HomeMy WebLinkAboutUnion 98-03-23
-, --. '.-.'
'"
.
, .
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
BETWEEN:
NETWORK NORTH
THE COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH GROUP
AND:
ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 666
IN THE MATTER OF GRIEVANCE:
UNION GRIEVANCE DATED OCTOBER 15,1996
ARTICLE 5.03 - OPSEU File # 96H261
BOARD OF ARBITRATION:
Kevin M. Burkett - Chairperson
Ms. Susan Pratt - Employer Nominee
Mr. John McManus - Union Nominee
APPEARANCES FOR THE EMPLOYER:
Marc Piquette - Acting Director Human Resources
John Scott - Manager of Addiction Services
Lilianne Lamontagne - Office Supervisor
APPEARANCES FOR THE UNION:
Jim Gilbert - Grievance Officer
Don Malette - Staff Representative
A Hearing in this matter was held in SUDBURY, Ontario on January 8, 1998
.'
AWARD
The union grieves in this matter that the employer is in breach of Article 5.03
of the collective agreement by reason of its refusal to accede to the request of Ms, Carole
Anderson, a bargaining unit employee, to have Mr. Donald Malette, the union staff
representative responsible for servicing this local, present at a meeting with management
involving an issue of discipline. Although the employer had advised Ms. Anderson that she
could have her steward present, (but not the staff representative), it takes the position that
Ms. Anderson was not entitled to representation at this meeting and, therefore, there has
been no breach of the collective agreements, There is no dispute with respect to our
authority to hear and determine this matter,
The relevant provision of the collective agreement are set out below;
ARTICLE 5 - UNION RIGHTS AND ACTIVITY
5.01 The Employer agrees to recognize the following union stewards:
One (1) steward from each of the eight (8) Community Clinics:
Walden Help Centre,
Positive Steps,
Alternatives (St. Charles),
Chapleau Mental Health Clinic
East Algoma Mental Health Clinic (Elliott Lake)
Espanola Mental Health Clinic
Manitoulin Mental Health Clinic
Nadmadwin Mental Health Clinic,
'.
.'
2.
and Community Clinics - Central Team; one (1) steward from PineGate
Addiction Services, one (1) steward from Men's Detox Services; one (1)
steward from Women's Detox Services; one (1) steward from Developmental
Clinical Services (Cottage 2); Two (2) stewards from Regional Children's
Psychiatric Centre full-time; two (2) stewards from Regional Children's
Psychiatric Centre part-time; one (1) steward from Speech/Language Service;
one (1) steward from Occupational Therapy; one (1) steward representing
R.M.C. and Education; and one (1) steward from Sudbury Algoma Hospital
representing clerical employees; full-time and one (1) clerical part-time; plus
three (3) stewards-at-Iarge whose jurisdiction and duties will be stipulated in
writing bý the Union. The number of jurisdictions of stewards shall be
reviewed by the Employee Relations Committee from time to time.
5.02 All the above-mentioned representatives shall be employees who have
completed their probationary period, unless there are no employees off
probation in the work area to be represented.
5.03 In addition to the above employees, the Employer shall also recognize a
i Union Staff Representative who may be assigned to assist these employees in
the discharge of their union duties.
A Staff Representative may enter the premises of the Employer to conduct
union business after having received prior permission from the Director of
Human Resources. Such permission shall not be unreasonably withheld.
The Emp!oyer may request the attendance of a Union Staff Representative at
any meetIng.
5.04 The union shall provide the Employer with an up-to-date list of the names,
office and jurisdiction held by each employee acting pursuant to this Article,
and only those thus named shall be recognized by the Employer,
Stewards will nonnally deal with matters arising in their area of jurisdiction.
If the steward for an area is unavailable, the alternate steward, as designated
in writing by the Union, may be excused by her supervisor to deal with the
matter.
