing she had seen on a number of memos, letters and documents. Ms. Bell was
a union representative on the pay equity committee, and Ms. Johnston believed that she'
was upset about the delay in the process.
Ms. Johnston did not initially suspect the grievor, but became suspiciouS after reviewing
records of the card access for the two buildings. Since the memo was altered before
11 :00 p.rn., and posted in both buildings, Ms. Johnston was interested to know who had
passed between both buildings before 11 :00 p.rn. on September 19~ ,She determined that
the grievor was the only person who made the return trip from the main building to
Martin House after the memo was posted. Since the grievor worked in the main building,
she had no reason to make the trip to Martin House that night. After considering the
access records, Ms. Johnston reviewed some samples of the grievor'shandwriting, and
found that they appeared to be similar to Ms. Bell's.
, '
-:
. .
6
....
Ms. Johnston was of the view that the memo was likely photocopied in Martin House,
, ,
since the copy machine in the main building was subject to security access after 4:30 p.rn.
In addition, she felt that the comments suggested that the author was someone who had
"inside information" about the process, and that the author was articulate. She felt that'
the grievor met both these criteria.
Ms. Thompson interviewed some staff members who were on the 3-11 shift the previous
day (excluding Ms. Bell, who was not on duty on the 20th, and the grievor, who was)
abollt their knowledge of the memo. Those interviewed stated that they didn't know
anything about the changes, although some confirmed that they had seen the altered,
memo in Martin House before 11 :00 p.rn. on September 19.
On September 21, 2000, Ms. Johnston interviewed the grievor with respect to the
incident. Another union steward and Ms. Thompson were also present. Ms. Thompson
took notes of the meeting. Ms. Johnston questioned the grievor about her knowledge of
the original memo, which the grievor acknowledged seeing in a conference room around
suppertime. Ms. Johnston showed the grievor the altered memo, which the grievor
denied having seen. When asked if she had heard anything about the altered memo, Ms.
Thompson recorded that the grievor replied, "no - oh - yes, I have heard about it at
coffee break". The grievor denied any knowledge of the how the changes were made,
'and expressed the opinion that they seemed "childish". Ms. Johnston advised the grievor
that she saw the changes as "severe insubordination", and that she had reason to believe
7
that the grievor had played a role in the alterations. She did not explain how she reached
-:
this conclusion, and in particular, she did not confront thegrievor with her knowledge of
the griev°I:'s trip to Martin House on the evening in question. She encouraged the
grievor to think about whether she was willing to take responsibility for the incident, and
asked her to come forward with any information she may have. She advised the grievor
that she would be suspended without pay pending further investigation. The meeting
ended with an understanding that the grievor would be contacted by September 28.
Ms. Bell was suspended the same day after a similar meeting. Ms. Johnston explained
that at that point, she was uncertain who was the author of the comments, but she felt that
both employees were involved in the incident. She found it necessary to suspend both
employees during the investigation, because she was concerned that their presence in the
workplace might hinder the investigation. Specifically, she thought that there might be
pressure on other staff members to not come forward with relevant information.
Although another meeting between the grievor and the employer was expected to take
place on September 28, the meeting had to be postponed to October 4, 2000 to
accommodate the scheduled of the union and employer representatives in attendance.
In the October 4 meeting, the grievor was asked to clarify her earlier comments that she
had heard about the altered memo at her coffee break. She replied that there had been a
discussion at the supper break in the cafeteria on September 20, but that she thought the
staff members were taJking about the petition. She acknowledged that she went to Martin
. ,
. ,
8
House during her evening coffee break, which was not her usual practice. She told Ms.
-:
Johnston that she went there to speak to Janet Bell about the memo that had been posted.
She was asked whether the conversation was about union business, and she replied that it
was "personal". The grievor provided names of other staff members she spoke to or saw
, while she was in Martin House. She denied that she changed the memo or assisted in
distributing it, and stated that she did not know who did this. At the end of the meeting,
Ms. Johnston told the grievor that she wóuld contact her one week later.
In the meantime, the employer's investigation consisted primarily of contacting Gordon
Ospreay, a forensic document examiner, and providing him with samples of writing and
printing by the grievor and by Ms. Bell to compare with the alterations on the memo.
