HomeMy WebLinkAbout1991-0594.Grant.91-10-08 ONTA RIO EMPLO Y~-S DE LA COURONNE
· CROWN EMPLOYEES DE L'ONTARIO
GRIEVANCE C,OMMISSION DE
SE'n'LEMENT REGLEMENT
BOARD DES GRIEFS
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'~80, RUE DUNDAS OUEST, BUREAU 2100, TORONTO rONTARIO.I. M5G tZ8 FACS]MILE/T£L~COP~E : (416) 326-~'396
594/91
IN THE MATTER OF ~N ARBITRATION
Un4er
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARG/%INING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
OPSEU (Grant)
Hrievor
- a~4 -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Correctional Services)
Employer
BEFORE: G. Simmons Vice-Chairperson
S. Urbain Member
D. Montrose Member
FOR THE M. McFadden
HRIEVOR .Counsel
Koskie & Minsky
Barristers & Solicitors
FOR THE C. Foster
EMPLOYER Grievance Negotiation Officer
Ministry of Correctional Services
HE~RINH September 12, 1991
2
The grievor is a correctional officer, classified as a Correctional Officer 2 at
the Miilbroo. k Correctional Centre. He has been employed as a correctional
officer since 1978. In January, 1991, the grieVor filed a grievance under Article
18.1 of the collective agreement claiming that managembnt had not maintained
the common practice of training days for I.C.LT. (Institutional Crisis Intervention
Team) which endangered his health and safety (Exhibit t).
The grievor worked the night shift on February 18 and 19. His regular days
off were February 20, 21, and 22. He returned to work on the day shift on
February 23, 1991. By letter February 13, 1991', the grievor received a letter from
the Area Personnel Administrator setting out, in part, the following comments
(Exhibit 2):
This is ta advise you that Mr. R. Hawkins, Regional
Manager (E), has been designated to meet with you in
accordance with Article 27.3~3 of the collective
agreement to discuss your grievance ...
Please report to the Superintendent's office, Millbrook
Correctional Centre, on Friday, February 22, 1991 at 0945
hours so that we may proceed with this Stage Two
meeting ...
The grievor attended the above Stage Two meeting on February 22 for
approximately four hours. He claims that he is entitled to call-back pay pursuant
to Article 14.1 in the collective agreement. Article 14.1 reads:
3
ARTICLE 14 ? CALL BACK
An employee who leaves his place of work and is
subsequently called back to work prior to the sta~ng
time of his ne~ scheduled shift shall be paid a minimum
of four (4) hours' pay at one and one-half (11/..2) times his
basic hourIy rate,
The Union contends that what transpired in the instant situation fails squarely
within Article 14.1. The gdevor last worked on' his regularly scheduled shift on
February 19. He was next scheduled to work on February 23. He was called back
to attend a meeting on February 22 which was prior to his next scheduled shift.
The Union claims .that A~c[e 14.1 applies because what transpired falls within the'
phrase "subsequently called back to Work". In the Union's viewpoint, the word
"'work'" needs to be broadly defined. It includes a whole host of circumstances
which goes beyond what one typically thinks of as "work"" and an employee's
defined duties.
The Board was referred to a number of cases which show that arbitratois
have acknowledged that '"work'" can include a highly varied number of
circumstances, in Koncz, GSB File No. 0748/88 an unreported decision of a Board
chaired by Mr. R.L. Vedty, QC, dated March 20, 1989, the gdevor was on sick
leave as a result of aieg injury from Monday, Juty 4 fo Friday, July 8. He was
scheduled to return to work on Monday, July 11. On Thursday, July 7, a Ministry
investigator held a series of interviews in connection with an investigation under
Section 24 of the Occupational Health and Safely Act regarding staff speeding
4,
on the premises. On that day the grievor attended at the work place to pick up
his pay cheque and to deliver a medical certificate fo a supervisor which
indicated that the grievor would be able to return to work the following Monday.
The supervisor requested the grievor to attend an interview with the investigator.
The gfievor stated that I~e formed the opinion that he had no choice but to
offend as requested. The grievor sought payment PUrsuant to Article 14.1 o~d
was successful. At pages 6 and 7, the Board commented as follows:
On the evidence adduced, the Board is satisfied
that the grievor's interview with Investigator Packer can
be properly characterized as 'work' within the meaning
of the call-back provision. The rationale of call-back is
'work'.- Admittedly, the gdevor's regular work was
maintenance 'painting. However, the evidence
establisl~ed that other employees were interviewed by
the Ministry Investigator on July 7 during normal working
hours. The Board finds as a fact that attendance at the
interview was sufficiently work related to constitute work.
