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HomeMy WebLinkAboutUnion 96-11-25 IN THE MATFER OF AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN: FANSHAWE COLLEGE OF APPLIED ARTS AND TECHNOLOGY (the "College") ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 110 (the "Union") UNION POLICY GRIEVANCE RE SENIORITY DATES (#95A674) BOARD OF ARBITRATION: Michel G. Picher - Chairperson John McManus - Union Nominee Hugh John CoOk - College Nominee APPEARING FOR THE UNION: Stephen Goudge - Counsel Paddy Musson - Local President Tom Geldard - Vice-President Garry Fordyce - Chief Steward APPEARING FOR THE COLLEGE: Robert J. Atkinson - Counsel Gall Rozell - Senior Human Resources Consultant A hearing in this matter was held in London on December 19, 1995. Final written submissions were received on February 12, 1996. AWARD This grievance is a policy grievance filed on behalf of some 18 employees of the College. The grievance reads, in part, as follows: Local 110 grieves that the seniority dates for [18 named grievors] are inaccurate because the College stopped the accumulation of seniority. While this is called for under the Collective Agreement, it violates the Ontario Human Rights Code in that all of these individuals are disabled as def'med under the Ontario Human Rights Code, Section 10(1). Because they are disabled, the College cannot treat them in a discriminatory manner. To limit their seniority is discrimination, therefore the employer cannot stop the accumulation of seniority. As remedy, we seek correction of the seniority list and a re-posting of the lists. FACTS AND ISSUES The facts giving rise to the grievance are not in dispute. The 18 named grievors have all been absent from work in excess of 24 months, save one, who has retired after a period of long-term disability leave which exceeded 24 months. In keeping with the provisions of the collective agreement, the College has stopped the accrual of seniority for the employees in question, after the expiry of 24 months of long-term disability leave. While the Union does not dispute that the action of the College is in keeping with the terms of the collective agreement, it now asserts that those provisions constitute discrimination against a class of employees by virtue of their physical disability, contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990. It therefore seeks a determination from this Board, by way of declaration and -2- direction to the College, that its actions are not supportable under the terms of the collective agreement, to the extent that the provision in question is unlawful. The following provisions of the collective agreement are pertinent to the resolution of this dispute: Article 4 NO DISCRIMINATION 4.01 A The parties agree that, in accordance with the provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Code, there shall be no discrimination or harassment against any employee by the Union or the Colleges, by reason of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or handicap. 27.03 D A full-time employee shall continue to accumulate seniority for the purpose of this Article while: (ii) absent through verified illness or injury and/or leave of absence for up to 24 months; A long-term disability plan is provided under Article 18 of the collective agreement. An employee who is absent due to illness or injury is entitled to long-term disability benefits after a qualifying period of 130 days or six months. Benefits continue for two years, so long as the employee cannot do his or her regular job. After that time, benefits are payable only -3- if the employee is unable to do any occupation for which he or she is reasonably qualified. In that circumstance, the benefit continues until the point of retirement, or the age of 65. It does not appear disputed that the provisions of Article 27.03 D(ii) have been contained in the collective agreement since 1989. Moreover, although it appears that the employer has allowed employees who are absent on other forms of leave to accumulate seniority during such leave, such as professional development leaves in accordance with Article 20 of the collective agreement, and exchange program leaves, it does not appear disputed that the College has consistently cut off the accumulation of seniority for employees on any form of leave beyond the period of 24 months. The issue is, therefore, fairly straightforward. Are the actions of the College, in ceasing to allow the accumulation of seniority for persons who are on long-term disability leaves beyond the period of 24 months, in accordance with Article 27.03 D of the collective agreement, in violation of the Ontario Human Rights Code? Or, to put'the matter differently, is Article 27.03 D (ii) of the collective agreement unenforceable as being contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code? ARGUMENTS The argument being put forth by counsel for the Union is relatively simple. He notes, firstly, that the discrimination provisions of the collective agreement incorporate the terms of the Ontario Human Rights Code. That, he submits, includes a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of physical disability, as provided for in the Code. Counsel submits that the employer's practice of discontinuing the accumulation of seniority after an -4- absence of 24 months on disability leave constitutes discrimination against a protected class employees - those who are disabled. He notes that the employees who are the subject of this grievance continue, like other employees, to maintain their status of full-time employees. However, they are treated differently, he argues, by reason of their physical disability. That, he submits, constitutes unequal treatment of the employees in question, constituting discrimination based on their physical disability. In support of his arguments, counsel refers the Board of Arbitration, in part, to the following provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Code: 5. (1) Every person has a fight to equal treatment with 'respect to employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or handicap. 10. (1) In Part I and in this Part, '"oecause of handicap" means for the reason that the person has or has had, or is believed to have or have had, (a) any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement that is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, including diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, any degree of -5- paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or heating impediment, muteness or speech impediment, or physical reliance on a guide dog or on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device. (b) a condition of mental retardation or impairment. (c) a learning disability, or a dysfunction in one or more of the processes involved in undertaking or using symbols or spoken language. (d) a mental disorder, or (e) an injury or disability for which benefits were claimed or received under the Workers' Compensation Act; In support of the Union's position, counsel refers the Board to the following two arbitral awards: Re Riverdale Hospital (Board of Governors) and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79 (1993), 39 L.A.C. (4th) 63 (Stewart); and Re Metropolitan Toronto Reference Library Board and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1582 (1995), 46 L/LC. (4th) 155 (Burkett). In the Riverdale Hospital case, the majority of the board of arbitration concluded that the hospital's policy of readjusting the seniority date of an employee who is absent on -6- Workers' Compensation did constitute inequality of treatment contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code. The board so found, notwithstanding that the collective agreement expressly provided that seniority was not to accrue during an unpaid leave of absence, with the exception of maternity leave. In coming to its conclusion, the majority of the board confirmed that it had the jurisdiction to interpret and apply the provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Code, citing Section 45 (8) of the Labour Relations Act which then provided as follows: 45(8) An arbitrator or arbitration board shall make a final and conclusive settlement of the differences between the parties and, for that purpose, has the following powers: 3. To interpret and apply the requirements of human rights and other employment-related statutes, despite any conflict between those requirements and the terms of the collective agreement. It may be noted that, with changes in wording not here material, the foregoing provision has continued in effect, notwithstanding recent amendments of the Labour Relations Act, as now contained in section 48(12), S.O. 1995, c. 1. Sch. A. The continuation of the above provision in the Act is a reflection of Canadian labour law policy favouring the resolution of employment-related disputes of various kinds within a single forum, for the benefit of employers, employees and unions alike. In Riverdale Hospital, upon an analysis of prior jurisprudence and having regard to the treatment of the work-injured employees as compared to the comparator group all other employees, the majority concluded that the provisions of the collective agreement which precluded the accrual of seniority during a period of absence due to a Workers' Compensation injury were in violation of Section 5 of -7- the Human Rights Code and, therefore, allowed the grievance. The board directed the readjustment of the grievor's seniority date and his vacation entitlement accordingly. In the Metropolitan Toronto Reference Library Board case, the majority of the board was called upon to consider the claim of an employee who was absent for an extended period by reason of suffering chronic fatigue syndrome, as a result of which he was absent during a critical period of computer training. Upon his return to work, because he had missed the training, he was downgraded both in his position and in his resulting salary. Subsequently, he was also denied access to two vacant positions, by virtue of his lack of qualification by reason of his having missed the computer training. On behalf of the employee, the union grieved that the Library Board had discriminated against the employee by failing to provide him with training upon his return to work, so that he was disadvantaged as compared with the comparator group of other employees who did not suffer an absence at the critical time by reason of any physical disability. Counsel for the Union submits that the merits of this case fall within the principles reviewed in the Library Board case. Very simply, he argues, but for their physical disability the employees on whose behalf the grievance is brought would not have suffered a reduction in the accumulation of their seniority, as compared with employees who are not absent. The difference, he submits, is based solely on the physical illness of the employees which is at the root of the employees' periods of absence. In the result, counsel submits, there has been a violation of the provisions of the Human Rights Code with respect to these employees. -8- Counsel for the College submits that there has been no violation of the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of handicap or disability, contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code, by virtue of the operation of Article 27.03(D)(ii) of the collective agreement. He submits that Article 27 deals, in a general way, with the accumulation of seniority and makes an exception for the circumstance of all employees who are not at work. More specifically, counsel asserts, the only distinction made within the provisions of Article 27.03(D) is between employees who are actively at work on the one hand and, on the other hand, employees who are not at work, for whatever reason. He