HomeMy WebLinkAboutAbel 89-01-19B E. T W E E'~N~
ST. LAWRENCE COLLEGE
(The Employer)
- and -
PUBLIC. SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION
(The Union)
AND IN T}~f~?~..Tf..~£ER OF THE GRIEVANCE OF A. ABEL - #87E45
BOARD OF ARBI~D~ION: Kenneth P. Swan, Chairman
R.J. Gallivan, Employer Nominee
Jane Bern, Union Nominee
Appearances.:.{.~
For the Employer: Chris White, Counsel
For the?~ni~n: C.G. Paliare, Counsel
AWARD
At the hearing in this matter, the parties were agreed
that the board of arbitration had been properly appointed, and
that we had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter at
issue between the parties. Although the matter is quite complex,
counsel were able to proceed by documentary evidence admitted on
consent and oral submissions, without the necessity of calling
witnesses.
Despite its agreement on our general jurisdiction in
this matter, the Employer argued that we were without jurisdic-
tion to hear the merits of the matter for two substantial
reasons, which were raised as preliminary objections. The first
of these is that the grievance was filed beyond the time limits
set out in the collective agreement. The second, and more
fundamental objection, is that the grievor was a probationary
employee at the time of the termination of his employment, and
that the present grievance, which effectively characterizes that
termination as discharge without cause, is not arbitrable. We
shall deal with the second objection first.
Before turning to the undisputed facts of this matter,
it is useful to set out the provisions of the collective agree-
ment on which the parties rely:
1.01 The Union is recognized as the
exclusive collective bargaining agency for
all academic employees of the Colleges
engaged as teachers (including teachers of
Physical Education), counsellors and librari-
ans, all as more particularly set out in
Appendix I hereto save and except Chairman,
Department Heads and Directors, persons above
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the rank of Chairman, Department Head or
Director, persons covered by the Memorandum
of Agreement with the Ontario Public Service
Employees Union in the support staff bargain-
ing unit, and other persons excluded by the
legislation and teachers, counsellors and
librarians employed on a part-time or
sessional basis.
NOTE A: "Part-time in this context shall
include persons who teach six hours per week
or less."
NOTE B: "Sessional in this context shall
mean an appointment of not more than twelve
months duration in any twenty-four month
period."
3.03 (1) The Salary scales as set out
in Appendix I will apply to persons teaching
more than twelve (12) hours on a regular
basis· Persons teaching over six (6) and up
to and including twelve (12) hours on a
regular basis will be covered by paragraph
(2) hereto and Appendix II.
3.03 (2) Persons who teach over six (6)
and up to and including twelve (12) hours per
week on a regular basis shall be referred to
as "partial-load" employees and shall not
receive salary, vacations, holidays or fringe
benefits (except for coverage of Worker's
Compensation and liability insurance) under
this Memorandum and Appendix I but shall be
paid for the performance of each teaching
hour at an hourly rate within the range of
hourly rates set out in Appendix II and in
accordance with the other provisions of
Appendix II.
3.03 (3) It is recognized that a full-
time teacher who may be assigned by the
College to an instructional assignment of
less than thirteen (13) hours per week shall
continue to be paid on the basis of salary
rather than on an hourly rate except as may
occur through the application of Article 8,
Seniority, or as may be mutually agreed
between the employee and the College.
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8.01 (a) (i) A full-time employee will be
on probation until the completion of the
probationary period which shall be two (2)
years' continuous employment.
(ii) A full-time employee hired
after September 1, 1981, who has completed a
probationary period at another Ontario
College of Applied Arts and Technology or who
holds a valid Ontario Teacher's Certificate
and who has one year or more of teaching
experience in Ontario will be on probation
until the completion of the probationary
period which shall be one year's continuous
employment.
(b) Effective September 1, 1976,
the probationary period shall also consist of
twenty-four (24) full months of non-
continuous employment (in periods of at least
one (1) full month each) in a forty-eight
(48) calendar month period. For this
purpose, only the period after September 1,
1975, shall be considered and no prior
employment or calendar period shall be taken
into account or credited. However, an
employee's continuous service acquired in
accordance with the provisions of the
previous agreement dated the 17th day of
September '1975, as at August 31, 1976, for
the period back to September 1, 1975, shall
count as continuous employment or months of
non-continuous accumulated employment for the
purpose of this Section.