Ms. Johnston received a verbal report ÍÌ'om Mr. Ospreay on October 4, when he advised
that he suspected that the grievor was the author of the alterations, but he would like to
receive further samples of the grievor's writing for comparison. These were provided,
and Mr. Ospreay informed the employer of his conclusions verbally, on October 10, and
in a written report of October 11,2000. It was his opinion that the grievor "probably
wrote" the alterations on the Strecker memo.
After the.October 4 interview with the grievor, Ms. Johnston interviewed three
employees who were said to have seen the grievor at Martin House on the night of
September 19. With one exception, they confirmed her whereabouts, but were unable to
offer any information about her activities that night.
L
9
<,
Ms; Johnston testified that Mr. Ospreay's opinion proved to her that her suspicions of the
grievor were correct. She concluded that the grievor was responsible for altering the
memo, and she decided to suspend the grievor for one week without pay. She met again
with the grievor on October 10 to inform her of this decision, and confirmed the action in
writing that day. The letter to the grievor indicates only Ms. Johnston's conclusion that
the grievor "had significant involvement in the defacing of the memo". The letter also
advises it considered that the suspension was served from September 21 to 28, and that
the grievor would be reimbursed for the period October4to 10. The employer initially
refused to compensate the grievor for the period from September 29 to October 3 because
of the delay in scheduling meetings; but it later paid the grievor for this period as well.
Ms. Johnston testified that she took the grievor's discipline record into account when
deciding upon the appropriate response. She noted that the employer had no concerns
with respect to the griever's work as an RPN. However, she found that the
communication was quite disrespectful, and she felt it necessary to send a message to the
employees that the administration should have the ability to communicate with the staff
without interference. She also felt that the alterations needlessly created a tense
environment. Ms. Johnston agreed that the grievor's denial ofher.Ïnvolvement affected
the decision, as she would have liked it if the grievor had come forward. Instead, the
grievor did not really express a concern about the incident, other than to comment that it
seemed childish.
, '
-:
f'
. "
10
The union takes the positioQ. that Ms. Johnston's theory about how the incident took place
-:;
is open to question. First, the evidence shows that notwithstanding the card access
records, it is possible for employees to move from one building to another without using
their cards (either by entering with another person, or by using an entrance in the main
building not controlled by card access). Consequently, the grievor may not be the only
person who made a return trip between the two buildings on the night in question.
Ms. Johnston testified of her belief that the staff is unaware that their movements can be
detected by the card access records, and thus she felt that the responsible party would not
have taken pains to disguise his or her movements. However, both the grievor and Ms.
Bell testified that they were aware of the employer's ability to review the access records.
Mr. Bevan suggested ~t someone who was aware ofthis would have taken efforts to
disguise her movements, and the grievor did not do this.
In addition, although Ms. Johnston did not believe that the alterations originated in the
main building, she did not consider evidence which was consiS1;ent with that possibility.
There were two other employees who moved :fÌom Martin House to the main building
that evening at times which were consistent with the posting of the altered memo before
11 :00 p.rn. In her evidence, Ms. Johnston rejected one of the employees, S. Mitchell, as a
suspect because she felt there was a reasonable explanation for the trip; i.e., Ms. Mitchell
was required to travel" between buildings in order to punch out. In addition, she feh that
she was familiar with Ms. Mitchell's writing, and she was not concerned about her
involvement. These do not appear to have been considerations at the time of the
11
investigation, since Ms. Johnston was uncertain whether she noticed Ms. Mitchell's
-:
movements when reviewing the card access records.
Ms. JohnstonruIed out H. Kennedy, the other employee who went ftom the main
building to Martin House, because Ms. Kennedy was not a member of the bargaining unit
and Ms. Johnston believed she wouldn't care about the pay equity negotiations. She also
felt Ms. Kennedy knew nothing about the pay equity issue, but conceded that she was
unaware whether Ms. 'Kennedy:mightbe affected by a pay et¡uity decision as Ii former
union member. She also believed that Ms. Kennedy had a reasonable explanation for her
movements that night, having to do with her duties in both buildings.