concedes that the argument of the Union might succeed if it could be shown that the provision in question made some invidious distinction which singles out or adversely impacts the disabled employee in a manner that does not touch the non-disabled. That, he submits, is simply not the case, as the provision makes no such distinctions. He submits that no disabled employee is more negatively impacted than any non-disabled employee who, for whatever reason, is not actively at work for a period in excess of 24 months. Counsel for the Hospital notes that if the position of the Union should prevail it would, in effect, create a form of super-seniority for the physically disabled. By. way of example, he compares the treatment of a laid-off employee, who could not accumulate seniority while a disabled employee, who might not be caught by a layoff by virtue of his or her absence from work, could continue to accumulate seniority indefinit61y. He stresses that the parties should not be taken to have intended that the disabled employee should, by virtue of the interpretation of Article 27.03(D)(ii) advanced by the Union, be in a better -9- position than employees on other forms of leave who might fall under the terms of the Article. Counsel stresses that not all forms of distinction or discrimination are such as to attract legal sanctions. It is, he submits, only those invidious distinctions based on personal characteristics prohibited by the Human Rights Code, resulting in a real difference in treatment, which constitute prohibited discrimination. In this regard, he directs the Board to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Law Society of British Columbia v Andrews (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1. In that case, the Court held that a provision of the Barristers and Solicitors Act, R.S.B.C. 1979 c.26 s.42, which established Canadian citizenship as a requirement to enter the legal profession, was in violation of equality rights protected by Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Counsel for the Hospital points to the following passage in the dissenting decision of McIntyre, J. at pp16-18: What does discrimination mean? 'The question has arisen most commonly in a consideration of the Human Rights Acts and the general concept of discrimination under those enactments has been fairly well settled. There is little difficulty, drawing upon the cases in this court, in isolating an acceptable definition. In Re Ontario Human Rights Com'n and Simpsons-Sears Ltd. (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at p. 332, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at p. 551, 9 C.C.E.L. 185, discrimination (in that case adverse effect discrimination) was described in these terms: It arises where an employer ... adopts a rule or standard ... which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground on one employee or group of employees in that it imposes, because of some special characteristic of the employee or group, obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the work force. It was held in that case, as well, that no intent was required as an element of discrimination, for it is in essence the impact of the discriminatory act or - 10 - provision upon the person affected which is decisive in considering any complaint. At p. 329 D.L.R., p. 547 S.C.R., this proposition was expressed in these terms: The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. It if does, in fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the community, it is discriminatory. In Action Travail des Femmes v. C.N.R. Co. (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 sub nom. C.N.R. Co. v. Can. (Canadian Human Rights Com'n), 87 C.L.L.C. 17,002, better known as the Action Travail des Femmes case, where it was alleged that the Canadian National Railway was guilty of discriminatory hiring and promotion practices contrary to s.10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, in denying employment to women in certain unskilled positions, Dickson C.J.C., in giving the judgement of the court, said at pp. 209-10 D.L.R., pp. 1138-9 S.C.R.: A thorough study of "systemic discrimination" in Canada is to be found in the Abella Report on equality in employment. The terms of reference of the Royal Commission instructed it "to inquire into the most efficient, effective and equitable means of promoting employment opportunities, eliminating systemic discrimination and assisting individuals to compete for employment opportunities on an equal basis." (Order in Council, P.C. 1983-1924, June 24, 1983). Although Judge Abella chose not to offer a precise definition of systemic discrimination, the essentials may be gleaned from the following comments, found at p.2 of the Abella Report. "Discrimination ... means practices or attitudes that have, whether by design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual's or a group's right to the opportunities generally available because of attributed rather than actual characteristics. "It is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an intentional desire to obstruct someone's potential, or whether - 1l- it is the acddental by-product of innocently motivated practices or systems. If the barrier is affecting certain groups in a disproportionately negative way, it is a signal that the practices that lead to this adverse impact may be discriminatory." There are many other statements which have aimed at a short definition of the term discrimination. In general, they are in accord with the statements referred to above. I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed. Counsel for the Hospital stresses the standard set out in the final paragraph above quoted, arguing that in the case at hand the impugned provision of the collective agreement does not impose disadvantages upon the physically disabled employees which are not in fact imposed upon all classes of employees who are absent from work for a period in excess of 24 months. There is, he submits, in this circumstance neither any direct discrimination nor any systemic or adverse effect discrimination visited upon the disabled employee. Counsel also argues that the sophistication of the parties and of their collective agreement should be taken into account before lightly striking down Article 27.03(D)(ii) as being contrary to the Human Right Code. He notes that the collective agreement, which specifically addresses the issue of discrimination, is negotiated to apply to a large number of community colleges, on a province-wide basis. By the incorporation of the Ontario - 12- Human Rights Code into the provisions of the agreement by the language of Article 4.01(a), counsel argues the parties have displayed a recognition of the need to respect the rights of the individual, and through Article 27.03(D) have reflected the business and employment law sense that the application of a general standard to all employees who are absent beyond 24 months is not discriminatory, given that it is exhaustive and fashioned so as to treat all employees, regardless of their particular circumstance, in the same way. Counsel further notes that the collective agreement reflects consistency in the treatment of employees who, because of their absence from work, are not deemed to have accumulated seniority. In this regard, he makes reference to Article 22.01(F) which deals with parental leave, providing that employees cannot accumulate seniority during such leaves. He also notes that an employee who, for example, was absent for service on jury duty would likewise be caught by the provisions of Article 27.03(D)(ii). From a purposive standpoint, counsel submits that the collective agreement reflects the understanding of the parties that seniority is, as a general rule, a right which accrues based on active service. Onto that general rule, the parties have engrafted certain spedfic exceptions, including the 24-month exception for leaves of absence, and specific provisions for professional development leaves and exchange programs. While counsel acknowledges that there are distinctions made which tend to favour an employee on either professional development leave or an exchange program, he stresses that those circumstances are distinguishable from the employee who is on leave for personal reasons, of whatever nature. - 13 - In his submission, the professional development or exchange program leaves can be considered a form of "quasi-service" to the College which, by their very nature, may have caused the parties to agree that there was no need to place a cap on such absences for the purposes of the accumulation of seniority. Counsel for the College frontally challenges the logic of the Union's position. Stressing that the provision of the collective agreement in question makes distinctions as between employees solely on the grounds of establishing a class of non-active employees, he argues that the position of the Union would lead to absurd results. Why, he submits, should disabled employees who are not at work but who are, nevertheless, employees, be denied the benefits of full salary, if the Union's notion of discrimination is correct? On the basis of the Union's reasoning, he suggests, it could be asserted that the long-term disability benefits received by disabled employees, which amount to 60% of their normal salary, are of themselves discriminatory, based on the prohibited ground of physical disability. Counsel submits, however, that that reasoning breaks down because, as the parties themselves recognized in the crafting of their collective agreement, there are valid lawful distinctions to be made between employees who are at work and employees who are not at work, for whatever reason. Counsel for the College submits that the proper approach to the issue of prohibited discrimination is reflected in a number of prior arbitral awards including the following: Re Canadian Airlines International Ltd. and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Airline - 14- Division (1993), 32 L.A.C. (4th) 398 (Springate); Town of Ajax and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 54 (1991), 23 L.A.C. (4th) 77 (Rayner); Re Windsor Western Hospital Centre and OPSEU, Local 143 (an unreported award of a board of arbitration chaired by Arbitrator Douglas C. Stanley, dated October 24, 1994); Canada Packers Inc. and United Food and Commercial Workers, Local l14P (1992), 28 L.A.C. (4th) 193 (Solomatenko); Re Corporation of City of Barrie and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 2380 (1994), 40 L.A.C. (4th) 168 (M.G. Picher); Re Versa Services Ltd. and Milk & Bread Drivers, Dairy Employees, Caterers & Allied Employees Union, Local 647 (1994), 39 L.A.C. (4th) 196 (R. M. Brown); Stelco Inc. Hilton Works and United Steelworkers of America, Local 1005, (an unreported award of Arbitrator O.V. Gray, dated February 13, 1995); and Re Metropolitan General Hospital and Ontario Nurses Association (1995), 48 L.A.C. (4th) 291 (Kennedy). DECISION The Canadian Airlines case does provide useful insights into the kinds of issues raised by parties who are at odds with respect to the meaning of equality and discrimination. In that case, the flight attendants employed by the predecessor Wardair Canada Inc..grieved that the proration of vacation entitlement roi employees on maternity leave was a form of discrimination prohibited on the basis of sex, contrary to the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. H-6. In fact, the proration provisions of the collective agreement provided greater protection to employees absent on maternity leave than it did to employees absent for periods of illness or disability, although the protection was not as great as that provided - 15 - to employees on witness or jury duty leaves of absence, who suffered no proration