In sum, the type of work. done does not affect the
payment.
In Clark, GSB File No. 950/89, 1029/89 an unreported decision chaired by
M.R. Gorsky dated August 8, 1990, Mr. Clark, a Correctional Officer 2 at the Burtch
Correctional Centre, had given cardiopulmanary resuscitation to an iht.hate on
April 6, 1989. The inmate later died. The grievor was not scheduled to work on
April 7, 1989, but was telephoned at his home by a supervisor at about noon and
was ordered to report to the Centre for an interview. The grievor's home was
located approximately 32 kilometres from the correctional centre. He received
5
payment for four hours pay at 1 ~/2 times his basic hourly rate pursuant to Article 14
but he also claimed entitlement to mileage rates under Article 22 of the collective
agreement and to time credits while ITaveJling under Article 23 of the collective
agreement. His grievance failed but in obiter comments, the Board stated on
page 8 as follows:
However one looks at the matter, the Grievor was
called back to work. The fact that the 'work' in this
case would involve an interview with Ministry afficials,
made it no less work. All of the purposes of Arlicte 14.1
were fulfilled. The payment to the Grievor was to
pravide him with a .guarantee. of adequate
compensation for the significant disruption and expense
incurred by him as a result of the call back.
The Board also was referred fo Re Ajax and Plckerlng General Hospital and
Nurses' Assoc. of the Ajax and Picketing General Hospital (1975) L.A.C. (2d) 440
(Weatherill); Re Steinberg Inc. and United Food and Commercial Workers Union,
Local 486 (,1985) 20 L.A.C. (3d) 289 (Foisy): and Re Allied Chemical Canada, Ltd.
and United Automobile Workers, Local 89 (1975) 8 L,A,C, (2d) 26 (O"Shea). Finally,
we were referred to Re International Molders and Allied Workers Union, Local 49
and Webster Manufacturing (London) Ltd. (1971) 23 L.A.C. (37) 0Neiler) in which
three employees worked their regular shift during which the Employer indicated
to them that if expected to receive a new bake oven. The truck arrival was
postponed and the grievors were asked if they would return to work following their
shift to unload the truck. The three grievors returned but the truck did not arrive
until approximately two and one-half hours after their return. In the International
6
Molders case, there are two purposes that the decision sets out with respect to
call-back situations. One is to compensate employees for the cost of having to
undertake an extra trip to the work ptace; and two, so that there will be some
fettering on the Employer so as to attempt to have its employees attend at work
during the regular shift and not during off work hours.
Accordingly, it was the Union's position that Article 14.1 squarely falls within
the fact situation that occurred.
The Employer argued that Article 14.1 has no application to what occurred.
The grievor was not called back to perform any work whatsoever. Instead. he
attended a Stage Two grievance meeting which is simply not work. All of the
Union cases that were referred to the Board go to call-back situations. While the
Employer does not argue over the correctness o.f the decisions that the Union has
submitted, if does argue o~er the requirements that are contained in those
decisions. The Employe~ referred the. Board to several cases as wett. In
Baker/Elliott, GSB File No. 90/89 an unreported decision chaired by B.A. Kirkwood
and dated October 31/1990, sets out three requirements in order for call-back
pay fo be invoked. Af page 8 that Board said:
Therefore, in order to receive entitlement fo the pay the
employee must (]) leave his place of work, (2) be
subsequently called back to work, and (3) he must be
called back to work prior to the starting time of his next
scheduled shift.
7
If is flue that the gdevor left his place of work and returned prior to the start of his
next scheduled shift. In Koncz, the Board ~vas satisfied that when fha Employer
asked the grievor to meet with the inspector the Employer triggered the situation
which the Board found was sufficiently related fo work an-d, therefore, activated
Article 14.1, In Clark, the Ministry was carrying out an investigation and once
again was activated by the Employer.
Instead of Article 14.1 being the pertinent article, the Employer takes the
position that if is Article 27 that is relevant. We were referred to Articles 27.3.3,
27.6.1, and 27.6.2:
27.3.3 The Deputy Minister or his designee shall
hold a meeting with the employee within
fifteen (15) days of the receipt of the.
