HomeMy WebLinkAboutChakravarty 96-01-195B769 CAMBRIAN VS CHAKRAVARTY
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
B E T W E E N :
ONTARIO COUNCIL OF REGENTS FOR THE COLLEGES OF APPLIED ARTS AND
TECHNOLOGY IN THE FORM OF CAMBRIAN COLLEGE
(hereinafter called the "College")
- and -
ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION
(FOR ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES)
(hereinafter called the "Union")
MahadevChakravarty
OPSEU File No. 95B769
(hereinafter called the "Grievor")
ARBITRATOR: Richard H. McLaren, C. Arb.
Jon McManus, Union Nominee
PatriciaHennessy,
College Nominee
COUNSEL FOR THE COLLEGE: Steven Shamie
COUNSEL FOR THE UNION: Joanne Fox
A HEARING IN RELATION TO THIS MATTER WAS HELD AT SUDBURY, ONTARIO, ON NOVEMBER
22, 1995.
PRELIMINARY AWARD
Counsel for the College raised a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the Board to hear and determine
the grievance for which this Board was established. Counsel agreed at the hearing to the following facts in support
of the arguments with respect to the preliminary objection:
1. Mr. Chakravarty was born December 25, 1929.
2. His seniority date with the College was August 1, 1967.
3. Following application for early retirement, the Grievor retired from the College pursuant to its
policy effective November 30, 1993, at which time he was age 63.
4. He was paid $61,604.31, $54,000.00 of which was paid into a registered retirement savings plan,
and the balance of which after deductions was paid to him by cheque dated November 30,1993.
5. The grievance was filed on August 24, 1994 alleging that: The College did not inform the Grievor
of his right to retire at the end of the contract year in which he turned 65.
For purposes of the Union's argument in response to the College's preliminary objection as to jurisdiction it was
also agreed that there would be a stipulation which assumed that a misrepresentation was made by the College as to
when the Grievor would cease working following reaching the age of 65 as provided for under the Collective
Agreement. It was agreed by Counsel and the Board that this would be assumed to be a fact for purposes of this
argument. It was further agreed that in the event that the preliminary objection was rejected, this assumed
misrepresentation would have to be proved in the Union's case. Then, depending on what the Board established to
be the facts with regard to the misrepresentation, it might have an impact on this preliminary Award. This would be
the subject of argument if the matter proceeds to the merits.
The argument of the College is threefold. First, Mr. Chakravarty is not an employee, and therefore unable to
launch a grievance under Article 32.01. If that difficulty is overcome, he must have been employed in the four
months preceding the filing of the grievance in August of 1994, which he cannot establish because of being in
retirement. In the alternative, it was argued that even if the grievance can be launched under Article 32.01, the
particular grievance launched in this proceeding was untimely and well beyond the limits established in Article
32.02 through 32.05. In support of its arguments the College made reference to the following case:
An unreported decision between Cambrian College and Ontario Public Service Employees Union a
decision by a Board of Arbitration chaired by Arbitrator Swan dated October 18, 1994.
In reply to the submissions of the College, it was argued on behalf of the Grievor and the Union that while the
time limits in Article 32.02 to 32.05 are mandatory, the provisions found at the outset of the grievance procedure in
Article 32.01 are merely directory. As a result of being directory, this provision does not require enforcement by the
Board so as to say that the grievance had been filed too late. It was the submission of the Union that the
misrepresentation affected the Grievor's assessment of the early retirement package. The essence of that affect was
that there was a right which had vested in the Grievor at the point of his decision for application and subsequent
acceptance of the early retirement. This vested right is analogous to a deemed quit where there has not been a
voluntary severing of the employment relationship. On the basis of the fact that the vested right arose during the
employment relationship, the former employee ought to be able to launch the grievance under the grievance
procedure. It was further submitted that it is this vested right which gives rise to the grievance. The College had
only referred to the provisions of Article 32.01 in its replies to the grievance and has waived any right to assert lack
of timeliness in the filing of the grievance. In support of its position reference was made to the following cases:
Re Genstar Chemical Limited, O.L.R.B.R. 835, (Haladner, 1978); Re The Queen in Right of Ontario et al.