5.05 It is understood that representatives of the Union have their nonnal duties to
perfonn; therefore, no representative shall leave her duties to conduct Union
business as provided in this Agreement without prior consent of her
supervisor which shall not be unreasonably withheld,
..
.
3.
5.06 Union Stewards may attend at Grievance meetings with the Employer without
loss of regular pay. It is understood that such time spent at Grievance
meetings shall not be used in the calculation of any overtime pay.
ARTICLE 6 - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
6.01 It is the mutual desire of the parties that complaints of employees shall be
adjusted quickly and effectively. As provided in clause 5.05 and 5.06, an
employee and her steward shall be given time off with no loss of pay to
attend any grievance meeting with the Employer provided for in this Article.
6.04 Complaints
An employee with a complaint shall discuss the matter with her immediate
Supervisor within ten (10) days of the circumstances giving rise to the
complaint, or of the date on which the employee ought reasonably to have
become aware of the circumstances. During this discussion, the employee
will infonn the immediate supervisor that such discussion should be
considered as a complaint under the Grievance Procedure of this Agreement,
Her immediate Supervisor shall give her answer within five (5) days of the
discussion of the complaint. Failing settlement at the Complaint Step, within
five (5) days of the answer or deadline for giving the answer, the matter may
then be taken up as a grievance.
6.05 A grievance shall be derIDed as " any difference arising out of the
interpretation, application, administration, or alleged violation of the
Collective Agreement." An employee has no grievance until she has flISt
discussed the complaint with her immediate supervisor,
6.06 Grievance Procedure
Step 1
An employee may fùe a grievance in writing with the next supervisory level
above the immediate supervisor. The grievance shall identify the nature of
the grievance, the remedy sought and should specify the provisions of the
Agreement which are alleged to have been violated, The grievance shall be
dated and signed by the employee. The Employer shall reply in writing
within five (5) days of the submission of the grievance,
..
,
,
4.
The parties agreed on a statement of facts that is reproduced below;
1. Network North and O.P.S,E.U. are parties to a collective agreement with an
expiry date of March 31, 1996 (appendix # 1 attached).
2. A disciplinary meeting was held in October 10, 1996 in a program operated
by Network North called PineGate Addictions Services. The meeting
involved Carole Anderson, a Secretary/Receptionist, employed in PineGate.
Carole Anderson is covered by the scope and recognition clause of the
collective agreement between Network North and O.P,S.E.U. Also present
at the meeting were Lilianne Lamontague, Office Supervisor, and John Scott,
Manager of Addiction Referral.
3. When Carole Anderson reported to Lilianne Lamontagne's office as
requested, she was informed by John Scott that the meeting would involve an
issue of discipline, Carole Anderson was then asked by John Scott if she
wanted the assistance of the union steward for PineGate who was available to
attend the meeting. Carole Anderson declined the offer stating that she
wanted to select the union representative who would attend and stated that she
wanted Donald Malette, the O.P.S.E.U. staff representative to attend the
meeting. Carole Anderson asked if her request to have her choice of
representative was being refused. The assistance of the PineGate steward
who was available to attend the meeting was offered a second time by John
Scott to Carole Anderson. Carole Anderson then left the office to make a
telephone call.
4. When Carole Anderson returned to the office Marc Piquette, Manager of
Labour Relations, by telephone speaker offered Carole Anderson the option
of having the PineGate union steward attend the meeting. Carole Anderson
again stated that she wanted her choice of representative and that her choice
of representative would be the local 666 President, Fae Hancharyk, or the
O.P.S.E. U. Staff Representative, Donald Malette. Carole Anderson declined
the assistance of the PineGate union steward. Marc Piquette asked if Carole
Anderson had a reason to justify her request to have the President or Staff
Representative attend the meeting. Carole Anderson offered no reason and
responded by reasserting that she wanted to select her own representative and
that she wanted the President or Staff Representative to attend. The request
to select her choice of representative and have the President or Staff
Representative attend was then denied. Carole Anderson was then again
offered the assistance of the PineGate Steward by Marc Piquette and she
declined the offer,
f
.'
