HomeMy WebLinkAbout2484-95-U - Waito 96-10-11 ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD
2484-95-U Murielle Waito, Applicant v. La Cit~ Coll~giale
Ottawa and Ontario Publio Servioe Employees Union, Responding
Parties.
BEFORE: K. G. O'Neil, Vice-Chair.
APPEAI~%~CES: Murielle Waito on her own behalf; Andr~
Champagne for La Cite Coll~giale Ottawa; Michael Gottheil for
OPSEU.
DECISION OF THE BOARD; October 11, 1996_
1. This is an application alleging that the employer
and the union responding parties have breached sections 67,
75 and 76 of the Colleges Collective Bargaining Act (referred
to below as the Act). The responding parties have made a
motion that the application should be dismissed without
further hearing as it does not make out a prima facie case.
This decision deals only with that motion.
2. For the purposes of this motion, the applicant's
asserted facts are taken to be true and provable. Together
with any agreed facts, they are the factual basis for the
decision.
3. The underlying dispute is over whether Ms. Waito,
who worked as a bookbuyer, should have been treated as an
employee in the bargaining unit represented by OPSEU at the
time the College terminated her in June, 1994. All parties
agree that at the relevant time, Ms. Waito, and the position
she was occupying, were not treated as being part of the
bargaining unit. The College and the Union say that since
she was not in the bargaining unit, the Board is without
jurisdiction to hear this matter. The applicant takes the
opposite position, that she should have been considered in
the bargaining unit for the over three years she worked for
the College. Ms. Waito argues that the Act applies to the
facts of this case, and that it was a violation of the Act to
treat her as outside the bargaining unit.
4. In the alternative, the union takes the position
that even if the grievor had been a member of the bargaining
unit, the manner in which the union acted did not violate the
Act. The employer also denies violating the Act.
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5. Having considered the oral and written
submissions of the parties in light of the statutory
provisions and the relevant case law, it is my view that it
is appropriate to allow this matter to proceed to hearing,
for the reasons, and with the reservations, expressed below.
6. The authority to decline to inquire further~to
this matter is found in the discretionary wording in sect~i°n
77(4) which gives the Board jurisdiction over this complaint:
the Board "may inquire into the complaint". That discretion
is exercised by the Board for reasons that include lack of a
labour relations purpose to proceeding, undue delay, or where
the matter is unlikely to succeed. See Mirza Alam, CUPE.
Local 1000 and Ontario Hydro, [1994] OLRB Rep. June 627.
7. As well the Board has the discretion and
authority under Rule 24 of the Board's Rules of Procedures to
dismiss without a full hearing where there is no arguable
case. That rule provides as follows:
24. Where the Board considers that an
application does not make out a case for the
orders or remedies requested, even if all the
facts stated in the application are assumed
to be true, the Board may dismiss the
application without a hearing. In its
decision, the Board will set out its reasons.
The applicant may within twelve (12) days
after being sent that decision request that
the Board review its decision.
8. The purpose of this Rule is to allow an early end
to cases that are not able to succeed. It is not in anyone's
interest to spend time, energy and money on a case that
cannot win. This is referred to legally as not making out a
Drima facie case. However, it is not meant to be used
because the claim is merely novel or the responding party may
have a strong defence. See analogously, the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Hunt v. Care¥ Canada Inc., [1990]
2 S.C.R. 959.
9. We will briefly review the facts in answering the
question as to whether there is an arguable case. We will
deal with the case against the union and the employer in
turn, including the underlying issue as to whether Ms. Waito
might be in the bargaining unit, which applies to both.
AGAINST THE UNION=
10. Ms. Waito's complaint mentions three sections of
the Act, two of which potentially involve the union. The
third, section 75(2), can only be breached by the employer,
and will be dealt with below. The two which could involve
the union are as follows: ~.
67. The bargaining units set out in the
Schedules are the units for collective
bargaining purposes under this Act.
76. An employee organization shall not act
in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory
or in bad faith in the representation of any~-~
of the employees, whether members of the
employee organization or not.
11. Section 67 is not a section that can be breached,
but it locates the bargaining units which are prescribed by
statute. And the essence of Ms. Waito's complaint is that
she was not treated as if she were in the bargaining unit.
Section 67 gives content to OPSEU's representation rights and
is thus relevant to the allegation under section 76.
12. I note that for reasons that are not before me,
the bargaining unit set out in the collective agreement is
not identical to the one listed in the statute, but it is
clear that the overall contours are the same. They both
exclude employees working regularly twenty-four hours or
less, and project employees,' although the latter category is
expressed in the Act, as non-recurring projects, while in the
collective agreement it is projects of an exceptional nature.
13. First, to answer the primary argument made by the
union and the employer, to the effect that Ms. Waito is no% a
bargaining unit employee, is there an arguable case that
Ms. Waito should have been considered part of the bargaining
unit? It is clear that there is. The bargaining unit here
has its source in statute, in section 67, set out above. The
support staff bargaining unit set out in Schedule 2 is as
follows:
The support staff bargaining unit includes
the employees of all boards of governors of
colleges of applied arts and technology
employed in positions or classifications in
the office, clerical, technical, health care,
maintenance, building service, shipping,
transportation, cafeteria and nursery staff
but does not include,
(i) foremen,
(ii) supervisors,
(iii) persons above the rank of foreman or
supervisor, .~..
(iv) persons employed in a confidential
capacity in matters related to
employee relations or the
formulation of a budget of a college
of applied arts and technology or of
a constituent campus of a college of
applied arts and~technology~. ~-~
including persons employed in
clerical, stenographic or
secretarial positions,
(v) other persons employed in a
managerial or confidential
capacity,
(vi) persons regularly employed for not
more than twenty-four hours a week,
(vii) students employed in a co-operative
educational training program
undertaken with a school, college or
university,
(viii) a graduate of a college of applied
arts and technology during .the
period of twelve months immediately
following completion of a course of
study or instruction at the college
by the graduate if the employment of
the graduate is associated with a
certification, registration or other
licensing requirement,
(ix) a person engaged for a project of a
non-recurring kind,
(x) a person who is 'a member of the
architectural, dental, engineering,
legal or medical profession,
entitled to practise in Ontario and
employed in a professional capacity,
or
(xi) a person engaged and employed
outside Ontario.
And section 48(2) of The Colleqes Collective Barqaining Act
provides that the legislation prevails over the collective
agreement where there is any appearance of conflict.
Further, the effect of section 52 of that Act is that th~
collective agreement is deemed to provide that OPSEU is~
exclusive bargaining agent for the bargaining unit to which
the agreement applies. The combined effect of all of these
provisions mean that, as a matter of law, OPSEU represents
the support staff bargaining unit set out in Schedule 2 of
the Act. The only potentially relevant exclusions from that
bargaining unit are in subparagraph (vi) - persons regularly
employed for not more than twentyrfour hours~a week,~nd
subparagraph (ix) - a person engaged for a project of a non-
recurring kind. There was nothing in the material filed or
the submissions made to suggest that Ms. Waito fell within
any of the other excluded categories and it is common ground
that she worked in a support staff capacity for the College.
14. Does Ms. Waito have an arguable case that she
should be considered in the bargaining unit - an arguable
case that she did'not fall in either of the above
exclusionary categories? It is common ground that she worked
for approximately thirty-five hours per week for a
substantial amount of the years she worked at the college,
and thus, there is clearly an arguable case that she is not
excluded under subparagraph (vi). Further, her job was
bookbuying for the College. No one suggested that bookbuying
had become a non-recurring project for the College. Thus,
there is an arguable case that she does not fall into
subparagraph (ix). Accordingly, there is an arguable case
that she fell within the bargaining unit.
15. The position of the union and the employer is to
the effect that the position Ms. Waito occupied was not
treated as part of the bargaining unit, but rather as a
contractual position further to various individual contracts
of a fixed term. Prior to the termination of' Ms. Waito's
employment on June, 1995, the most recent communication from
the College as to its view of the status of her position was
that it was under contract with an end date of June 30, 1994
and fell within Appendix D of the collective agreement, being
a temporary replacement for a bargaining unit person who was
on secondment. This would have had the effect of her still
not being considered part of the bargaining unit but under a
requirement to pay dues nonetheless. Ms. Waito strenuously
disputes the idea that she was replacing someone, noting that
the person indicated was working regularly in the same'
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department. And it is her version of the facts which must be
accepted at this stage of the matter. It is also to be noted
that the union did not accept that her position should be
considered under Appendix D either.
