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HomeMy WebLinkAbout1986-1277 Vinall et al 93-07-21 ONTARIO EMPLOYES DE LA' COURONNE CROWN EMPLOYEES DE L'ON TARIO GRIEVANCE C,OMMI$SION DE SETTLEMENT' REGLEMENT BOARD DES GRIEFS 150 DUNDAS STREET WE$~ SUITE 2100, TORONTO, ONT~, M5G 1Z8 TE~PHONEIT~L~PHONE; (476) ~2~ t388 180, RUE OUNDAS QUEST, BUREAU 21~o TORONTO ~ONTARIO~, M5G 1270/86, 1276/86, 1277/86 IN THE MATTER OF ]tN ARBITI~ATION Under' THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT Before THE GRIEU/%NCE SETTLEMENT BOARD BETWEEN OPSEU (Vinall' et al) Grievor _. - and -. The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) EmPloyer BEFORE 'O. Gray Vice-Chairperson I. Thomson Member J. Miles Member FOR THE M. Webb GRIEVOR Counsel Gowling, Strathy & Henderson Barristers & Solicitors FOR THE D.-Costen RESPONDENT Counsel Legal Services Branch Management Board of Cabinet HEARING May 27, 1993 AWARD The union alleges that the employer has breached the terms on which a grievance by Roy Vinall was settled in 1988. It asks that We enforce the terms of that settlement. The employer says that it has abided by the terms of the settlement. As a preliminary matter, however, it objects that this Board has no jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement because they involve the provision Of training, a matter which subsection 18(1) of the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act ("the Act~) says may not be the subject of collective bargaining. This award deals with that preliminary Objection. - The Facts Alleged by the Union Apart from references to correspondence received by the Grievance Settlement Board (~GSB'), the background description which follows reflects union counsel's opening statement. Parts of it may be in dispute. It is not in dispute that the parties entered into the Memorandum of Settlement quoted below. On October 6, 1986, Mr. Vinall and two other pilots employed by the employer grieved that they had been improperly denied a position described as ~IFR - Remote Sensing Pilot" which had been the subject of two job postings. The job involved flying an aircraf~ described to us as a 'Navaho~ out of the Ministry's Malton base. The first posting did not identify current proficiency on that aircraft as ·something applicants had to have. Mr. Vinall did not have it. A more junior applicant did. Mr. Vinall was interviewed. His score was almost as high as that of the junior applicant. Afar the interviews, .the employer cancelled the job competition and reposted the' job'. The second posting required current proficiency on the Navaho aircraft. The more junior of the original applicants, who had that qualification, was awarded the job. The three grievances were referred to the GSB for arbitration. Having earlier had the hearing of the grievances adjourned sine die, in mid-1988 the parties executed a written Memorandum of Seftlement in the ,following terms: In the mstter of grievances (G.S.B.//1270/86, 1276/86 and 1277/86) betweer~ The Ontario Public Service Employees Union (R. Vinall, L. Zinn, P. Crosby, Grievors) -and- The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) the parties are agreed to the following as a full and final.resolUtion. 1) The Ministry shall"provide' training, to each of the Grievors to a proficient level, on the King Air in order of seniority. 2) The training shall begin on approximately October 1, 1988, following the completion of the 215 prOgram, beginning with the most senior grievor. Training for the other two grievors shall begin on approvingly the same date in 1989 and 1990. Following completion of their training, each grievor will be 'given reasonable flying time on the King Air. 3) Upon completion of their tr~inlng, the grievors agree to compete for King Air Pilot vacancies as they arise. Such vacancies will be posted and conducted in accordance with Article'4 of the Collective A~reement. 4) Should any or all of the Grievors be the successful candidate in any competition described in//3, they agree to accept the position ~nd relocate as necessary. Article 4.5 will apply. 5) The Union and the Grievors sb~]l immediately withdraw their grievances and notify the Registrar ~of the GrievanCe Settlement Board that the matter is resolved. The above terms and conditions are agreed to without prejudice to the positions of the parties and shall not be raised in any further or other disputes. The "Air King' is another aircraft which was and is being flown out of'the Ministry's base in Malton. In September 1~88, the GSB was advised by' the union's courmel that tho three grievances had been settled and that, in accordance With the settlement, the grievors were withdrawing their grievances. In January 1993, the union wrote to the GSB as follows: The GSB did not issue an award in the above captioned matter as a Settlement was reached. A copy of