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HomeMy WebLinkAboutUnion et al 16-01-11IN  THE  MATTER  OF  AN  ARBITRATION     BETWEEN     Seneca  College     (the  “College”)     and       Ontario  Public  Service  Employees  Union,  Local  560     (the  “Union”)       Re:    Grievances  of  Professors  Matson,  Olivo,  Singer,  and  Yee         SOLE  ARBITRATOR:    James  Hayes         APPEARANCES     For  the  College     Timothy  P.  Liznick,  Counsel   Karen  Tobin,  Director,  Employee  and  Labour  Relations   Amy  Hsiung,  Employee  Relations  Assistant   Mosfekah  Ferdaus,  Employee  Relations  Assistant       For  the  Union     Jonathan  Singer,  President   Frank  Yee,  1st  Vice  President   Larry  Olivo,  Chief  Steward   Paul  Matson,  Member,  College  Workload  Monitoring  Group     A  hearing  was  held  in  Markham  on  January  7,  2016.            2   AWARD     1. While  I  am  also  named  as  an  Article  32  arbitrator  in  the  CAAT  Academic   Collective   Agreement,  these   complaints   came  to   me  in   my   capacity  as   a   Seneca/OPSEU  Local  560  Workload  Resolution  Arbitrator  (“WRA”).       2. The  College  submits  that  the  gravamen  of  these  complaints  does  not  engage   the  jurisdiction  of  a  WRA.    Article  11.02A  6(b)  limits  the  jurisdiction  of  a  WRA  to   grievances  as  follows:     Grievances  arising  with  respect  to  Article  11,  Workload,  other  than  11.01,  11.02   and  11.09  shall  be  handled  in  accordance  with  the  grievance  procedure  set  out  in   Article  32,  Grievance  and  Arbitration  Procedures.       3. The  parties  elected  to  address  both  the  preliminary  objection  and  the  merits   of  the  grievances  at  the  hearing.    However,  the  College  submits  that  its  preliminary   objection  precludes  a  determination  of  the  merits  in  this  expedited  proceeding.    A   contrary  concession   would,  of   course,  have   rendered   the   preliminary   objection   redundant.     4. Having   considered   the  representations   of   the   parties   and   the   extensive   documentary  material  filed,  I  conclude  that  the  preliminary  objection  must  prevail.     While  the  concerns  of  the  Union  about  the  delay  that  will  occur  as  the  result  of  this   ruling   are   understandable,   a   WRA   may   not   assume   jurisdiction   without   proper   cause.    In  view  of  this  conclusion  it  would  be  inappropriate  to  provide  a  gratuitous   opinion  concerning  the  merits  of  these  grievances,  albeit  that  they  have  been  heard   at  length.         5. The  core  facts  giving  rise  to  these  grievances  are  not  in  dispute.         6. The  College  elected  to  change  a  longstanding  practice  in  June  of  2015.    It   advised   that   it   would   no  longer   identify  the   work   of   Union   appointees   to   the   Workload   Monitoring   Group   (“WMG”)   as   complementary   functions,  to   which   5.0    3   hours  weekly  had  been  routinely  attributed,  on  Standard  Workload  Forms  (SWFs).     The  College  explains  that  the  decision  in  Sault  College,  December  12,  2014  (Kaplan)   had  come  to  its  attention.    Sault  College  found  there  to  be  a  contractual  distinction   between  complementary  functions  assigned  by  a  College  and  most  union  business.     In  the  opinion  of  Arbitrator  Kaplan,  the  former  were  required  to  be  identified  on  a   SWF  while  the  latter  was  not.    The  Award  did  not  identify  WMG  participation  as  an   exception  to  the  general  rule.  Seneca  concedes  that  this  change  prompted  it  to  alter   a  decades  long  practice  of  including  WMG  participation  by  Union  members  as  a   complementary  function  on  SWFs.     7. Faced   with   this  unilateral  change   in   College   practice   the   Union   chose   to   “purchase”  union  release  time  pursuant  to  Article  8.04B  to  cover  the  anticipated   work  of  its  WMG  appointees.    It  was  concerned  that  Union  WMG  appointees  “could   be  forced  into  involuntary  overtime”  unless  it  did  so.     8. The  College  responded  with  amended  SWFs,  reassigning  additional  teaching   workload,  having  taken  into  consideration  the  number  of  hours  purchased  by  the   Union.  The   Union   alleges   that  these   SWF   amendments  were   unprecedented   and   “had  the  effect  of  nullifying  the  reduction  of  teaching  contact  hours  purchased  by  the   Union”.    The  College  says  that  it  has  the  right  to  do  so  and  that  pressing  financial   exigencies   affecting   the   entire   College   system  require  that   it   assign   teaching   workload  as  efficiently  as  possible.    It  denies  any  non-­‐compliance  with  the  Collective   Agreement  and  states  that  the  Union  has  failed  to  identify  any  flaw  in  the  amended   SWFs.    It  says  that  the  subsequent  Article  11  calculations  include  a  full  accounting   for  the  time  purchased  by  the  Union.       9. Both   parties   preserved   their   respective   legal   positions   throughout.     The   College  agreed  that  these  issues  could  be  considered  by  the  WMG  without  prejudice   to  its  objection  that  they  were  not  judiciable  by  a  WRA.    