For the purpose of this paragraph,
effective September 1, 1976, a calendar month
in which the employee completes fifteen (15)
or more days worked shall be considered a
"full month".
Effective September 1, 1981, if an
employee completes less than fifteen (15)
days worked in each of the calendar months at
the start and end of the employee's period of
employment and such days worked, when added
together, exceed fifteen (15) days worked an
additional full month shall be considered to
be completed.
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(c) During the probationary period
an employee will be informed in writing of
the employee's progress at intervals of four
(4) months continuous employment or four (4)
full months of accumulated non-continuous
employment and a copy given to the employee.
Also, it is understood that an employee may
be released during the first five (5) months
of continuous or non-continuous accumulated
employment following the commencement date of
the employee's employment upon at least
thirty (30) calendar days' written notice and
during the remainder of the employee's
probationary period upon at least ninety (90)
calendar days' written notice. If requested
by the employee, the reason for such release
will be given in writing.
(d) Upon the completion of the
employee's probationary period, a full-time
employee shall be credited with two (2)
years' seniority if treated under 8.01(a) (i)
or one (1) year's seniority if treated under
$.01(a) (ii). An employee who commenced full-
time employment with the College directly
from the College's predecessor educational
institutions shall be credited for the
purpose of this Article with seniority equal
to the employee's continuous service in such
predecessor institution. The list of
predecessor educational institutions referred
to herein is attached as Appendix VIII of the
Collective Agreement.
8.02 (a) It being understood that the
release of an employee during the probation-
ary period shall not be the subject of a
grievance under the Grievance Procedure, an
employee who has completed the probationary
period and is discharged for cause may lodge
a grievance in the manner and to the extent
provided in the Grievance Procedure.
Appendix II
PARTIAL-LOAD EMPLOYEES
2. It is agreed that Article 8 has no
application to partial-load teachers except
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as referred to in Section 8.05(d) and Section
8.15(b). Such partial-load teachers may be
released upon two (2) weeks' written notice
and shall resign by giving two (2) weeks'
written notice.
3. For the purpose of determining the
service of a partial-load teacher under
Section 8.05(d) a partial-load teacher will
be entitled to credit for service from
September 1, 1971 (but not earlier) on the
basis of one-half (1/2) month's credit for
each full month of service up to January 1,
1977 and thereafter on the basis of one-half
(1/1) month's credit for each calendar month
in which the employee teaches thirty (30)
hours or more.
Appendix IV
In the administration of Section 8.05(d)
and for that purpose only, a part-time
employee shall be considered to have service
based on one-quarter (1/4) month's credit
respectively for each full month of employ-
ment with the College.
Article 8.05(d), which is referred to in the above provisions,
relates to the relative priority of full-time, partial-load or
part-time employees on lay-off. Reference will be made to this
provision below, but there is no need to quote it in its
entirety.
The grievor's service with the College began in 1983 on
a part-time basis, and ended with a letter of termination dated
September 25, 1986. The precise nature of the grievor's employ-
ment record is central to this case, so we shall set it out in
detail. However, his employment is covered by nearly 20 over-
lapping payroll authorization forms, and we have decided to
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summarize these for the purpose of our assessment of his rights
in this matter. The following is our summary, based on the
evidence presented:
1. From September 14, 1983 to September 9, 1984, the
grievor was on a series of part-time academic staff appointments.
While these specific appointment documents overlap somewhat, it
appears that this can be treated as one single stretch of
employment, but on a part-time basis only.
2. From September 10, 1984 to January 27, 1985, the
grievor was on a partial-load academic staff appointment, which
was interrupted by a strike from late September to early November
1984.
3. From January 28, 1985 to January 5, 1986, the grievor
was on a series of sessional and partial-load and academic staff
appointments, which both parties agree should be treated as
continuous sessional employment for the purposes of this
grievance.
4. From January 6, 1986 to October 10, 1986, he was on a
probationary academic staff appointment, which was terminated by
notice of his release by letter dated September 26, 1986, to be
effective on October 10, 1986.
Based on this employment record, the parties are agreed
that the grievor is entitled to count service from January 28,
1985 to October 10, 1986 as service toward the completion of his
probationary period. The dispute is whether he can count any
other appointment toward his probationary period, and if so how
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that affects the determination of his probationary status at the
time of his release. There are really three aspects to the
disputed parts of the grievor's service:
1. Is the grievor entitled to count any of his service
prior to January 28, 1985 toward his probationary period?