the Memorandum of Settlement is enclosed. It is now requested that this matter be scheduled for arbitration as the terms of the Settlement have not been complied with and therefore the original grievances remain u~_resolved. Whatever may have been intended by that letter, the union does not now ask that this Board entertain Mrl Vinall's original grievance. As we.noted at the outset, it asks that we enforce the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement by which that grievance was settled. -' The Union's position is that the training and flying time provided for in the Memorandum of Settlement are the training and flying time required to attain and maintain the qualifications required of a pilot of an Air King aircraft under the federal Department of Transport's Air Navigation Order, Series' 7, N~.~mber 3. It says Mr. Vina]l received that training and flying time in 1989, 1990 and 1991. He is the only one of the three grievors still in the bargaining unit. By letter dated November 6, 1992, the Ministry advised Mr. Vinall that it would no longer fund his "annual Air King training' because of the "current fiscal environment'. He was also told that the Ministry is prepared to assure you that you will be interviewed for the next pilot vacancy at Malton if future recruitment is required. Further, we are prepared to assure you tlmt currency on a King Air will not be a job requirement nor will it be considered is a factor in the interview process. This assurance apparently plays a part in the argument the Ministry would make that its refusal to provide ongoing training and flying time is not a breach of the Memorandum of Settlement. Enforcing.the terms of that memorand~.~m will require that we interpret them. Argument In the course of their argument, counsel referred to the following provisions of the Act: 18.--(1) Every collective agreement shall be deemed to provide that it is the exclusive function of the employer to m~rmge, which function, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes the right to determine, (a) employment, appointment, complement, organization, assignment, discipline, dismissal, suspensio .n, work methods and procedures, kinds and locations of equipment and classification of positions; and Co) merit system, training and development, appraisal and superannu- atiom the g~Verning principles of which are subject to review 15y the employer with the bargaining agent, and such matters will not be the subject of collective bargaining nor come within the jurisdiction of a beard. (2) In addition to any other rights of grievance under a collective agreement, au employee, cl~irnirlg, . (a) that his position has been'improperly classified; (b) that he has been appraised contrary'to the governing principles and standards; or (c) that he has been disciplined or dismissed or .suspended from employment without just cause, 'may process such matter in accordance with the grievance procedure provided in the collective agreement, and faili~g final determination under such procedure, the · matter may be processed in accordance with the procedure for final dete _rrn~nation applicable under section 19. 19.--(1) Every collective agreement sb~!! be deemed to provide that in the .event the parties are ~,~oble to effect a settlement of any differences between them arising from the interpretation, application, sc]miuistration or alleged contravention of the agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable, such matter may be referred for arbitration to the Grievance Settlement Board and the Board after giving full opportunity to the parties to present their evidence and to · moke their submissions, sh~!~ decide the matter and its decision is final and binding upon the parties and the employees covered by the agreement. (6) Where a party or an employee has failed to comply 'with any of the terms of the decision of the Grievance Settlement Board, any party or employee affected by the decision may,'after the expiration of fourteen days from the date of the release of the decision or the date provided in the decision for compliance, whichever is later, file.in the~office Of the R~gistrar of the Supreme Court a copy of the decision, exclusiv~ of the reasons therefor, whereupon the decision shall be 'entered in the same way as a judgment or order of that court and is enforceable as such. Counsel also referred to four decisions.of this Board: Sim arid Bain, 1387/86 (Draper), Jansen, 888/89 (Watt'rs), Neamtz, 5i6/84 (Roberts) and Union .Grievance, 802/91 (Watters). The award in Sim and Bain, supra, concerned a grievance which alleged that the employer had failed to~comply with the written terms on which a previous grievance had been settled. Notwithstanding the willingness of both parties to have it deal with their dispute about the interpretation of their settlement agreement, .a. panel of the