16. The employer also asserted that an estoppel
applied against the union for not asserting that Ms. Waif's
position should be in the bargaining unit until it grieve~' On
May 31, 1995 and/or because of the settlement of that
grievance. Whatever might be the case if this were purely a
matter of interpretation of the collective agreement, we are
dealing here with a statutory bargaining unit. There is' no
"contractual" exception to the statutory support staff
bargaining unit, nothing analogous to the "sessional"
category in the academic bargaining unit set, out in A~mpendi×
1 of the Act. The well established principle that one cannot
contract out of a statute gives Ms. Waito an arguable case in
response on both the point that the two parties treated her
as a contractual employee and on the point that the union
might be estoppel from asserting otherwise.
17. Turning then to the union's alternative argument
that even if Ms. Waito was to be considered a member of the
bargaining unit it did not breach the Act. In order to make
out a prima facie case against the union under section 76,
Ms. Waito has to have pleaded sufficient facts to warrant the
conclusion, if those facts are eventually proven, that the
union acted in a manner that was arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith. The Board's jurisprudence is clear that
disagreements as to the meaning of the collective agreement,
unless reflecting arbitrary conduct on the part of the union,
or as to the viability of a grievance, do not breach the Act.
As well, negligence, unless indicative of a reckless, non-
caring attitude does not breach the Act. See, for example,
Re Walter Princesdomu, Ontario Hydro and CUPE, Local 1000,
[1975] OLRB Rep. May 444. But a union must turn its mind to
a problem and give it serious, honest consideration.
18. Extracting the essentials from Ms. Waito's
documentation and submissions at the hearing, the allegations
made against the union are that they told her on June 1, 1994
that she had no union rights because she was in an Appendix D
(temporarily replacing a bargaining unit person)position,
and that they are responsible for the fact that an individual
grievance concerning her dismissal was not filed until
October 7, 1994. There are no allegations against the union
dating from before June, 1994, although the union is
mentioned before that date in the context of inquiring about
her position when it was omitted from the list of contract
persons.
19. The facts asserted by Ms. Waito relevant to these
allegations can be summarized as follows. For sometime prior
to May 31, 1994 Ms. Waito had many concerns about her
supervisor's treatment of her, and she had apparently spoken
to a union representative about them. On May 31, 1994,
Ms. Waito decided to write to the College administration~
about her concerns. That letter is a detailed and
impassioned plea for intervention from higher management in a
relationship with a supervisor Ms. Waito found oppressive and
unfair. It does not deal with her status as a contract
employee, as opposed to one covered by the collective
agreement except to say she was not unionized. It was
delivered to the College on May 31, 1994, also the date on
which her most recent contract w~s t° exq~ire. This~,~ntract
started on May 2, 1994, and was signed on May 4, 1994.
20. As noted, the union had inquired about
Ms. Waito's position. On May 4, 1994 the union was sent a
memo indicating the College's position that she had been
employed under an Annex D contract for the period October 25,
1993, to June 30, 1994. Ms. Waito was copied on a memo dated
May 2, 1994, (oddly, the same day she was starting a contract
with a duration of May 2 to May 31, 1994) saying that she had
been under Annex D since October 25, 1993, but giving no end
date. Neither the union nor Ms. Waito accepted that
characterization of her employment. The union grieved on May
31 that the bookstore clerk's position occupied by a contract
employee, Ms. Waito, for more than three years should be
filled on a full-time permanent basis, and that it should not
be considereda replacement position, but a vacant
position. The grievance does not ask that Ms. Waito be
reclassified as a permanent employee, and in argument the
union took the position that the collective agreement would
have required that the vacancy be posted, with senior
qualified bargaining unit employees having preference over
Ms. Waito under the collective agreement.
21. The following day, June 1, 1994, Ms. Waito was
informed that her contract had not been renewed and that a
Vice-president of the College, Yvon Saint-Jules, would
investigate the complaints in the letter of May 31, 1994.
Ms. Waito says that she contacted her union representative
and was told she had no union rights, that she was considered
to be an Appendix D employee, temporarily replacing a
bargaining unit employee. Therefore, she hired a lawyer, who
wrote to the College protesting her dismissal. The College
responded in July, upholding the dismissal.
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22. On August 25, 1994, the union and the College
settled the grievance of May 31, 1994 on the basis that an
additional bargaining unit position would be created in the
bookstore when the 1995-96 budget was adopted. ~Ms. Waito was
not involved in that settlement, and not informed of it until
much later. The position was later used to offset downsizing
in the College, and was filled by a bargaining unit empl~ee.
23. Ms. Waito tried various avenues of redress,
culminating in her contact with Mr. Sauer, a union official
from Timmins and a member of the College Relations
Commission, who came to Ottawa to investigate the situation.
He is alleged to have said that the union was responsible for
her lawyer's fees because the union had failed to represent
her, and she states that the unio~ has. a rcopy of the~-~nvoice,
which has not been paid. As a result of Mr. Sauer's
intervention, a grievance protesting Ms. Waito's dismissal
was filed on October 7, 1994.
24. The dismissal grievance went to arbitration, but
was dismissed as untimely by a Board of Arbitration. The
applicant attributes the delay to the fact that the union did
not want to represent her and the delay of the College in
responding to her lawyer's letter of June 8, 1994. In the
decision, having heard Ms. Waito's evidence about delay, the
arbitrator explicitly notes his view that the fault was not
the union's. The union relies on this as a finding of fact,
but the employer says this was obiter, a comment which was
not about any issue of which the arbitrator was seized.
There is no discretion given by the College Collective
Bargaining Act to an arbitrator to extend the time limits as
there is in section 48(13) of the Labour Relations Act. The
employer says the only issue was whether the grievance was
late, not whose fault it was.
25. Ms. Waito submits that these facts make out a
breach of section 76. Subject to the comments made at the
end of this decision about the practicalities of the matter,
it is my view that there is an arguable case of a breach at
least on the question of arbitrariness - whether the union
turned its mind to the statutory nature of the basis for the
claim that Ms.'Waito's position should be considered in the
bargaining unit and that she herself was potentially entitled
to representation because of the possibility she should have
been in the bargaining unit much earlier. And it is my view
that whether the quality of arbitrariness, for instance,
should be inferred from the facts is a matter that is best
answered after a hearing. The fact of the dismissal of the
delayed discharge grievance is secondary, and not necessarily
dispositive of the more fundamental issue of whether Ms.
Waito should have been treated as outside of the bargaining
unit.
AS ~INST THE COLLEGE:
26. The section alleged as against the College i~" -
section 75(2) which reads as follows:
75. (2) The Council, an employer or any
person acting on behalf of an employer shall
not,
(a) refuse to employ or ~o continue to ~-~
employ or discriminate against a person
with regard to employment or any term or
condition of employment because the
person is exercising any right under
this Act or is or is not a member of an
employee organization;
(b) impose any condition on an appointment
or in a contract of employment that
seeks to restrain an employee or a
person seeking employment from becoming
a member of an employee organization or
exercising any right under this Act;
(c) seek by intimidation, by threat of
dismissal or by any other kind of threat
or by the imposition of a pecuniary or
any other penalty or by any other means
to compel an employee to become or
refrain from becoming or to continue or
cease to be a member oS an employee
organization, or to refrain from
exercising any other right under this
Act,
but no person shall be deemed to have
contravened this subsection by reason of any
act or thing done or omitted in relation to a
person employed in a managerial or
confidential capacity.