The  Union  filed  an  Article  8   grievance  covering  all  of  the  issues  raised  before  me.    That  grievance  rests  in  the    4   parallel  Article   32   stream   notwithstanding   the   Union’s   position   that   a   WRA   has   jurisdiction  over  the  instant  grievances.     10. In  a  well-­‐developed  submission,  Mr.  Singer  emphasized  the  position  of  the   Union  that  the  failure  of  the  College  to  credit  WMG  participation  on  SWFs  violates   Article  11.02A  2.    He  says  that  such  SWFs  no  longer  include  “all  details  of  total   workload”   as   required   by   that  Article.    He  also  asserted   that   the   subsequent   amendment  of  the  SWFs  in  issue  violated  Article  11.02A  1  (b).    He  says  that  the   Union  purchase  of   union   release   time  should   have   triggered   a  concomitant   reduction  of  teaching  contact  hours  consistent  with  past  practice  and  that  Union   purchase  did  not  permit  the  College  to  invoke  the  “change  in  circumstances”  right   conferred  by  Article  11.02A  1(b).    He  says  that  these  subsequent  SWF  amendments   also  violate  Article  8  in  that  they  will  impact  the  workload  of  union  officers  who  are   teachers  and  “will  interfere  with  their  ability  to  conduct  union  business”.     11. The  Union  further  maintained  that  there  are  no  “water  tight  compartments”   in  the  Collective  Agreement  dividing  WRA  issues  from  those  assigned  to  Article  32   arbitrators.    Reference  was  made  to  Algonquin  College  (Wojcik),  September  23,  2014   at   p.   6  where  Arbitrator   Slotnick   found   that   a   SWF   tainted   by   anti-­‐union   discrimination   could   be   challenged   through   the   WRA   process.  In   the   Union’s   submission,  whether  or  not  the  Article  8  Union  Business  provision  also  requires   consideration,  these  grievances  fall  squarely  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  WRA.    The   Collective   Agreement   requires   that   challenges   to   the  validity   of   SWFs  must   be   reviewed  by  a  WRA.     Decision     12.  While  I  concur  with  the  Algonquin  College  observation,  in  my  opinion  a  WRA   should  be  careful  not  to  trench  upon  the  jurisdiction  of  an  Article  32  arbitrator.    The   College  is   correct   in   emphasizing   that   the   WRA   process   is   intended   to   address   straightforward  Article  11.01,  11.02,  and  11.09  issues  relating  to  individual  faculty    5   members   in   an   expedited,   informal,   non-­‐precedential   manner.    The   Collective   Agreement   itself   commands   that   the   two   dispute   resolution   procedures  remain   distinct.    In   my   view,   if   there   is   threshold   controversy   about   which   process   is   appropriate,   an   arbitrator   should   focus   upon   what   appears   to   be   the   pith   and   substance  of  the  grievance(s)  in  question.     13. Without  purporting  to  identify  or  canvass  the  potential  issues  raised  by  the   instant  grievances  in  any  detail,  it  is  plain  that  there  is  a  controversy  over:  how   Union  appointees  to  the  WMG  should  be  treated  on  their  SWFs  at  first  instance;   whether  or  not  the  Union  should  be  required  to  obtain  Article  8  union  releases  for   WMG  purposes;  and,  what  right  remains  to  the  College  to  further  amend  SWFs  if  the   Union  purchases  union  release  time  in  such  circumstances.    The  legal  significance  of   past  practice  at  Seneca  may  be  in  issue.      One  would  not  expect  a  WRA  process  to  be   particularly  amenable  to  potentially  complex  issues  concerning  an  alleged  estoppel   or  the  relevance  of  past  practice,  should  those  positions  be  pursued  and  contested.         14. While  there  will  be  some  inevitable  overlap  with  Article  11,  I  conclude  that   the   rights   of   union   officers   and   appointees  lie  at   the   heart   of   these   matters.   A   consideration   of   Article   8   will   be   fundamental   to   any  analysis.     The   Union   submissions  made  before  me,  and  the  content  of  the  pending  Article  8  grievance   that  the  Union  has  filed,  make  this  clear.         15. With  all  due  respect  to  the  opposing  point  of  view  well  made  by  Mr.  Singer,  I   conclude  that  an  Article  32  arbitrator  is  best  situated  to  address  the  issues  raised  by   these  grievances.    The  decision  of  Mr.  Kaplan  in  Sault  College  is  the  product  of  an   arbitrator  to  whom  both  WRA  and  Article  32  jurisdiction  was  given.    While  not   binding,  such  a  decision  has  precedential  value  unlike  any  decision  made  by  a  WRA.     In   my   opinion,   an   Article   32   arbitrator,  with   the   plenary   jurisdiction   that   the   Collective  Agreement  confers,  should  hear  grievances  that  are  driven  primarily  by   issues  relating  to  the  rights  of  union  representatives.          6   16. The  preliminary  objection  is  upheld.         Dated  at  Toronto,  this  11th  day  of  January,  2016                       James  Hayes