whatsoever. At pp.405-08, the arbitrator reviewed the authorities and reasoned as follows to conclude that the employer's practice, and the relevant provisions of the collective agreement, did not violate the Canadian Human Rights Act: Union counsel contended that Wardair's action in prorating the vacation entitlement of employees on maternity leave was a form of discrimination on the basis of sex since it placed an impediment on pregnant women not placed on other employees absent from the work place. In support of this contention counsel noted that the collective agreement did not call for the prorating of the vacation entitlement of flight attendants who were on a leave of absence for jury or witness duty, irrespective of the length of time they were off work. Counsel submitted that it was discriminatory for Wardair to provide employees absent due to jury or witness duty with greater benefits than employees whose absence from the work place was the produce of an innate characteristic, namely, their sex. In support of .this position union counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 321, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, 89 C.L.L.C. 17.012. In that case an employer's group insurance plan had provided weekly benefits to compensate employees for lost wages as a result of accident or sickness. The plan excluded pregnant employees for a 17-week period during which they were entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits. The Supreme Court unar~imously held that the disentitlement of pregnant women during the 17-week period constituted discrimination by reason of pregnancy. The court also held that this was discrimination on the basis of sex which contravened the Human Rights Act of Manitoba. A key portion of the court's judgement, which was delivered by Chief Justice Dickson, read as follows at pp. 334-5: I agree entirely that pregnancy is not characterized properly as a sickness or an accident. It is, however, a valid health-related reason for absence from the workplace and as such should not have been excluded from the Safeway plan. That the exclusion is discriminatory is evident when the true character, or underlying rationale, of the Safeway benefits plan is appreciated. The underlying rationale of this plan is the laudable desire to compensate persons who are unable to work for valid health-related reasons. Pregnancy is clearly such a reason. By distinguishing "accidents and illness" from pregnancy, - 16- Safeway is attempting to disguise an untenable distinction. It seems indisputable that in our sodety pregnancy is a valid health-related reason for being absent from work. It is to state the obvious to say that pregnancy is of fundamental importance in our society. Indeed, its importance makes description difficult. To equate pregfiancy with, for instance, a decision to undergo medical treatment for cosmetic surgery - which sort of comparison the respondent's argument implicitly makes - is fallacious. If the medical condition associated with procreation does not provide a legitimate reason for absence from the workplace, it is hard to imagine what would provide such a reason. Viewed in its social context, pregnancy provides a perfectly legitimate health-related reason for not working and as such it should be compensated by the Safeway plan. In terms of the economic consequences to the employee resulting from the inability to perform employment duties, pregnancy is no different from any other health-related reason for absence from the workplace. Furthermore, to not view pregnancy in this way goes against one of the purposes of anti-discrimination legislation. This purpose, which was noted earlier in the quotation from Andrews, supra, is the removal of unfair disadvantages which have been imposed on individuals or groups in society. Such an unfair disadvantage may result when the costs of an activity from which all of society, benefits are placed upon a single group of persons. This is the effect of the Safeway plan. It cannot be disputed that everyone in society benefits from procreation. The Safeway plan, however, places one of the major costs of procreation entirely upon one group in society: pregnant women. Thus, in distinguishing pregnancy from all other health-related reasons for not working, the plan imposes unfair disadvantages on pregnant women. In the second part of this judgement I state that this disadvantage can be viewed as a disadvantage suffered by women generally. That argument further emphasizes how a refusal to find the Safeway plan discriminatory would undermine one of the purposes of anti- discrimination legislation. It would do so by sanctioning one of the most significant ways in which women have been disadvantaged in our society. It would sanction imposing a disproportionate amount of the costs of pregnancy upon women. Removal of such unfair impositions upon women and other groups in society in a key purpose of anti-discrimination furthers this purpose. - 17- In sum, if an employer such as Safeway enters into the field of compensation for health conditions and then excludes pregnancy as a valid reason for compensation, the employer has acted in a discriminatory fashion. In the instant case employees on maternity leave actually received more favourable treatment with respect to vacation entitlement than did employees off work on account of sickness or injury. They also received more favourable treatment than did employees off on personal, educational or union leave. Employees on maternity leave were treated in the same manner as were employees on a child care leave of absence where the child was adopted. The only group the union can point to who might have received more favourable treatment than employees on maternity leave were employees on witness or jury duty leave. In the Brooks case the Supreme Court of Canada compared the situation of women off work on maternity leave with other employees who were off work for health-related reasons. The union here seeks to make the comparison with a group whose absence from work was in no way related to their health. Any employees who while on witness leave actually testified on behalf of Wardair could reasonably be said to have been working for the company. Unlike employees on '.maternity leave, all of those on witness or jury leave would have been required to attend at a specific location at a particular time and stay until dismissed. They would not have had control over their activities while attending to their witness or jury duties. In addition, the likelihood of a Wardair flight attendant actually, being on a jury or giving evidence for a period longer than 18 weeks (the time during which the vacation entitlement of an employee on maternity leave was not prorated) would presumably have been remote. Having regard to these considerations, I am not satisfied that the situation involving employees on witness and jury leave reasonably leads to the conclusion that flight attendants on maternity leave were being discriminated against. Union counsel contended that any treatment accorded a pregnant woman which differs from the treatment accorded employees generally is discriminatory and contrary to the Canadian Human Rights Act. He submitted that Wardair's action in taking away vacation entitlement which otherwise would have accrued to employees on maternity leave was discriminatory irrespective of the manner in which Wardair treated other employees absent from work. A similar argument was raised in Re Glen Haven Manor Corp. and C.U.P.E., Loc. 2330 (1991), 19 1.a.c. (4th) 61 (Darby). In that case the employer applied a prorating policy equally to all employees who were on unpaid leaves. The - 18- union, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in the Brooks case, contended that by prorating the vacation entitlement of an employee on maternity leave the employer had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex contrary to the Human Rights Act of Nova Scotia. The board of arbitration rejected this contention. The board commented that unlike the Brooks case, where an employee had been denied benefits available to everyone else, the employee in question had been treated exactly the same as every other employee. The board's reasoning was summarized as follows at pp. 71-2: In conclusion and to recapitulate: in our opinion, while discrimination based on pregnancy would be discrimination based on sex and therefore illegal, there is neither directly nor indirectly any discrimination whatsoever whether based on sex, on marital status or on physical (or mental) disability in the Employer's policy of prorating vacation benefits for females on maternity leave. It is important to recognize that no "obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions" are imposed on either the Grievor or on pregnant females or on females generally that is not imposed on everyone in the bargaining unit. Nor is this a case where the Employer applied a criterion that "less favourably treats all women" or '~rhere special, less favourable treatment is accorded to a class consisting only of women, albeit not all women". In short, there is not discrimination between pregnant women and anyone else either directly or indirectly. Finally, there is no evidence that the policy of proration imposes an unfair disadvantage on that group in society called pregnant women such as might trigger the need for some affirmative or at least neutralizing action in order to fulfil or further the key purpose of anti-discrimination legislation, which is to remove such unfair disadvantages. For a somewhat similar result involving the issue of seniority accrual during maternity leave, see Re Ajax (Town) and C.U.P.E. Loc. 54 (1991), 23 L.A.C. (4th) 77 (Rayner). The rationale underlying the union's position appears to be that for vacation entitlement purposes the situation of an employee on maternity leave should be compared with what the employee would have received had she not become pregnant and gone off work. The discussion in the Supreme Court's judgment in the Brooks case relating to the burden of the costs associated with procreation provides a philosophical basis for this contention. (Arguably the judgement makes an even stronger case for governments, acting on behalf of sodety generally, to assume a greater proportion of the costs of - 19- procreation.) If taken to its logical conclusion the union's position would appear to require that an employer "make whole" an employee on maternity leave and treat her for pay and benefit purposes as if she was still actively at work. The Canadian Human Rights Act prohibits an employer from differentiating adversely in relation to an employee based on a prohibited ground of discrimination. To conclude that this goes beyond requiring that employees on maternity leave be treated as well as other employees off work for health- related reasons, and instead requires that they be treated in the same manner as employees actively at work, would require that I give the Act an interpretation much broader than similar provisions have been given to date. As indicated above, the arbitral jurisprudence, although limited, has rejected this type of approach. Further, although the Supreme Court of Canada in the Brooks case expressed its concern about pregnant women bearing a disproportionate amount of the costs of procreation, it did not adopt the approach being advanced by the union. Instead the court held only that employees on maternity leave were entitled to be treated in a manner similar to other employees who were off work for health-related reasons. The Town of-Ajax case is of limited value, as it relates to the interpretation of a provision of the Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, in respect of maternity leave which is no longer in effect. The