5.
5. The disciplinary meeting then proceeded. Carole Anderson was provided a
letter of discipline which imposed a one shift suspension. Lilianne
Lamontagne, John Scott and Carole Anderson were present at the meeting.
Mr. Don Malette, the umon staff representative SIDce 1994, gave
uncontradicted evidence that union stewards regularly attend meetings of the type at issue
here and that over the initial objection of local management he attended one such meeting in
the past. Although not contacted by either Ms. Anderson or the employer in advance or at
the time of the meeting here, he testified that he would have cleared his calendar in order to
attend if he had been asked.
The union argues that bargaining unit employees have a right to union
representation at meetings of this type, both under the statute and under the collective
agreement. The union relies on the provision for stewards under Article 5.01, the
recognition of a union staff representative assigned to assist stewards under Article 5.03 and
the provision for stewards to attend grievance meetings without loss of pay under Articles
5.06 and 6.01. It is the position of the union that these. clauses, read together, entitle an
employee to representation by both a steward and a union staff representative in a
disciplinary, (as distinct from an investigative) meeting, More specifically it is the position
of the union that under Article 6,01, representation by both a steward and, if requested, by
the staff representative, is an entitlement when an issue involving employee discipline
crystallizes. The union relies upon Fleet Industries and I.A.M. Local 171 (1975) 10 LAC
.
.'
6.
(2d) 69 (Arthurs) and B.C. Telephone Co. and Telecommunications Workers (1988) 32
LAC (3d) (Kinzie) in support of its interpretation of these provisions of the collective
agreement. Victory Soya Mills and Teamsters Local 1247 (1987) 28 LAC (3d) 349 (A.
Barrett) is cited in support of the proposition that the employer cannot choose who will
represent an employee. The union argues that in addition to whatever right to
representation is found in the collective agreement, there exists a statutory right as well; a
statutory right that would apply in the circumstances here, to entitle Mr. Anderson to the
representation she sought. We are referred to Windsor Western Hospital O.L.R.B. rep.
November, 1984 1643 in support of this proposition.
i.
The union argues in the flIst alternative that if the language is ambiguous the
evidence establishes that stewards are regularly present at meetings such as the one at issue
here and, therefore, by necessary implication, given the existence of Article 5.03, there is a
right to have a staff representative present as well. The union argues in the second
alternative that given the practice, given the failure of the employer to say anything about a
departure from the practice at bargaining and given the union's reliance on the practice in
accepting the status quo, the employer is now estopped from departing from the practice.
The union argues in the fIDal alternative that on these facts and apart from any general right
to representation, where representation by the steward was offered, the employer breached
.
.'
7.
Article 5,03 when it refused to allow Mr. Malette, the staff representative to attend the
meeting at which Ms. Anderson was disciplined.
The employer asks us to apply the strict language of the collective agreement.
The employer points to Article 5.06 as containing the representation right upon which the
union relies; the right which the union asserts gives the steward standing at the meeting in
question and by the operation of Article 5.03, the staff representation. It is the position of
the employer that the right is to attend at "grievance meetings". Weare referred to Article
6 which sets out a process for registering employee complaints with the immediate
supervisor following which a grievance may be fùed. Weare referred specifically to the
stipulation in Article 6.05 that" an employee has no grievance until she has flISt discussed
the complaint with her immediate supervisor," and the requirement in Article 6.06 that a
grievance be in writing. The employer argues that whereas there is a right for a steward to
be present at a grievance meeting, the meeting at issue here was in connection with the
imposition of discipline prior to the fùing of any grievance, Accordingly, we are asked to
fIDd that the grievor did not have a right to be represented by her steward or by the union
staff representative. The employer relies on re Zellers Inc. and Department Store Union
(1986) 25 LAC (3d) 222 (Haefling) in support of the position that absent an express
entitlement in the collective agreement there is no requirement for representation prior to
the implementation of discipline. Oshawa General Hospital and ONA (1997) 33 LAC (3d)
J
.'
