HomeMy WebLinkAbout1991-0803.Union.94-12-19'~r ~ · ONTARIO EMPL OY~.S DE LA COURONNE
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'GRIEVANCE C,OMMISSION DE
SETTLEMENT REGLEMENT
BOARD DES GRIEFS
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803/91
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ~CT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
OPSEU (Union Grievance)
Grievor
- and-
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Correctional Services)
~mployer
BEFORE: N. Dissanayake Vice-Chairperson
T. Browes-Bugden Member
D. Montrose Member
FOR THE A. Ryder
UNION Counsel
Ryder Whitaker Wright
Barristers & Solicitors
FOR THE J. Benedict
~MPLOYER Manager, Staff Relations & Compensation
Ministry of Correctional Services
HE]tRING Septelnber 17, 1993
January 24, 1994
2
DECISION
Thi~ is a policy grievance wherein the union alleges that
the employer has contravened article 3.15.1 of the collective
agreement by failing to convert unclassified positions to
classified positions at the Whitby Jail.
The relevant provisions are as follows:
3.15.1 Effective April t, 1991, where the same
work has been performed by an employee in
the Unclassified Service for a period of
least two (2) consecutive years, and
where the ministry has determined that
there is a continuing need for that work
- to be performed on a full-time basis, the
ministry shall establish a position
within the Classified Service to perform
that work, and shall post a vacancy in
accordance with Article 4 (Posting and
Filling of Vacancies or New Positions}.
3.15.2 For the purpose of this section, "full-
time" shall mean a minimum of one
thousand seven hundred and thirty-two and
three quarter (1,732.75) straight-time
hours or one thousand nine hundred and
twelve (1,912) straight-time hours in
each year, as applicable, including
authorized leaves of absence. However,
all hours worked by an unclassified
employee while he is replacing a
classified employee who is on an
authorized leave of absence shall not be
included in computing the annual hours
worked by the unclassified employee.
The union led evidence relating to the work performed by
unclassified correctional officers at the Whitby Jail. The
Whitby Jail employs approximately 50 classified correctional
officers and 25 unclassified officers. Of the 25 unclassified
employees approximately 20 are used on~a daily basis. It is
'~ 's position that the manner in which these
the union
unclassified officers are used satisfies all of the criteria
in article 3.15.1 to warrant conversion of the unclassified
positions into classified positions.
The union's claim was based on the unclassified
employees' involvement in four aspects of correctional officer
duties. These were:
(1) The replacement of a classified correctional
officers assigned as "medical runner"..
(2) The daily assignment of unclassified officers to
replace two classified officers assigned to utility functions.
(3) The Assignment of unclassified officers to fill in
for classified -officers assigned to acting management
positions.
(4) The assignment of unclassified officers (a) to
replace classified officers who are assigned to barber parade,
visitation, security post and outside iescort duties, and (b)
to perform those duties themselves.
During the cross-examination of Mr. Orville Kerlew,
Superintendent of the Whitby Jail, after he had disclosed that
the utility duties were no longer being backfilled by
unclassified officers and that two ~additional classified
positions had been created to perform those duties, union
4
counsel advised the Board that the union was abandoning the
claim b~sed on utility duties.
There was no dispute between the parties that
unclassified employees performed the various duties as claimed
by the union. There was also no dispute that such performance
was on-going at the time of the grievance, although Mr. Kerlew
suggested that this may change in the future as a result of an
audit that was underway at the time. There was also agreement
that there was no difference between these duties performed by
unclassified officers and that performed by classified
officers.
The crux of the dispute between the parties is whether
the manner in which unclassified officers are used~at this
workplace triggers article 3.15.1 so as to require conversion
to classified positions. This dispute stems from very
different interpretations of that article relied upon by the
parties4
For article 3.15.1 to have application, the following
conditions must be met:
(a) The same work must have been performed.
(b) That work must have been performed by "an employee
in the unclassified service" for a period of at least two
consecutive years.
5
(c) The ministry must have determined that there is a
continuing need for. that work to be performed on a full time
basis.
The employer concedes that the "Same work" requirement.
