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HomeMy WebLinkAboutUnion 02-04-10 < IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN Hamilton-Wentworth Community Care Access Centre (Hereinafter referred to as "the Employer") -, AND Ontario Public Service Employees' Union - Local 274 (Hereinafter referred to as "the Union") Regarding:- Group Grievance " \ Sole Arbitrator: Felicity D. Briggs For the Employer: John E. Brooks, Counsel Barbara Headly Mia Manson For the Union: Mitch Bevan, Grievance Officer Marilyn Mailett Rita Castellino . I On April 18, 2000 two Relief SuppOli Staff filed a group grievance that stated: The grievors alledge (sic) that the employer has violated the Employment Standards Act section 25 specifically but not exclusively. The grievors are requesting that they be paid for stat holidays. This request will also include any future stat holidays and also be retroactive to their date(s) of hire. Also requesting to be made whole. After the parties met to discuss that grievance the Employer sent the following letter to the Union: Further to our grievance meeting on April 20, 2000, I am to respond to you in writing with my decision within seven calendar days. Please find this as my response. The Grievors allege that the Employer has breached Section 25 of the Employment Standards Act. The Grievors are requesting that they be paid for Statutory Holidays, including any future Statutory Holidays and any Statutory Holidays retroactive since their dates of hire. Section 25 (I) states that, "This section does not apply to an employee who, (a) is employed for less than three months; (b) has not earned wages on a (sic) least twelve days during the four work weeks immediately preceding a public holiday; (c) fails to work his or her scheduled regular day of work preceding or his or her scheduled regular day of work following a public holiday; (d) has agreed to work on a public holiday and who, without reasonable cause, fails to repOli for and perform the work; or (e) is employed under an arrangement whereby the employee may elect to work or not when requested to do so... ." As per Article 2.02(c) of the Collective Agreement, "A Relief Employee is one who is employed inegularly on a relief basis as and when required by the Employer", '. 2 Furthennore, as relief staff, they are required to submit their availability to the Human Resources Assistant advising of dates they are not available to work when offered, Therefore, they do not meet criteria (e) above, and are not enti tled to be paid for Statutory Holidays, The Employer also considers this grievance to be untimely with respect to the claim for retroactive pay for Statutory Holidays back to the dates of hire, and objects to its arb itrab ility. The matter remained outstanding and the parties agreed to put the dispute before an arbitrator. 'prior to the scheduled hearing date, the parties agreed to resolve the issue and signed a memorandum of agreement dated April 4, 2001 that stated: 1. The CCAC will pay to each Grievor 3,1 % in lieu of statutory holidays on all hours worked between January 1, 2000 and October 9, 2000, $633.78 less deductions required by law for Diana Atkins and $596.19 less deductions required by làw for Sherri Patterson. 2. The Union and the Grievors hereby withdraw this grievance. 3. The CCAC and the Union agree that this settlement is made without prejudice or precedent to the rights of the parties in any other matter and shall not be referred to or relied upon in any other matter for any purpose whatsoever. Notwithstanding the third paragraph above, the parties agreed that the memorandum of agreement should be put before me to enable me to appreciate the history of the instant dispute. I accept the document for that purpose. Subsequent to the April 4, 200 I tnemorandum of agreement the parties bargained a new collective agreement which amended the provisions for holiday pay for relief staff. The present collective agreement provisions shall be set out later in this award. ') .) Marilyn Mailett and Rita Castellino were hired as Relief Support Staff with the Employer on August 23, 1999. On June ll, 2001 they filed a group grievanèe that stated: We grieve that the employer has violated the Employment Standards Act Section 25 and the collective agreement specifically but not exclusively. The amended remedy requested was: The grievors are requesting that they be paid for stat holidays. This request will be retroactive to their dates of hire. The Employer's response was dated June 22, 2001 and it stated, in part: The new collective agreement, ratified on December 14, 2000 is clear with respect to statutory holiday pay for relief staff. Letter of Understanding (C) paragraph reads (sic) that: "Relief Employees (other than those covered by paragraph 3 above) will receive an amount equal to 3.1 % of their regular straight-time hourly rate in lieu of holiday pay under Article 18. Relief Employees who are offered and accept term contract assignments which are expected to exceed one month will be eligible for holiday pay as per Article 18 of the Collective Agreement but will not be compensated in lieu of holiday pay under paragraph 3 above". Both of these grievors are currently receiving 3.1 % in lieu of paid statutory holidays 111 accordance with the Relief Letter of Understanding (C). Further, this grievance is untimely and, pursuant to Article 9 of the collective agreement, has been abandoned and any rights or recourse to the grievance procedure are at an end. At the hearing into this matter, relevant background facts were not in dispute and various documents were admitted upon consent. 