Windsor Western Hospital case is closer, on its facts, to the issue in the case at hand. Under the collective agreement there considered, .the hospital consistently denied the accrual of vacation or sick benefits to all employees who were absent from work for whatever reason, including personal reasons, illness, union business in excess of one month, pregnancy and adoption, education leave and leave pursuant to a compensable injury under the Workers' Compensation plan. The majority of the board of arbitration rejected the Union's claim that the provision of the collective agreement and the employer's practice constituted prohibited discrimination against the grievor, who suffered a period of absence for a compensable injury. Having given consideration to the definition of prohibited grounds of discrimination under Section 5 of - 20 - the Code, the definition of disability (then handicap) under Section 10 of the Code and the concept of "constructive discrimination" found in Section 11 of the Code the majority concluded that no discrimination was made out. At ppll-12, the Board reasoned, in part, as follows: The issue we must decide is whether the provision in the collective agreement which denies employees on a leave of absence the right to accrue vacation and sick leave is "discriminatory." If it is, it can only be so because of the broader definition of discrimination found in s. ll of the Code. In accordance with that section, what we have to ask is whether the collective agreement provisions - "results in the exclusion, restriction or preference of a group of persons who are identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination and of whom the person is a member." The "group" which the collective agreement singles out to deny accrual of sick leave and vacation is not "a group of persons who are identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination." The group denied accrual of sick leave and vacation is all those employees who are on leaves of absence. The Code does not list '"oeing on a leave of absence" as a prohibited ground of discrimination. It might be argued that employees with a "disability" are a group within this larger group and are therefore covered by the language. That is really the essence of constructive discrimination - that a general innocuous exclusion sweeps in all members of a protected group. In this case there are really two protected groups - those with "handicap" and the person who is defined as handicapped because he/she "has or has had, Or is believed to have or have had an injury or disability for which benefits were claimed or received under the Workers' Compensation Act." However, not all employees with a handicap, or all employees who have or have had an injury for which benefits are claimed, are going to be on leaves of absences. Thus the general exclusion does not sweep in all or even a majority of the members of a protected group. If we had to decide whether the qualification was reasonable and bona fide, since it is accepted in so many collective agreements that vacation and sick leave are benefits earned through attendance at work, we would conclude that the qualification in this case is reasonable and bona fide. In the Corporation of the City of Barrie case, the Chair of this Board, sitting as a sole arbitrator, was compelled to consider whether the prorating of vacation credits during - 21 - pregnancy leave was in violation of the Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. EA4 as well as the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S;O. 1990 c. H. 19. Although the grievance was allowed, based on the arbitrator's analysis of the provisions of the Employment Standards Act, the union's argument with respect to an alleged breach of the Human Rights Code was rejected. In coming to that conclusion, the arbitrator placed substantial weight on the fact that the collective agreement treated employees other than employees on pregnancy leave in a similar fashion with respect to the prorating of vacation credits. At pp.181-83, the following analysis appears: I have equal difficulty with the suggestion of the union's representative that the reduction of vacation entitlement during a pregnancy leave constitutes unlawful discrimination on the basis of either sex or age. It is, of course, self- evident that pregnancy leave can apply only to female employees. When art. 19 of the collective agreement is read in its entirely, however, it becomes apparent that. the parties did not intend to isolate or identify a group of employees for adverse treatment based upon their sex. Rather, the article reflects a number of circumstances in which the parties deemed it appropriate to reduce vacation credits by reason of the extended absence of an employee in Certain circumstances. They have done so, for example, for an employee of either sex who takes a personal leave of absence for a period in excess of 20 working days or who takes a leave of absence to assume a full-time temporary salaried position with the union. In those circumstances, as in the case of pregnancy leave, the parties have agreed that an employee should not be deemed to have earned paid vacation entitlement accrued over the period of an extended leave of absence. While the reasons for the absences may differ, and it is true that only one of them, pregnancy, can apply in the case of female employees, the provision for prorating vacation entitlement is not, by that fact alone, discriminatory on the basis of sex. Nor can the arbitrator conclude that the greater vacation entitlement protected in respect of parental leave, which applies to employees of both sexes, of itself, makes the pregnancy leave provisions of the collective agreement discriminatory on the basis of sex. The prorating of vacation entitlement in respect of pregnancy leave is a long-standing provision which is not based on an invidious distinction, but is generally based on the relationship between vacation entitlement and time worked in the service of the employer. The distinction can be no more invidious merely by reason of the more generous treatment of vacation entitlement in relation to parental leave introduced into the collective agreement by the amendments to the Employment Standards Act in December of 1990. For these reasons the arbitrator is of the view that the union has failed to establish that the prorating of vacation entitlement for employees on pregnancy leave constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex, contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code. I am likewise satisfied that the union has failed to establish discrimination on the basis of age in the application of art. 19:05 of the collective agreement. As the corporation's spokesperson submits, there is, very simply, no evidence before the arbitrator to establish that age is a determining factor in respect of adverse impacts in the application of art. 19:05. It is true that employees with longer service are impacted more severely by the prorating of vacation entitlement than are employees with less than three years of service whose two-week period of vacation cannot be reduced. However, the distinction applied to the employees has nothing to do with their age, but turns entirely on the length of their service. While it may be, as a matter of incidental fact, that long-service employees are usually older than employees with less service, that will not always be so and, more significantly, it is not the basis upon which vacation entitlement is prorated under the terms of arts. 16:01 and 19:05 of the collective agreement. In the arbitrator's view, the mere fact that employees of longer service, who may in some cases be older, have more to lose in the application of these provisions does not, of itself, constitute discrimination on the basis of age in the sense prohibited by the Ontario Human Rights Code. The Canada Packers case involved the termination of an employee by reason of her / loss of seniority pursuant to a provision of the collective agreement which distinguished seniority after certain defined periods of breaks in active service. As the employee was absent from work by reason of a compensable injury, her union alleged, among other things, a violation of the discrimination provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Code. In a course of analysis which arbitrators have subsequently declined to follow, the majority of the Board ruled that a violation of the standards of the Code could only be found if there was a causal relation to the employee's termination, rather than a mere correlation in time between her - 23 - absence by reason of disability and her loss of seniority. The Versa Services case is, we believe, more closely analogous to the dispute before us. The grievance in that case was filed, in part, in respect of a claim of employees receiving LTD benefits objecting that a provision of the collective agreement requiring them to pay half the cost of all benefits was contrary to the Human Rights Code, where the employer paid the full cost of all benefits for other employees, with the exception of LTD and optical benefits for which it paid 50% of the cost. The collective agreement there under consideration contained the following language in article 17.05: Employees on LTD will be allowed to continue their benefit coverage at the Company's cost and remain enroled in the Company's benefit plan provided the employee reimburses the Company for the cost of the benefits. The board of arbitration agreed with the interpretation of the employer that Article 17.05 properly required employees collecting LTD benefits to make greater contributions in the form of benefit premiums than was the case for employees who were actively at work. Part of the Code considered by the board was Section 17 which provides, in part, as follows: 17 (1) A right of a person under this Act is not infringed for the reason only that the person is incapable of performing or fulfilling the essential duties or requirements attending the exercise of the right because of handicap. (2) The Commission, a board of inquiry or a court shall not find a person incapable unless it is satisfied that the needs of the person cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for accommodating those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety requirements, if any. Arbitrator R.M. Brown dismissed the grievance. He reasoned, in part, that there was no discrimination as the fundamental entitlement to contributions by the employer was contractually based, for all employees, on attendance at work. Further, he concluded that the Code and, in particular, Section 17, primarily addresses the issue of participation, rather than compensation, and that no discrimination is made out if rules governing compensation are applied generally to all employees, whether absent by reason of disability or actively at work. The core of Arbitrator Brown's reasoning is reflected at pp 201-203: Are employees on LTD benefits being denied equal treatment within the meaning of the Code? They are being treated in a less advantageous manner than emplOyees on the job for whom the company contributes towards the cost of benefits. However, active employees are performing services in exchange for this benefit contribution, whereas those on LTD are not working. LTD benefits do not commence until an employee has been off the job for more than a year and continue until an employee is able to work again or reaches retirement age. There is no evidence to suggest the employer makes any benefit contributions for an employee without a handicap who is absent for period of similar duration. In the absence of such evidence, I cannot find handicapped employees collecting LTD benefits are being treated worse than those without a handicap who have