(a) above has been satisfied. However, counsel submits that
at the Whitby Jail "an employee in the unclassified service"
has not performed that work for at least two years. According
to the employer's interpretation of that phrase, "an employee"
means "the same employee", tn other words, a particular ~
unclassified employee must have performed the work in question
for at least two consecutive years before article 3.15.1
applies. Counsel pointed out to the evidence that the work
relied upon by the union was performed, not by the same
unclassified employee, but by different unclassified employees
assigned by management. Thus, counsel 'submits that no single
employee met the condition set out in (b) above.
Similarly, counsel points out that for article 3.15.1 to
apply, there must be evidence that the ministry has determined
that there was a continuing need for the work to be perfgrmed
on a full-time basis. He submits that such evidence is
lacking, and that the evidence is that management in fact
decided to the contrary by determining that there was no need
to post classified positions under article 3.15.1. He
cautions that "complement" is an exclusive management function
6
pursuant to section 18~1) of the Crown Employees Collective
Barga, in~-ng Ac% and that the Board should not make dacisions as
to what positions must be classified and what positions should
be unclassified.
Finally, employer counsel took the position that, in any
event, the evidence does not establish a continuing need for
the work in question to be performed on "a full time basis" as
envisaged by article 3.15.1. In support of this position,
counsel relies on the definition of "full-time" in article
3.15.2. He points out that the definition requires a
specified number of straight time hours in each year, and that
in computing those hours "all hours worked by an unclassified
employee while he is replacing a classified employee who is on
an authorized leave of absence" are not to be included. It is
the employer's view that the bulk of the work relied upon by
the union is not to included in the computation, because when
performing that work, unclassified employees were replacing
classified officers.
The union takes a completely different interpretation of
each of the phrases relied upon by the employer. We will deal
with each of these.
"An employee in the unclassified service"
If the employer's interpretation is correct that "an
employee" means "the same" or "a particular" employee, then
7
the evidence does not establish that any one employee meets
the conditions of article 3.15.1. However, after very careful
consideration, we prefer the union's interpretation that "an
employee" in article 3.15.1 means, not "the same employee" but
"any employee". It must be remembered that the provision is
about conversion of "positions" and not about converting the
status of individuals from unclassified to classified. Even
if one employee performed all of the Work relied upon by the
union, it is clear that article 3.15.1 does not envisage that
that particular employee's status Would be changed from
unclassified to classified. Instead, a position in the
classified service is to be posted, and filled according to
the provisions of the collective agreement. Article 3.15.1
does not confer any individual rights, but envisages the
addition of classified positions to the bargaining unit.
Adopting a purposive approach to interpretation, it is
difficult to see any rationale or logic as to why the parties
would have required that a particular employee must have
performed all of the work to warrant the conversion.
In our view, article 3.15.1 is an attempt by the parties
to stipulate some guidelines to limit the employer's right to
use unclassified employees to perform Work for which there is
a regular and continuing need. The absence of a requirement
that the same employee must perform the work in question is
recognized by the language the Board chose in Re Justus,
879/91 (Knopf) at p. 20, to put Article 3.15.1 into context
vis-a-vis the distinction that had previously been recognized
between classified and unclassified positions:
This interpretation preserves the distinction
between the status of classified and unclassified
staff that is apparent in the nature of the bargain
between OPSEU and the government throughout their
collective.agreement and that was so ably pointed
out by Mr. Ryder in his argument. It recognizes
the permanent ongoing nature of appointments to the
classified or civil service as distinct from the
limited appointments and employment claims of the
unclassified staff. This interpretation also seems
logical in light of the 'newly negotiated Article
3.15.1 that allows, effective April 1, 1991, that
if the same work is being done in the job for two
years and there remains a continuing need for that
work to be done on a full-time ~asis, the position
will have to be recognized as within the classified
service and duly posted and filled as a 3acancy
within the classified work force. This is a
sensible balancing by the parties of the right of
the Employer to make contractually limited, yet
long-term unclassified appointments, but checking
it with the requirement to acknowledge a situation
where a full-time permanent position exists if the
need for he works continues beyond two years.