4 On August 20, 1999 both grievors received a letter setting out their terms of employment. Those identical letters stated, in part: As a casual employee, you are not eligible to participate in the group benefits plan. Relief Employees who have worked less than 3900 hours shall be entitled to 6% vacation pay. Relief Employees who are offered and accept term contract assignments, which are expected to - exceed one month, will be eligible for holiday pay as per Article 18 of the Collective Agreement. .... Relief Staff are included within the OPSEU Local 274 bargaining unit. During your orientation, you will meet with a representative who will provide you with the details of your membership. Please refer to the Collective Agreement Letter of understanding (c) regarding Relief Employees. It is probably helpful to set out the relevant prQvisions of the collective agreement at this point. Article 9 - Grievance Procedure 9.05 The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding upon both parties and the Employee or Employees affected. The Arbitrator shall not have jurisdiction to amend or add to any of the provisions of this Agreement or to substitute any new provisions in lieu thereof nor to give any matter not covered by the Agreement. No matter shall be dealt with at arbitration which has not been properly carried through all the previous steps of the grievance procedure, 9.06 All agreements reached under the grievance procedure between the representatives of the Employer and the representatives of the Union will be final and binding upon the Employer and the Union and the Employee or Employees affected. 9.07 The time limits set out in this Article are to be construed as mandatory. If a grievance is not submitted or advanced through the grievance procedure or to arbitration within the time limits 5 " set out, the grievance shall be deemed to be abandoned and all rights or recourse to the grievance procedure shall be at an end. 9.08 The parties may agree to extend or waive any of the time limits prescribed in this Article. However, any such agreement shall be expressed in writing and acknowledged by the parties. 9.09 Group Grievance Where a number of Employees have identical grievances and each Employee would be entitled to grieve separately they may present a group grievance in writing, signed by each Employee who is grieving to the Director, Corporate Services within fomieep (14) calendar days after the circumstances giving rise to the grievance have originated or ought reasonably to have come to the attention of the Employees. Group grievances shall be treated as being initiated at Step No. 2. Letter of Understanding ( c) - Relief Employees 2, None of the provisions of the Collective Agreement apply to Relief Employees except as specifically set out herein. 3. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Letter of Understanding relief employees in the bargaining unit on June 10, 1999 (the date of ratification of the 1999 collective agreement) will continue to receive an amount equal to 6.5 percent of their regular straight time hourly rate in lieu of any holiday pay under Article 18 (i.e. 3.l percent) and for pay in lieu of any benefits under Article 2 I (i.e. 3.4 percent) for all earnings. In all other respects the provisions of this Letter of Understanding shall apply to these Relief Employees. .. ... 5. Relief Employees (other than those covered by paragraph 3 above) will receive an amount equal to 3.1 % of their regular straight-time hourly rate in lieu of holiday pay under Article 18. Relief Employees who are offered and accept term contract assignments which are expected to exceed one month will be eligible for holiday pay as per Atiicle 18 of the Collective 6 Agreement but will not be compensated in lieu of holiday pay under paragraph 3 above, Section 25 of the Employment Standards Act states: 25. (l) Application - This section does not apply to an employee who, (e) is employed under and arrangement whereby the employee may elect to work or not when requested to do so. There is no dispute that, since the ratification of the most recently negotiated collective agreement which took place on December 14,2001, the grievors have been paid 3.1 % holiday pay and that payment is in accordance with the terms and provisions of the collective agreement. It was the Employer's position that the grievance is not arbitrable for a number of reasons. The Union contended that the Employer should pay the -- grievors proper holiday