(1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 474 (H.C.J.); An unreported decision between The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Revenue) and Ontario Public ServicesEmployees' Union, a decision by a Board of Arbitration
chaired by Arbitrator Stewart dated April 16, 1991; Re Corporation ofMunicipality of Casimir, Jennings &
Appleby, 5 L.A.C. (4th) 443 (Joyce, 1989); Re Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 41 L.A.C. (4th) 310 (Knopf,
1994).
The relevant clauses of the Collective Agreement read as follows:
ARTICLE 27
JOB SECURITY
27.03
E Seniority shall be lost and employment deemed terminated if:
(iii) an employee resigns or leaves the employ of the College;
ARTICLE 32
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
32.01
Articles 32.02 to 32.05 inclusive apply to an
employee who has been employed continuously for at least the
preceding four months.
Complaints
32.02
It is the mutual desire of the parties that complaints of employees be adjusted as quickly as possible
and it is understood that if an employee has a complaint, the employee shall discuss it with the employee's
immediate supervisor within 20 days after the circumstances giving rise to the complaint have occurred or
have come or ought reasonably to have come to the attention of the employee in order to give the
immediate supervisor an opportunity of adjusting the complaint. The discussion shall be between the
employee and the immediate supervisor unless mutually agreed to have other persons in attendance. The
immediate supervisor's response to the complaint shall be given within seven days after discussion with the
employee.
Grievances
32.03
Failing settlement of a complaint, it shall be taken up as a grievance (if it falls within the definition
under 32.12 C) in the following manner and sequence provided it is presented within seven days of the
immediate supervisor's reply to the complaint. It is the intention of the parties that reasons supporting the
grievance and for its referral to a succeeding Step be set out in the grievance and on the document referring
it to the next Step. Similarly, the College's written decisions at each step shall contain reasons supporting
the decision.
Step One
An employee shall present a signed grievance in writing to the employee's immediate supervisor setting
forth the nature of the grievance, the surrounding circumstances and the remedy sought. The immediate
supervisor shall arrange a meeting within seven days of the receipt of the grievance at which the employee,
a Union Steward designated by the Union Local, if the Union Local so requests, the Dean of the Division
and the immediate supervisor shall attend and discuss the grievance. The immediate supervisor and Dean
will give the grievor and the Union Steward their decision in writing within seven days following the
meeting. If the grievor is not satisfied with the decision of the immediate supervisor and Dean, the grievor
shall present the grievance in writing at Step Two within 15 days of the day the grievor received such
decision.
Step Two
The grievor shall present the grievance to the College President.
The College President or the President's designee shall convene a meeting concerning the grievance, at
which the grievor shall have an opportunity to be present, within 20 days of the presentation, and shall give
the grievor and a Union Steward designated by the Union Local the President's decision in writing within
15 days following the meeting. In addition to the Union Steward, a representative designated by the Union
Local shall be present at the meeting if requested by the employee, the Union Local or the College. The
College President or the President's designee may have such persons or counsel attend as the College
President or the President's designee deems necessary.
In the event that any difference arising from the interpretation, application, administrator or alleged
contravention of this Agreement has not been satisfactorily settled under the foregoing Grievance
Procedure, the matter shall then, by notice in writing given to the other party within 15 days of the date of
receipt by the grievor of the decision of the College official at Step Two, be referred to arbitration.
32.04 A
Any matter so referred to arbitration, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable,
shall be heard by a Board of three arbitrators composed of an arbitrator appointed by each of the College
and the Union and a third arbitrator who shall be Chair. The Chair shall be selected from the following
panel:
G. Brent R. MacLaren (sic)
H. Brown M. Mitchnick
K. Burkett M. Picher
D. CarterP. Picher
J. Devlin S. Schiff
R. Howe O. Shime
P. Knopf M. Teplitsky
R. MacDowell
Representatives of the Council and the Union shall meet monthly to review the matters referred to
arbitration and agree to the assignment of a Chair to hear each of the grievances. The Chair shall be
assigned either by agreement or, failing agreement, by lot. The parties may from time to time, by mutual
agreement, add further names to such panel. Also, the parties may agree to a supplementary list of persons
to act on a single or number of occasions. Following selection of a Chair, the College and the Union shall
each appoint its arbitrator within ten days and forthwith notify the other party and the Chair. However the
College and Union may mutually agree, prior to selection of a Chair, to arbitration by a sole arbitrator. The
sole arbitrator shall be selected from the panel as in the case of a Chair and the other provisions referring to
an arbitration board shall appropriately apply.
