HomeMy WebLinkAbout1990-0267.Poapst.90-09-25
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,'~r OIVTARIO EMPLOYÉS DE LA COURONNE
,4 CROWN EMPLOYEES DEL 'ONTARIO
. . . GRIEVANCE COMMISSION DE
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1111 SETTLEMENT REGLEMENT
BOARD DES GRIEFS
180 OUNDAS STREET W£ST, SUITE 2100, TORONTO, !,NTAFlJO. M5G lZ8 TELEPHONf£ITËUEPHONf£: (416) 325-1388
lBO, RUE DUNDAS OUe-ST, BUREAU 2100, TORONTO (ONTARIO). M5G 128 FACSIMILEITÉL£COPIE : (4HS) 326- /396
267/90
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IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
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Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEBN
OPSEU (Poapst) - I
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Grievor .'
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The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Revenue)
. Employer
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A. Barrett Vice-Chairperson
M. Lyons Member
R. Scott Member
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FOR THE D. Eady
GRIEVOR Counsel
Gowl ing,. Strathy & Henderson "~
Barristers & Solicitors
FOR THE K. Cribbie
EMPLOYER Labour Relations Officer
Personnel Services Branch '"'
Ministry of Revenue
HEARING: August 27, 1990
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In this g!ievance the union argues that the employer is
estopped from unilaterally terminating a past practice of paying
for 'meal breaks in certain circumstances, contrary to any
requirement in the collective agreement that it do so, until the
expiration of the current collective agreement.
The grievor is one of approximately 20 property assessors
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in the Cornwall office of the Ministry. Once a year {and sometimes
twice} the property assessors hold "open houses" during Saturday
and evening hours to explain newþroperty assessments to the public
who come in to enquire or complain. In 1990 the grievor attended
five such open houses between February 10th and February 15th.
Sinc~ 1984 all property assessors in the Cornwall office
have been given a paid one hour meal break during these open
houses. Article 17.1.2 of the collective agreement which makes
referenèe to meal breaks would not require a paid meal break in
these circumstances.
We did not hear evidence as to how this practice arose,
but it was consistent from 1984 through 1989. In the summer of
1989 an audit on the branch books was done, and the payments were
discovered and ordered discontinued.
At our hearing the employer led evidence to show that the
property assessors were clearly notified that the practice would
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be discontinued as early as June of 1989. A memorandum dated June
21. 1989, did not refer specifically to open house dinner breaks
and on the evidence of the grievor, and in our view, the notice was
insufficient to serve as clear notification that the practice would I
be discontinued. Similarly, minutes of an employee relations
committee meeting dated October 5, 1989, dealing with lunch breaks
not being considered overtimecwould also not constitute sufficient
notice that the practice in question was to be discontinued.
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However, we are satisfied on the evidence that at a staff meeting
on November 20, 1989, all employees present were told of the
discontinuance of the benefit. The grievor, Mrs. Poapst, was not
present at the meeting; she was absent due to illness on that day.
It is also undisputed on the evidence that the Regional Assessment
Commissioner told the union local president in December 1989 that
dinner hours at open houses would no longer be paid.
l] scheduled
The next open houses were for February 1990,
as stated earlier. The first three property assessors who
submitted time sheets for the open houses did not claim'a paid
dinner break. The remaining 17 or 50, b~ing disgruntled about the
change, claimed a paid dinner break, but all but the grievor were
persuaded to drop their claim. Another employee relations
committee meeting was held on February 15th and the new practice
was very clearly spelled out at that meeting.
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The grievor claims that she was not aware until after she
had worked the open houses tha.t she would not be paid for her
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dinner break. If she had known, she would have complained through
the union.
The union cites the well known cases of Re: Canadian
National Railway Co. et al. and Beattv et a1. ( 1981) 128 D.L.R.