.grievance and shall give the grlevor his
decision in writing within seven (7) days of
the meeting.
27.6.1. An employee who is a grlevor' or
complaina.nt and who makes application
for a hearing before the Grievance
Settlement Board or the Public Service
Labour Relations Tribunal shall be allowed
leave-of-absence with no loss. of pay and
with no loss of credits, if required to be in
attendance by the Board or Tribunal.
27.6.2 An employee who has a grievance and is
required to affend meetings at Stage One
and Two of the Grievance Procedure shall
be given time off with no loss of pay and
with no Joss of credits to attend such
meetings.
8
According to the Employer, a meeting was held in accordance with Article 27.3.3.
It was the Employer's position that Article 27 is a complete code on how
grievances are to be processed as well as how compensation is to be paid for
attendance at such meetings. It was the Employer's position that the Board must
stay within the four corners of Article 27 and one cannot go outside of theft article
to find additional compensation. Article 27.6.2 alIows for the attenda~.ce al: a
Stage Two meeting (which was what occurred On February 22, 1991) whereby on
employee is given time off without loss of pay or credits. There is no evidence
that the grievor lost any pay or any credits and so, therefore, there is no violation
of Article 27.6.2.
In support of the Employer's position, the Board was referred to Berlinghoff
and. Eaton, GSB File No. 1878/87 an unreported decision of Ms. Barr6:tt, Vice
Chairperson, dated July 20, 1988. In that case, two grievors Were headquartered
in a small town in Northern Ontario. Both grie~ors had filed grievances
concerning meal allowances and were advised that the Step. Two grievance
meeting would be held at Timmins approximately forty to forty-five miles from their
headquarters. The grievors sought fravet and meat expenses fo attend the
grievance meeting, but they were denied. The Union in that case relied on
Article 2 which deals with mileage rates and Article 17 which is concerned with
meal allowances. The Barrett Board had the following to say on pages ;z and 8:
We have no doubt that it is part of the employer's
business to process grievances. It is also part of an
employees [sic] business fo file grievances and to attend
9
fo the grievance procedure on his own behalf. Effective
grievance handling is in the best interests of both the
employer and employee. An appropriate grlevance
-procedure is the main underpinning of any collective
agreement because it ~s to the'mutual benefit of the
parties to facilitate the proper handling of g. rievances.
· Traditionally both have shared, at least I'o some extent,
the cost of handling grievances so that neither is inclined
to abuse the process. Generally speaking grievance
meetings are held during regular business hours because
that is when all of the participants are readily available.
The management team is paid to attend these meetings
because that is part of their regular duties. Similarly,
grlevors are not docked pay to attend these meetings
in regular working hours because the lass of pay could
well be prohibitive to some employees with legitimate
'grievances. It is the presumed legitimacy of the
grievance procedure which brings into being clauses
such as Article 27.6.2 to prevent salary loss to the
participants in a grievance meeting. However we do
not find that Article 27.6.2 is an all encompassing clause
requiring that the employee is to bear no expense
whatsoever to participate in the grievance procedure.
We find that Article 27 was intended by the parties
to cover the entire procedure for the handling of
grievances and the financing of same and we should
not look outside that clause to Articles 17 and 22 to find
additional recompense for employees engaged in the
grievance procedure. Article 27.6.2 is quite clear in
specifying that employees shall suffer no loss of pay or
credits to attend grievance meetings but, framed
negatively as the clause is, we can find no Intention or
wording that would impose a positive onus on the
employer to pay expenses as well. While grievance
handling is part of the employer's business, it is by no
means the main business of the employer. Grievance
handling is the joint business of the employer and the
employee and in our view the cost-sharing involved in
that has been fulty and completely set out in Article 27.
10
In McKie et al., GSB File No. 80/80 an unreported decision chaired by
Mr. E.E. Palmer dated March 6, 1981, a meeting was scheduled on a ,:lay that
was the grievor's scheduled day off which resulted in his having to use. his own
time for attendance. As he was not paid for this time-he filed his grievance
claiming entitlement to payment. On pages 6 and 7, the Palmer Board had the
following to say concerning Article 27.7.2 (which is now currently Article 27.6.2]:
Having considered the arguments of the parties,
it is the view of this Board that the grievance be
dismissed. In this regard, we agree .with the position put
forward by the Employer regarding Article 27.7.2. Quite
cleady, the meaning of this clause is that where a
grievance meeting is scheduled dudng times when the
gdevor ts scheduled to work, the Employer is required to
permit him to attend this meeting, pay him for the time
while he is so engaged, and, finally, treat the time when
he is at this meeting as if he had worked for purposes of
credits for vacations and the like. Again, having set out
this requirement for payment, there is no obligation for
the Employer to go further.