32.04 B
No person shall be appointed as an arbitrator who is or was within six months prior to such
appointment an employee or is or has within six months prior to such appointment, acted as solicitor,
counsel, advisor, agent or representative of either of the parties or the College concerned. Any Chair who
declines to act on five consecutive occasions shall be removed from the panel and a replacement selected
by mutual agreement of the parties.
32.04 C
The finding of the majority of the arbitrators as to the facts and as to the interpretation, application,
administration or alleged contravention of the provisions of this Agreement shall be final and binding upon
all parties concerned, including the employee(s) and the College.
32.04 D
The arbitration board shall not be authorized to alter, modify or amend any part of the terms of this
Agreement nor to make any decision inconsistent therewith; nor to deal with any matter that is not a proper
matter for grievance under this Agreement.
34.04 E
The College and the Union shall each pay one-half the remuneration and expenses of the Chair of
the arbitration board and shall each pay the remuneration and expenses of the person it appoints as
arbitrator.
General
32.05A
If the grievor fails to act within the time limits set out at any Complaint or Grievance Step, the
grievance will be considered abandoned.
32.05 B
If an official fails to reply to a grievance within the time limits set out at any Complaint or
Grievance Step, the grievor may submit the grievance to the next step of the grievance procedure.
32.05 C
At any Complaint or Grievance Step of the grievance procedure, the time limits imposed upon
either party may be extended by mutual agreement.
32.05 D
The time limits set out at the Complaint or Grievance Steps including referral to arbitration shall
be calculated by excluding the period from Christmas Day to New Year's Day inclusive.
32.05E
At a meeting at any Step of the grievance procedure, the employee may be represented by a Union
Steward if the employee desires such assistance.
32.05 F
The arbitration board may dispose of a grievance without further notice to any person who is
notified of the hearing and fails to appear.
32.05 G
Where the arbitration board determines that a disciplinary penalty or discharge is excessive, it may
substitute such other penalty for the discipline or discharge as it considers just and reasonable in all the
circumstances.
32.05 H
It is understood that nothing contained in this Article shall prevent an employee from presenting
personally a grievance up to and including a hearing by the arbitration board without reference to any other
person. However, a Union Steward may be present as an observer, commencing at Step One, if the steward
so requests.
32.05
The College and the Union Local shall each keep the other advised in writing of the names of its
respective representatives authorized to act on its behalf under the Grievance Procedure.
The general statement on retirement policy found in the College's manual, and filed as Exhibit 6 in these
proceedings reads in part as follows:
GENERAL STATEMENT
The normal retirement age for all College employees is age 65. Listed below are the conditions or
procedures relating to retirement.
PROCEDURE
1. Normal Retirement
a) Academic Staff An academic staff member has the option of retiring at the end of the month, end of the
semester or end of the contract year in which his/her birthday occurs.
(Exhibit 6)
The "Early Retirement Assistance Plan" { "Plan" } utilized by the College was filed as Exhibit 7. Under its
provisions, only those who were age 63 or less could use the Plan. At the point when the Grievor retired, he was
still 63 years of age. However, the Grievor was within 24 days of becoming 64 years of age and ineligible under the
Plan. The Grievor made application and was accepted by the College to participate in the Plan. The purpose of the
misrepresentation, which is assumed in this analysis, would relate to the Grievor's valuing of the incentives
proffered under the Plan in contrast to the continuing benefits of employment for the time remaining for him to
work if he did not take up the Plan.
The document which explains the Plan provides at page 2 in Section 3(b) entitled "Definitions" as follows:
b) Date of Retirement
Administrative, Support Staff, and Faculty:
_ Anniversary of the birthdate; or
_ End of the month of the anniversary of the birthdate; or
_ In the case of faculty, end of the semester or end of the academic year in which age 65 is reached.