(3d) 236 lOnt Div. Ct.), and Re: Domq1as Inc. and United Glass and
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Ceramic Workersl Local 203 (1983 ) 9 L.A.C. (3d) 125 in support of
the proposition that a long-standing past practice of paying for
lunch breaks or sick days, contrary to any requirement in the
collective agreement I cannot be unilaterally altered by the
employer during the currency of a collective agreement.
In our case both employer and union counsel agreed that
an estoppel was created here, and that it can be terminated by the
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. employer if sufficient notice is given. The employer says that
"reasonable notice" is all that is réquired, and relies upon
comments in the Domqlas case and G.S.B. 105/83 Boyd (Roberts) . In
the Domalas case the arbitration board held that a long established
past practice of paying employees for lunch breaks on certain
shifts could not be discontinued during the currency of the
collective agreement, based upon the premise that the union should
have an opportunity to attempt to negotiate the benefit into the
collective agr·eemen t , not having done so before based upon their
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understanding that the benefit would continue. At page 132 et
seq. the arbitration board held:
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"There is a range of responses that such reliance might
engender. On the evidence we have held. that in these
circumstances, it is reasonable that the representation
not be revoked mid-term in the collective agreement.
There may well be other circumstances, where on the
evidence, a lesser . period would be a reasonable time
within which to terminate, the estoppel. The remedy
granted in any circumstances ought to be that which, on
the facts, the equities would require."
In Boyd the board stated:
"Finally, with respect to termination of promissory
estoppel, we note that varying views have been expressed
as to when such an estoppel should terminate. In past
cases, this Vice Chairman has adopted the view expressed
by Lord Hodson in Ajavi v. Briscoe, (1964J 3 All E~R. 556
(P.C.), that the party against whom promissory estoppel
operates ··can resile from his promise [not to enforce his
strict contractual rights] on giving reasonable notice,
which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee
a reasonable opportunity of resuming his original
position . . . [and] the promise only becomes final and
irrevocable if the promisee cannot resume his position."
Other arbitrators apparently have expressed the view that
a promissory estoppel does not terminate until the date
of termination of the relevant collective agreement. To
this Vice-Chairman, this view seems too mechanical and
approaches too closely. the forbidden territory of
clothing with contractual status promises which are
unsupported by consideration. Given the result l.n the
present case, however, it is unnecessary for this Board
as a whole to apply either viewpoint."
While we do not agree with the statement of the Bovd
board that "this view seems too mechanical and approaches too
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closely the forbidden territory of clothing with contractual status
promises which are unsupported by consideration", we do agree that
in some. circumstances, based on the equities, an estoppel can be
terminated during the currency of a collective agreement.
We find this is such a case. The situation arises only
once a year, or twice at most, and affects a small number of
property assessors employed by the Ministry. It is not a Ministry-
wide practice, nor does it appear it was ever really discussed
between the parties. In addition, no assurances were given that
the practice would continue as in the G.S.B. Beauine 0606/86 case
relied upon by the union.
In Beaulne the board held that the employer was estopped
from discontinuing its long-standing practice of providing free
lunches for "day-shift employees during the currency of the
collective agr~ement. At p. 6 is held: "In the face of a clear
long-standing practice which had endured undisturbed through at
least three sets of negotiations, and the assured continuance of
which had been offered by a top ranking employer official, the
employer is estopped from in m~d-contract unilaterally withdrawing
from that position." ,
We distinguiSh the instant case from the Beaulne case on
the basis that no assurances of a continuance of the practice were
made by top-ranking employer officials.
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In this case the past pra~tice is restricted to very few
employees, generally occurs only once a year, and involves a small
amount of money, so the detrimental reliance, which is the
fundamental consideration upon which an es.toppel is founded, is
more notional than real.
We find that the notice given by management to the staff
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and union local president in November and December 19891 prior to
the February open houses, was reasonable in these circumstances.
Accordingly the grievance is dismissed.
DATED at Toronto, this 25th- day of September, 1990.
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ANNE BA ETT, ce-Chai erson
. II I DISSENT II (Dissent to follow
MICHAEL LYONS, Member
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ROLY SCOTT, Member
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