27. As against the College, a prima facie case
requires sufficient facts to establish an arguable case that
the College might be found to be doing any of the acts
prohibited in that section which were aimed at penalizing a
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person for, or restraining them from, exercising some right
under the The Colleges Collective Bargaining Act. It is
Ms. Waito's submission that the College has interfered with
her rights under that section, by firing her when she
submitted the letter of May 31 concerning her supervisor and
by refusing to acknowledge she is within the bargaining unit,
a full-time employee, and not a replacement. She allege~the
College sometimes made her sign blank contracts so that
actual hours of work were not recorded, and ignored the fact
that she was working sufficient hours to be included in the
bargaining unit, and then fabricated the replacement position
they now use as the basis for her exclusion. She says the
College breached the Act by treating her as excluded from the
bargaining unit when she should have been included.
28. In response, as noted, the College says that
Ms. Waito was not in the bargaining unit, because despite the
fact that she may have been working more than twenty-four
hours a week, she was in a position which was not a
bargaining unit position. This is the underlying issue,
dealt with above, on which we have concluded Ms. Waito has an
arguable case.
29. The College also denies that it acted in
contravention of the Act, and says that Ms. Waito exercised
her rights after the termination of her employment, and not
before or during ~her employment, which are the time periods
the section addresses.
30. Given the view of the underlying bargaining unit
issue we have taken above, we have also concluded that
section 65 of the Act, and the Act read as a whole, give
Ms. Waito an arguable right to be part of the support staff
bargaining unit and to participate in OPSEU's lawful
.activities. Do the facts she alleges establish an arguable
case that the College's treatment of her position was in
response to an exercise of those rights, or to restrain her
from exercising them?
31. 'There is nothing to suggest that the College was
acting in response or in reprisal to any exercise of her
rights, unless it can be said that.her letter of complaint
was a grievance under the Act or unless the union's grievance
of May 31, 1994 is to be considered an exercise of her right.
In our view, it is not necessary' to determine that matter at
the moment, given the view we take of this matter on the more
fundamental basis set out immediately below.
32. It is the Board's view that there is an arguable
case that the College imposed the condition of contractual
status on Ms. Waito's employment with a view to restraining
her from exercising her arguable rights to representation
within the statutory, and contractual, bargaining unit.
There is nothing about the work itself that Ms. Waito was
doing, as pleaded by her, that explains why the position
ought to have been treated as contractual, or would naturally
have been so treated. As noted, she disputes the
characterization of her position as that of a replacemen~f0r
a bargaining unit one. The effect of treating her position
as contractual is that Ms. Waito is excluded from the
arguable right to be represented as part of the bargaining
unit. Ms. Waito's allegation that the treatment of her
position as a contractual one is for the purpose of
preventing her from exercising any rights she may have as a
member of a bargaining unit finds~its arguable basis~i~ the
idea that one is assumed to intend the natural consequence of
one's acts. And the union has observed that there is an
ongoing, province-wide issue with various Colleges covered by
the same legislation about the use of contractual positions
as a means of controlling the number of positions that are
subject to the terms of the applicable collective agreements.
33. In all, this amounts in our view to an arguable
case against the College that may be heard.
THE PI~CTICALITIES
34. The above analysis establishes a sufficiently
arguable case that this matter may proceed to hearing.
However, for the parties' guidance, and in the hopes of
encouraging some other resolution to the underlying problem
which this application represents, I make the following
comments. Each of the parties runs significant risks that
may make a solution other than a potentially lengthy hearing
more sensible. I will set these out briefly in turn. I must
underline that it doing so, I am making no findings, and that
after a hearing, none of the scenarios contemplated may turn
out to be the appropriate basis for the final decision. I
have heard no evidence, and only Ms. Waito's view of the
facts has been highlighted because of the stage of hearing at
which this decision comes. Obviously a hearing on the merits
would take full account of all the eventual evidence and'
argument.
35. Firstly, in respect of Ms. Waito's case, although
there are valid legal points to be made, as I have indicated
above, this case may never result in any significant benefit.
In common parlance, Ms. Waito may never get anything out of
this complaint, even if she "wins". At least, nothing 'that
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she would likely consider worthy of the time and energy that
she has and will continue to put into the pursuit of her
claims.
36. Why do I say this? At the moment, the Board is
limited to reliance on Ms. Waito's view of the facts. Her
view is that she was hired into work which fell into the_
support staff bargaining unit, and was quickly working e~Ugh
hours on regular work to be considered part of the bargaining
unit. She sees her situation from the point of view of an
individual. It is a straight line for her from the idea that
she should have been in the bargaining unit to being back in
the'job she did not wish to lose. But the larger situation,
which will have to be taken into account at the end of the
day, is not that straightforward.~ ~.~
37. To illustrate, if Ms. Waito is right that the
position she was occupying should always have been in the
bargaining unit, there is the point of view of the group that
will have to be taken into account. From that point of view,
there is the possibility that her job should never have been
offered to her in the first place. If her position was
effectively a bargaining unit position to start with, the
position should have been posted internally, and filled from
within the bargaining unit if there was a qualified
applicant. And if it had commenced being treated as a
bargaining unit position as of the May 31, 1994 grievance,
the result might well have been a posting. Ms. Waito might
then have had to compete with more senior employees who were
also qualified and she might never have gotten the job.
There was no suggestion that there were no available,
qualified members of the bargaining unit, with more seniority
than Ms. Waito, even if she had been attributed seniority for
the time worked as a contract employee. These considerations
are relevant to what she might ultimately, get out of a
successful complaint. Winning the legal points does not mean
that Ms. Waito will necessarily get her job back.
38. The undisputed facts indicate there are further
obstacles to Ms. Waito getting what she wants. If she had
been treated as being in the bargaining unit at the time of
her termination, she is not guaranteed continued employment.
She would have had the rights to grieve to protest the
termination, but she would not have been guaranteed the
outcome she wanted. The result of such a grievance could
have been a settlement, the details of which would not have
been completely in her control. It could have for instance,
resulted in the position being in the bargaining unit, and
Ms. Waito personally being laid off.
39. And then there are the obstacles created by what
actually did happen to the two grievances that were filed.
The employer has taken the position that the subject matter
of the position Ms. Waito held is now determined both by a
settlement made by the union of the May grievance, and by an
adjudication by an arbitrator of the individual October
grievance. And the union says that that decision should be
relied on to say that the delay was not its fault. At a~'~ i
hearing of this complaint, Ms. Waito would have to persuade
the Board that the settlement and the arbitration decision
were not barriers to her getting her job back or some other
remedy she would find meaningful. This is by no means
guaranteed.
40. Further, there is al~ays the possibility~_~hat it
would be found after the evidence was heard that neither the
union or the employer breached the Act by treating the
poSition the way that they did. As to the union this could
be because the Board finds they took a reasonable position
towards the circumstances presented to it, or because they
were never asked to act differently than they did, or because
even if they were wrong, it did not amount to arbitrariness,
unreasonableness, or bad faith. As to the employer, this
could be on the basis either that they are right that the
position was not in the bargaining unit, or that even if they
were wrong about that, they did not treat the position as a
contractual one with a view to restricting Ms. Waito's
statutory rights.
41. As well, and perhaps most fundamentally, even if
Ms. Waito had been in the bargaining unit from the beginning
of her employment, there is no guarantee that she would not
have been laid off in the current climate of downsizing.
Although it is not a fact pleaded by Ms. Waito, or one which
she was in a position to confirm or deny, the union indicated
that the position created as a result of the resolution of
the May, 1994 grievance has since been filled in a round of
bumping. There was the suggestion that the current incumbent
may have more seniority than Ms. Waito might have been found
to have had, even if credited with seniority for all the time
she worked as a contractual employee. All these things, if
proven, might limit what Ms. Waito could hope to obtain even
if she "wins".
42. Turning to the union's situation. Another side
of each of the eventualities listed for Ms. Waito exists for
the union and I will not lengthen this by detailing each one,
as its counsel and representatives are in a position to do
that. But to illustrate, for instance, the union could be
found to have breached its duty on the basis that it should
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have turned its mind to the statutory basis of the bargaining
unit and or dealt with Ms. Waito on the basis that she was a
bargaining unit employee. There is nothing.in Ms. Waito's
pleadings to suggest that the union took into account the
idea that Ms. Waito personally might be in the bargaining
unit. If this were found to be arbitrary, the union would
then have the downside of the findings made and the reme~es,
monetary or otherwise, awarded as a result of that. Fur~er,
and drawing inferences from its own submission, it might have
the seed for the multiplication of similar situations
elsewhere.
