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HomeMy WebLinkAboutPaquin 96-02-27IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN: CAMBRIAN COLLEGE (the "College") - and - ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION (the "Union") GRIEVANCE RE TERESA PAQUIN BOARD OF ARBITRATION: Michel G. Picher- Chairperson John McManus- Union Nominee David Cameletti- Employer Nominee APPEARING FOR THE EMPLOYER Stephen Shamie- Counsel Susan Pratt APPEARING FOR THE UNION: Susan Stamm- Counsel Teresa Paquin- Grievor John Closs Judy Laplante A hearing in this matter was held in Sudbury on November 30, 1995. A W A R D The grievor, Teresa Paquin, has filed two grievances. The first concerns the changes implemented by the College in respect of her rate of pay and other conditions of employment, including a reduction in her course load and hours of work. The second of the two grievances, both of which are dated March 7, 1994, grieves a threatened dismissal and alleges sexual discrimination against Ms. Paquin. The College submits that the grievances are not arbitrable, as the grievor, in her capacity as a Continuing Education Instructor, is not covered by the collective agreement. Therefore, this award, by agreement of the parties, deals solely with the preliminary issue of arbitrability. The background facts pertinent to the issue of arbitrability are not in dispute. Ms. Paquin was first hired by the College in 1972 to teach sewing in its Continuing Education program. While she worked part-time in her first year, from 1973 through 1994, when the instant grievances arose, she generally worked from nine to twelve hours per week, with her courses being offered in a period of nine months during each calendar year. According to the grievor's evidence, which is unchallenged, she was not paid under the terms of the collective agreement between 1972 and 1988. In 1988, however, she was advised by her coordinator, Mr. David Marx, that she then came under the collective agreement because she taught from nine to twelve hours per week. According to her evidence, however, she was advised at the same time that she would not be receiving the then recently increased wage rate of the collective agreement. It appears that Ms. Paquin then approached the Union which immediately filed a grievance. The grievance was orally settled in Ms. Paquin's favour and, thereafter, from 1988 to 1994 she was paid in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement, more specifically, in accordance with the grid governing the payment of non-post, secondary, partial-load professors. The grievor is characterized by both parties as a "pure continuing education" teacher. There are approximately 300 continuing education teachers, and some 2io full-time and part-time professors employed by the College. It is not disputed that the College has never paid or deducted Union dues on behalf of the continuing education teachers, that it has never provided them with benefits under the terms of the collective agreement and that neither of those facts has ever been the subject of a grievance by the Union. Certain evidence was presented by the Union to support its view that the grievor should be seen as coming under the collective agreement. Apart from the verbal settlement of her grievance in 1988, it appears that on at least two occasions Ms. Paquin's name appeared on a seniority list prepared by the College and provided to the Union on an annual basis in accordance with article 27.04(a) of the collective agreement. As a general rule Ms. Paquin did not appear on seniority lists, but she did appear on the partial load employees' seniority list for the years 1989 and 1990. Her evidence also indicates that during the course of a strike conducted against the College by the Union she responded to a request by the Union to participate in picket line duty, which she did for a period of some five weeks. The evidence establishes that in February of 1994 Ms. Paquin was advised that her pay rate for the winter 1994 semester, a twelve-week period, would be $46.69, the rate which appears at Step 4 of the grid for non-post secondary, partial-load professors under article 14.04 B 2 of the collective agreement. She was also advised, however, that in the spring semester both her hours of work and pay rate would be reduced. That is reflected in the terms of a letter addressed to her, dated February 14, 1994 by the Chair of Continuing Education, Ms. Laura Broderick which reads as follows: Dear Ms. Paquin: This letter is to advise you that, in accordance with Article 26.03 of the Academic Collective Agreement, your current partial load contract will terminate on the last day of Winter 1994 semester continuing education classes in accordance with your contract. Your current rate of pay of $46.69 per hour will remain in effect for the duration of this contract. Beginning in April with the Spring 1994 semester, sewing courses will be offered a maximum of 6 hours per week per instructor. Each course will be offered an instructor on the following bases: . 