Although the employer did not rely upon it exclusively, a key piece of evidence is the
opinion of Mr. Ospreay respecting the likely author of the comments on the Strecker
memo. Mr. Ospreay has worked as a forensic document examiner for ten years. He has
undergone extensive training in the field, and has provided more than 1000 opinions
involving the identification of handwriting. The union did not challenge his
qualifications to give expert evidence on this subject.
In his oral testimony, Mr. Ospreay described the process he followed in examining the
'known writings of the grievor and Janet Bell, and the questioned writings on the Strecker
memo. He testified that he was provided with samples of original writing (Le., in ink)
ftom both the grievor and Ms. Bell. He did not have an original copy of the writing on
the Strecker memorandum.
. ..
.
12
-:
Mr. Ospreay described a number of writing characteristics that are considered in
comparing known and questioned writing. I have not found it necessary to detail his
opinion on this point, as the union did not challenge this aspect of the evidence. It is
sufficient to note Mr. Ospreay's opinion that, in order to conclude that the author of the
," '"
known and questioned writings are the same person, there must be: (a) similarities in the
class characteristics of the writings; (b) similarities in the individual characteristics (both
conscious and unconscious) of the writings; and (c) no Uilexplained differences in these
characteristics. He found more than twenty similarities in the characteristics of the
grievor's and the questioned writing, which he described at length, and he found no
unexplained dissimilarities. While he found some similarities between the writing of Ms.
Bell and the questione~ writing, there were unexplained dissimilarities which led him to
conclude that Ms. Bell was not the author. Those dissimilarities included variations in
the letter spacing, letter formation, and line quality.
Mr. Ospreay was questioned with respect to the need for an original rather than a
photocopy of a questioned documentjn order to reach an opinion about the author of the
document. He testified that a number of writing characteristics are unaffected by
photocopy, including speed of writing, most portions of line quality, hesitation,
movement, variation, slope/slant, height/width ratios, writer habits, spacing, spelling,
skill, and baseline alignment. The most significant factor which cannot be observed in a
photocopy is pen pressure. In this case, the quality of the photocopy did not affect Mr.
13
Ospreay's opinion; but because the questioned document was a photocopy, it was
necessary that his opinion be qualified.
In Mr.. Ospreay's experience, the highest degree of certainty within which he will render
an opinion is a conclusive standard. This means that there is no doubt in the examiner's
mind about whether or not the author of known writing is the author of questioned
writing. In his practice, he will not render an opinion with this standard of certainty when
dealirigwìtha photocOpy ora questioned docUlIÍent. Instead, he"WilI offer only a
qualified opinion.
When qualifying an opinion, Mr. Ospreay applies the standards of highly probable,
probable, and inconclusive. An inconclusive opinion means thathe has been unable to
identify or eliminate the writer of known writing as the author of the questioned writing.
In this case, Mr. Ospreay concluded that the grievor "probably wrote" the questioned
writing on the Strecker memo. He reached the conclusion that Janet Bell probably did
not write the questioned writing. He could not apply the higher standard of "highly
probable" in this case because of the absence of original writing in the questioned
document, and linn'tations in the sample of writing (i.e., the number ofletters used) on the
questioned document.
The grievor and Janet Bell testified about their actions on the evening of September 19.
The grievor acknowledged that she had been involved in circulating the petition referred
to above. She read the Strecker memo after retUI11Ïng from her supper break, at around
. .
-:
, .
14
7:00 p.rn. She testified that she was very upset that the employer did not acknowledge
-:
the wishes of the staff to continue the pay equity process.
Later in the evening, the grievor went to Martin House on her second break to speak: to
Janet Bell about the memo. When she arrived on Ms. Bell's unit, they spoke at the :front
desk. The grievor testified that they read the memo together, and reached the conlcusion
that there was nothing they could do about it. They made no plans at that time for future
action. Although the grievor described the convers~tion as "ho-hum", she also stated that
both she and Ms. Bell were "very upset", and that she may have said inappropriate things.
She was unable to provide further detail about the conversation. In contrast, Ms. Bell
described the grievor that night as "her usual jovial self', and did not recall that the
grievor made any inappropriate comments.