8,
78 (H,D. Brown), Consumers Gas Co. and International Chemical Workers (1973) 2 LAC
(2d) 366 (H.D. Brown) MacMillan Bathurst and Canadian Paperworkers Union (1992) 29
LAC (4th) 415 (Schiff) and Metro Toronto and CUPE Local 43 (1989) 9 LAC (4th) 353
(Joyce) are cited as examples where, absent express provision for representation in the
specific circumstances of each case, fmdings were made that representation was not
required. Weare asked to fmd that under this collective agreement there is no requirement
for representation prior to the fùing of a grievance and, therefore, the refusal to allow the
staff representative to attend (even though it would have allowed the steward to attend) does
not constitute a breach of the collective agreement.
In response to the union reliance upon post practice, both for purposes of
resolving any ambiguity and for purposes of establishing an estoppel, the employer argues
that one prior incident where the staff representative appeared at a meeting such as this does
not constitute a practice that can be relied upon.
In response to the union submission that there exists an independent statutory
right, the employer submits that any statutory right must be applied having regard to the
agreement of the parties. In so far as the union relies on the decision of the O.L.R.B. in re
Windsor Western Hospital (supra), the employer points out that in that case the collective
agreement provided for representation at the time discipline was imposed. Absent such a
,
."
9.
requirement under this collective agreement it is argued that a breach of the collective
agreement cannot be found on the basis of statutory representation rights.
We start by endorsing the general statement of principal articulated in re
Windsor Western Hospital (supra), The O.L.R.B. relying on the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in re J. Weingarten Inc. and Retail Clerks (1973) 485F 2d 1135, 84
LRRM 2436 U,S.C.A. 5th Circuit, 430 U.S. 251 (Sup, Ct.), stated as follows;
The whole scheme of our Act is to reverse the imbalance that
exists between individual employee and employer, The Act
provides for the certification of trade unions to act as collective
representative for all of those falling within a bargaining unit
found to be appropriate for collective bargaining. It is clear on
a reading of the Act as a whole that the right to collective
representation encompasses not only the negotiation of the
collective agreement but the representation of individual
employees in pursuit of or in protection of their rights under
the collective agreement. It follows that just as under the
American and Quebec statutes, which are designed to serve
essentially the same purpose, the right to collective
representation under the Labour Relations Act (embodied in the
right accorded to all persons under section 3 of the Act to join a
trade union and participate in its lawful activities and the
prohibition in section 64 of the Act against interference with
the representation of employees by a trade union) extends to
include union representation at a meeting called by the
employer to charge an employee with misconduct or to impose
discipline. While the statute does not give an employee the
right to choose his union representative, it does protect the
right to representation and prohibits employer interference with
this right. It is not for the employer to decide who will be the
employee's representative at a discipline meeting or to put
impediments in place that cannot be reasonably justified.
,
.'
10.
In that case, where the collective agreement provided for union representation at the time
that discipline is imposed, the O.L.R.B. found that in the absence of any explanation from
the employer as to why the meeting at which it was put to the individual employee that she
could resign or be terminated, could not be rescheduled to facilitate union representation,
the employer" exploited its authority over (the employee) to interfere with her right to be
represented at the discipline hearing (as provided in the Act and under the collective
agreement) and thereby breached section 64 (now Section 90) of the act." The board then
remitted the matter back to arbitration; an exercise of its remedial discretion that was
quashed by the court. The ratio of the decision, however was allowed to stand.