3 hours per week per course . the 3 hours will be- divided into 1 hour of teaching/instruction and 2 hours of lab/work time for which supervision and technical advice is required . the rate of pay for an individual with your experience, will be $38.00 for each teaching hour, and $19.97 for each hour of technical supervision One sewing course will be offered in the Spring 1994 semester Continuing Education calendar. Please advise me if you wish to teach that course under the revised terms and conditions as described above, should that course gain sufficient enrolment to proceed. Sincerely, "Laura Broderick" Chair, Continuing Education It is the foregoing letter which prompted the grievances of which we are seized. The College takes the position that the grievor is not covered by the collective agreement, as she is not part of the "academic employees" of the College within the meaning of the recognition clause, article 1.01, which provides as follows: Article 1 RECOGNITION 1.01 The Union is recognized as the exclusive collective bargaining agency for all academic employees of the Colleges engaged as teachers, counsellors and librarians, all as more particularly set out in Article 14, Salaries, except for those listed below: (i) Chairs, Department Heads and Directors, (ii) persons above the rank of Chair, Department Head or Director, (iii) persons covered by the Memorandum of Agreement with the Ontario Public Service Employees Union in the support staff bargaining unit, (iv) other persons excluded by the legislation, and (v) teachers, counsellors and librarians employed on a part-time or sessional basis. NOTE A Part-time in this context shall include persons who teach six hours per we ek or less. NOTE B: Sessional in this context shall mean an appointment of not more than 12 months duration in any 24 month period. As noted above, the College stresses that the grievor is a "pure continuing education teachern. Its counsel notes that, although she was paid at the rate of a partial-load teacher, until the winter term of 1994, Union dues were never deducted for the grievor, she was never covered under any benefit plan and was never made the subject of any probationary period under the terms of the collective agreement. It is not disputed that partial load employees are entitled to benefits under the collective agreement, in accordance with article 26.06, and that union dues are to be deducted on their behalf, as required by article 26.05. The College rests its case principally on the award of a board of arbitration chaired by Arbitrator M.G. Mitchnick, in a grievance between OPSEU and George Brown College, an unreported award dated February 16, 1993. That case concerned the arbitrability of a grievance filed by a continuing education teacher at George Brown College, an institution subject to the same province-wide collective agreement which governs the instant grievance. The majority of the board of arbitration in that case concluded that the collective agreement does not cover continuing education teachers, and that the grievance could not succeed. Further, counsel for the College relies, in part, on the following provisions of the collective agreement: 27.04 A In January of each year, the College shall prepare and post lists as follows: (i) a seniority list of all regular fulltime employees showing the employee's name, classification, division or department, and seniority as determined pursuant to this Article. (ii) a list of all probationary employees showing the employee's name, division or department, date of hire, and date of completion of the probationary period. (iii) a seniority list of all partial-load employees employed since the previous January showing the employee's name, division or department, and accumulated service to date. Such lists shall also be sent to the Union Local President. 27.04 B Such lists shall be posted for at least two weeks and the information contained therein shall be considered correct for all purposes unless the employee disputes its accuracy within such two week period by filing written notice thereof with the College. 