43. As to the College it is similarly unnecessary to
detail its downside in each of the eventualities set out, but
it will suffice to illustrate. ~ven if theCollege'~A~ins",
there is nothing to stop Ms. Waito from continuing her
pursuit of a resolution she considers just. In its own
submissions, the College acknowledged the possibility of a
wrongful dismissal suit. And if Ms. Waito is successful in
this application, it has lost an important opportunity to
have control over the resolution of the issue of its use of
contractual employees, as well as bearing the cost of any
remedy awarded. Even if all the points made above as to
Ms. Waito's remedial difficulties were to be borne out,
damages might be available if a breach were found.
44. Because of the weight of these practicalities, I
am hereby authorizing a Labour Relations Officer to confer
with the parties with a view to finding a non-litigious
solution to this matter, now that they have the Board's view
of the issues dealt with above. A new date will not be set
for hearing until the Officer reports that such efforts have
been fruitless. The matter is referred to the Manager of
Field Services.
"K. G. O'Neil"
for the Board
2484-95-U.Murielle Waito, requ~rante c. la Cit& Coll&giale
d,Ottawa et le' Syndioat des employ&s et employ&es de la
fonotion publi~ue de 1,Ontario (SEPPO), parties intim~es.
DEVANT : K. G. O'Neil, vice-pr~sidente.
ONT COMPARU : Murielle Waito, en son propre nom; Andr~
Champagne, pour la Cit~ Coll~giale d'Ottawa; Michael
Gottheil, pour le SEFPO.
D~CISION DE LA COMMISSION
1. -D'apr~s la requite en cause, l'employeur et le
syndic&t, qui constituent les parties intim~es, ont enfreint
les articles 67, 75 et 76 de la Loi sur la n~ociation
collective dans les coll~ges (ci-apr~s appel~e la loi). Les
parties intim~es ont d~pos~ une demande de rejet de la
requite, car il ne s'agirait pas d'une pr~tention ~tablie
prima facie. La pr~sente d~cision ne porte que sur cette
demande.
2. Aux fins de la demande, la requ~rante a ~nonc~
des faits qui s°nt jug,s v~ridiques et prouvables. Avec les
autres faits convenus, ils repr~sentent le fondement factuel
de la pr~sente d~cision.
3. La ~uestion de fond qu'il faut d~terminer ici est
de savoir si Mm Waito, qui travaillait & titre d'acheteuse
de livres, &ur&it d~ ~tre consid~r~e comme une employee
membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation repr~sent~e'par le SEFPO au
moment o~ le coll~ge l'a cong~di~e en ~uin 1994. Toutes les
parties conviennent qu'a ce moment, Mm Waito et le poste
qu'elle occupait n'~taient pas consid~r~s comme faisant
pattie de l'unit~ de n~gociation. Le coll~ge et le syndicat
affirment que par consequent, la Commission n'a pas la
competence pour se prononcer sur cette afl&ire. La '
requ~rante soutient le contraire et affirme.qu'elle.aurait d~
'~tre membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation pendant ia~riode.de
trois &ns o~ elle a travaill~'pour le coll~ge.M~ Waito'
soutient que la loi s'applique aux faits en cause et qu'il
est contraire & la loi de la consid~rer comme ne faisant pas
pattie de l'unit~ de n~gociation.
- 2 -
4. Le syndicat affirme cependant que m~me si la
requ~ante avait ~t~ membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation, les
agissements du syndicat ne violaient pas la loi. L'employeur
refuse ~galement d'admettre qu'il a enfreint la loi.
5. Apres avoir examin~ les observations orales et
~crites des parties & la lumi~re des dispositions
l~gislatives et de la jurisprudence pertinente, je juge~qu'il
convient de soUmettre Cette question & une audience pour les
raisons et avec les r~serves expos~es ci-dessous.
6. Le pouvoir de refuser de poUrsuivre toute enqu~te
sur cette question est ~nonc~ au paragraphe 77 (4), qui donne
~ la Commission le pouvoir discr~tionnaire de traiter cette
Dlainte. En effet, la Commission <<Deut faire enquire elle-
m~me>>. La Commission peut exercer ce pouvoir
discr~tionnaire pour diff~rentes raisons, notamment s'il est
inutile de Continuer ~ des fins de relations de travail, en
cas de retard excessif ou lorsque le requ~rant ou la
requ~rante est peu susceptible de gagner sa cause. Voir
Mirza Alam. CUPE. Local 1000 and Ontario Hydro, [1994] OLRB
Rep. June 627.
7. En outre, en vertu de l'article 24 des r~gles de
procedure de la Commission, celle-ci ale pouvoir de rejeter
la requite sans audience lorsqu'elle n'est pas ~ond~e. Cette
r~gle est ~nonc~e comme suit :
24. Si la Commission consid~re qu'une~
requite pour les ordonnances et les recours
demand~s n'est pas fond~e, m~me lorsque tous
les faits pr~sent~s dans la requite sont
r~put~s v~ridiques, elle peut rejeter la
requite sans audience. La Commission
pr~sente alors se~motifs en rendant sa
d~¢ision. Le(la) requ~rant(e) peut, dans les
douze (12) jours qui suivent, demander & la
Commission de reconsid~rer sa d~cision.
8. Cette r~gle a pour objet de rejeter rapidement'
les requites qui ne sont pas fond~es. I1 n'est dans
i'int~r~t'de personne de'consacrer du temps; de.l'~nergie, et
de. l'argent.& une requite qui.ne peut ~tre accept~e. En .
droi~, on dit qu'une telle requite ne constitue pas une
pr~tention ~tablie prima facie.- Cependant, il ne fau~ pas
recOurir & cette r~gle uniquement parce que la requite est
inhabituelle ou parce que la partie intim~e joUit d'une'bonne
d~fense. ~ cet ~gard, voir l'arr~t de la Cour supreme du
Canada dans Hunt c. Care¥ Canada Inc., [1990.] 2 S.C.R. 959.
- 3 -
9. Nous passerons bri~vement les faits en revue afin
de d~terminer si la requite est d~fendable. Nous traiterons
& tour de r61e des allegations formul~es contre le syndicat
et l'employeur, y compris~ la question fondamentale qui
consiste & d~terminer si ~" Waito fait ou non partie de
l'unit~ de n~gociation et qui s'applique aux deux parties
intim~es. ~"-
ALLeGaTIONS CONTRE LE SYNDIC~T
10. Les plaintes de Mme Waito renvoient & trois
dispositions de la loi, dont deux pourraient viser le
syndicat. La troisi~me, le par~graphe 75 (=2), ne pe~t ~tre
enfreinte que par l'employeur, et nous en ~eparlerons plus
loin. Les deux qui pourraient viser le syndicat sont les
suivantes :
67. Les unit~s de n~gociation d~crites aux
annexes constituent les unit~s de n~gociation
collective pour l'application de la pr~sente
loi.
76. L'association d'employ~s ne doit pas se
comporter de fagon arbitraire ou
discriminatoire, ni fairepreuve de mauvaise
foi dans la representation d'un employS,
qu'il soit membre ou non de l'association
d'employ~s.
11. On ne peut enfreindre l'article 67, qui localise
unit~s de n~gociation provue dans la loi. La plainte de
Waito est fond~e essentiellement sur le fait qu'elle n'a
pas ~t~ trait~e comme une membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation.
L'article 67 precise les droits de representation du SEFPO,
et il est donc pertinent pour ~tudier 'l'all~gation formulae
en vertu de l'article 76.
12. Je remarque que pour des raisons qui ne m'ont pas.
~t~ com~uniqu~es, l'unit~ de n~gociation ~tablie dans la
'convention collective n'est pas la m~me que celle qui figure
dans la loi, bien que les deux soient g~n~ralemen2
semblables. Toutes deux excluent les employes qui
travaillent r~guli~rement 24 heures ou moins ainsi que les'
employes affect~s a des projets, bien que la loi mentionne
plut~t des personnes engag~es pour des projets de nature non
r~p~titive, alors que dans la convention'collective, on parle
de projets exceptionnels.