(Exhibit 7)
In both the College's general policy manual and in its Plan, the information as to the operation of the normal
retirement date is available and is explicitly set out to be read by those desiring to utilize the Plan. In the policy
manual the particular retirement date is at the option of the employee. The Plan is not as specific on the point of
having an option. The Grievor made an application under the Plan. Therefore, he must be taken to have read the
Plan. He had in the Plan and other documents all of the information as to the possible termination dates for his
normal retirement.
Even on the assumption that the College misrepresented when the Grievor would cease working following
reaching age 65 all any College representative would be telling the Grievor was one of the possible dates upon
which he would likely be retired given the information in the manual and the Plan. As he would become 65 in
December 1994, which also coincides with the end of the semester, he was being told that when the autumn of 1994
rolled around he would likely be retired as of the month in which he turned 65. It is a statement centring upon the
normal retirement. That statement or representation must be as to a fact in the future by some two years at the time
it is assumed to have been made. What the representative of the College was doing was indicating a likely scenario
of several possibilities for the actual normal retirement date. All of these possibilities are summarised in the very
documents the Grievor would have had to have read in order to make the application for the Plan.
In order for a misrepresentations to occur in contractual matters, it requires a misstatement of an existing legal
relationship as to a present fact not as to future intentions, opinions or other future matters. Therefore, this Board
does not find the circumstances which could give rise to a misrepresentation existed in this case. Therefore, there is
no legal basis upon which to found a promissory estoppel. The presumed misrepresentation, even if it occurred,
relates to future events and can not be said to be one which is an eligible operative misrepresentation on which an
estoppel might be found. Without a representation which is an operative misrepresentation to found any estoppel
arising from it, there can be no vested rights theory by which to circumvent the time limits of the Collective
Agreement. The Board makes that determination without finding that if there was an operative eligible
misrepresentation, it would have provided the basis for a vested right. There is no need to make such a
determination in this Award because there is no eligible operative misrepresentation to found the estoppel. There
was no eligible misrepresentation which could affect this matter.
Should the Board be wrong in its finding that there is no eligible representation which is an operative
misrepresentation to found the estoppel it would further find as follows. Misrepresentation is a concept in contracts
law which gives some contractual effect to statements said outside of the documentation or contractual
arrangement, and which can possibly give rise to the estopping of that documentation or contractual arrangement on
the basis of the principles of fairness when it is equitable and reasonable to do so. It must be equitable to apply it.
Here it is nine months later when a desire to rely on the misrepresentation becomes manifest. That is too long a
time frame in which to use principles of equity to upset legal positions established by both the Retiree and the
College. Furthermore, the tardiness of filing the grievance suggests that there was little reliance on the
misrepresentation.For, if it were to be said that it was not known that the provisions of the Collective Agreement
had been improperly stated as to their effect on the Grievor, then the Grievor would have not relied on them in
making the early retirement application decision, and subsequently signing the document which put it into effect.
The Grievor had all the correct information before him on which he could place his own reliance. Thus the
equitable concept of a misrepresentation by the College, even when it is presumed to exist, does not give rise to the
vested right of a contractual nature in respect of this grievance. At best it is something which should be addressed in
the equities and fairness of the circumstances. That does not amount to a vested right which the employee had while
an employee. The College made a future statement as to how it was thought the administration of the contract
would apply to the mandatory retirement when it arose.
On that basis, there can be no vested rights pursuant to the theories found in the cases supplied by the Union
Counsel. The vested rights argument within the cases cited by Counsel for the Union often arose in a situation in
which the collective agreement had expired and the new collective agreement was yet to come into force. In those
situations, it was the intention of both parties for vested rights to exist within the interim period. Such intention was
not evident here, as it was the intention of the parties for the employee to be terminated from his employ upon
acceptance of the Plan. In the absence of any vested rights, there is no ability to look to an earlier time frame than
the date of filing of the grievance.