27.16 Extension and Continuing Education programs and courses which are not included in the regular assignment of full-time employees are excluded from the application of this Article for all purposes. Counsel stresses that, as a general matter, save for two exceptions which he submits were in error, the grievor never appeared on seniority lists prepared by the College, nor were any grievances filed in respect of her omission from the lists. He further submits that the language of article 27.16 confirms the intention of the parties that the job security provisions in the collective agreement are to have no application to persons employed in extension and continuing programs. Counsel for the Union submits that article 1.01 is clear and unambiguous and that under its terms the grievor cannot be found to be excluded from the operation of the collective agreement. She submits that the scope clause makes no reference to the kinds of courses which are taught by persons engaged as teachers, but make distinctions only as to part-time and sessional employees based on their teaching hours and the duration of their appointment. She stresses that the clause is framed in terms other than the normal scope clause which would apply to all employees save certain specified exceptions. No exception, she argues, can be found with respect to persons employed to teach continuing education courses. Counsel submits that the grievor falls within the definition of partial-load employees reflected in article 26 of the collective agreement in the following terms: 26.01 A partial-load employee is defined as a teacher who teaches more than six and up to and including 12 hours per week on a regular basis. 26.02 A partial-load employee shall not receive salary or vacations but shall be paid for the performance of each teaching hour at an hourly rate calculated in accordance with 14.04. As agreed and as reflected above, counsel notes that between 1988 and 1994 the grievor was paid in accordance with the terms of article 14.04 of the collective agreement, at the rate applicable to non-post secondary, partial-load professors. Counsel for the Union also draws to the Board's attention the provisions of article 26.03, which are as follows: 26.03 It is agreed that Article 27, Job Security, has no application to partial-load teachers except as referred to in 27.04 A, 27.06 (iv), (v), (vi), 27.08 B and 27.12. Such partial load teachers may be released upon 30 days' written notice and shall resign by giving 30 days' written notice. Counsel stresses that the foregoing provision makes no reference to article 27.16, which was relied upon by the College. She submits that article 27.16 must be understood as applying to full-time employees who might have also taught within the Continuing Education program, for the limited purposes of article 27, which involves a number of matters including the computation of seniority and the calculation of severance payments. Counsel submits that the article plainly has no application to partial-load teachers, which she maintains to be the status of Ms. Paquin. George Brown College Counsel for the Union submits that the decision of the board of arbitration in the case is George Brown College wrong, and ought not be followed. Counsel submits that the board of arbitration in the Canador College and OPSEU award misconstrued the meaning of a prior arbitration award in , an unreported decision of a board of arbitration chaired by Arbitrator H.D. Brown, dated February 20, 1990. In that case, it was found that continuing education teaching, voluntarily undertaken by full-time professors, became a part of the maximum workload permissible under the provisions of article 4.01 of the collective agreement. Arbitrator Canador Mitchnick construed the award as limited to that determination, and as falling short of the conclusion that the work of teaching continuing education programs is, of itself, bargaining unit work. Counsel for the Union Canador College submits that is an erroneous, unduly restrictive reading of the award. With respect to the principles which govern a board of arbitration in determining whether certain individuals are or are not excluded from the provisions of a collective agreement, counsel for the Union refers the board of Lambton College and Ontario Public Service Employees Union, arbitration to the following awards: an unreported decision of a board of arbitration chaired by Arbitrator E.E. Palmer dated July 14, 1988; Re Government of North West Territories and Public Service Association (1973), 6 LAC. (2nd) 94 ( Melnyk); and Canada Post Corporation and Canadian Union of Postal Workers Re(1987), 31 LA C (3rd) 211 ( Burkett). For Re United Steelworkers the principles governing a determination of latent ambiguity, counsel referred the board to of America, Local 1005 and Steel Co. Ltd. Re Canadian National (1978), 20 OR (2nd) 205 ( Ont.H.Ct.); Railway Company (Telecommunications Dept.) and Canadian Telecommunications Union, Division 43 Re Canteen of Canada Ltd. and Retail, Commercial and Industrial Union, (1975), 9 LAC. (2nd) 5 (Brown); Local 206 Re United Steelworkers, Local 5951 and Medland Enterprises (1981), 1 LAC (3rd) 359 ( Gorsky); Re Eastern Bakeries Ltd. and Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco Ltd. (1963), 14 LAC. 55 ( Reville); International Union, Local 406 Re Milk and Bread Drivers, Local 647 and (1989), 9 LAC. (4th) 366 ( Graser); Standard Bread Co. Ltd. Re International Nickel Co. Ltd. and United (1963), 13 LAC. 327 (Thomas); Steelworkers, Local 6500 Re United Steelworkers and Uddeholme (1974), 6 LAC. (2nd) 120 ( Simmons); and Steels Ltd. (1971), 22 LAC. (419) (Weiler). In essence, with respect to the issue of latent ambiguity, counsel submits that the language of article 1.01 of the collective agreement is clear and unambiguous. In it, she submits, there is no exclusion of continuing education teachers. Nor, she adds, is there any reference to such persons in the article which can be the basis for a latent ambiguity. Counsel argues, very simply, that silence, in the sense of a failure of any reference whatsoever to continuing education personnel being excluded, cannot be the basis for finding an ambiguity in the collective agreement. Finally, counsel submits that, in any event, the College must be estopped from denying the status of Ms. Paquin, given its treatment of her in the past. In this regard, counsel submits that in the words communicated to her by Mr. Marx in 1988, a representation was made to her that she is covered by the collective agreement. That representation, she stresses, was further confirmed in the verbal settlement whereby she has been paid at the rate of a partial-load teacher, in accordance with the terms of a collective agreement. Those representations, counsel argues, were still further reinforced by the appearance of Ms. Paquin's name on seniority lists on at least two occasions in 1989 and 1990. Finally, in support of the view that the College itself believed and held out to the grievor that she was a partial-load teacher, counsel points to the letter of February 14, 1994 which, in its own terms, refers to the grievor's "partial-load contract". In reply, counsel for the College submits that the estoppel argument cannot succeed. He stresses that estoppel can arise only as it might apply to representations made between the parties to a collective agreement, in this case the College, or more particularly, the Ontario Council of Regents for the Colleges and the Union. Counsel stresses that representations made, in error or otherwise, by an individual administrator to an individual employee cannot form the basis of an estoppel for the purposes of interpreting the more general terms of a collective agreement. Further, he argues there is no evidence of injurious reliance or prejudice to the grievor arising out of the alleged representations made to her. On that basis, counsel submits that the principles of estoppel can have no application. We turn to consider the merits of the dispute. The first issue to be determined is whether the grievor falls within the scope clause of the collective agreement. Is Ms. Paquin who, it is agreed, is a "pure" continuing education teacher - employed to teach sewing in a non-credit course - an academic employee of the College engaged in teaching within the meaning of article 1.01 of the collective agreement? If she is not, absent considerations of estoppel, examined below, she cannot grieve or seek to vindicate any rights under the terms of the collective agreement, the document from which this board of arbitration draws its jurisdiction. At the outset, we consider it important to stress that the collective agreement is a document negotiated provincially, which is of general application to a number of community colleges and their academic employees, represented by the Union. In interpreting such a document, a board of arbitration must have a natural concern to construe the document in light of its wider application. For the protection of both union and employer, care should be taken not to draw unduly wide conclusions of general application as to the intention of the collective agreement, based solely on the actions or beliefs of individual administrators or employees, in a given locality, with respect to its meaning. Where extrinsic evidence is resorted to, the intention underlying collective agreements of broad application should be inferred, insofar as possible, from commensurately broad patterns of practice and application. Secondly, we must take due cognizance of the fact that the parties to the collective agreement, being the provincial Council of Regents and the Union, have jointly agreed upon a permanent panel of arbitrators who are charged with the interpretation of the collective agreement which governs the academic staff of all of the colleges in the system. In such a circumstance, it should be inferred that the boards of arbitration constituted under the collective agreement should give due deference to the decisions of other boards, save in the most extraordinary of circumstances, for example where such decision can fairly be characterized as patently unreasonable. Jurisprudential consistency is obviously important in the day-to-day administration of a multi-institution collective agreement of wide application. Boards of arbitration should not, therefore, depart from the prior awards of other boards constituted under the same collective agreement in respect of the same