- 4 -
13. En premier lieu, pour aborder le-principa~e
argument du syndicat et de l'employeur selon lequel M-- Waito
n'est pas membre de l'unit~ de negocia~n, pourrait-on
d~fendre le point de rue qui veut que~.L Waito aurait d~
~tre consid~r~e comme membre? Oui, de toute ~vidence.
L'unit~ de n~gociation en question est provue dans la loi, ~
l'article 67 ~nonc~ plus haut. L'unit~ de n~gociation du
personnel de soutien ~tablie & l'annexe 2 est d~crite c~me
suit :
L'unit~ de n~gociation du personnel de
soutien comprend les employes de tous les
conseils d'administrationdes coll~ges d'arts
appliques et de technologie employes ~ des
postes ou dans des classes qui font partie du
personnel de bureau, de ~ecr~tariat% ~-~
technique, des services de sant~,
d'entretien, du service des b&timents, de
l'e~p~dition, du transport, de cafeteria et
de garderie, & l'exception :
(i) des contremaitres,
(ii) des superviseurs,
(iii) des personnes occupant un poste de
rang sup~rieur a celui de contremaitre
ou de superviseur,
(iv) des personnes occupant des postes de
confiance dans'le domaine des
relations avec le personnel ou de la
preparation du budget d'un coll~ge
d'arts appliques et de technologie ou
d'une constituante de celui-ci, y
compris les personnes occupant des
postes de commis, de secr~taires ou de
st~nographes,
(v) des autres personnes occupant des
postes de direction ou de confiance,
-(vi)' 'des personnes qui, sur une base
r~guli~re, sont employees au plus
vingt-quatre heures par semaine,
(vii) des ~tudiants participant & un
programme coop~ratif de formation en
enseignement dans une ~cole, un
coll~ge ou Une universitY,
- 5 -
(viii) des dipl6m~s des coll~ges d'arts
appliques et de technologie au cours
des douze mois suivant imm~diatement
la fin de leurs ~tudes au coll~ge si
leur travail est une condition'de
l'obtention d'un certificat, d'une
inscription ou d'un permis, ~.- -
(ix) des personnes engag~es pour des
projets de nature non r~p~titive,
(x) des architectes, des dentistes, des
ing~nieurs, des avocats et des
m~decins ayant le droit d'exercer leur
profession en ontario et employes a ~
titre,
(xi) des personnes engag~es et employees &
l'ext~rieur de l'Ontario.
En outre,'le paragraphe 48 (2) de la Loi sur la n~gociation
collective dans les coll~ges pr~voit qu'en cas
d'incompatibilit~ entre une disposition d'une convention et
une disposition l~gislative, celle-ci l'emporte. Par
ailleurs, en vertu de i'article 52 de la loi, la convention
collective est r~put~e pr~voir que le SEFPO est reconnu comme
agent n~gociateur exclusif de l'unit~ de n~gociation vis~e
par la convention. Compte tenu de toutes ces dispositions,
le SEFPO repr~sente en vertu de la loi, l'~nit~ de
n~gociation du personnel de soutien d~crite a l'annexe 2 de
la loi. Les seules categories exclues de cette unit~ de
n~gociation qui pourraient ~tre pertinentes sont ~nonc~es a
l'alin~a (vi) : les personnes qui, sur une base r~guli~re,
sont employees au plus vingt-quatre heures par semaine, et &
l'alin~a ('ix) : les personnes engag~es pour des projets de
nature non r~p~titive. Rien dans les observations 'et les
documents d~pos~s ne donne a penser queM~ Waito faisait
partie des autres categories exclues, et il a ~t~ convenu
qu'elle ~tait membre du personnel de s°utien du coll~ge.
14. Mme Waito peut-elle soutenir qu'elle aurait d~
'.~tre consid~r~e comme membre de 1,unit~ de n~gociation,
qu'elle n'~tait pas vis~e par l'une ou l'autre des
exclusions? I1 a ~t~ convenu qu'elle a travaill~ pour.le
coll~ge environ 35 heures par semaine pendant plusieurs
ann~es et que, par consequent, on peut clairement soutenir
qu'elle n'~tait pas exclue en vertu de l'alin~a (vi). En
outre, elle occupait un poste d'acheteuse de livres pour le
coll~ge. Personne n'a affirm~ que l'achat de livres
repr~sentait un projet de nature non r~p~titive~ur le
coll~ge. Par consequent, on peut supposer que M~ Waito
n'~tait pas vis~e par l'alin~a (ix). On peut donc pr~tendre
qu'elle aurait d~ faire pattie de l'unit~ de n~gociation.
15. D~pr~s le syndicat et l'employeur, le poste
qu'occupait ~" Waito n'~tait pas consid~r~ comme faisant
pattie de l'unit~ de n~gociation; il ~tait plut6t un po~e-
contractuel faisant l'objet de ding,rents contrats de dur~e
fixe. Avant le cong~diement de M-' Waito, en juin 1995, la
communication la plus r~cente du coll~ge sur la nature de son
poste indiquait qu'il s'agissait d'un poste contractuel
prenant fin le 30 juin 1994 et vis~ par l'annexe D de la
convention collective, c'est-~-dire un poste temporaire pour
remplacer une personne membre~e l'unit~ de n~gociation qui
avait ~t~ d~tach~e. Ainsi, ~' Waito n'aur~it pas ~
consid~r~e comme ~tant membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation, mais
e aurait quand mame ~t~ tenue de payer des cotisations.
Waito rejette cat~goriquement l'affirmationselon
laquelle elle remplagait quelqu'un d'autre, en faisant
remarque~que la personne en question travaillait
r~guli~rement dans le m~me service. C'est sa version des
faits qu'il convient de reconna~tre a cette ~tape-ci. I1
faut ~galement souligner que le syndicat n'a pas accept~ non
plus que son poste soit vis~ par l'annexe D.
16. L'employeur a ~galement affirm~ que le syndicat
faisait l'objet dm'~ne preclusion parce qu'il n'a pas soutenu
que le poste de M-- Waito devait faire pattie de l'unit~ de
n~gociation avant de d~poser un grief le 31 mai 1995, ou par
suite du r~glement de ce grief. Quoi qu'il en soit, s'il
s'agissait purement d'interpr~ter la convention collective,
l'unit~ de n~gociation en question est provue par .la loi. 'Il
n'y a pas d'eXception <<contractuelle>> a l'unit~ de
n~gociation du personnel de soutien provue dans la loi'qui
soit analogUe ~ celle qui s'applique aUx personnes d~sign~es
pour au moins un trimestre dans l'unit~ de n~gociation.du
corps enseignant ~tablie & l'annexe i de la loi. En raison
du principe s~on lequel un contrat ne.peut avoir pr~s~ance
sur la loi,M~ Waito peut contester l'affirmation des deux
parties selon laquelle elle est une employee a contrat, et
l'argument de. l'employeur que le syndicat devrait faire
l'objet d'une preclusion qui l'emp~cherait d'affirmer le
contraire.
17. Envisageons maintenant l'argument secondaire du
syndicat selon leqUel ce derni~ n'a pas enfreint la loi,
m~me s'il ne consid~rait pas M--- Waito comme membre de
l'unit~ de n~gociation. Afin d'~tablir une pr~tentio~ prima
facie contre le syndicat en vertu de l'article 76, Mm. Waito
- 7 -
a d~ fournir des faits suffisants qui, s'ils sont prouv~s,
permettraient de conclure que le syndicat s'est comport~ de
fagon arbitraire ou discriminatoire ou a fait preuve de
mauvaise foi. La jurisprudence de la Commission d~montre
clairement que les d~saccords concernant l'interpr~tation de
la convention collective, & moins qu'ils ne refl~tent une
attitude arbitraire de la part du syndicat, ou les d~saccords
concernant la validit~ d'un grief n'enfreignent pas la.~oi-.-
En outre, la n~gligence, & moins qu'elle n'indique une
attitude inconsid~r~e et indiff~rente, n'est pas contraire
la loi. Par exemple, voir Re Walter Princesdomu, Ontario
Hydro and CUPE0 Local 1000, [1975] OLRB Rep. May 444.