a similar attendance record. I must assume entitlement to benefit contributions turns on attendance at work,, not on handicap. In other words, everyone is treated the same way, based upon attendance, regardless of handicap. If this type of equal treatment is all the Code requires, there would be no violation. This is one way to understand equal treatment, but there is another way which places a greater obligation on employers. These two very different understandings of equality are described in Equality in Employment (1984), the report of the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment (p.3): Sometimes equality means treating people the same, despite their differences, and sometimes it means treating than (sic) as equals by accommodating their differences. - 25 - Formerly, we thought that equality only meant sameness and that treating everyone as equals meant treating everyone the same. We now know that to treat everyone the same may be to offend the notion of equality. Ignoring differences may mean ignoring legitimate needs. It is not fair to use the differences between people as an excuse to exclude them 'arbitrarily from equitable participation. Equality means nothing if it does not mean we are of equal worth regardless of differences in gender, race, ethnicity, or disability. The projected, mythical, and attributed meaning of these differences cannot be permitted to exclude full participation. To some extent at least, the notion of equal treatment embodied in the Human Rights Code requires employers to do more than treat everyone the same without regard to handicap. Section 17 requires employees to accommodate handicapped people by taking special measures to allow them access to employment. Consider a person whose handicap prevents her from operating a machine as it presently exists, but who could operate the machine if it were modified in a manner which would not impose an undue hardship on the employer. To refuse to employ this person as a machine operator because of her disability would be a violation of the Code. The employer is not permitted, to exclude this individual from employment by treating her in the same way as an able-bodied person who is required to operate the machine in its unmodified form. As well as requiring an employer to modify the work environment, the duty to accommodate also may require an employer to grant unpaid leave to someone whose disability temporarily prevents her from working. In these ways, people with a handicap must be accommodated by taking special measures to allow them to participate in the working world, so long as doing so does not entail undue expense for the employers concerned. The case at hand is not about modifying jobs so they can be performed by disabled people. It is not about entering or leaving the world of work. The handicaps afflicting employees on LTD benefits are sufficiently serious that they are unable to work for more than a year. The Union contends the employer is obliged to make benefit contributions on their behalf while they are off the job. As these contributions are a form of compensation, this case concerns compensation while not working, rather than participation in the world of work. According to the union, the Code compels the employer to bear the cost of providing benefits to these employees, even though benefits are not provided to able-bodied employees who are absent from work for such a prolonged period. Does equal treatment require not only accommodative measures to allow people to work, but also special payments for those unable to do so? - 26 - I think not. In my view, the Code treats compensation differently from participation. The reference in s.17 to a person's capability to perform duties indicates this section applies to engagement in active employment. On this from, s.17 adopts the broader notion of equal treatment which requires differences to be accommodated, so as not to exclude a handicapped person from a work place. Section 17 cannot be construed as applying the same broad notion of equal treatment to compensation because it contains no reference to compensation. There is no other section of the Code which specifically applies this broader understanding of equality, which requires special measures, to compensation for handicapped employees. I believe the absence of such a section indicates a legislative intention to apply a different understanding of equality to matters of compensation. A handicapped person's only entitlement is to be compensated in the same way as someone without a handicap. If employees without a handicap receive compensation during short absences, so too must those with a disability. Conversely, if most employees receive no compensation during prolonged absences, those with a handicap have no complaint when they are treated in the same way. In this Board's view, the distinction identified by Arbitrator Brown between the protections accorded by the Human Rights Code to issues of access to work, on the one hand, and the very different issues of entitlement to compensation, on the other, is significant and useful. It is also, to some extent, rooted in judicial authority, as discussed below. We consider that distinction to be instructive for the purposes of resolving the dispute before us by the proper application of the protections enshrined in the Human Rights Code. The analysis in the Versa Services case was generally approved and followed by Arbitrator Gray in the Stelco case. The arbitrator there concluded that a provision in the collective agreement which limited an employee's entitlement to vacation time off, based on the hours that the employee worked during a given year was not discriminatory, contrary -27- to the Human Rights Code, as it applied to a grievor whose vacation entitlement was reduced by reason of an extended absence from work due to an injury for which he was in receipt of Workers' Compensation benefits. At p.19 of the award, after thoroughly reviewing and quoting the reasoning of Arbitrator Brown in the Versa Services case, Arbitrator Gray comments: I agree with arbitrator Brown's conclusion that the Code does not require an employer to pay an individual who is unable to perform work the compensation to which someone who did perform that work would be entitled, merely because the individual's inability to perform the work is due to a handicap. As can be seen from the jurisprudence, employers, unions and arbitrators have struggled mightily to come to grips with the sometimes difficult issue of equality of treatment for employees with a disability, in respect of various kinds of rights relating to their employment. There have, to be sure, been inconsistencies in the reasoning and outcomes of arbitration awards in this area. A helpful appreciation of the evolution of thought with respect to the application of the Human Rights Code to collective agreement provisions which impact disabled employees is reflected in the decision of the Board of Arbitration chaired by Arbitrator Kennedy in Re Metropolitan General Hospital and Ontario Nurses Association. The issue in that case is the same as that before us. Because of a disability, the grievor was absent from work for a substantial period of time. Article 10.04 of the collective agreement provided a general rule whereby all leaves of absence in excess of 30 calendar days would result in the cessation of the accumulation of "seniority or - 28 - service for any purpose under the Collective Agreement for the period of the absence in excess of (30) continuous calendar days...". The provision went on, however, to make special provision for disabled employees in the following terms: Notwithstanding this provision, seniority shall accrue for a period of one year is a nurse's absence is due to disability resulting in WCB benefits or LTD benefits including the period of the disability program covered by Unemployment Insurance. In the Metropolitan General case, the grievor's seniority was reduced by virtue of her absence from work for a period in excess of one year, caused by a work-related, compensable disability. The union argued that the collective agreement provision adversely affected the grievor, and discriminated against her contrary to section 5(1) of the Ontario Human Rights Code, resulting in the denial of accrual of her seniority, by reason of which she became disentitled to a full-time position. The union argued, in part, that while article 10.04 appeared to treat all nurses equally, nurses who have suffered absences from work by reason of a disability were adversely affected, as compared with able-bodies nurses, because of the fact that their absence from work was due to a disability. Citing a decision of the Divisional Court of the Supreme Court of Ontario in Re Etobicoke General Hospital and O.N.A. (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 40, the union argued that the reduction of seniority standing negatively impacted an employee's access to work and promotion opportunities and, therefore, constituted constructive discrimination contrary to the Code. - 29 - Given the importance and difficulty of the issue we are called upon to decide, we deem it appropriate to reproduce, at some length, both the summary of argument and reasons for its decision related by the majority of the board of arbitration in the Metropolitan General Hospital case. At pp.296-300, the following appears: Two derisions argued by the union to be directly on point were Thorne v. Emerson Electric Canada Ltd. (1993), 18 C.H.R.R. D/510 (Leighton), and Riverdale Hospital (Board of Governors) and C.U.P.E., Loc.79 (1993), 39 L.A.C. (4th) 63 (Stewart). In Thorne the complainant was absent and receiving workers' compensation benefits for a period of time, and on her return to work and pursuant to the specific provisions of the collective agreement under which she worked, her seniority was adjusted to exclude part of the absence. The complainant relied on the same provisions of the Code as are raised in this case by the union, and at p.D/514 the adjudicator stated the following: It therefore find that Ms. Thorne, being a member of a specific class which is protected under the Code, handicapped in this case, was adversely affected by the provision in the collective agreement in that she lost six months of seniority because she was handicapped. Although the provision in the collective agreement is neutral on its' face, it discriminates against anyone qualifying as handicapped [who is] absent from work for more than one year as a result of that handicap. Both the employer and the union were party to that complaint and were found to be in violation of the Human Rights Code. The Riverdale Hospital decision considered equivalent facts and collective agreement language and concluded that to the extent the collective agreement language precluded accrual of seniority during a period of absence due to a workers' compensation injury, those provisions constituted inequality in treatment with respect to employment in violation of s.5 of the Human Rights Code. For the employer, it was argued that there were two problems with the union's logic and with the decisions upon which it had been based. First, the argument did not recognize a proper discrimination definition. The argument and some of the cases treat discrimination simply as someone being treated differently from someone else. It was argued that something did not constitute discrimination just because the result was different and that to constitute - 30 - discrimination a person had to be preferred or penalized because of the particular difference. Second, on the union logic, it constitutes discrimination to deprive someone who is off work of what people who are at work are entitled to receive. Then why would that not extend to wages? It was argued that if the union is