In the absence of any misrepresentations giving rise to vested rights in the Grievor, the Board may focus on the
explicit provisions of the Collective Agreement and their application to this grievance. Article 32.01, which
incorporates by reference Article 32.02 through to 32.05 applies to an employee, and not to former or retired
employees Furthermore, it only applies to employees who have been "employed continuously for at least the
preceding four months". The Grievor applied for and was accepted for the Plan. At page 2 of the Plan, at Section
3(d) entitled "Definitions", it is stated that "Employees accessing the Early Retirement Plan will be considered as
having terminated their employment with the College." (Exhibit #7). By signing Exhibit # 8, the Grievor accepted
this condition of his early retirement package. Therefore, he was no longer an employee of the College as of
November 30, 1993.
Article 27.03 E(iii) strips an employee of their seniority who resigns or leaves the employ of the College. At the
point when the early retirement took effect on November 30, 1993, this provision applied and the employee was no
longer an employee of the College, but a former or retired one. Therefore, this individual is a former employee,
who is now retired. As a retiree, and not an employee within the meaning and requirements of Article 32.01, he is
ineligible to launch a grievance under the Collective Agreement. Therefore, this Board is without jurisdiction to
hear this grievance.
In the further alternative, the equivalent predecessor provisions to Article 32.01 through 32.05 have been held to
be mandatory, and a Board of Arbitration has no jurisdiction under the Colleges Collective Bargaining Act to
relieve against the effect of the time limits contained therein. Despite the submissions of the Union Counsel that
Article 32.01 could be considered to be directory because of the absence of any compulsory language or penalties,
the determination of whether terms are mandatory or directory will turn on the construction of the agreement and
the parties' prior interpretation of its terms in the absence of any change in the language. The Board agrees with the
submissions of the College that these provisions have been well known between the parties and understood to be
mandatory provisions, as was cited in a decision involving this College in a Board of Arbitration chaired by
Arbitrator Swan, involving the grievance of a Mr. Glen E. Bailey in an unanimous decision dated October 18, 1994.
Therefore, the Board concludes that Mr. Chakravarty is not an employee and, therefore, not able to activate the
grievance procedure. Even if he were an employee, he has not been so in the four months preceding the grievance,
which is required in Article 32.01, and could not file a grievance. Nevertheless, even if the Grievor was considered
to be an employee and fit within Article 32.01 and a grievance could be filed, there is the issue of the mandatory
time limits. In this case Mr. Chakravarty retired on November 30, 1993. The grievance was filed on August 24,
1994, more than nine months after the retirement date. There is a grievance on August 24, 1994 relating to events
which preceded the retirement which occurred on November 30, 1993. Therefore, the grievance is filed far too late
to be considered one which is timely even if the time limits were merely directory which they are not. The
grievance must be deemed to be void and not arbitrable before this Board.
Furthermore, in accepting the early retirement, the Grievor signed a document filed as Exhibit 8 in which it is
stated:
"As part of this agreement, you will immediately advise in writing the OPSEU Local Union and the
Director of Human Resources that you are formerly withdrawing from any grievances filed under your
name.
Your signature at the bottom of this letter will constitute acceptance of the foregoing terms and conditions
of your early retirement package." That statement is in effect waiving any grievances or right to grieve in
accepting the early retirement. These provisions, coupled with the nine month delay in filing the grievance
which almost placed it on the date on which the Grievor would have reached the age of 65, makes the
grievance too late in the same sense as found in this Award in the absence of any misrepresentations. This
is notwithstanding that the possible misrepresentations might, at best, affect the equity surrounding the
entering into of the early retirement.
For all of the foregoing reasons it is found that this Board is without the jurisdiction to hear the matter in that the
grievance was not launched by someone who was entitled to utilize the grievance procedure. It is further found that
the grievance was launched too late for it to meet the mandatory requirements of the grievance procedure found in
Article 32 and this makes the grievance void and not arbitrable before this Board. For all of the foregoing reasons
the preliminary objection of the College is upheld and the grievance is found to be not arbitrable.
DATED AT LONDON, ONTARIO THIS 10TH DAY OF JANUARY 1996.
Richard H. McLaren, C.Arb.
I concur
Jon McManus,
Union Nominee
I concur
PatriciaHennessy,
College Nominee