Cependant, le syndicat doit se pencher sur le probl~me de
fa~on s~rieuse et honn~te.
18. D'apr~s les documents et les observatiO~ qu'elle
a pr~sent~s & l'audi~gce, M-- Waito all~gue que le syndicat
lui a signifi~, le 1 juin 1994, qu'elle n'avait pas de
droits syndicaux parce que son poste ~tait vis~ par l'annexe
D (remplacement temporaire d'une personne membre de l'unit~
de' n~gociation), et que le syndicat est responsable de ne pas
avoir d~pos~ un grief concernant son cong~diement avant le 7
octobre 1994. Aucune allegation contre le syndicat ne date
d'avant juin 1994, bien que le syndicat soit mentionn~ avant
cette date, car il a demand~ des renseignements sur le poste
de Mme Waito apres avoir constat~ que celle-ci ne figurait
pas sur la liste des employes & contrat.
19. Les faits all~gu~s par Mme waito peuvent se
r~sumer ~omme suit. Pendant un certain temps avant le 31 mai
1994, Mm Waito ~tait pr~occup~e par la fa~on dont-sa
superviseure la traitait, et elle a apparemment parl~ & une
e~r~sentante syndicale ~ ce sujet. Le 31 mai 1994,
Waito a d~cid~ d'envoyer une lettre ~ l'administration du
coll~ge concernant ses inquietudes. Cette lettre d~taill~e
lame instamment l'intervention des cadres sup~rieurs,
Waito jugeant sa superviseure abusive et injuste. Cette
lettre ne mentionne pas son statut d'employ~e & contrat qui
n'est pas vis~e par la convention collective, mais elle
precise qu'elle n'est pas syndiqu~e. La lettre a ~t~ remise
-au c~Al~ge le 31 mai 1994, date ~ laquelle le dernier contrat
de ~" Waito expirait. ' Ce contrat est entr~ en vigueur le 2
mai 1994 et.a ~t~ sign~ le 4 mai.
20. C°mme nous l'avons d~ja soulign~, le s~diCat
avait demand~ des renseignements sur le Poste de ~"- Waito.
Le 4 mai 1994, il a re~u~ne note ~nongant la position du
coll~ge selon laquelle ~" Waito avait ~t~ a son emploi du 25'
.octobre 1993 a~e30 juin 1994 en vertu d'un contrat vis~ par
l'annexe D. ~- Waito a renu une copie d'une note dat~e du
- 8 -
mai 1994 (qui, ~trangement, est le jour o~ entrait en vigueur
son contrat de travail s'~chelonnant jusqu'au 31 mai 1994)
selon laquelle elle ~ta~t employee en vertu de l'an~xe D
depuis le 25 octobre 1993, sans date d'~ch~ance. M-'- Waito a
rejet~ cette description de son poste, avec l'appUi du
syndicat. Ce dernier a d~pos~ un grief le 31 ~a~ r~clamant
que le poste de commis de librairie occup~ par ~ WaitO ~
titre d'employ~e ~ contrat pendant plus de trois ans devinne
un poste permanent & plein temps, et qu'il soit consid~r~ non
pas comme un poste de remplacement, ma~ comme un poste
vacant. Le grief ne r~clame pas queM~ Waito soit reclass~e
comme employee permanente, et dans ses observations, le
syndicat a affirm~ qu'en vertu de. la convention collective,
le poste vacant aurait d~ ~tre annonc~, et la preference
accord~e aux employes qualifies membres de l'unit~ ~
n~gociation. ~ ~
21. Le lendemain, le 1er juin 1994, Mme Waito a ~t~
inform~e que son contrat n'avait pas ~t~ renouvel~, et qu'un
vice-pr~sident du coll~ge, M. Yvon Saint-Jules, s'occuperait
des plai~es qu'elle avai~ formul~es dans sa lettre du 31 mai
1994. M-- Waito a dit s'etre adress~e & sa repr~sentante
syndicale, qui lui a annonc~ qu'elle n'avait aucun droit
syndical parce qu'elle ~tait consid~r~e comme une employee
vis~e par l'annexe D, qui rempla~ait~t~mporairement un
employ~ de l'unit~ de n~gociation. M-- Waito a alors fait
appel aux services d'un avocat, qui a ~crit au coll~ge pour
protester contre son cong~diement. Le coll~ge a confirm~ ce
cong~diement dans sa r~ponse dat~e de'juillet.
22. Le 25 ao6t 1994, le syndicat et le coll~ge ont
r~gl~ le grief du 31 mai 1994. D'apr~s ce r~glement, un
poste suppl~mentaire faisant partie de l'unit~ de n~gociation
seraitc~c ~ & la librairie une fois adopt~ le budget 1995-
1996. M- Waiton'est' pas intervenue dans ce r~glement, et
n'en a'~t~ inform~e que bien plus tard. Le poste, utilis~
plus tard pour compenser des compressionsde personnel au
coll~ge, a ~t~ combl~ par un employ~ membre de l'unit~ de
n~gociation.-
23. Mme Waito a emprunt~ plusieurs voies.de recours
avant de s'adresser ~ M. Sauer, responsable syndical de
Timmins et membre de la Commission des relations-dei~ravail
dans les coll~geS, qui est Venu & Ottawa pour enqu~ter sur. la
situation. Selon elle, il aurait affirm~ que le syndicat
devait acquitter les honoraires de son avocat parce que SEFPO
ne l'avait pas repr~sent~e, et elle soutient que le syndicat.
a en main une copie de la facture, qui demeure impay~e, k la
suite de l'intervention de M. sauer, un grief protestant du
e
cong~diement de Mm Waito a ~t~ d~pos~ le 7 octobre 1994.
- 9 -
24. Le grief pour cong~diement a ~t~ port~ en
arbitrage, mais un conseil.d'arbitrage l'a rejet~ parce qu'il
a ~t~ d~pos~ en dehors des d~lais prescrits. La requ~rante
attribue ce retard au fait que le syndicat ne.voulait pas la
representer et que le coll~ge a tard~ & r~pondre ~ la lettre
de son avocat dat~e du 8 juin 1994~e Apres avoir pris
connaissance des observations de M- Waito concernant
retards, l'arbitre, dans sa d~cision, precise que selon lui,
le syndicat n'est pas & blamer. Ce dernier consid~re qu'il
s'agit l& d'une conclusion de fait, mais pour l'employeur, ce
n'est qu'une opinion incidente, qui n'a aucun rapport ave¢ la
question dont l'arbitre a ~t~ saisi. Contrairement au
paragraphe 45 (8.3) de la Loi sur les relations de travail,
la Loi sur la n~qociation collective dans les coll~ges ne
donne pas & l'arbitre la libert~ de proroger les d~l~s.
L'employeur affirme qu'il s'agit uniquement de d~terminer si
le grief a ~t~ d~pos~ ou non en retard, et non pas qui est le
responsable de ce retard.