Board refused to do so on the ground that, in its view, the dispute did not fall within the statutory jurisdiction conferred on the GSB by the Act. This decision was the subject of ~m application for judicial· review, to which reference will be made later. In Jansen, supra, another panel had a discharge, grievance before it. The union claimed that the matter had been settled. The employer said it had not. Further, the employer argued that the Board was without jurisdiction to consider whether a settlement had been concluded, relying on the award in Sim and Bain, supra. The panel ruled that it did have that jurisdiction: In our judgment, we do possess the Jurisdiction to determine whether the parties effected a settlement of the issueB in d.tspnte. We th~lc that this case is distinguish. able from Sim and Bair~ There, both parties asked the Board'to interpret terms of settlement which had been reduced to written form. The Board concluded that it lacked the necessary authority to embark on an interpretation of the agreement. In this instance, we are being asked a more fu~4~mental question, this being, -.. - wheiher a settlement act~_~a_lly exists between these parties. In our minds, this is a significantly d.i_~_erent issue. Indeed, the Board considers that this case is much closer to the factual situation found in Cover, 256/50 (Kennedy) which was relied on by the Union. It is apparent from a reading of the award that the Board there was prepared to interpret written csmmunicatlons in an effort to find whether a settlement had been reached. After e~mlning these communications, it held that a settlement did exist. The Board, thei, efore, concluded that it would be improper to entertain the merits of the dispute. In this regard, the award states at page four (4): ,~ ~There are numerous 'arbitral authorities to the effect that a grievance that' ' is settled, withdrawn or abandoned cannot be the subject matter of a subsequent submission-to arbitratior~" We are inclined to adopt an approach slmil~ to that employed in (~over. More specifically, we conclude that our jurisdiction to proceed is found within section 19(1) of the Crown Employees Qo. llective Bargaining Act. Under that section, the Board is empowered to determine, inter alia, whether a matter is arbitrable. In our assessment, it is necessary for us to examine the facts in order to properly consider whether these parties arrived at a binding agreement' following the preheating meeting. If this question were to be answered in the affnnnative, this Board would be deprived of the right to hear the grievance. Conversely, if the parties were not ad idem, the grievance could go forward. The Employer would then be required to commence its case and to show just cause for the discipline. A contrary finding would, in our judgment, f/ixlermine the sanctity of settlements freely concluded as it would permit parties to withdraw from such agreements with impunity. For .. reasons which are obvious, that result would not provide for good labour .relations. We are .consequently disinclined to adopt reasoning which could have that effect. In Neamtz, supra, the union asked the Board to interpret the terms of an Order it had earlier issued at the joint request of the parties, embodying an agreement the parties had made in order to settle certain, grievances; The employer objected that the Board was functus offic/o, and therefore without jurisdiction to do as the union asked. One of the provisions of the parties' agreement and, thus, of the consent Order was that 8. This settlement shall be made an Order of the Grievance Settlement Board only for the purpose of enforcement of this settlement. Having regard to that provision, the Board concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to do as the union asked: Considering the submissions of the parties in the light Of the unique facts of this case, we must conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to clarify .any latent ambiguities in the settlement agreement which was embodied in the instant Consent Order. We have no doubt that by virtue of paragraph 8 of the Minutes of Settlement, the parties agreed that the settlement would .be made an order of the .. Board for a very limited purpose, i.e., the purpose of obtaining enforcement of the terms of the settlement under Section 19(6) of the Crown Employees CollectiVe Bargaining Act. They did not agree the Minutes of Settlement would become a Board erder for all purposes, nor are we convinced that as a matter of law the act of issuing the Consent Order transformed the Minutes of Settlement into an award of the Board for all intents and purposes, including the purpose of clarifying the language in which the parties cast their settlement. If this were so, it would stand as a complete contradiction to paragraph 8, which, after all, formed part of the Order. If