While the above statement was made by way of obiter, it
is clear that the Board in Re Justus di~ not see article
3.15.1 as introducing a requirement that the same employee
must be performing the work in question. Like we do, the
Board there recognizes that article 3.15.1 is intended to
regulate or limit the use of unclassified appointments
generally, to perform work which the employer has determined
needs to be performed on a continuing basis.
9
Has the Ministry determined that there' is a continuing need?
The union took no issue with the employer's assertion
that it is an exclusive function of the employer to determine
what work is required to be performed.~ The issue is whether
the employer has made a determination that there is a
continuing need for the work in question to be performed. We
cannot agree with employer counsel that the fact that the
employer decided that it will not post classified positions
under article 3.15.1 is determinative 6f this issue, indeed,
in our view that decision is irrelevant because it amounts ,to
nothing more than an assertion that the.employer believes that
it was not required to apply article 3.15.1 in the
circumstances. That conclusion, albeit arrived at in good
faith, cannot be binding on anyone. This Board must decide,
based on objective facts, whether the Ministry has in fact
made a determination that there was a continuing need for the
work to be performed.
In reviewing the evidence, the Board can come to no other
conclusion, but that the Ministry has indeed decided that
there was a continuing need for the work to be performed. The
undisputed evidence was that the work in question, i.e. those
listed in items 1, 3 and 4 (supra) at p.3) continued to be
performed as of the date of the' grievance and the date of
hearing. The only reason that the employer has that work
performed must be because it has determined that there was a
continuing need. In our view, the fact that the work in
question in fact continues to be performed, is conclusive
proof that the employer has made a determination that there
was a continuing need. It is the employer that decides what
work is to be performed. The uncontradicted evidence is that
work in question continues to be performed. Having decided to
have that work performed on a continuing basis, it is not open
to the employer to deny that it had determined that there was
a continuing need for that work.
Is the work beinq performed on a "full-time" basis
Article 3.15.1 requires that the employer must have
determined that there was a continuing need for the work to
be performed on a "full time" basis. We have already decided
that the employer's determination isconclusively evidenced by
what work is actually being performed. Therefore, the issue
is whether at the Whitby Jail, the work is being performed on
a "full-time" basis within the definition of article 3.15.2.
Under article 3.15.2 in computing the stipulated straight
time hours, "hours worked by an unclassified employee while he
is replacing a classified employee who is on an authorized
leave of absence" are not to be included. The evidence
indicates that a significant portion of the hours relied upon
by the union were "replacement hours" in the sense that the
unclassified officer was replacing a classified officer.
However, article 3.15.2 does not exclude all replacement hours
from the computation. The hours are excluded only if the
classified officer being replaced was on "an authorizad leave
of absence".
The evidence indicates that the unclassified employees
here were replacing classified officers in different
situations. They replaced a classified officer, who had been
(a) reassigned as medical runner,
(b) reassigned to an acting management position,
(c) reassigned to barber parade, visitation, security post and
escort duties.
If the employer's position is to be upheld, the Board
must find that when a classified officer is reassigned to any
of the foregoing duties, he or she is "on an authorized leave
of absence". However, we do not find that to be a reasonable
interpretation. If the parties intended to exclude all
replacement hours from the computation they could have simply
have said "while he is replacing a classified employee". They
must have added the words "who is on ,an authorized leave of
absence" deliberately because they did not intend to cover all
replacement hours. A "leave of absence" must necessarily
involve an "absence". A leave of absence is generally
understood to be a period where the employee is away from
work. An employee, who is absent from work due to vacations
or sickness, for example, would be on "an authorized leave of
absence". However, where an employee is reassigned to perform
duties other than his normal or regular duties, he is not on
a leave of absence at all. He cannot be on a "leave of
absence" simply because he is not absent - he is at work,
although performing some special or different duties.
Therefore, where an unclassified employee replaces a
classified _employee who is at work in some capacity, those
replacement hours are not excluded from the computation for
purposes of article 3.15.2.
To summarize our interpretation then of the disputed
phrases, we find as follows:
(a) Article 3.15.1 does not require that the work be
performed by the same or a particular employee. "An employee
in the unclassified service", in article 3.15.1 means "any
employee" in the unclassified service.