right on its argument, people within a class protected by the Code should get full wages and all other benefits whether or not they are at work. In the employer's view, there was at this point in time no authority or logic to support such a proposition. Particular reference was made to the decision in Re Versa Services Ltd. and Milk & Bread Drivers, Dairy Employees, Caterers & Allied Employees Union, Loc. 647 (1994), 39 L.A.C. (4th) 196 (R.M. Brown), as providing the rational basis for reconciling the existing case law and establishing where it was appropriate to draw the line between what is protected for disabled employees and what is not. Based on the Versa Services decision, it was argued that the purpose of the provisions of the Code was to protect participation in and access to the workplace rather than to ensure receipt of all benefits and entitlement which people who come to work will receive. It was the employer's position that under the collective agreement people not at work do not accumulate seniority on the same basis that they do not get paid salary. That does not constitute penalizing them because they are part of a particular class. On the issue of an appropriate definition for "discrimination" and the requirement that the particular penalty or privilege be as a result of the particular characteristic protected in the Code, reference was made to Re Canada (Treasury Board - Employment and Immigration) and Dekoning (1993), 33 L.A.C. (4th) 203 (Canada Public Service Staff Relations Board) (Burke), and Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [1989] 1 $.C.R. 143, 25 C.C.E.L. 255. It was the position of the employer that for the purposes of determining whether or not there was discrimination within the meaning of the Code, the appropriate comparison of the grievor was to others who for varying reasons did not come to work, rather than with those who were at work. Reference was made to Re Canadian Airlines International Ltd. and C.U.P.E. (1993), 32 L.A.C. (4th) 398 (Springate); Re Glen Haven Manor Corp. and C.U.P.E. Loc. 2330 (1991), 19 L.A.C. (4th) 61 (Darby), and Re Family Service Assn. of Metropolitan Toronto and O.P.S.E.U., Loc. 594 (Schif), unreported [summarized 36 C.L.A.S. 469], October 19, 1994. Included in the employer's references in this area was the Central Hospital award dated May 30, 1989, issued by Gall Brent, with respect to a number of grievances relating to art. ll.07(h) of the participating hospitals' master agreement. The most useful authority in the employer's view was the Versa Services Ltd. decision and the distinction it drew between access and participation in the workplace which was protected by the Code and particular compensation and collective agreement provisions that were not within the Code protections. -31 - The deemed termination cases relied upon by the union constituted denial of access to the workplace by reason of the disability or other protected characteristic and were, therefore, recognized by the Versa Services Ltd. case. That was the sort of protection intended to be conferred by the provisions of the Code. When the issue involves something other than access to the workplace and a consideration of the compensation that flows from being at work, the focus then is on whether or not the protected class is being treated less favourably than others not at work. If they are, then that too is a violation of the protections granted by the Code. It was the employer's argument that in the context of this collective agreement, disabled employees receiving workers' compensation benefits are, in fact, given greater benefits under the seniority provisions than other employees absent from work, and there is, therefore, no discrimination. With reference to the Emerson Electric decision relied upon by the union, it was the employer's argument that the decision showed no logic or thought process with respect to the issue being decided. The decision merely constituted a recital of the facts and of a number of other decisions, and then the adjudicator simply jumped to a conclusion without any discussion of the concepts or relating that conclusion to either the facts or the authorities. The employer held a similar view of the Riverdale Hospital decision on the basis that it simplY .relied on the deemed termination cases and seemed to say that if something bad happens to you, it must be discrimination. It was argued that the decision in Re Ajax (Town) and C.U.P.E., Loc. 54 (1991), 23 L.A.C. (4th) 77 (Rayner), which was distinguished by the arbitrator in the Riverdale decision, was, in fact, directly on point with respect to the issues involved in this arbitration. In reply, the union noted that the employer characterized the situation as equivalent to a compensation issue, and in that context the parties operate in a system where compensation in these circumstances is covered by the Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W. 12. Accordingly, for all intents and purposes, injured employees are receiving moneys and continue as employees of the employer, and they may be considered to be in receipt of wages in so far as the workers' compensation benefits are concerned. The union characterized it as a seniority issue, not a compensation issue, and that employees have rights under the collective agreement related to promotions and bumping that are governed by seniority. Within the language of the Versa Services Ltd. decision, those fights are just the same as access to the workplace, and that access is what the grievor is being denied because of the non-accrual of seniority. The denial of seniority has the potential of being a denial of access to the workplace, and it is because of the handicap the grievor has been denied accrual of seniority. - 32 - The issues and positions of the parties have been clearly set out in the arguments already summarized in this award, and it is obvious that the existing body of case law contains inconsistencies and contradictions. Against that background, it is our view that the arguments of the employer constitute the preferable summary of the principles to be garnered from the authorities to be applied to the factual circumstances of this case. That being said, this has not been an easy decision. We recognize on the one hand the importance of giving to human rights legislation a broad and purposeful interpretation in the achievement of important public policy initiatives. At the same time, we recognize the importance of consistency and predictability in the ongoing application of collective agreement provisions in the workplace. The particular provision which we are considering is contained in a collective agreement that governs the terms and conditions of employment for nurses employed not only by this employer, but also by a large number of other hospitals throughout the Province of Ontario. That collective agreement is the product of extensive central negotiations, coupled with arbitrated provisions where the parties could not reach agreement on their own. Those negotiations and arbitrations were all carried on by sophisticated and experienced parties with detailed knowledge of the sector within which they were operating. Against that background, a board of arbitration ought to conclude that those parties overlooked fundamental human rights legislation in their negotiations and proceedings only in the face of clear and convincing evidence that they did. It was the employer's position in argument that the collective agreement provision involved in fact gave greater benefits under the seniority provisions when compared to other employees, as opposed to constituting discrimination against them. The validity of this argument in the overall context of a collective agreement is recognized by arbitrator Rayner in the Town of A~ax decision wherein at p.82 he stated as follows: In our opinion we must look at the article as a whole and consider the positive and negative implications of the article. To do otherwise would be to artificially sever the bargain that the parties freely made. The board cannot-and should not speculate as to what trade-offs were made when art. 11:07 was bargained. To consider only the negative aspect of the article would be to rewrite the contract. The employer in its argument placed considerable reliance on the rationale of the Versa Services Ltd. decision, and it is a matter of record that that decision was reviewed by the Ontario Divisional Court composed of Southey, Boland and Rosenberg JJ. on February 7, 1995. The application was dismissed with the following endorsement on the record: - 33 - It is unnecessary to consider in this 'case the effect of the standard of review of the 1992 amendments to s.45 of the Labour Relations Act. We are all of the view that the arbitrator was correct in his conclusion that there had been no violation of the rights of handicapped employees to equal treatment with respect to benefit contributions. Even applying the test of correctness, the application for judicial review must be dismissed. In the context of this collective agreement, seniority accrual for all employees of whatever characteristic is based on time actually worked. There is no distinction or discrimination that is based on or results from the fact that the grievor is within the language of the Ontario Human Rights Code subject to a handicap as defined in the Code. The Code does not confer on the grievor a particular seniority regime that protects her from the normal consequences of not being at work. Only if others in equivalent non-working circumstances were given seniority entitlement that exceeded that available to the grievor could there be found to be discrimination. On the facts before us, the reverse is true, and employees of the particular characteristic of the grievor receive preferable treatment with respect to the continued accumulation of seniority. In the result, therefore, it is our conclusion that to the extent the grievance is based on-the Ontario Human Rights Code, the grievance must be dismissed. We remain seised with respect to the determination of the grievor's actual seniority, should the parties not be able to agree upon same. As can be seen from the foregoing analysis and conclusion, both boards of arbitration and the courts have accepted that there is a valid distinction between issues of compensation or earnings, or other monetary/benefit entitlements, on the one hand, which are based on work actually performed and are not generally protected by the provisions of the Human Rights Code and, on the other hand, concepts of employment status and access to work, which are so protected. Central to the analysis which an adjudicative body must make in determining whether there has been inequality of treatment, contrary to section 5 of the Code or, alternatively, constructive discrimination contrary to section 1 of the Code, is - 34 - establishing the base comparator group. The major premise of the decision of the majority in the Metropolitan C, eneral Hospital case, as in the argument of the employer before us, is that the appropriate comparator group for the purposes of assessing unequal treatment is all employees who are absent from work for a period in excess of a defined limit. Arbitrator Kennedy found that nurses whose accrual of seniority was limited by reason of their absence from work were treated no worse than nurses who were absent for other reasons and, indeed, they were given better treatment under the terms of the collective agreement. The board therefore rejected the comparator premise advanced by the Union, which is that disabled employees should be compared to able-bodied employees who do not suffer absences from work, as a basis for determining equality or inequality of treatment or, alternatively, adverse impact or constructive