the parties had wished to place such ambigaities before the Board for its determination~ they could have dono so by including appropriate language in their Minutes of Settlement. As we have seen, the language they did choose to use indicated precisely the opposite intent. The' award in Union Grievance, supra, dealt with an objection by the employer to the Board's jurisdiction to-entertain a grievance alleging that it had breached the' ' terms' of an agreement by which an earlier grievance had been settled. The settlement agreement had not been made an order of the GSB. The employer argued that the Board had' no jurisdiction to interpret a settlement and that the grievance was inarbitrable under subsection 19(1) of the Act because it was not premised on breach of specific articles in the collective agreement. The awards in Sim and Bain, Jansen and Neamtz were cited.. With reference to. the award in Sim and Bain, supra, the Board noted that The Union subsequently filed au Application For Judicial Review dated October 14, 1988. The primary ground for asking for the intervention of the Divisional Court was stated as follows: the Grievance Settlement Board errored [sic] in declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Crown Employees Collective B0rgaining ACt,, R.S.O. 1980, c. 108 to give a final and binding determin~ti°n to the grievances of Patricia Sim and Douglas Bain. The Union asked for an Order q~_~ashing the earlier decision of the Board and for a further Order remitting the m~tter back for final and binding determination. The endorsement of Mr. Justice Reid on the Application Record read: .. Application is unopposed. The de~ision of the Grievance Settlement Board is set aside and the matter remitted to the Board for a hearing of the grievance. The Board in concluded that it had jurisdiction under subsection 19(1)of the Act to resolve the parties' dispute about .whether the employer had complied with the settlement, because it was a difference ,~which arose from the appIication, administration or alleged violation of the collective'agreement: The dispute between the parties initially arose from a complaint that the Employer had improperly administered the provisions of Appendix 3, Schedule A of the collective agreement. The grievance of September 11, 1989 was subsequently resolved on March 8, 1991. The settlement 'roached on that date incorporated earlier guidelines of March 14, 1990 that addressed, inter alia, the accumulation and utilization of excess hours by. Schedule A employees. The Board, aflmr reviewing the history of the dispute, concludes that the threshold issue on the merits is whether the EmploYer has complied with the aforementioned settlement. More specifically, did it change the guidelines prior to December 31, 1991 as alleged. Such question~ of necessity, requires an interpretation of paragraph number four (4) of the guidelines. In this regard, we do not accept the Employer's assertion that the settlement was complied with as of the issuance of the ~. guidelines. Quite clearly, the settlement on its face contemplated that these guideline~ would be in effect without change from April 15, 1991 to December 1991. The question of change cannot, therefore, be avoided. - The Board has been persuaded that the ultimate difference between the parties is directl~ r~la~d to the application, admim~ation or alleged contraven. tion of the collective agreement, particularly Appendix 3, Schedule A thereof. Section 19(1) of the Crown Emolovees Collective Bargaining Act makes the Grievance Settlement Board the final arbiter of such disputes between the parties. The Board by statute is authorized to m~ke a final and binding decision. There is no question that the issue was properly before the Board by way of the' grievance of September 11, 1989. We have not been convinced that jurisdiction was ousted or exhausted as a consequence of the subsequent settlement~ Rather, we think that juris&ction over the matter continues for purposes of ensuring that the settlement is, in fact, complied with by both parties. Tkis role may require us to make a final and binding decision on the threshold i~sue, as desm-ibed above. To be clear, we find that the parties may return to the Board inthe event there is an allegation ofnen- compliance. Our decision on this aspect of the case promotes the labour relations objective that settlement of grievances be encourage& Parties would not be inclined to enter settlements if they could be breached with impunity without recourse to the . Grievance Settlement Board. In a matter such as this, the parties could not resort to,section 19(6) of the Crown Em~lovee~ Collective Bargaining Act as the Board did not issue a decision that could be filed in the Supreme Court. Further, in view of the settlement, it is unlikely that the Union could proceed with a fresh grievance on the