2. Is-the 90 day notice period specified in Article
8.01(c), which in this case was partially worked and partially
paid out, required to be counted toward the employee's probation-
ary period?
3. At the time of the termination of his employment, the
grievor had accumulated 18 days of unused vacation, which was
paid out by the Employer. Was the grievor entitled to use those
18 days toward his probationary period?
The period of service which both parties agree that the
grievor worked appears to be one year and 256 days, although
there were a few brief interruptions in the grievor's sessional
appointments and there is scope for arguing for a slightly lower
count. As will be seen, however, it is sufficient in this case
to take the one year and 256 day period as the basis for con-
sideration.
We turn first to the question of whether the grievor is
entitled to count any of his periods of part-time or partial-load
employment prior to January 28, 1985. This issue divides into
two separate considerations. During 1984, the grievor's employ-
ment always fell below the 13 hour per week limit for partial-
load employees, but during the month of January, because of
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additional assignments, his workload in the third week rose to 28
hours, while his workload in the fourth week was at 16 hours.
Immediately after that last week, he began the sessional appoint-
ment from which time his accepted service counts.
The Union argues first that the provisions of Appendix
II, paragraph 3 entitle the grievor to count his partial-load
employment from September to December at one-half month's credit
for each of those months. The argument is based first on a
comparison with Appendix IV, which specifies that part-time
employees are considered to accrue service credits "in the
administration of Section 8.05(d) and for that purpose only", and
Appendix II, paragraphs 2 and 3 in which no such restrictive
language as "for that purpose only" is found. In our view,
however, the effect of reading paragraph 2 of Appendix II, which
provides that Article 8 has no application to partial-load
teachers except for 8.05(d) and 8.15(b), combined with the
service calculation set out in paragraph 3 of that Appendix, was
clearly intended to achieve the same result as the wording used
in Appendix IV. Given that the probationary period calculation
is found in Article 8.01, and that Article 8 has no application
to partial-load teachers except as specified, we are of the view
that no credit is given for partial-load service towards the
probationary period.
The Union also refers, however, to Re Sheridan College
and Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Smith), unreported,
May 17, 1982 (Weatherill). This suggests that partial-load
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service may be counted at the half-time basis specified in
Appendix II, paragraph 3 for the purposes of determining the
position on a seniority list of an employee who has already
completed a probationary period.
The Employer argues that this case is simply wrong, but
in our view it may readily be distinguished in any event from the
matter before us. In that case, there is no discussion of
counting time as a partial-load employee toward the completion of
a probationary period. The concept of "seniority" appear~
throughout clause 8.05, and it is entirely possible that the
board in the Sheridan College (Smith) case was considering it in
that context. In any event, there is nothing in the case to
suggest that the question now before us was raised before that
board and considered before they came to the conclusion which
they did. In our view, the clear words of Appendix II mean that
the grievor is not entitled to account any of his partial-load
service toward his probationary period, whether or not such
service may be used to establish seniority once the probation is
completed.
We turn next, therefore, to the situation in January
1985. During this period, the grievor taught two weeks for a
number of hours which clearly exceeded the definition of partial-
load employee, 'which at the time was limited to 13 hours per
week. The issue is whether the grievor can be said to have been
teaching "on a regular basis" beyond the definition.
This matter has been dealt with between the parties in
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Re St. Lawrence College and Ontario Public Service Employees
Union (Arsenault), unreported, November 16, 1982 (Brent). At
page 7 of that award, the unanimous decision concludes:
It is our view that anyone who teaches more
than six hours per week and who also cannot
be said to teach between seven and 13 hours
per week "on a regular basis" must be
considered to be a full-time teacher. It is
the phrase "on a regular basis", which occurs
in Article 3.03(b), which must be given
meaning.
The award continued to find that in a month when an
employee worked for 13 hours per week for 10 teaching days and
for 22 hours per week for 11 teaching days, that person could not
be said to have worked between six and 13 hours "on a regular
basis" during that month.
In a recent award, Re Algonquin College and Ontario
Public Service Employees Union, unreported, April 26, 1988
(Swan), the present chairman decided that not only the quantity
but also the quality of the assignment must be considered to
decide whether an assignment over the partial-load limit is on a
regular basis. In this case, we really have very little evidence
from either party to assist us to assess the nature of the extra
work assigned. What we are able to infer from the documentation
is that it was likely overload work of a non-recurring nature.