issue, unless they are satisfied that the prior award is "clearly wrong. One of the earliest expressions of the accepted approach is-reflected in the Brewers Warehousing Co. and International Union of Brewery, decision of then Professor Bora Laskin in Re Flour, Cereal, Malt, Yeast, Soft Drink & Distilled Workers of America, Local C-278 (1954), 5 LAC 1797 where, at p.1798, the following appears: It is not good policy for one Board of Arbitration to refuse to follow the award of another Board in a similar dispute between the same parties arising out of the same Agreement where the dispute involves the interpretation of the Agreement. Nonetheless, if the second Board, has the clear conviction that the first award is wrong, it is its duty to determine the case before it on principles that it believes are applicable. Re Canadian National Railway Co. and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers See also (1993), 35 LAC. (4th) (M.G. Picher). In the result, while we ought to be prepared to draw a conclusion different from that found by the board of arbitration chaired by Mr. Mitchnick in the George Brown College case, we should do so only after careful examination of that award, and then only if we are satisfied that the board in that case reached a clearly wrong or insupportable conclusion. George Brown College It is clear from reading the decision of the majority in the award that the examination of the issue as to whether continuing education teachers are excluded from the operation of the collective agreement was extensive and thorough. Evidence and argument in that case were heard over the course of six days of hearing. The award itself is extensive, and reflects an analysis of the evidence of persons involved in the original certification of the bargaining unit, when certain categories of employees were excluded from the right to participate in the certification balloting process. It also included reference to legislative history and passages from Hansard quoting the Minister of Colleges and Universities, making general reference to classes of employees Colleges Collective Bargaining Act. contemplated to be included under the George Brown College We are satisfied that the decision made by the board of arbitration in should be respected. Far from resorting to principles of deference, upon a close reading of that award, we are of the view that it represents a correct interpretation of the collective agreement. It is clear from the text of the award that the board of arbitration considered, in that case, that the College should be given the opportunity to adduce evidence to disclose a latent ambiguity within the phrase "academic employees" appearing in article 1.01 of the collective agreement. There, as in the instant case, the board of arbitration found a longstanding practice whereby continuing education teachers, comparable to Ms. Paquin, were never subjected to a probationary period, were never treated as union members in the sense that their names did not appear on seniority lists, union dues were not deducted in respect of them and they did not receive benefits payable to employees under the terms of the collective agreement. Specifically, it was found that the parties to the collective agreement never treated "pure continuing education" teachers as employees falling under the terms of the collective agreement, even where their teaching hours exceeded six per week. In that case, as in the instant case, there had never been any grievance brought by the Union with respect to the wages or other treatment of continuing education teachers, their omission from seniority lists or the non-payment of union dues on their behalf. Simply put, the evidence before the board of arbitration in the George Brown College case was amply supportive of a conclusion that from the earliest days of the parties' Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, bargaining relationship, predating the it was always agreed and understood that persons employed solely in teaching continuing education courses were not considered to be academic employees within the bargaining unit governed by the collective agreement George Brown College In examining the history of the collective agreement, the board of arbitration in the case noted that until 1985 what was then article 8.15(b), now article 27.12, the quarterly obligation of the College to provide the local branch president with data in respect of all hirings of personnel assigned to perform "work of the nature of that performed by the members of the bargaining unit" made a specific exception for "... persons employed in extension and continuing education. Arbitrator Mitchnick noted, implicitly, that the earlier version of the collective agreement supported the evidence before him that continuing education staff were never intended to be included in the bargaining unit. At pp.21-22, he comments as follows on the