While we are limited in our jurisdiction to applying the tenns of the collective
agreement, the purpose and scope of the representation rights under the statute are
instructive when faced with conflicting interpretations as to the scope of representation
rights under a collective agreement. The position of the employer is that under Articles
5.06 and 6.01. read together, the right to fonnal representation commences after the fùing
of a written grievance and that under the scheme adopted by these parties, under which the
individual must [lIst disèuss a complaint with his/her supervisor before fùing a grievance,
there is no right to fonnal representation prior to the fùing of the grievance. We do not
read Articles 5.06 and 6.01 as having the limiting effect suggested by the employer. The
purpose of these clauses, when read in the context of both the statutory framework and the
,
.'
11.
related provisions of the collective agreement, is to provide an entitlement to union
stewards to attend grievance meetings" without loss of regular pay," Without these clauses
there would be no entitlement to payment of stewards for attendance at grievance meetings.
We look to Articles 5.01 and 5.04 in derIDing the scope of representation rights. Article
5.01 provides for a number of stewards within identified areas of jurisdiction. Article 5.04
provides that" stewards will nonnally deal with matters arising in their area of jurisdiction. "
There is no restriction on what these "matters" are. Finally, Article 5.05 stipulates that the
prior consent of the employer will not be unreasonably withheld when a steward seeks to
"leave her duties to conduct union business as provided in this agreement." These are the
clauses that speak to the scope of representation. It must be presumed that the "matters"
over which the steward is empowered to deal in his/her area of jurisdiction, given the extent
of the statutory entitlement, would, at the very least, (whether or not the time off work is
paid» encompass the representation of employees at meetings with management where
discipline is imposed where such representation is sought by the affected employee, This
would, of course, include the meeting at which Ms. Anderson was disciplined. It is our
fIDding, therefore, (consistent with both the statute and the practice) that if requested, a
steward is entitled to be present at such a meeting for the purpose of representing the
employee who is about to be disciplined. In this regard it is to be observed that there is no
such open-ended conference of representation rights in the contract language under review
in Zellers (supra) and therefore that award must be distinguished.
I
"
12.
We make this rIDding without intending to suggest that under Article 6.04 an
employee is entitled to union representation when, as mandated under that clause, he/she
discusses a "complaint" with his/her immediate supervisor, Complaints may encompass
any number of work related matters such as a failure to properly schedule overtime,
payments of shift premium or change in shift rotation, a change in job responsibilities, a
failure to recognize seniority, the necessity for a medical certificate etc. These parties, in
their wisdom, have agreed that initially complaints of this type shall be dealt with between
the employee and his/her immediate supervisor. These parties have decided that matters
such as these, if not resolved between the individual employee and the immediate
supervisor may then be dealt with in the fonnal grievance procedure with the attendant
union representation. However, there is a fundamental difference between matters such as
these and 'the application of discipline. Discipline involves charges of improper conduct
against an individual employee, the imposition of penalties up to the termination of
employment and impacts the on-going employment record. Furthennore, the setting within
which discipline is imposed, where statements or denials' may later be relied upon,
constitutes a critical distinction that weighs in support of a rIDding that, absent express
language to the contrary, the provision for dealing with individual complaints directly with
the supervisor is not intended to deny an employee representation, if requested, in matters
of discipline. In our view the scope of representation provided for under Article 5.04
encompasses representation at the time that discipline is imposed and is in no way limited
J
"
13.
by the individual complaint process under Article 6.04. Accordingly, notwithstanding the
parties' agreement that complaints be dealt with directly between the individual employee
and his/her immediate supervisor under Article 6.04, the imposition of discipline is
nevertheless a "matter" within the meaning of Article 5.04, in respect of which, if
requested, representation rights apply.