Some of it, indeed, seems to have involved course outline work
and student interviews on a one-time basis. In our view, this
can hardly be called a "regular" assignment.
We have come to the conclusion that, looked at as a
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whole, the month of January 1985 must be treated as partial-load
employment, and the grievor therefore is not entitled to count
this service toward his prObationary period. The extremely high
workload in the second week must be seen in light of the pattern
of the grievor's employment prior to that week, and indeed in
light of what occurred after until he began his full-time
sessional employment following January 28. On balance, we think
the Employer is right on this issue.
The second issue to be considered is the 90 day no%ice
period. This notice is required by Article 8.01(c), and is
expressed to be "at least ninety (90) calendar days' written
notice" to be given "during the. . .probationary period". This
matter has been considered in a number of earlier cases involving
this collective agreement and its predecessors, including Re
Ontario College of Regents of Colleges of Applied Arts and
Technology and Civil Service Association of Ontario (1976), 13
L.A.C. (2d) 82 (Weatherill), Re Fanshawe College and Ontario
Public Service Employees Union (Safran), unreported, January 21,
1981 (Rayner), Re Durham College of Applied Arts and Technology
and Ontario Public Service Employees Union (McIntyre), un-
reported, December 6, 1982 (Weatherill) and Re Sheridan College
of Applied Arts and Technology and Ontario Public Service
Employees Union (Brackenridge) , unreported, May 8, 1985
(Brunner). All of these cases find, in effect, that the entitle-
ment to three months' notice is entirely independent of the two
year duration of the probationary period, and that a release
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within the last three months of the probation period is equally
effective as one before, provided always that the full three
months' notice must be given. Where the notice period is not to
be worked, the cases also conclude that payment in lieu of notice
is sufficient.
The Union attacks all of these cases on the basis of
the underlying principles, but we are of the view that the
decisions outline what is a perfectly reasonable interpretation
of all of the language of the collective agreement, and that it
is an interpretation which has persisted between the parties
through several renegotiations of the collective agreement. Some
of these decisions, we observe, have been unanimous.
In our view, it would be wrong to disturb a line of
jurisprudence on which the parties have relied to regulate their
relationship, and which is of such long standing. In addition,
however, we think we should observe that, while the matter is not
entirely free of doubt, we would have reached the same conclusion
as to the meaning of the collective agreement.
We turn finally to the question of whether the grievor
is entitled to count the 18 days accrued but unused vacation to
which he was entitled as of the termination of his employment
toward his probationary period. From the findings we have
already made, it will be obvious that our decision on this matter
will not be conclusive of anything, but we shall nevertheless
respond to the arguments made by counsel.
The only provision in the collective agreement to which
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we were referred is clause 8.02(b). That refers to the discharge
of an employee who has completed the probationary period, so it
is of no direct relevance here. It does, however, contemplate
that vacation may be paid out in addition to the notice period.
While once again there is scope for some doubt, it would appear
to be an unusual practice to permit accrued vacation to count
toward a probationary period unless specifically provided for in
the collective agreement. Under the employment standards
legislation applicable to most employment in this province,
vacation pay accrues from day to day, and is the subject of a
statutory trust. The Union's reasoning would therefore have the
effect of making any express probationary period reduced by the
amount of accrued vacation, surely a rather extraordinary and
complicated approach to the measurement of probationary periods.
However, the Union also argues that vacation may not be
a part of the notice period, because Regulation 286 under the
Employment Standards Act provides, in section 11, that the length
of notice of termination of employment shall not include any week
of vacation without the agreement of the employee terminated.
The Employer points out, however, in our view correctly, that
Regulation 286 applies to the so-called mass termination provi-
sions of the Employment Standards Act, and that section 11 must
therefore be read as applying to the statutory notice periods set
out in that provision. Therefore it cannot have general effect,
and it does not apply to the particular circumstances of this
case. We find this argument persuasive, and we therefore find
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that the 18 days of accrued vacation do not count toward the
grievor's probationary period.
In the result, the grievor was still well within his
probationary period at the time of his termination of employment,
and his grievance against that termination, pursuant to Article
8.02(a), which has been interpreted in a number of cases involv-
ing this collective agreement, is not arbitrable. In these
circumstances, it is not necessary for us to deal with the
Employer's preliminary objection relating to timeliness.
The grievance is therefore denied.
DATED AT TORONTO, Ontario this 19th day of January, 1989.