discrimination. The second observation which flows from the analysis of the majority in the Metropolitan General Hospital case is' that it treats seniority as analogous to issues of compensation or entitlement to benefits which, under the collective agreement, are based on periods of time spent actively at work. The majority of the board rejected the position of the Union that a reduction in an employee's seniority entitlement is tantamount to a reduction to his or her access to employment, an interest which both arbitrators and the courts have acknowledged to be protected by the Code. For reasons elaborated below, we have difficulty with that characterization of seniority. - 35 - In his final written submission, counsel for the Union takes strong exception to the comparator group analysis adopted by the majority of the board in the Metropolitan General Hospital case. He writes, in part: Secondly, the Metropolitan General Hospital case is, in my respectful submission, wrongly reasoned. Human rights analysis in Canada does not proceed by way of seeking a "similarly situated" group to the complainant group. The debate about which comparator group - all employees or only those not at work - is the appropriate comparator group before the complainants in this case is premised on an equity analysis that has been rejected in Canada beginning with Andrews ... and confirmed emphatically since that time. In our view, the decision of the Board in the Metropolitan General Hospital case is in stark contradiction to the position of the majority of the board chaired by Arbitrator Burkett in the Re Metropolitan Toronto Reference Library Board decision. In that case, to the grievor's claim that he was discriminated against because he was denied training made available to other employees while he was absent by reason of a long-term disability, the employer responded that with respect to the issue of equality of treatment under section 5 (1) of the Human Rights Code, the grievor was to be compared with other employees who might have been absent for other reasons during the training period, and who were treated no differently. As the board characterized the employer's argument: The employer relies on the fact that Mr. Haley was absent from work at the time of the technological change and asks us to find that in these circumstances the group in respect of which he is entitled to equal treatment under s.5(1) of the Human Rights Code is that comprised of persons absent from work. In the absence of any evidence that Mr. Haley was treated - 36 - differently than anyone else on a long-term absence from work, we are asked to find that although he lost an opportunity (to be trained) he was not discriminated against in the sense that he was treated any differently than those with whom he shared the same defining characteristic (i.e., long-term absence from work). The majority of the board in the Metropolitan Toronto Reference Library Board case allowed the grievance, firstly, on the basis of the contractual right to training provided to all full-time employees within the terms of the collective agreement, finding that the grievor continued to retain his entitlement in that regard notwithstanding his extensive leave of absence of some 33 months. The board then went on to rest its decision on the alternative basis that the denial of training to the grievor was a denial of equal treatment as contemplated under Section 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, by reason of his disability. In' so doing, it concluded that the appropriate comparator group was not other employees denied the benefit of training, but rather the general group of bargaining unit employees who did receive the benefit. At pp. 169-71, Arbitrator Burkett reasoned and concluded as follows: This takes us to the question of whether Mr. Haley was denied "equal treatment" within the meaning of s.5(1) of the Human Rights Code by reason of being found not qualified under art. 20.02(b) in circumstances where he was not given the same art. 24.01 training that others received during his absence from work because of "handicap". The identification of the group to whom Mr. Haley must properly relate in pushing his claim of unequal treatment is a necessary first step in answering the broader question. The employer, as we have recounted, argues that the appropriate group is that comprised of those who would also have been absent from work on long-term leave for whatever reason. Apart from the absence of any evidence that anyone else was absent at the time or has been absent in the past when training was being given under art. 24.01, we have a great deal of difficulty with the employer's position. The question of whether, but for the handicap, - 37 - a person would have received a benefit or entitlement (which is the fundamental question in determining whether or not there has been discrimination), can only be answered by reference to those who have received the benefit or entitlement. If the reference group is comprised of non-handicapped persons who have been denied the benefit or entitlement (for non-proscribed reasons) there can never be a finding of discrimination even though unequal treatment because of handicap may have occurred vis-h- vis those who were at work, as the grievor would have been had it not been for his "handicap". The Human Rights Code is designed to protect against the loss of benefits or entitlements that would have been received but for the "handicap". To compare the grievor to those not entitled to the benefit or entitlement, for non-proscribed reasons, therefore, negates the protections against "unequal treatment" contained in the Code. We find support for this conclusion in the analysis of arbitrator S.L. Stewart in Re Riverdale Hospital C.U.P.E., Loc. 79, supra, as follows [at pp.72-3]: However, in determining whether there has been inequality of treatment of Mr. Jovellanos in relation to his disability, it is necessary to consider the appropriate comparator group. The decisions in Re Canada Packers and in Re Toronto Hospital address .this issue in the context of two clauses in the collective agreement, providing for differing standards for discharge for employees who have been absent for a specified period, including employees who have been absent due a workers' compensation injury, and those employees who are discharged for other reasons. In Re Canada Packers, it was concluded that the appropriate comparator group in determining whether there has been unequal treatment of an employee who has been off work as a result of a workers' compensation injury is the other employees who are subject to the deemed termination clause. This approach was rejected by the board in Re Toronto Hospital, where it was concluded that the appropriate comparator is the bargaining unit as a whole. Moreover, the decision in Re Toronto Hospital expresses the view that this conclusion is supported by the decision of the Divisional Court in Stratford (City) v. C.U.P.E., Loc. 197 (April 19, 1991), supra, and that the decision in Re Canada Packers is inconsistent with that decision. At p.63 in Re Toronto Hospital, the board states as follows: 'Whe essence of the decision in Re Stratford (City) which was upheld by the Divisional Court as being correct was that the protection provided - 38 - the grievor under s.4 of the Human Rights Code, 1981 was infringed because the automatic termination provision denied him access to the just cause provisions applicable to the employees in the bargaining unit. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the court endorsed the necessary and implicit finding of the arbitrator that the proper group for comparison in assessing whether the grievor, as a handicapped person within the meaning of the Code, had been afforded equal treatment as the employees in the bargaining unit as a whole and not simply the other employees who are subject to the deemed termination provision of the collective agreement. We adopt these findings." The board went on to a detailed consideration of the decision in Canada Packers, At pp. 66-7 the decision states as follows: 'Whe board of arbitration in the instant matter cannot adopt the reasoning of Re Canada · Packers. First, as set out above, we are satisfied that the Divisional Court decision in Stratford (City) did endorse, as being correct, the finding of the arbitration board in Re Stratford (City) that the proper group for comparison, in assessing whether the grievor, as a handicapped person within the meaning of the Code, had been afforded equal treatment, was the employees in the bargaining, unit as a whole and simply the other employees who were subject to the deemed termination provision of the collective agreement. Accordingly, we cannot adopt the view of the majority of the board in Re Canada Packers [at p.214] that a breach of the Code is avoided because "the grievor in the instant case ... has available to her all the arguments and arbitral principles of review that are available to any other employee to whom art. 12.5(d) may apply'". Again, we are in agreement with Mr. Caley's submission that the decision in Re Toronto Hospital is the better analysis and that the appropriate comparator group is the bargaining unit as a whole. - 39 - In accordance with this analysis, the issue to be determined is whether Mr. Jovellanos has experienced unequal treatment in relation to the members of the bargaining unit as a whole. The award goes on to confirm its consistency with Re Board of Governors of Riverdale Hospital and C.U.O.E. (June 6, 1990), unreported (O'Shea), which found that even though the collective agreement provided for the reduction of vacation pay because an employee worked fewer than a stipulated number of hours, the employer could not rely on this clause where the employee had been off work by reason of a compensable injury, and Re Ontario (Ministry of Health) and O.P.S.E.U. (Martin) (May 13, 1993), unreported (reported 31 L.A.C. (4th) 129] (Dissanayake), where an employee was denied a position because of his record of absenteeism including compensable injury absences. The arbitrator found that even though the attendance policy applied to everyone in the bargaining unit [at p.143], "... it is not neutral because it has an adverse impact on a group protected by the Code, i.e., those who suffer compensable injuries or disabilities". We need only repeat that for purposes of determining whether an employee has been discriminated against under the Human Rights Code the reference or comparator group must be those who received the benefit or entitlement that has been denied so that it can be determined whether, but for the handicap, the handicapped employee would have received .the benefit or entitlement. After substantial reflection, we are of the view that the approach of the board of arbitration in the Metropolitan Toronto Reference Library case is to be preferred to that found in the Metropolitan General Hospital award. In our view, to conclude that the grievors have been accorded "equal treatment" in respect of their employment within the meaning of Section 5.1 of the Code because they have suffered the same disentitlement to the accrual of seniority experienced by other employees absent for a period in excess of 24 months is to fail to appreciate the purpose of the equal protection provision, as it relates to a prohibited ground of discrimination. Furthermore, to the extent that Article 27.03D (ii) can be characterized as a rule of general application embracing all employees who are absent, it is plainly one which operates adversely against disabled employees, as compared - 40 - to employees who are absent for reasons within their control, and as compared to able- bodied employees who do not suffer absences from work. To that extent it would constitute constructive