pre-1985 language of article 27.12: Ms. Thornton herself was of course not President back that far, but what that language shows is that the interested Union, until 1985, was not even in the comings and goings of teachers in Continuing Education. When they did become interested, the extent of that interest was specified to be with respect to "credit" courses only (of which, although nothing would appear in the end to turn on it, the grievor has failed to clearly demonstrate that he taught one). Consistent with that language change, those additional lists, at least in latter years, have in fact been designated on their face as "Funded", and the errors admitted to in that regard are not so widespread as to elevate the exception to a rule. But more importantly, that limited extension of the scope of Article 8.15(b) alone is not sufficient to infer an intent to suddenly include at least "funded" Continuing Education program teachers in the bargaining unit, given that another clearly "excluded" group, " sessionals", were added to that informational list as well. In all other respect the practice and conduct of the parties with respect to "pure" Continuing Education teachers remained as it always had been ... George Brown In light of the bargaining history and the full evidence before it, the majority of the board in the College case finally concluded, at pp.23-24: More broadly, there is clearly a growing interest, as reflected in the amendment to Article 8.15(b) itself, on the part of the Local to monitor the allocation of any available credit hours, be they amongst Continuing Education or amongst sessional teachers with a view to identifying, especially in times of restraint, a Fanshawe College potential source of full-time workload hours (see the comments of the board in , a decision released by this same chair, on June 18, 1992). But on the issue before us, when one combines the history of the parties' dealings on this issue, together with that of the collective agreement language itself, the conclusion one is overwhelmingly driven to is that pure Continuing Education teachers are not covered by the provisions of the collective agreement as it has been negotiated by the parties. Whether, as Mr. Bloom argues, there are, notwithstanding the full history set Colleges Collective Bargaining out herein, bargaining rights stipulated by the Act that go further so as to include the representation of Continuing Education teachers, and to which not even " estoppel" can apply, is not a matter for a board of arbitration. Our only function is to interpret the collective agreement that is before us, and we find that that collective agreement is not one that the parties have negotiated to cover Continuing Education teachers in themselves. The grievance is accordingly dismissed. We can see no reason to depart form the above conclusion. While we might consider it arguable, as counsel for the Union submits that article 27.16 is construed too broadly for the purposes of that award, and might fairly be understood to merely limit the use which full-time employees can make of continuing education service for the purposes of article 27 of the collective agreement, that conclusion alone does not diminish the overwhelming thrust George Brown College of the award which, we find, to be unexceptionable. George Brown College The Board in this case is, like the Board in the award, faced with arguments made by the Union which prompt a distinct sense of unreality. The Union pleading before us on behalf of Ms. Paquin acknowledges that it has never objected to the omission of Continuing Education teachers from its seniority lists. It has never collected dues from Continuing Education teachers, and has never grieved the fact that the College has never remitted such dues. It has never, prior to this grievance, raised any exception to the fact that the College has treated persons such as Ms. Paquin, whose teaching load exceeded six hours per week, as falling outside the collective agreement nor has it objected to the fact that such persons have not received benefits or otherwise been accorded any rights under the terms of the collective agreement. Accepting, as we do, that there is an ambiguity in the phrase "academic employees" as it appears in article 1.01 of the collective agreement, we cannot but conclude that the longstanding practice and conduct of the Union is overwhelmingly consistent with the conclusion that the parties have long recognized that the "pure continuing education" teachers are not covered by the terms of the collective agreement. Can that conclusion be displaced in the case of Ms. Paquin on the basis of the application of the doctrine of estoppel? We think not. Placing the evidence at its highest, the comments made to Ms. Paquin in 1988, the verbal settlement made through the Union with respect to her wages, and the appearance of her name on the seniority list in two