K~e~~~an
I concur "R.J. Gallivan"
R.J. Gallivan, Employer Nominee
I dissent; see attached "Jane Bern"
Jane Bern, Union Nominee
ADDENDUM
We have received and considered our colleague's careful
dissent in this matter, but we regret that we still differ from
her. There is, however, one point which she raises which
requires us to clarify the basis of the majority award.
On the issue of whether the 90 day notice period must
be given, in effect, prior to the expiration of 21 months of the
probationary period, so that the notice period may be served, day
for day, within the two year probationary period, she relies on
Re C.S.A.O (Inc.) and The Ontario Council of Regents for Colleges
of Applied Arts and Technology, et al., unreported, June 18, 1975
(Ont. Div. Ct.), which may be referred to as the "Aitchison
case". She concludes, quoting us, that it would not be "wrong to
disturb a line of jurisprudence" when the Divisional Court has
spoken so clearly.
The line of jurisprudence of which we speak, however,
is based upon Re Ontario Council of Regents of Colleges of
Applied Arts and Technology and Civil Service Association of
Ontario (Inc.), (1976) 13 L.A.C. (2d) 82 (Weatherill). In that
case, the majority distinguished the Aitchison case from the
facts of the case before it. In Aitchison, the effective date of
release was outside the probation period; in the second case, the
employee was terminated within the last three months of the
probation period, but the termination was made of immediate
effect, and payment in lieu of notice was provided. The majority
concluded that payment in lieu of notice was sufficient compensa-
tion for the loss of an actual three months' notice, and that
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termination of employment during the two year notice period was
sufficient to satisfy the principles set out in the Aitchison
case, even where it took place during the last 90 days of the
probationary period. This decision, and in particular its
reasoning distinguishing the Aitchison case, was upheld on
judicial review by another panel of the Divisional Court in R__e
C.S.A.O (Inc.) and Ontario Council of Regents for Colleges of
Applied Arts and Technology, unreported, March 7, 1977 (Ont. Div.
ct.).
The case before us falls squarely into the reasoning of
the board of arbitration chaired by Mr. Weatherill, which
reasoning has received not only the "blessing" of the Divisional
Court, but the reasoned concurrence of a number of other boards
of arbitration, referred to in our original decision, since that
time. As we have observed, the interpretation is not beyond
reasonable disagreement, but it is the interpretation upon which
the parties have conducted themselves for a decade, and we think
it would be wrong to disturb it now.
With the greatest of respect for our colleague,
therefore, we must continue to disagree; as we have already
suggested, reasonable people may reasonably do so on this issue.
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
B E T W E E N:
ST. LAWRENCE COLLEGE
(The Employer)
- and -
ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION
(The Union)
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE GRIEVANCE OF A. ABEL - #87E45
BOARD OF ARBITRATION: Kenneth P. Swan, Chairman
R. J. Gallivan, Employer Nominee
Jane Bern, Union Nominee
Appearances:
For the Employer: Chris White, Counsel
For the Union: C.G. Paliare, Counsel
DISSENT
I have had an opportunity to review the award of the
majority and disagree with a number of the findings as well as
the result.
At page six, Mr. Swan makes it clear that the parties
agreed that the grievor was entitled to count service from
January 28, 1985 to October 10, 1986, as service towards the
completion of his probationary period. Thus, the grievor had
- 2 -
approximately one year and nine months of service toward his
probationary period of two years. I find it simpler to deal with
this matter in terms of months rather than to say that the
grievor had one year and 256 days to his credit.
I would have come to a different conclusion than the
majority with respect to each of the questions asked. I will
simply follow the order as set out in the draft award.
Can the Grievor Count Part-Time or Partial Load Emplovment
My conclusion is different than those of the majority
at pages eight and nine. In my view, both the provisions of
Appendix II, Paragraph three and the Re Sheridan College and
Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Smith) case lead to the
conclusion that the grievor would have been entitled to one-half
months' credit for each month of employment from September to
December, 1984. The distinction drawn by the majority in the
Sheridan Colleqe (Smith) case is not one that can be made on a
full and fair reading of that decision.
Then, for the month of January, 1985, where the grievor
worked two weeks in excess of 13 hours per week, coupled with his
appointment to a regular full-time position, can only lead to the
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conclusion that the grievor began working full-time "on a regular
basis" at the beginning rather than at the end of that month.
Thus, the entire month of January ought to count towards the
probationary period as well.