The essence of the grievor's case wouid seem fo
lie in the requirement of the Employer to schedule
'meetings during normal working .hours for at least all of
the employees involved in the grievances that are
covered by the Collective Agreement. A perusal of the
Collective Agreement finds no provision to this effect. In
the opinion of the Board, this is understandable as the
vast maior~ty of members ct the' bargaining unit and
undoubtedly management work a normal work week
between Monday and Friday and grievance meetings
would be scheduled at that time. Thus, the instant
situation would be unlikely to arise. Unfortunately, if did
in this case and the grievor is bereft of any remedy. Put
another way, the time of scheduling meetings appears
to be an oversight in the Collective Agreement. One
would hope, therefore, that the problem could be
I ~
1t
addressed in the next period of bargaining between the
parlies.
After having had an opportunity to review the jurisprudence that was
presented to this Board, we are of the opinion that the grievance must be '
dismissed. The parties have, as was stated by the Barrett Board, intended to
cover the entire procedure for the handling of grievances and the financing of
same in Article 27. We are also mindful of the comments of Mr. Palmer in McKie
et al that such meetings might normally be scheduled during normal working
hours but that a perusal of the collective agreement finds no provision to this
effect. While, as Mr. Palmer comments, the lack of directing attention to the time
of scheduling meetings could'be considered to be an oversight his ~Jecision was
released in February, 1981, and the same argument cannot be advanced today,
ten years later. The Union alluded to.the possibilih/of abuses occurring if the
grievance was unsuccessful. We take it that the Unio~ meant that there is
nothing to prevent the Employei from scheduling such grievance meetings during
times when the grievor is not scheduled to be at work. This would therefore result
in holding grievance meetings at a time that would not interfere with the grievor's
working hours. The Board hastens to point out that there was no allegation of
abuse in the instant situation. Clearly, if such were the case and the evidence
were to establish that abuses of this nature were occurring, then other
considerations might apply. However, given the factual situation that is before
us that is not a consideration for the Board at this time.
Another concern expressed by the Union was over a memorandum that
had been sent to all members of staff by the Superintendent of the Correctional
Centre which was in relation to a recent decision of the G.S.B. inw~lving a
Mr. Hayford. The first two paragraphs of that memorandum reads in part as
follows (Exhibit 3):
RE: G.$.B. AWARD OPSEU (HAYFORD) AND THE CROWN
IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO (M.C.S:)
The above noted award has now been received and I
am sure has been discussed amongst staff. It is the type
of award that can be misinterpreted inadvertently by
some and deliberately by others. In order to avoid
confusion or misunderstanding on anyone's part, '1 am
issuing this mema to provide direction to each staff
member individually, and to the staff of this Centre
collectively.
a) Orders and/or direction by a person or persons in
a position of authoriN
A Supervisor or Department Head has the
autharity fa issue orders, instrucfians and direction
to. staff members. A refusal to carry out and/or
question and/or unreasonable delay in complying
with such order, instruction or direction by
subordinate staff will by its very nature place that
person in a position of insubardinafion. Anyone
who places himself/herself in a position of
insubordination will be subject to administrative
action, including being subject to an investigation
and/or the disciplinary process ....
This'memorandum dated February 6, 1991, was issued a short time prior to
February 13 when the grievor was informed to attend the February 22 meeting.
There was a concern that should the grievor fail to attend such a meeting then
13
he may very well opefi himsel~ to disciplinary action pursuant fo the above
memorandum. Once again, such an eventuality did not occur. The grievor
attended the meeting. Had the grievor been unable or refused fo attend the
meeting and had he been disciplined as a result, he un~doubtedly Would have
gdeved the disciplinary action taken by the Employer. Again, had such an
eventuality occurred the Board would have had to deal with the issue but thi~ is
speculative on our part and is not an issue that'must be considered at this time.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, .the grievance is dismissed.
Dated 'at Kingsfon, Ontado, this 8ch day of october, 1991.
C. Gordon Simmons
Vice Chairperson
S. Urbafn
Membe~
D Montrose
Member