discrimination contrary to Section 1 of the Human Rights Code. With respect to the issue of constructive discrimination, we are bound by the decision of the Divisional Court in the Etobicoke General Hospital (1993), 14 O.R. (4th) 40. In that case, the Court reviewed the decision of Arbitrator Craven in Re Etobicoke General Hospital and Ontario Nurses Association (1992), 25 L.A.C. (4th) 376. Arbitrator Craven declined to find that the automatic termination of a nurse, after an absence from work for a period of 24 months by reason of disability, was contrary to the Human Rights Code. In so doing, he clearly departed from the approach taken by the boards of arbitration in Glengarry lndustries/Chromalox Components and United Steelworkers, Local 6976 (1989), 3 L.A.C. (4th) 326 (Hinnegan) and Re Toronto Hospital and Ontario Nurses Association (1992), 31 L.A.C. (4th) 44 (P.C. Picher).'Arbitrator Craven reasoned, in part, at pp.386-87: ... the determination of the griever's employment was not due to her handicap, but rather to her absence due to illness or disability for 24 months. In this she was treated the same way that the collective agreement contemplates treating any employee who is absent due to illness or disability for 24 months. The decision of the Divisional Court, quoted at page 12 of Arbitrator Gray's award in the Stelco case struck down the decision of Arbitrator Craven, reasoning, in part, at pp.43-4: We incline to the view that the approach in Glengarry, supra, as affirmed in Stratford, supra, is correct. However, even if we were prepared to assume the arbitrator in the instant case was correct and a prima faeie case of direct -41 - employment discrimination had not been made out, we are of the view that a prima facie case of employment discrimination has been made out based on constructive discrimination provided for in s. 1 of the Human Rights Code. In our view, even if cl. 8.03(g) can be properly viewed as a neutral provision there can be no doubt that in the circumstances of this case, the clause has adverse effects on employees because of their handicap and is accordingly discriminatory for that reason: see Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at p.550, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at p.332. In the circumstances whether cl. 8.03(g) is directly discriminatory or constructively discriminatory, it was incumbent upon the arbitrator to apply 2.17 of the Code. His failure to do so constitutes serious error. We conclude that the decision of the arbitrator in this case was patently unreasonable. As has been stated the arbitrator erred in not finding the application of d.8.03(g) resulted either in direct or constructive discrimination. Once either form of discrimination is found, the arbitrator was bound to consider whether the grievor could be accommodated within s.17 of the Code. The arbitrator failed to engage in this inquiry but held that he would remain seized of the case to deal with this issue at the request of either party. In our view, the deCision of the arbitrator is patently unreasonable. He should have found either direct or constructive discrimination and made a finding as to the issue of accommodation within s.17 of the Code. He did none of these things but rather found no discrimination while at the same time finding that an accommodation hearing within s.17 was required. In the absence of a finding of discrimination, there is no jurisdiction to conduct a s.17 hearing. In the face of the foregoing authorities, we take it as settled law that the generality of application of Article 27.03D (ii) is not a defence to the assertion that in its .specific application it operates adversely against disabled employees, as it sets up an invidious distinction, contrary to Section 1 of the Human Rights Code, as between able-bodied employees who do not suffer extensive periods of absence from work, and those employees who are absent from work for periods in excess of 24 months by reason of their disability, a condition specifically protected by the Human Rights Code. - 42 - Secondly, with the greatest of respect, we feel compelled to follow a different course than the board of arbitration in the Metropolitan General Hospital case with respect to the treatment of seniority rights. Firstly, as reflected above, we accept the distinction, noted by Arbitrator Brown in the Versa Services case, between rights to earned wages or benefits based on attendance at work, which are not protected by the Code, and the more fundamental rights of access to employment, which are so protected, a distinction implidtly approved by the Divisional Court. Under most collective agreements, seniority is an employee's pass-key to job security, a touchstone to vital job interests such as opportunities for promotion, protection against layoff and rights of recall. (Tung-Sol of Canada Ltd. (1964), 15 L.A.C. 161 (Reville)). If, as is well settled, an employee cannot suffer automatic termination by reason of an extended absence from work because of a physical disability, on what logical basis Can that same employee have his or her protection against eventual layoff, or his or her recall rights, diminished by a reduction in seniority standing, caused only by an absence from work occasioned by a physical disability protected by the Human Rights Code.9 If an employee cannot be automatically discharged by reason of an absence caused by illness or injury, we do not see how the consequences of an absence for a physical disability can operate to reduce the same employee's relative seniority in relation to non- disabled employees, pushing him or her closer to the head of the line in the event of a future layoff or further back in the line which will regulate a recall to work. While it may be that employees under the instant collective agreement who are absent for periods in excess of 24 months for reasons other than disability may also see their access to employment diminished by reason of the reduction of their relative seniority standing, there - 43 - is no unlawful discrimination against them, because they do not have the protected status accorded to the disabled by the Human Rights Code. To the extent that Article 27.03 D(ii) of the collective agreement may "discriminate" against them, as compared with employees who are at work, it does so lawfully. That provision cannot, however, operate so as to visit the same discrimination upon a disabled employee. Having regard to the principles developed by the Supreme Court of Canada, as reflected in the Andrews case cited above, we are compelled to conclude that although Article 27.03D (ii) appears to be of general application, in its practical operation it results in adverse impact discrimination against disabled employees. We feel it important, however, to stress the limitations of our conclusions. In keeping with the reasoning of the board of arbitration in the Versa Services award, we are satisfied that the provisions of Sections 1 and 5(1) of the Ontario Human Rights Code prohibit the College and the Union from fashioning a collective agreement provision which, as we have found with respect to Article 27.03D (ii), reduces the vested job security interest of an employee represented by his or her seniority standing. We are, therefore, satisfied that Article 27.03D (ii) of the collective agreement cannot operate to reduce the relative seniority of an employee, notwithstanding the length of his or her absence from work, where the absence is for reasons of disability protected by the Code, to the extent that the reduction in seniority would impact that employee's access to work or to work opportunities under the collective agreement, including protections against layoff, rights of recall, access to promotions and such other rights as may exist with respect to bidding or holding work -44- under the terms of the collective agreement. We do not, however, find that the Code would protect against the application of Aa'tide 27.03D(ii) of the agreement so as to entitle the employees who are the subject of this grievance to any wages, benefits or other advantages which can only be gained, under the terms of the collective agreement, by attendance and service at work. For the foregoing reasons, the grievance is allowed, in part. The Board finds and declares that Article 27.03D (ii) of the collective agreement is contrary to Sections 1 and 5(1) of the Ontario Human Rights Code, to the extent that it would reduce the seniority of employees absent from work by reason of a disability specifically protected by the Code, to the extent that such seniority rights may attach to the ability of the employees whether presently, or in the future, to safeguard their access to work and work opportunities. This matter is referred back to the parties for implementation. We remain seized in the event of any dispute which may arise with respect to the interpretation or implementation of this decision. DATED at Toronto this 25th day of November, 1996. I CONCUR. "John McManus" Union Nominee DISSENT ATrACHED. "Hugh John Cook" College Nominee - 45 - DISSENT OF COLLEGE NOMINEE The parties have signed a collective agreement Which provides under section 27.03 D (ii) that no employee shall continue to accrue seniority after an absence from work of more than 24 months for reason of verified illness or injury and/or leave of absence, or on a College approved secondment. The majority of the board has found that this constitutes discrimination against some employees because they are physically handicapped. The majority of the Board has chosen to say that the comparator group for employees who are absent for more than 24 months because of illness or injury, is those employees who are at work. With respect, 'I believe that the majority of the Board has erred. The proper comparator group for employees who are absent for more than 24 months because of illness or injury, should be persons who are covered under section 27.03 D (ii) who are absent from work for more than 24 months for reasons other than illness or injury. The parties have agreed to treat all these employees in the same manner, but the decision of the majority would result in treating employees absent from work for illness/injury better than other employees covered under 27.03 D (ii), who are absent for reasons other than illness/injury. In my opinion, this will create discrimination where previously none existed. The majority has found that these employees are entitled to access to promotion while absent for more than 24 months for reasons of disability. Does this mean that, upon their return to work, they are entitled to grieve any promotion that has taken place during - 46 - their absence, for which they can argue that they were better qualified and possessed more seniority? The majority has also found that these employees are not entitled to "any wages, benefits or other advantages which can only be gained, under the terms of the collective agreement, by attendance at work". I respectfully submit that it is not self evident why these employees are entitled to some benefits and not others, or which benefits should be awarded, if 27.03 D (ii) is contrary to the Human Rights Code. There is a further point that should be mentioned. The local union has chosen to challenge an agreement reached between its own representatives and the Council of Regents, by going t°. binding arbitration. If there had been an individual who was disadvantaged by the provision to which they object, this might have been justifiable, but there is not, nor is there likely to be. This is an arrogant and irresponsible waste of their own and the public resources, which could have been avoided by removing this clause by mutual agreement at the next negotiations. I would have dismissed the grievance. "Hugh John Cook" College Nominee