Ninety Day Notice Period
Without question, this aspect of the majority decision has
caused me the most amount of concern because the decision is
clearly contrary to the plain wording of the collective
agreement. Also, the majority has totally ignored a Divisional
Court decision squarely on point which contradicts the
arbiprudence quoted by the majority. The issue is one of whether
the employer must give 90 calendar days written notice during the
probationary period or whether the employer can give payment in
lieu of notice thus shortening the probationary period. The
grievor received his letter of termination September 26, 1986,
with a purported effective termination date of October 10, 1986.
Thus, he received approximately two weeks' written notice. The
Union argued that he was entitled to three months' written
notice such that he could not have been terminated in the
circumstances of this case until at least December 26, 1986.
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The starting point in considering the validity of the
Union's argument, is the wording of the collective agreement.
Article 8.01(c) reads, in the relevant portions, as follows:
"Also, it is understood that an employee may be
released during the first five (5) months of continuous
or non-continuous accumulated employment following the
commencement date of the employee's employment upon at
least thirty (30) calendar days' written notice and
during the remainder of the employee's probationary
period upon at least ninety (90) calendar days' written
notice."
It is obvious that the parties contemplated that a
probationary employee who had survived five months of the
probationary period was entitled to at least 90 days' written
notice in order to be terminated. The purpose of such a clause in
a teaching context would be to ensure that the teacher had an
opportunity to find alternate employment while still maintaining
a teaching position. It is obviously clear that it is easier to
find a job when one has a job and the parties must have had this
simple proposition in mind when they agreed upon the clause in
question. It would have been an easy matter to have said that
employees were entitled to 90 days' notice had the parties
intended that payment in lieu of notice would have been adequate.
Rather, the parties specifically stated that the employee was
entitled to 90 days' written notice and not money in lieu
thereof. The majority has obviously "written out" the requirement
of written notice in Article 8.01(c). Amending the collective
- 5 -
agreement in this fashion is expressly prohibited under this
collective agreement.
It may be that the result of the interpretation which
the Union advanced and which I accept is that the probationary
period is shortened by 90 days but, this appears to be what the
parties contemplated. Obviously, this would not work any great
injustice upon the employer since the probationary period is a
very lengthy two years.
Moreover, the Divisional Court clearly dealt with a
decision which had erroneously interpreted Article 8.01(c) in the
same way as the majority. In that case the Court stated:
" In our view, the term 'release' must
mean the total cessation of the relationship
of employer and employee and this cessation
of the relationship in this case must occur
before the expiration of the two year period.
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The mere notification that such termination
will occur in the future does not of itself
terminate the relationship. In adoDtinq this
view, we recoqnize the fact that this
interpretation of the term 'release' will
have the effect of shortenin~ the
probationary period to 21 months as it will
then be incumbent upon an employer in
circumstances like this to ~ive the three
months' notice at a time sufficiently distant
from the expiration of the probationary
period to allow the three months to run
within the two year period. I should add as
well that, in our view, this interpretation
of the agreement is not only the proper one,
but also the only interpretation that the
language of this agreement could reasonably
bear." (emphasis added)
The Civil Service Association of Ontario
(Inc.) and The Ontario Council of Re~ents for
Colleqes of Applied Arts and Technology, et
al. (unreported decision of the Divisional
Court, June 18, 1975, Zuber, Morden and Reid,
JJ.)
In the face of the clear wording of the Divisional
Court and the clear wording of Article $.01(c) of the collective
agreement, it is difficult to understand how the majority has
opted for relying upon arbitral awards to the contrary. Thus, it
would not be "wrong to disturb a line of jurisprudence" when the
Divisional Court has spoken so clearly.
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Vacation Days
I read the provisions of the Employment Standards Act
differently than the majority. In my view, Section 11 of
Regulation 286 does not apply simply to mass terminations. An
employer cannot shorten a notice period by deducting vacation.
Therefore, it logically follows that the vacation period must be
included in determining the period of employment for the employee
in question. I would have found that the 18 days in question
should have been counted. Obviously, if the employee had taken
the 18 days vacation at an earlier time, no one would have argued
that he had not completed his two year probationary period simply
because he took the amount of vacation that he was entitled to
during the two year time frame. In other words, the probationary
period is not elongated beyond the two year time frame to include
the amount of vacation to which an employee is properly entitled.
Accordingly, in my view, the employee has exceeded the
probationary period and we should have dealt with the merits of
this case in terms of determining whether he was dismissed for
cause.