Both the grievor and Ms. Bell denied having written anything on the Strecker memo, and
. -
they testified that they did not know who was responsible for the alterations. The grievor
made no effort to investigate the matter on her own; I draw no negative inference :from
this, since the grievor's suspension must be taken to have sent a clear message that she
was not to interfere in the employer's investigation.
In this case, I am req1rired to determine, on the balance of probabilities, whether the
grievor was the author of the comments on the Strecker memo. I agree with the employer
that Mr. Ospreay's opinion is only one component of the evidence, which is to be
considered as a whole. In view of the grievor's denial of her role in the alterations, the
15
credibility of her evidence is a significant issue. Her testimony must be assessed, both
-:
for its own quality, and for its consistency with the other known facts. The often cited
test for assessing credibility is particularly apt in this case:
The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflicts
of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal
demeanour ofthe particular witness carried conviction of the truth. The
test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its
consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing
conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in
such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the
probabilities which a practical and info~d person would readily
recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions. (Faryna
v. Chorny, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.))
, Viewing the evidence- in its totality, I have concluded that the grievor was the author of
the comments on the Strecker memorandum. She was well aware of the issues at stake in
the pay equity process. - She was so upset about the employer's decision to delay the pay
equity meeting that she took the unusual step of going to Martin House to talk to one of
, <
the members of the committee about the issue. While the comments 0;11 the memo do not
seem to me to have required "inside information", they would not likely have been made
by someone without significant knowledge of and emotional involvement with the issues
at stake. Of those persons having the opportunity to take the memo :fÌ'om Martin House
to the main building, only the grievor fits that description.
The grievor's movements on the night of September 19 permitted her sufficient time to
take the document to Martin House, leave it there, and return to the main building with
one of the copies. The printing on the memo was similar in a number of ways to the
'. ,.
. .
16
grievor's own printing, in the opinion of a qualified expert. The comments could have
-:
been made at any time before or during the grievor's meeting with Ms. Bell.
Mr. Ospreay's conclusions, although qualified, must be considered in light of this
evidence. While his opinion may not have supported an allegation against a person who
had neither the opportunity nor the motive to make the comments on the Strecker memo,
it is consistent with the facts before me. The level of probability with which his opinion
was offered, while not at the highest standard, does not underm.iIie this conclusion. The
grievor's denial of her role in the incident is simply not in harmony with the
preponderance of probabilities, viewed reasonably and practically.
The remaining issues to be determined are whether the comments are insubordinate, and
if so, whether the discipline imposed was excessive. Given the anonymous nature of the
comments, the grievor's status as a union steward has no bearing on my consideration of
this issue. This is not a situation in which the employer challenges a union official's role
in aggressively putting forward the union's position on an issue in dispute. The grievor is
to be treated as any other employee who made similar comments on the employer's
communication with its employees.
The employer took the position that the comments on the memo, taken as a whole, were,
an attempt to undermine the authority of management, and to challenge the integrity and
authority of Ms. Strecker. The union argued that the comments on the memo would not
have been inappropriate if they were contained in a letter to the management. It argued
17
that the comments did not interfere with the employer's message, in the sense that they
did not render the document unreadable, and they did not contain objectionable language.
For these reasons, the union argued that there was nothing insubordinate about the
grievor's comments.
The union did not take issue with the employer's right to post the memo as it did, and so I
am left to consider the overall effect of the comments on the employer's ability to
communicate with the staff. Arevíew of the comments discloses thatwbile'they contain
no profanity or direct insults, they nonetheless challenge the factual basis for the
employer's decision, and impute an improper motive ("stalling") for the decision.
Employees in the bargaining unit are entitled to their opinions about the employer's
decisions, but this does not extend to an interference with the employer's accepted right
to communicate its decisions to its staff. In addition, the comments on the memo
represented a challenge to the competence and judgment of the person writing the memo.
For these reasons, I am satisfied that the comments can be characterized as
insubordination.
