HomeMy WebLinkAbout1991-1797.Quan.92-07-29 ONTARtO EMPLOY~-$ DE LA COURONNE
CROWN EMPLOYEE$ DE L 'ON TA
GRIEVANCE C,OMMISSION DE
SETTLEMENT REGLEMENT
BOARD DES GRIEFS
180 DUNDAS STREET WEST, SUITE 2~O0, TORONTO, ONTARIO, M5G
180, RUE DUNDAS OUEST, BUREAU 21,~, TORONTO {ONTARrOL M5G
1797/91
IN ~ ~TTE~ OF ~ ~T~TION
Under
~ C~ ~P~ES COL~~ B~GAINING ACT
Before
OPS~
~r~evor
The Cro~ in Righ~ of Ontario (Minist~ of ~bour)
~ployer
BEFO~: M. Gorsky Vice-Chai~erson
J. Car~2hers Me. er
F. Collict Me. er
FORT HE A. Lokan
GRIEVOR Counsel
Gowling, Strathy & Henderson
Barristers & Solicitors
FOR THE D. Costen
EMPLOYER. Counsel
Legal Services Branch
Management Board of Cabinet
HE]t~tING July 6, 1992
1
DECISION
The Grievor, Thuy Quan, filed a grievance on July 23, 1991,
the statement of grievance being as follows:
I grieve that I have been unfairly denied a promotion to
Consultant, Environmental Radioactivity, Competition LB-
347 - 9102.'
The settlement desired was:
I request that the competition be re-run and conducted in
the fair and equitable way.
At the date the grievance was filed, the Grievo~ held'the
classification title Scientist, her position title being Scientist
(level not settled), her date of hire being July, 1981. The job in
question was posted in March of 1991 and attracted 28 applicants,
the Grievor being the only internal one, and as such she had
seniority rights under the collective agreement.
The successful candidate, Ephriam Schwartz, was a contract
employee at the Radiation Protection Service at the time of the
posting.
The Employer decided to proceed to fill the vacancy by pre-
screening .the candidates who would be granted interviews. As a
result of the screening carried out by the representatives of the
Employer, six applicants were granted interviews, the'Grievor not
being one of them.
The incumbent, Mr. Schwartz, received notification of his
right to attend at and participate in the hearing and he did so
appear, and his rights were again explained to him.
Counsel for the Grievor, in his opening statement, identified
the areas of dispute raised by the Union:
1. Were the qualifications established as part of the job
posting, and more particularly the screening criteria
developed by the Employer, fair? Counsel for the Union
referred to Tab C of Exhibit 1, being the Position
Specification and Class Allocation form with respect to the
posted position and to category 4 thereof bein9 "Skills and
knowledge required to perform at full working level," and
contrasted them with the qualifications set out in Tab B of
Exhibit 1, being the job posting, the position of counsel
being that the qualifications at Tab B went considerably
beyond those required by the position as set out in Tab C.
2. Counsel for the Union also referred to Tab I of Exhibit 1,
being the screening criteria established by the Employer to
assess which employees would be granted an interview, which he
regarded as introducing unwarranted requirements and/or traits
not found in either the posting, Tab B, or the Position
Specification and Class Allocation form, Tab C. In
particular, counsel for the Uni6n referred to category D
3
("Consultation skills") set o~t in Tab I.
It was the position of counsel for the Union that neither the
contents of the posting (Tab B) nor the screening criteria
(Tab I) amounted to a fair and accurate representation of the
requirements of the position.
3. It was also the position of counsel for the Union that even if
the criteria applied by the Employer were fair and accurate,
which was not admitted, they were not fairly and consistently
applied to the Grievor.
It was the position of counsel for the Union that the case law
of the Board had established that the legal and evidential burden
of proof lay on the Employer to demonstrate that it had used fair
an~ accurate screening criteria in assessing whether the Grievor
ought to receive an interview and that it had fairly and
consistently applied such criteria to the Grievor (assuming,
without accepting, the fairness and accuracy of the criteria). It
was the position of counsel for the Union that, in these
circumstances, the Employer was required to lead evidence before
the Union was called upon to respond.