pay for the period between their dates of hire and the ratification of the new collective agreement. Mr. Brooks, for the Employer, and Mr. Bevan, for the Union, agreed that the preliminary matters should be considered first. Accordingly, this decision deals only with the issue of jurisdiction. The first aspect of the Employer's preliminary objection deals with jurisdiction. Simply put, I was appointed under this collective agreement and therefore I can only hear and determine alleged violations of the current collective agreement. The parties are agreed that there is no such breach and that must be a complete answer to the question of jurisdiction, Article 9.01 of the collective agreement refers to violations of "this collective agreement". Any breach of a past colIective agreement cannot be determined 7 or remedied by an arbitrator appointed under the current collective agreement. In this regard the Employer relied upon Re Goodyear Canada Inc. and United Rubber Workel's, Local 232 (1980), 28 LA.C. (2d) 196 (picher); Re Gananoque Light & Power Ltd. And International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 636 (1996), 54 LA.C. (4th) 203 (Thorne); Re York University and York University Faculty Association (January 29, 2002), unreported (Davie); and Re Dufferin-Peel Roman Catholic Separate School Boa rd and Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Association (1999), 85 LA.C, (4th) 21 (Samuels). As mentioned earlier, the Employer also had alternate arguments regarding my jurisdiction that I will not set out for reasons that will become apparent below. It is sufficient to say that those alternate grounds included the grievances were filed beyond the mandatory til1le limits, set out in the collective agreement and there are no reasonable grounds for an extension, the matter was previously resolved by the parties and, finally, the matter should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of laches. Even if I found I had the jurisdiction to hear the merits of the instant grievance, it was the Employer's contention that I would be without jurisdiction to award any remedy that predated the filing of the grievance. Mr. Bevan asserted that in the event that this issue was put before me on the merits, there would be a dispute as to the quantum of appropriate holiday pay. In any event, it was the Union's submission that the grievance alleges a violation of the collective agreement as well as Section 25 of the Employment Standard~ Act. In such instances where there is an allegation of both a breach of the collective abIJ'eel11ent and the relevant statute, it is not 8 beyond my jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue even if the breach occurred prior to the current collective agreement. DECISION In assessing jurisdiction I must be take into account what the grievance- alleges and under what collective agreement it was filed. The grievors allege that they were improperly paid holiday pay for a period that fell during the life of the previous icollective agreement. However the grievance was filed under the current collective agreement and the pmiies agree that there is no violation of the present collective agreement. In my view, the jurisprudence on this issue is clear, consistent and leads me to uphold the Employer's objection, In Re York University (supra) Ms. Davie was considering her jurisdiction to hear and remedy 17 grievances that alleged that female staff had been paid less than their male counterparts for substantially the same work for many years. The Faculty Association asserted that such action was a brea~h of the collective agreement, the Employment Standards' Act and the Human Rights Code. Unlike the circumstances before me, Ms. Davie accepted jurisdiction to hear and determine the grievances on the basis that the grievances were continuing in nature, She found that each time the female grievors were paid there was, arguably, a fresh breach of the collective agreement. However, in assessing her ability to provide a remedy that predated the collective agreement under which she was appointed she stated, at pages 36 and 37: . " . . 10 grievance procedure there are numerous references to "this agreement". Such references must be given meaning. In assessing what, if any, jurisdiction I have I must look to the collective agreement lli1der which I was appointed. It was common ground between Mr. Brooks and Mr. Bevan that there was no violation of the instant collective agreement. Notwithstanding th~t lack of a breach, the Union urged me to take jurisdiction to hear and determine the grievance on the basis that there is also an alleged violation of statute. I cannot. I do not obtain my jurisdiction in this matter from the Employment Standards Act. This is an arbitration hearing resulting from my appointment under the current collective agreement and it is under that collective agreement that my jurisdiction would be found. For those reasons, the Employer's preliminary objection is upheld and the grievance is dismissed. ronto this 10th day of April, 2002. , 1J