identical issue. Were the Employer correct, the Union here would be '; required to go to the' courts of general jurisdiction in order to seek enforcement. Quite apart from the possible effect of the Ri~ht~ of Labour Act, R.S.O. 1980, Chapter 456, it would seem preferable, as a matter of policy, to have issues of the present type dealt with by ~mi,dstrative tribunals having labour relations expertise. This is especially so vis a vis the Grievance Settlement Board which initially entertained the grievance and which by statute is compelled to render final and bi:n_~,_'ug decision on outstanding differences between these parties. -The Board found support for its conclusions in the result in the Divisional Court in Sim and Bain, supra, despite the employer's argument that that result was premised largely on the fact that there both parties wanted the Board to resolve their dispute: Our decision is also consistent with ~irn and Bain. As stated previously, that case raised an issue of compliance with a settlement. That question, which was also before the Board by way of a second grievance, called for an interpretation of the settlement. The Board declined to entertain the dispute. In its judgment, it lacked the requisite jurisdiction under the Crown Ein~loyees Collective Bargaining Act. The basis for the decision was placed squarely before the Divisional Court in the Application For Judicial Review. We think it highly unlikely that' the Court would have set aside the decision and remitted it back to the Board were it not of the opinion the Board, in law, possessed the jurisdiction to undertake and complete the tasl~ It is obvious that the Grievance Settlement Board is a creature of statute. It~ jurisdiction .cannot be enlarged by either the Court or the consent of the parties. UltimAtely, on our review of Sim and Bairn we think the Divisional Cour~ has determlued that this Board has the jurisdiction to hear a compliance issue requiring an interpretation of terms of s~ttlement. This Chairperson's comments in ~ansen relating to ~im and Bain were made without the benefit of the Divisional Court's endorsement. Indeed, ~ was heard and released prior to the release of that endorsement. The Board also observed that the decision in Nearntz turned largely on the provision in the 'parties' agreement that it was only to be made an order of the Board for purpose of enforcement, which led the Board to conclude that the parties intended that enforcement would be dealt with by the means contemplated in subsection 19(6) of the Act. Without acknowledging that it is correct, counsel for the employer argued that the decision in Union Grievance, supra, is distinguishable because the relief sought here is an order directing the employer to provide training. Because of subsection 18(1) of the Act, 'training" could not be the subject of a collective agreement provision, counsel submitted, and accordingly could not be the subject of a difference of the sort contemplated by Subsection 19(1). He also argued that the wording of subsection 18(2) of the Act makes 'it clear that the GSB does not have jurisdiction to entertain a grievance about the Provision of training. He submitted that a settlement cannot give the GSB that jurisdiction. In answer to questions bY the chair, counsel for the employer said it was not .the employer's position that the minutes of settlement Were unenforceable, but only that they could not be enforced by the GSB. Asked, how the employer thought they could be enforced, counsel first speculated about the possibility of an unfair labour practice complaint to the Ontario Public Service Labour Relations Tribunal. Ultimately, he stated that the Crown's position is that interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement of this sort could be the subject of court proceedings. Counsel for the emploYer noted that the settlement in question was made before · the decision in Union Grievance, supra. He submitted that we should consider the significance of the parties' decision whether to make their settlement an order of the - Board or not in light of the jurisprudence as it then existed. He argued that the parties'.failure to have the terms of their settlement incorporated into a Board order should lead us to infer that they did not contemplate that a dispute about the level and sufficiency of training provided pursuant to the Settlement would come back before the Board. Counsel for the union argued that the analysis in Union Grievance, supra, is directly on point and cannot be distinguished as counsel for the employer suggests. She · submitted that most settlements in some way or other touch on management rights and other subjects not addressed by the relevant collective agreement. She argued that the Board has jurisdiction over the parties' dispute here because the dispute concerns the terms on which the parties