25. Selon Mme Waito, ces circonstances ont pour effet
d'enfreindre l'article 76. Sous r~serve des observations
figurant & la fin de la pr~sente d~cision concernant les
d~tails pratiques de cette affaire, je juge que ces
circonstances repr~sentent un cas d~fendable, du moins sur la
question de comportement arbitraire du syndicat. I1 s'agit
de d~terminer si le syndicat a envisag~ le fondement_e
juridique de.l'affirmation voulant que le poste deM~ Waito
devait ~tre consid~r~_~omme faisant pattie de l'uni~ de
n~gociation, et que M~ Waito elle-m~me pouvait avolr le
droit d'etre repr~sent~e parce qu'elle aurait pu ~tre admise
dans l'unit~ de.n~gociation beaucoup plus t6t. En outre, je
crois qu'il est preferable de d~terminer apres l'audience
s'il faut d~duire des faits ~tablis si le syndicat a agi de
fa~on arbitraire. Le rejet du grief pour cong~diement en
raison de son retard est unequestion secondaire, qui ne
concerne pas n~cessairement la question fondamentalequi
consiste .~ d~terminer si Mme Waito aurait d~ ~tre trait~e
comme si elle'n'~tait pas membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation'
. ALLEGATIONS CONTRE LE COLL~GE
26'. Les allegations formUl~es Contre le c°ll~ge-sont
fond~es sur le paragraphe 75 (2), libell~ comme suit
75- (2) Le Conseil, un employeur ou
quiconque agit au n°m d'un employeur ne doit
pas :
a) refuser d'employer ou de continuer
d,employer une personne, ou pratiquer la
discrimination en ce qui concerne son
emploi ou une condition de son emploi
parce qu'elle exerce un droit que lui
conf~re la pr~sente loi ou qu'elle est
ou n'est pas membre d'une association
d'employ~s; .~.r_
b) imposer, lots d'une d~signation ou dans
un contrat de travail, une condition qui
vise & restreindre le droit d'un employ~
ou de la personne qui cherche un emploi
de devenir membre d'une association
d'employ~s ou d'exercer un autre droit
que lui conf~re la ~r~sente'loi; ~-~
c) chercher, par l'intimidation, par la
menace de cong~diement ou par toute
autre forme de menace, ou par
l'imposition d'une peine p~cuniaire ou
autre, ou par un autre moyen, & obliger
un employ~ a devenir, a s'abstenir de
devenir, & continuer ou & cesser d'etre
membre d'une association d'employ~s, ou
& s'abstenir d'exercer les autres droits
que lui conf~re la pr~sente loi.
Toutefois, nul n'est r~put~ avoir contrevenu
au present paragraphe du fait d'une action ou
d'une, omission relative & une personne
occupant un poste de direction ou de
confiance.
27. Pour ~tablir une pr~tention prima facie, il faut
presenter des faits suffisants pour soutenir que le coll~ge
pourrait ~tre reconnu comme ayant pos~ l'un des actes
interdits dans ce paragraphe, en vue de p~naliser une
personne pour'avoir exerc~ un droit pr~vu dans la Loi sur la
n~ociation ~.~llective dans les coll~ges ou de l'emp~cher de
le faire. M-- Waito pretend que le coll~ge a enfreint ses
droits en vertu de ce paragraphe en la cong~diant apres
qu'ell? lui a envoy~ la lettre du 31 mai concernant Sa
supervlseure et en refusant de reconna~tre qu'elle est membre
de l'unit~ de n~gociation & titre d'employ~e a plein temps,
et non une employee de remplacement. Elle all~gue que le
coll~ge lui a fait signer, & quelques reprises, des contrats
en blanc o~ ne figuraient pas ses heures r~elles de travail,
qu'il n'a pas tenu compte du fait qu'elle travaillait un
nombre d'heures suffiSant pour ~tre int~gr~e dans l'unit~ de
- 11 -
n~gociation, et qu'il a cr~ de toutes pi~ces le poste de
remplacement pour donner un fondement & cette exclusion.
Elle affirme que le coll~ge a viol~ la loi en l'excluant de
l'unit~ de n~gociation alors qu'elle aurait d~.en faire
partie.
28. Comme nous ~'avons soulign~, le coll~ge, dans sa
r~ponse, affirme que Mm Waito n'~tait pas membre de l~it~
de n~gociation parce qu'en d~pit du fait qu'elle travaillait
plus de vingt-quatre heures par semaine, elle occupait un
poste qui ne faisait pas partie de l'unit~ de n~gociation.
I1 s'agit 1~ de la question de fond, que nous avons trait~e
plus haut. Sur ce point-l& nous avons conclu qu'elle a un
cas d~fendable.
29. Le coil~ge rejette ~galem~nt l~all~ti~ selon
laquelle il a enfreint la loi et soullgne que M-- Waito a
exerc~ ses droits apres son cong~diement, et non avant ou
pendant qu'elle occupait son poste, p~riodes qui sont vis,es
par la disposition en question.
30. Compte tenu de la question susmentionn~e touchant
l'unit~ de n~gociation, nous concluons ~galement que
'~rticle 65 de la loi, comme l'ensemble de la loi, donne &
Waito le droit de faire partie de l'unit~ de n~gociation
du personnel de soutien et de participer aux activit~s
l~gales du S~PO. I1 s'agit donc de d~terminer.si les faits
qu'all~gue M~ Waito d~montrent que le coll~ge lnterpr~te
ainsi la nature de son poste parce qu'elle a exerc~ ses
droits ou pour l'emp~cher de les exercer.
31. Rie~ donne & penser que le coll~ge a agi de la
sorte parce que M Waito avait exerc~ ses droits, & moins
qu'il soit ~tabli que sa lettre de plainte constituait un
grief en vertu de la loi ou que le grief d~pos~ par le
syndicat le 31 mai 1994 soit consid~r~ comme un exercice de
ses droits. Selon nous, il n'est pas n~cessaire de se
prononcer sur cette question pour le moment, ~-tant donn~
notre point de rue sur le v~ritable fondement du litige que
nous exposons ci-dessous.
32. .La Commission est d'avis qu'il y a un cas
· d~fendable que !e coll~ge a~ait, pu donner Ie statu~ de Poste
contractuel.~ l'emploi de M~ .Waito en rue de l'emp~¢her'-
d'exercer son droit d'etre repr~sent~e au Sein de l'unit~ de
n~gociati°n provue par la lOi. Comme l'a plaid~ Mme wait°,
rien dans son travail ne justifie que son poste soit
consid~r~ comme contractuel, ou qu'un poste de ce genre soit
naturellement contractuel. Comme nous l'avons indiqu~, elle
rejette l'affirmation selon laquelle son poste a ~t~ ~tabli
- 12 -
pour remplacer un poste faisant partie de l'unit~ de
n~gociation. ~mme son poste est consid~r~ comme
contractuel, ~- Waito est priv~e du droit d'etre rep~sent~e
au sein de l'unit~ de n~gociation. L'all~gation deM~= Waito
selon laquelle son poste est consid~r~ comme contractuel
parce qu'on veut l'emp~cher d'exercer ses droits en tant que
membre d'une unit~ de n~gociation est d~fendable, car il
s'agit d'une consequence naturelle de cette position. -~- - '
outre, le syndicat a observ~ que la creation de postes
contractuels visant & limiter le nombre de postes assujettis
aux modalit~s des conventions collectives suscite
actuellement des questions dans diff~rents coll~ges de la
province.
33. Tout compte fait, les allegations de la
requ~rante contre le coll~ge me ~emblent defendables.
D~T~LS PI~T~OUES
34. L'analyse pr~c~dente ~tablit une cause
suffisamment d~fendable pour justifier une audience.
Cependant, pour orienter les parties et afin de favoriser une
autre forme de r~glement, je tiens · formuler les
observations suivantes. Pour les parties, une audience
susceptible d'etre longue pose des risques consid~rables;
c'est pourquoi une solution de rechange pourrait sembler plus
logique. Je tenterai d'exposer chaCun ces risques
bri~vement. Ce faisant, je precise qu'il ne s'agit pas la de
constatations, et qu'apr~s une~ventuelle audience, il est
possible que la d~cision finale ne soit fond~e sur aucun des
scenarios exposes plus loin.~eJe n'ai entendu aucune preuve,
et seul le point de rue de M- Waito a ~t~ mis en ~vidence en
raison de l'~tape de l'audience o~ la pr~sente d~cision est
rendue. De toute ~vidence, une audience portant sur les
m~rites de la cause tiendrait compte de toutes les preuves et
observations ~ventuelles.
En premier lieu, en ce qui concerne le cas de
~ Waito, bien que.des questions de droit valables soient.en
cause, un r~glement ne rapporterait.pas n~cessairement
d'avantages.~ngibles. En d'autres mots, m~me si elle
'<<gagne>>,Mm Waito-n'obtiendra..peut-~tre rien,, du moinS~
rien qui pourrait probablement justifier Ie temps et
l'~nergie qu'elle consacre a cette requite.