years cannot, in our view, be considered sufficient to establish a representation from the employer to the Union, intended to alter the legal relations between them. At most, what is disclosed is an erroneous or gratuitous approach taken by local administrators with respect to the treatment of a valued Continuing Education teacher. There is, moreover, no suggestion of any injurious reliance suffered by Ms. Paquin. There is no evidence to indicate that she altered or compromised her circumstances based on what was said to her, or that she suffered any negative consequences save those flowing from the decision of the College to reduce her hours and rate of pay. Even if there had been a representation which could ground an estoppeL which we find did not occur, the College would, in any event, be entitled to bring that estoppel to an end by reasonable notice. We would find that such a notice was appropriately given in the letter of February 14, 1994. For all of the foregoing reasons, the board of arbitration concludes that the grievor, Ms. Teresa Paquin, was at all material times a Continuing Education teacher excluded from the terms of the collective agreement. Her grievances are, therefore, not arbitrable and must be dismissed. DATED at Toronto this 27th day of February, 1996. Michel G. Picher - Chairperson DISSENT ATTACHED - "John McManus", Union Nominee I CONCUR - "David Cameletti", Employer Nominee IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION. BETWEEN: ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION GRIEVOR, TERESA PAQUIN AND: CAMBRIAN COLLEGE. DISSENT I DISSENT FROM THE MAJORITY WITH RESPECT TO THEIR DETERMINATION THAT THE GRIEVOR MS.TERESA PAQUIN WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE TERMS OF THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT. BARGAINING UNIT CONTINUING EDUCATION COURSES IT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED WERE NOT COVERED BY THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AND HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS GENERAL INTEREST COURSES NON FUNDED COURSES ETC. THESE CHARACTERIZATIONS ARE NOT HELPFUL TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE AND ARE MISLEADING IN THAT THEY FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE BARGAINING UNIT DESCRIPTION AS Defined IN THE STATUTE AND THE RECOGNITION PROVISION IN THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT. SECTION 1 (12) OF THE ACT DEFINES THE BARGAINING UNIT AS THE "ACADEMIC STAFF BARGAINING UNIT" AS n SET OUT IN SCHEDULE 1. SCHEDULE 1 DESCRIBES THE UNIT AS INCLUDING" EMPLOYEES... WHO ARE EMPLOYED AS TEACHERS ". THE ONLY TEACHERS WHO ARE EXCLUDED ARE THOSE WHO TEACH SIX HOURS OR LESS PER WEEK AND THOSE WHO ARE EMPLOYED FOR NOT MORE THAN THEREFORE, ALL TEACHERS NOT SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED ARE INCLUDED IN THE UNIT AND THERE IS NO EXCLUSION FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION. ARTICLE 1 ( RECOGNITION ), RECOGNIZES THE UNION AS THE SOLE BARGAINING AGENCY FOR ALL ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES. THIS DESCRIPTION MIRRORS THE DESCRIPTION IN THE ACT AND THE USE OF THE TERM ACADEMIC IS INTENDED TO DISTINGUISH THIS BARGAINING UNIT FROM THE SUPPORT STAFF UNIT. THE DEFINING FEATURE OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE ACADEMIC Bargaining UNIT IS WHETHER ONE IS ENGAGED IN TEACHING. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER BEING TAUGHT BY MANY MEMBERS MAY NOT BE VIEWED BY SOME AS TRADITIONALLY ACADEMIC. MEMBERSHIP IS DEPENDANT ON THE FACT THAT THEY ARE TEACHERS, IE ENGAGED IN TEACHING AS WAS MS. PAQUIN. IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT EMPLOYEES SUCH AS MS PAQUIN (THOSE WHO TEACH IN THE CONTINUING EDUCATION FIELD ) WERE NEVER INTENDED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE BARGAINING UNIT. THIS CONCLUSION FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE HISTORIC INCLUSION OF PARTIAL LOAD FACULTY AS MEMBERS OF THE BARGAINING Unit. FULL TIME STATUS WAS NOT A PRE-REQUISITE TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE BARGAINING UNIT EITHER UNDER THE First OPSEU COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT OR UNDER THE, "COLLEGE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT" TEACHERS EMPLOYED FOR MORE THAN 6 HOURS PER WEEK WERE CLEARLY INCLUDED IN THE BARGAINING UNIT Notwithstanding THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT FULL TIME. IN CONCLUSION IT IS MY VIEW THAT NOTHING WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT, PERMITS THE COLLEGE TO DEPRIVE A PERSON WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT FROM GAINING PROPER STATUS UNDER THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AND AVAILING THEMSELVES OF THE BENEFITS OF THE AGREEMENT. MS. PAQUIN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUCH A PERSON, AND I WOULD HAVE SO FOUND. JOHN MCMANUS