Counsel for the Union argued that if the Employer is unable to
discharge the burdens of proof cast upon it, then the Union sought
by way of relief: a rerun Of the competition as between the
4
incumbent and the Grievor alone;, that the rerun take place before
a different panel; and that the newly constituted panel disregard
any experience gained by the incumbent in the position, including
time spent by the him as a contrac~ employee prior to the
competition. If, as a result of the rerun of the competition, the
Grievor is selected as the suGcessful candidate, we were asked to
award her full compensation retroactive to the day when the
incumbent was awarded the position. We were also requested to
retain jurisdiction in the event that the Grievor was successful
and the parties experienced difficulty in the implementation of the
award.
Counsel for the Union indicated that there was another matter
in dispute between the parties relating to whether the Board should
hear evidence concerning a prior competition held approximately two
years ago for the position of Environmental Radioactivity
Consultant (the position not being the same as the one involved in
the competition before us) where the Grievor was an applicant and
where she had~been granted aa interview.
It was agreed that the Board would first deal with the issues
of which of the parties bore the burden of proof with respect to
the sufficiency of the pre-screening mechanism de~eloped by the
Employer and which of them would be required to proceed first.
It was the position of counsel for the Union that the
5
Employer had both the legal and evidential burdens of proof with
respect to the 'sufficiency of the pre-screening mechanism employed
by it and should also be required to present its case first.
Counsel for the Employer took the position that the Union had
both the legal and evidential burdens of proof, and that it ought
to be required to present its case first. Counsel for the Employer
also argued that, even if we did not accept this position, the
UniOn still had the preliminary burden of first establishing a
prima facie case that the Grievor was qualified to carry out the
duties and responsibilities of the posted position before the
Employer could be called upon to call evidence to demonstrate that
it had carried out the pre-screening in a fair and proper manner-.
Counsel for the Employer also submitted that even if the Union was
able to establish a prima facie case that the Grievor was so
qualified and the Employer was then required to lead evidence as to
the sufficiency of the way it conducted the pre-screening, the
legal burden of proof remained throughout with the Union to
demonstrate that the Employer had not carried out its pre-screening
in a satisfactory manner.
Counsel for the Union noted that the procedure that it
submitted we ought to follow in assigning the burdens of proof and
the obligation to go forward was that followed by several panels of
the Board in cases where the grievances alleged that the employer
improperly denied a grievor an interview in a promotion case. That
6
is, where a pre-screening mechanism has been employed to reduce the
number of candidates .who would be interviewed by a panel
established by the Employer f6r that purpose.' It was submitted
that only when the Board finds that an Employer had not properly
conducted the pre-screening that the Board would be required to
address the issue of relative equality under art. 4.3 which states:
In filling a vacancy, the Employer shall give primary
consideration to qualifications and ability to perform the
required duties. Where the qualifications and ability are
relatively equal, length of continuous service shall be a
consideration.
As we view the cases on this subject, if we conclude that the
Employer failed to properly conduct the pre-screening, we would not
involve ourselves in the relative equality question but, as counsel
for the Union earlier submitted, remit the matter back to the
parties and order that the Grievor be granted an interview and that
the competition panel reconsider its decision in the light of the
results of the interview.
Counsel for the Union argued that there was no hardship on the
Employer in imposing the burden on it, without requiring the Union
to establish a prima faeie case that the Grievor was at least
minimally qualified for the position. The Employer was said to be
in possession of all of the relevant evidence necessary to
demonstrate whether the Grievor was minimally qualified for the
position, and if it was able demonstrate that on the evidence
re. aonably available to it when conducting the pre-screening, that
he was not, the matter would be at an' end. In contrast to the
7
alleged fairness of imposing the burden of pr.oof that the pre-
screening was fair and properly conducted on the Employer, it was
submitted that it would be most difficult for the Union to divine
what was 9oing on in the Employer's mind when it made the decision
to screen out the Grievor prior to the interview stage if the
burden of doing so was placed on it. Even if the Union was in
possession of all of the evidence used by the Employer in carrying
out the pre-screening, it could not know sufficient details of the
basis for the Employer choosing certain criteria with respect to
the posted position, developing a weighting scheme whereby the
criteria were assigned different values, and why the applicants
were assigned particular credit in the evaluation process. All of
these matters were said to be peculiarly within the knowledge of
the Employer.