settled a grievance concerning the interpretation, · application, administration or alleged contravention of the parties collective agreement and, hence,, involves a difference ~arising from' the interpretation, application, administration or alleged contraventio'n of the parties collective agreement. She denied that the law on these points was clearly against the Board's having jurisdiction when the settlement was made. She also submitted that our jurisdiction is not determined by what the parties thought at the time. There was no reference in argument to the fact that the allegation of non- compliance with a grievance settlement was brought before us by requesting that a hearing be convened with respect to the original grievance, rather than by processing a fresh grievance through the grievance procedure. Decision In labour relations, as in other contexts, a resolution negotiated and agreed to by the parties to 'a dispute is_preferable to one imposed on them through adjudication. Grievance processes are intended to encourage and facilitate settlement. Parties to labour relations disputes, are expected to pursue settlement before resorting to- arbitration. The language of subsections 18(2) and 19(1) of the Act reflects that expectation. If settlements are to be encouraged, then they must also be enforced: Re Zehrs Markets and Retail Clerks Union, Local 1977 (1984), 14 L.A.C. (3d) 379 (Barton) at 380. In Re Canadian General-Tower Ltd. (Oakville DiVision) and United Rubber Workers, Local 292 (1990), 12 L.A.C. (4th) 153, arbitrator Craven observed (at pages 155-156) that It is generally accepted that boards of arbitration have jurisd/ction to enforce settlements reached during the grievance procedure, and that in exercising this jurisdiction an arbitrator is to give effect to the parties' agreement~ without going behind the terms of settlement to determine whether it was the "right' result in the circumstances. The latter principle follows not only from the law of contracts, but also f~om the sound industrial relations policy of encouraging the parties to settle their own disputes: see generally, Crown E/ectr/c~ [19781 O.L.R.B. Rep. 344; ., Perfection Rug Co. Ltv~, [1984] O.L.R.B. Rep. 68; Corporation of Borough of Scar. t borough and C.U.P.E., Loa 368 (unreported, May 23, 1978 (Brandt)); Re Corp. of Borough of Etobivoke and EtobiWke Professional Firefighters Asst,, Loc. 1137 '. (1982), 5 L.A.C. (3d) 52 (Kenned,v); Re Stelco Inc. (Hilton Works) and U.S.W. (1989), 5 L.A.C. (4th) 284 (Haefling). I accept these propositions. Moreover, them is no evidence before me concerning tha merits of Mr. Hearns' original grievant, nor would such.evidence be relevant to my determination of this dispute. Nevertheless, if the grievance settlement is to be enforced its ~term~ must be interpreteck If, as the company argues, the settlement is couched in ambiguous language, then that ambiguity must be resolved so that the real agreement can be given effect. In this regard there is a crucial distinction to be drawn between second-guessing the settlement in light or'the original dispute, which would constitute unwonted arbi~al interference in the grievance procedure, and interpreting the terms of settlement to give effect to the Parties' mutual intention, which constitutes the proper exercise of the arbitral jurisdiction to enforce private grievance settlements. The arbitrator's jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a grievance settlement was not in .dispute before arbitrator Craven in that case. It was in dispute, however, in one of the cases he cited: Perfection Rug Co. Ltd., [19841 O.L.R.B. Rep. 68, 84 C.L.L.C. ¶16,017. There, the Ontario Labour Relations Board ("OLttB") was acting as a grievance arbitration board-'under section 124 (now 126) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act ("the LRA'), which provided that a party to a collective agreement in the construction industry" ... may refer a grievance, concerning the interpretation,' application, administration or alleged violation of the agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable, to the Board for final and binding determination." The grievance referred to the OLRB in that matter alleged that the employer had failed to comply fully with the terms on Which an earlier grievance had been'settled. The employer argued that the OLRB had no authority under section 124 of the LRA to enforce a grievance settlement. After reviewing the arbitral jurisprudence, the OLRB concluded that: Whether raised inthe context of the original grievance (as in Suss Woodcraft Ltd., [[1983] O.L.R.B. Rep. April 600]) or of a second grievant. (such as in the present case and in Ford Motor Company [(1952), 3 L.A.C, 1159 (Lang)]), an allegation that a party to a collective agreement has failed to comply with the settlement of a grievance constitutes an arbitrable