The issue before us is the refusal of the employer to allow the union staff
representative to attend the meeting at which Ms. Anderson was disciplined. The employer
offered to have the steward present but was not prepared to have the staff representative
present. In most cases the presence of the steward would be sufficient, regardless of the
desire of an individual to have a higher ranking union official present. However, under this
collective agreement Article 5,03 stipulates that",., the employer shall also recognize a
union staff representative who may be assigned to assist those employees (stewards) in the
discharge of their union duties." The import of the clause is that a staff representative who
is assigned by the union to assist a steward in the perfonnance of his/her union duties shall
be recognized by the employer. We know that representation at a meeting for the purpose
of imposing discipline is a matter within the realm of a stewards union duties. Indeed, the
employer offered Mr. Anderson the representation of her steward. It follows from the
clear meaning of Article 5.03 that if assigned, Ms. Anderson was also entitled to have
present the union staff representative. The employer was emphatic that it would not
recognize Mr. Malette, the staff representative, if he was assigned. It is our view that the
.
"
14,
employer, in so doing, interfered with Mr. Anderson's representation rights under Article
5.03. Under the tenns of this collective agreement she was entitled to representation by her
steward and, if assigned, her staff representative as well. It does not lie in the month of the
employer to preemptively deny recognition to. the staff representative in circumstances, as
here, where, if assigned, it was required to recognize the staff representative.
Having regard to all of the foregoing the grievance succeeds. We hereby
declare that by preemptively refusing to recognize the union staff representative as a
participant at the meeting in which Ms. Anderson was disciplined the employer breached
Anicle 5.03 of the collective agreement.
i
)~ßJ -'[¿,íP-\- ¿¿J
DATED in TORONTO on this date o~ary, 1998,
,/
L 'ji II!
< ~1---1 ~ 'i- ,t, '
,Kevin M. Burkett'
'J --~
I ~r /Dissent ~ / r: .,
O~\&J~ ~ fat'
Susan Pratt
I concur~t 1\ -', M¿ MC{ill~ -r
~OV\~
John Mc:Nfanus
DISSENT "
RE: Network North and OPSEU Local 666
Union Grievance dated October 15, 1996 reo Article 5.03 - OPSEU # 96H261
I have given careful consideration to the Award in this matter, and I find that I must respectfully
dissent.
The statutory scheme underlying the collective bargaining relationship confers on the union
exclusive rights to represent all employees in the bargaining unit. However, the point in time at
which an employee may be entitled to union representation depends upon the specific terms of
the collective agreement.
Article 5.04 provides that stewards will normally deal with matters arising in their area of
jurisdiction. Although "matters" are not defined, Article 5.05 stipulates that union
representatives must obtain prior consent before leaving their duties to conduct union business
l "as provided in this Agreement". Accordingly, the parties must look to the collective agreement
to define what is union business which may be conducted by stewards.
Article 6.04 stipulates that employees with a complaint must discuss thè matter with their
immediate supervisor before it may be taken up as a formal grievance. This discussion must
take place within 10 days of the circumstances giving rise to the complaint. Complaints may
encompass any matters of any nature arising from the work place, including the imposition of
discipline, even though discipline will usually have more serious consequences to the employee
than other matters which may be the subject of Complaints, Nevertheless, no matter what the
subject of the Complaint, Article 6.04 requires that it be discussed between the employee and
supervisor before it can become a grievance. The parties have agreed in Articles 5.06 and 6.01
that the entitlement to union representation only arises after the Complaint discussion, if the
matter is taken up as a formal grievance and grievances meetings are held.
Entitlement to union representation at a meeting with the Employer to impose discipline is not
provided for in the collective agreement. However, what is provided for in Article 5.05 is that
Union representatives may only leave their duties with the consent of their supervisors to ,
conduct union business "as provided in this Agreement".
Based on the above reasons, jt is my respectful submission that the scope of representation
should be limited to what the parties have expressly agreed to in the collective agreement, and
that "matters" referred to in Article 5.04 should not be given such a broad interpretation so as to
include the right to union representation at discipline meetings. Accordingly, the grievance
should be dismissed.
Date: March 17, 1998 ~~vr-- \) {CJJ
Susan Pratt
Employer Nominee