(b) We find that the evidence that the work in question
in fact continued to be performed, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, is conclusive proof that the
employer had determined that there was a continuing need for
that work to be performed. If the employer had not so
determined the work would not have zontinued to be performed.
(c) The only replacement hours excluded from the
computation of hours for purposes of the definition of "full-
time" basis in article 3.15.2, are hours where an unclassified
employe~is replacing a classified employee who is absent from
work with the employer's ~uthorization.
On an application of the foregoing interpretations to the
evidence before us, we make the following findings:
(a) The hours performed by any unclassified officer in
carrying out the duties relied on by the union in terms t, 3
and 4 (supr~ p. 3) are to be included in the computation of
the hours ·for purposes of article 3.15.2.
(b) We find that by continuing to assign unclassified
employees· to perform the work in question, the employer has
determined that there is a continuing need, as of the time of
the grievance, for the performance of that work. Therefore,
that requirement of article 3.15.1 has'been met.
(c) The hours of work performed by unclassified officers,
while replacing classified officers who were at work in any
capacity are to be included in the computation for purposes of
article 3.15.2. Those hours are not excluded because the
classified officers are not "on an authorized leave of
absence" within the meaning of article 3.15.2.
Taking into consideration the Board's interpretations and
findings set out above, the parties are directed to endeavour
to agree upon the number of hours of work (items 1, 3 and 4 at
p. 3 supra) and consequently the number of positions, if any,
that are required to be converted pursuant to article 3. ]5.1.
The Board remains seized in the event the parties are unable
to 'reach' agreement on those issues.
Dated this 19th day of December, 1994 at Hamilton, Ontario.
Vi ce- Cha i rper s on
T. ~rowes-Bugden U
Member
I Dissent 'Dissent Attached'
D. ~,~ontr ese
Member
EMPLOYER DISSENT' t
803/91 UNION GRIEVANCE
MINISTRY OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
With respect I feel obligated to dissent from the majority, for the following
reasons:
1. In my estimation, the majority'in this award has exceeded its jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 18{1} of the Crown Employees Collective Bargain£ng Act
by determining:
"The uneontradicted evidence is that work' in question
continues to be performed. Having decided to have that
work performed on a continuing basis, it is not open to
the employer to deny that it had determi'~ed that there
was a continuing need for that work."
The employer not the Grievance Settlement Board, can only determine if the
work performed constitutes a "continuing need" on a "full time basis. Both
conditions must be met, one does not determine the other. The exclusive
management function to determine "compliment." rests solely with the
employer. This right cannot be used in an arbitrary manner and has not,
as indicated in the award, two additional classified positions have been
created to perform utility functions.
2. The majority in my estimation has determined a very narrow interpretation of
the use of leave of absence, in the calculation of qualifying hours for the
purpose of Article 3.15.2 by determining:
"therefore, where an unclassified employee in article
3.t5.2 replaces a classified employee who is at work in
some capacity, these replacement hours ar'e not. excluded
from the computation for the purposes Of 'article 3.15.2".
In part, I agree with the majority, "an employee" in Article 3.t5.1 means
"any employee". Thus in the application of "authorized leave of absence",
in Article 3.15.2 the majority should be consistent. The majority has not
excluded replacement hours where an unelass£fied employee replaces a
classified employee who is at work in some capacity. (emphasis added) This
assumption fails to recognize the classified employee at work may be
replacing another classified employee who is on an authorized leave of
absence. In correctional institutions, the manning of posts by correctional
officers is critical, and constantly necessitates reassignment of personnel
to meet the required shift complement. (The '?ed line) Thus simply assigning
hours to unclassified employees to meet requirements in Article 3.15.2, for
all replacement hours, where the replaced classified employee is actually at
work, is in my opinion an error, and covers 'the majority of work relied upon
by the union.
As a post comment, article 3.15.1 and 3.15.2 appear to be drafted to cover
conditions found in the average office day and not continuous operation
found in a correctional institution, where absenteeism is relatively high,
requiring reassignments to maintain the staffing of all posts.
D.C. Montrose