The employer argues that the absence of any prior disciplinary rec.ordshould not mitigate
the penalty imposed, particularly in light of the grievor's denial of her role in the
incident. On the other hand, the union argues that the discipline imposed is out of line
with even those authorities cited by the employer. In those cases, the penalties ranged
:fÌ"om a reduction of a thirty day suspension to no suspension (if an apology was offered)
(Re Corporation of the City of London and London Civic Employees Union, Local] 07
. .
~
,
.
",
"
18
(1978), 19 LA.C. (2d) 147 (Kruger»; a suspension of one day (Re Canadian
-'
Broadcasting Corporation and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 675 (1982),
6 LA.C. (3d) 415 (Frumkin»; and a suspension of two weeks (with pay) (Re Amoco
Fabrics Ltd. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 1606 (1984),
17 LAC. (3d) 425 (O'Shea». The conduct in each of these cases appears to have been
more inflammatory than in the case before me, either because of the nature of the
comments or the level of publicity outside the workplace that accompanied them.
While I agree that the grievor's comments were insubordinate and warrant disciplinary
action, I am of the view that a one week suspension is excessive. Although the grievor's
failure to come forward is troubling, it is only one factor and must be considered in light
of the surrounding circ~ances. The grievor is an employee Without any disciplinary
record. As both parties acknowledged, tensions in the workplace were high, with both
parties carrying on a public relations effort on the pay equity issue. The grievor in
particular appeared to have intense personal feelings about the process.
Once the employer determined the possibility of the grievor's involvement in the
incident, it immediately suspended her without pay. This suspension continued for
almost three weeks pending an investigation into an incident which, even on the
employer's own view of the grievor's conduct, merited a one week suspension. While I
recognize the employer's position that this suspension was non-disciplinary, there can be
no question that it was punitive. It appears that no thought was given during the course
of the investigation to the appropriate disciplinary response in the event the allegations
19
were proven. The practice of suspending employees with a view to later amassing
evidence to support the suspension is not to be encouraged, and should be reserved for
serious or potentially harmful or dangerous situations. Once it suspended the grievor, the
employer should have considered the question of the proportionality of response at some
point during this prolonged process.
Although it was the employer's position that the conduct complained of would result in
increased tensions in the workplace, Theardno evidence to sUpport that assertion or about
how those tensions manifested themselves. In addition, there does not appear to have
been any consideration of how the employer's investigation and lengthy non-disciplinary
suspension of the grievor and Ms. Bell might have also contributed to the tensions. In my
view, when confronted with a small paper fire, the employer's response was more akin to
adding gasoline, rather than water, to put out the flames. While this does not excuse the
grievor's refusal to admit to her misconduct, it provides some explanation for it.
Consequently, although I find troubling the grievor's failure to come forward, I do not
consider it to be an aggravating factor in this case.
The employer's legitimate interest in unhindered communication with its staff would not
necessarily have been served by a written warning to the grievor. However, a one day
suspension would have been sufficient to deliver the message to both the grjevor and the
other members of the bargaining unit. For these reasons, I would uphold the grievance to
the extent that the one week suspension should be reduced to one day. I will remain
seized to deal with any issues arising out of the implementation of this award.
... '
...
..
20
The union also requests that I make a declaration that the erilployer was not entitled to
suspend the grievor without pay pending the investigation into the grievor's conduct.
The employer argues that I have no jurisdiction to interfere with a suspension pending
, "
investigation, which was non-disciplinary in nature, since the grievor,has been
compensated for the period in question. I note that the authorities relied upon by the
union in support of its position all arose in cases of suspensions without pay pending
investigation for which the grievors were not subsequently compensated, unlike the
matter before me. Whether or not the suspensions in those cases were described as
"disciplinary" or "non-disciplinary", there was a live issue with respect whether the
employer was entitled to withhold compensation :lÌ'om the grievor for the period in
question. That is not the case here, since the grievor has been compensated, and there is
no suggestion that the non-disciplinary period of the suspension forms part of the
grievor's record. I have already indicated my views about the effect of the suspension in
the overall circumstances of the case. Even if! accepted the union's position, I am not
persuaded that it would be appropriate to go further and entertain the relief requested by
the union.
Dated at Toronto this 27th day of April, 2001
,l)/j~~ h k
M. sha Faubert, ArbItrator
-:
~'