36. Le fait est que pour le moment,_Aa Commission ne
peut se fier qu'& la version des faits de Mm Waito. Celle-
ci affirme avoir ~t~ affect~e ~ un poste qui faisait partie
de l'unit~ de n~gociation du personnel de soutien, et que peu
- 13 -
apres son entree en fonction, elle travaillait assez d'heures
pour ~tre consid~r~e comme membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation.
Elle envisage cette situation d'un point de vue personnel;
pour elle, il semble clair que si elle faisait partie de
l'unit~ de n~gociation, elle va r~cup~rer son poste.
Cependant, ~ la fin du cas, il me faut tenir compte de la
situation d'ensemble, qui n'est pas aussi simple.
37. Si Mme Waito a raison et si le poste qu'elle
occupait aurait d~ faire partie de l'unit~ de n~gociation, il
faut tenir compte du point de vue collectif. Dans ce cas, il
est possible que ce poste n'aurait pas d~ lui ~tre offert.
S'il s'agissait effectivement d'un poste faisant partie de
l'unit~ de n~gociation, il aurait d~ ~tre annonc~ & l'interne
et combl~ par un membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation, advenant
que l'une ou l'un d'entre eux so~t qualifi~. Si le~ste
avait commenc~· & ~tre consid~r~ comme faisant pattie de
l'unit~ de n~gociation & partir du 31 mai 1994, dat~edU
grief, la vacance aurait pu ~tre ainsi affich~e. M-' Waito
aurait pu entrer en concurrence avec des employes qualifies
qui avaient plus d'anciennet~, et peut-~tre qu'elle n'aurait
jamais d~croch~ cet emploi. Personne n'a laiss~ entendre
qu'aucun membre qu~ifi~ de l'unit~ de n~gociation ay~nt plus
d'anciennet~ que M- Waito n'~tait disponible, m~me sa cette
derni~re s'~tait vu accorder de l'anciennet~ pour la p~riode
o~ elle a travaill~ en tant qu'employ~e & contrat. Ces
facteu~s sont pertinents lorsqu'il s'agit de d~terminer ce
que MTM Waito serait susceptible d'obtenir si elle gagne sa
cause. M~me si elle a 'raison pour ce qui est des ~uestions
de droit. Mme Waito ne sera pas n~cessairement r~int~gr~e
dans son poste.
38. Les faits, tels qu'ils ont ~t~ convenus, r~v~lent
que Mme Waito a d'autres obstacles ~ franchir pour obtenir ce
qu'elle veut. Si elle avait ~t~ consid~r~e comme membre de
l'unit~ de n~gociation au moment de son cong~diement, un
emploi continu ne lui aurait pas ~t~ garanti. Elle aurait eu
le droit de d~poser un grief pour protester de son
cong~diement, mais cette d~marche n'aurait pas ~t~
n~cessairement fructueuse. Elle aurait peut-~tre pu obtenir
'un r~glement, dont les modalit~s, auraient ~chapp~ en partie ~
-son contr61e.. .Par exemple, ce r~glement aurait pu.pr~voir
l'int~ration du ~ste dans l'unit~'de n~gociation, 'mais"le'
cong~d~ement de M--- Waito.
39. La suite'des deux griefs qui ont ~t~ d~pos~s pose
~galement des obstacles. L'~loyeur est d'avis que la
nature du poste-qu'occupait M~ Waito a ~t~ ~tablie dans le
cadre d'un r~glement conclu avec le syndicat & la suite du
grief de mai, et par la d~cision de l'arbitre concernant le
- 14 -
grief d~pos~ en octobre. En outre, le syndicat renvoie
cette d~cision pour souligner qu'il n'~tait pas responsable
eretard. Lors d'une aUdience concernant sa plainte,
Waito serait tenue de convaincre la Commission que le
r~glement et la d~cision de l'arbitre ne l'emp~cheraient pas
de r~cup~rer son poste ou d'obtenir un autre r~glement qui
lui semblerait acceptable. I1 n'est pas ~vident qu'elle
r~ussirait & le faire.
40. En outre, il est toujours possible qu'apr~s avoir
entendu les preuves, la Commission d~cide que nile syndicat
ni l'employeur n'ont enfreint la loi en traitant le poste de
cette faqon. La Commission pourrait ~tre d'avis que le
syndicat a adopt~ une position raisonnable compte tenu des
circonstances, qufon ne lui a jamais demand~ d'agir
diff~remment, ou que m~me s'il ~vait eu to~t, cela~h~ voulait
pas dire pour autant qu'il avait commis des actes
arbitraires,, d~raisonnables ou de mauvaise foi. Pour ce qui
est de l'employeur, la Commission pourrait d~cider qu'il a
raison de juger que le poste ne relevait pas de l'unit~ de
n~gociation, ou que m~me dans le cas contraire, il n'a pas
consid~r~ ce po~e comme contractuel dans le but de limiter
les droits de M-' Waito tels qu'ils sont pr~vus dans la loi.
41. De plus, et surtout, m~me si Mme Waito avait ~t~
membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation d~s son entree en fonction,
elle aurait pu ~tre miSe~ePied dans le cadre des
compressions en'cours. M-- Waito n'en a pas parle, et elle
ne pouvait nile confirmer nile nier, mals le syndicat a
indiqu~ que le poste cr~ & la suite du r~glement du grief de
1994 a ~t~ combl~ depuis a la'suite d'une s~rie de
supplantations. On a laiss~ croire que, Ae titulaire actuel
du poste aurait plus d'anciennet~ que M-- Waito, m~me si
cette derni~re s'estvu accorder de l'anciennet~ pour le
temps oO elle a ~t~ a contrat. Tous ces facteurs, s'ils sont
uv~s, pourraient limiter les <<gains>> ~ventuels de
- Waito.
42. Passons maintenant & la situation du syndicat..
Un autre aspect des facteurs ~num~r~s en ce qui concerne
'Mme Waito s'appliquent &'lui,. et-je ne pr~ciserai pas les
· particularit~s; je laisse & son avocat et a ses repr~sentants
le.soin de le faire. Par exemple, il serait possible'de"
d~terminer que le syndicat a manqu~ ~ Son devoir car il
aurait dO envisager le fait que~A'unit~ de n~gociation est'
provue dans la loi ou traiter Mm waito comme si elle ~tait
e~bre de l'uni't~ de n~gociation. Dans la plaidoirie de
Waito, rien. ne donne & penser que le syndicat a envisag~
la possibilit~ qu'elle soit membre de l'unit~ de n~gociation.
Si cette attitude ~tait consid~r~e arbitraire, le syndicat
- 15 -
ferait l'objet d'un jugement d~favorable et des ordres de
r~paration mon~taire ou autre. En outre, d'apr~s les
observations du syndicat, il est possible que cette situation
se reproduise ailleurs.
43. En ce qui concerne le coll~ge, il n'est pas plus
utile, de pr~ciser son risque dans chacune des circonstances
~nonc~es pl~ haut. M~me si le coll~ge <<gagne>>, rien~
n'emP~che M--- Waito de continuer ~ demander un r~glement
qu'elle consid~re ~quitable. Selon ses propres observations,
le coll~ge a reconnu qu'il s'expose a une poursuiteM~p~RrWait°
cong~diement injustif, i~. Si la pr~sente requite de
est accueillie, le coll~ge perdrait une occasion importante
de r~gler lui m~me la question du recours aux employes &
contrat,~ plus de devoir assumer la r~paration accord~e.
M~me siM~= Waito se trouve face~ ~ tous les~ obstacl~
~ventuels dont nous avons parle, elle pourrait quant m~me
avoir droit a des dommages-int~r~ts si la loi a ~t~ viol~e.
44. En raison de l'importance de ces aspects
pratiques, j'autorise par la pr~sente une agente ou un agent
des relations de travail & consulter les parties en vue de
parvenir a une entente sur cette question, maintenant que la
Commission a exprim~ son avis sur les questions
susmentionn~es. Une nouvelle date d'audience ne sera fix~e
que si l'agente ou l'agent signale que ces. efforts ont ~t~
infructueux. L'affaire est renvoy~e au chef des services
r~gionaux.
<<K. G. O'Neil>>
pour la Commission