question concerning the 'application" or 'a_~ministration' of the collective agreement, within the meaning of section 124(1) of the Act. The langUage of section 124 of the LRA was no broader than that' of subsection 19(1) of the Crown Employee8 Collective Bargaining Act. We agree with the'conclusion of%he award in Union Grievance, supra, although we would not have assigned as much significance as that award did to the Divisional Court's disposition of the unopposed application for judicial review of the award in Sim and Bain. The award's assessment of the significance of that disposition depended, in part, on the proposition that the arbitral jurisdiction of the GSB cannot be enlarged beyond its statutory confines by the consent of the parties. We are not sure that that is so. If it were, provisions in the parties' current collective agreement for expedited arbitration by a single vice,hair of the GSB sitting aIone might be ineffective. In any event, we agree that, with or without the parties' specific consent, the GSB has jurigdiction under subsection 19(1) of the Act to resolve a dispute about whether or not a party has complied with a grievance settlement. Such a dispute is a difference "arising frpra' the application, administration or alleged violation of the collective agreement. We do not accept the employer's argument that because the parties did not have their agreement' i.ncorporated into a Board order, they must have expected that disputes about whether the training provided met the requirements of the agreement would not be resolved by the GSB. The settlement preceded the decision in Sim and Bain, supra. If the parties anticipated the possibility'of such disputes, it would have been natural for them to expect that the GSB would be the forum in which any such dispute would' be resolved, absent an existing GSB order which could be enforced pursuant to subsection 19(6) of the Act. In any event, the parties did nothing to give express contractual effect to their expectations, whatever those expectations may have been. Nothing in the terms on which the parties agreed or in the circumstances in which they agreed to them warrants our declining jurisdiction to resolve a dispute about whether those terms been complied with. Our jurisdiction under section 19(1) of the Act to interpret and enforce a grievance settlement is not contingent on the parties' having expressly acknowledged it when making their settlement. Are we without jurisdiction to. interpret and enforce the particular grievance settlement in issue here because one of its terms involves training, a subject referred to in subsection 18(1) of the Act? ,~ Subsection 18(1) of the Act does not expresslY limit the jurisdiction of the GSB -- the reference to Va board~ at the end of the ~subsection is to an interest arbitration board constituted under section 11. Nor, in our view, does the reference in subsection 18(2) of the Act to some but not all of. the subjects identified in subsection 18(1) impliedly impose a restriction on what would otherwise be within the GSB's jurisdiction by virtue of subsection 19(1). The enforceability of-a grievance settlement cannot depend on whether the terms of the settlement reflect what an arbitrator would have done or could have done in response to'the original grievance. Nor can it depend on whether it would have - been within an arbitrator's jurisdiction to impose the terms which tl~e parties incorporated into the settlement. Limiting the enforceability of set~tlements in those Ways would effectively negate one of the considerable attractions of dispute resolution by negotiated settlement - that the parties are not confined, as an arbitrator would be; in defining either the scope of the problem they wish to resolve or the nature of, an appropriate response to it. Similarly, the enforceability of a grievance settlement cannot depend on whether its terms could or would have been the subject or result o£ bargaining for a collective agreement. If settlements are to be encouraged, any lawful provision of a settlement agreement must be enforceable, and enforceable in the same. forum as any other such provision. The employer does not say that subsection 18(1) prohibited it from entering into an agreement with the union to provide training to an employee, nor that the agreement is unenforceable because the subsection makes it unlawful. In our view, the GSB has jurisdiction under subsection 19(1) of the Act to interpret and enforce any lawful provision of an agreement by which the parties to a collective agreement have settled a grievan, co, including the provisions in question here. Accordingly, we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to hear and determine the parties' dispute on the merits. Our hearing for that purpose will commence on August 23, 1993. ~ Dated at Toronto this 21 day of July, 1993.