Counsel for the Union submitted that the order of proceeding
ought to follow the usual rule that the party bearing the onus of
proof proceed first. This was said to make common sense as the
Union was entitled to know the Case it had to meet, Otherwise the
Union was said to be put in a position where it would have to lead
evidence without adequate knowledge as to what elements of the case
it would have to establish and would be, in effect, rebutting a
case which it does not sufficiently know in advance.
Counsel for the Union also submitted that as the parties
acknowledged that the case would involve the presentation of a good
8
deal of highly technical evidence requiring a considerable amount
of explanation relating to the duties and responsibilities
associated with the posted position in order to assess the criteria
employed in screening out applicants and how they were chosen and
evaluated, there was merit in narrowing the scope of the evaluation
by requiring the Employer to proceed first. If the Union were
required to go first, the Board might have to hear a great deal of
unnecessary technical evidence as the union tried to anticpate the
positioa that might be taken by the Employer.
Counsel for the Employer viewed the issue before us as being
one that, while it involved one facet of the application of-art.
4.3, ought to be governed by the usual procedure that applies in
promotion cases involving the application of that article. That
is, the legal and evidentiary burdens of proof that the Employer
had violated the provisions of art. 4.3 should be assigned to the
Union and it should be required to present its case first.
Counsel for the Employe~ argued that if the Board accepted the
position of the Union that there was, what he referred to as, a
"preliminary onus" on the Employer, we would be recognizing the
existence of a provision not found in the collective agreement. It
was submitted that if the Board required th~ Employer to present
its case first on the basis of there being some preliminary onus
cast upo~ it, although the ultimate onus under 4,3 was on the
Union, we would be adding to the language of art. 4.3.
In response to the position of counsel for the Union that the
evidence relating to the formation and carrying out of the
screening process was peculiarly within the knowledge of the
Employer and for this reason it would be unfair to require the
Union to proceed first, counsel for the Employer stated that all
exhibits from the Employer's file relating to the screening process
had been made available to the Union and that there was nothing
held back. In these circumstances it was submitted that the Union
was in possession, of the same information as the Employer relating
to the formation and application of the pre-screening procedure.
The Union, in support of its position that the Employer bore
the legal and evidential burdens of proof and ought to be required
to present its case first, relied upon three cases involving
grievances of grie~ors who, were applicants in job competitions and
had been denied interviews. The first case relied upon by the
Union was Borecki, 256/82 (Swinton). At.pp.2-3 of the Borecki
case, the Board stated:
As the hearing proceeded, it [became] clear during
the examination of Mr. Fisher that the union intended to
conduct the interview process and the competition before
the arbitration board. Counsel for the employer objected
to this line of questioning. As a result, the board
ruled that the hearing should proceed in two stages.
First, the board'should determine whether the employer
acted improperly in denying the grievor an interview,
with the onus on the employer to show that it acted
properly. If it acted properly', the case would be over.
It if acted improperly, the board would have to consider
the relative equality of the candidates and the
appropriate remedy.
In Balics, 42/84 (Verity), which was also a competition
10
grievance, where the. grievor alleged that he had been "unjustly
denied an interview," and where the "sole issue before the board
was whether the employer acted improperly' in denying the grievor an
interview," the matter proceeded with the onus being upon the
employer "to establish that it did act properly in the
circumstances."
The Board in Balics, noted, at p.2, that "the above procedure
was the course followed by arbitrator Swinton in [Borecki] with one
variation. On an examination of the ~licg case, we were unable to
identify the "one variation" from the procedure followed in
~oreck~.
The Union also relied upon Dale 2384/87 (De/isle), where the
grievor grieved the failure on the part of'the employer.to grant
him an interview and complained that the selection process was
flawed and the provisions of art. 4 of the collective agreement
breached. At page 1 of the interim decision, the Board stated:
The Board was persuaded to follow the wisdom of Dak%¢~,
42/84 (Verity) and Borecki 256/82 (Swinton) that the
Ministry has the onus of establishing that the employer
acted improperly in denying the grievor an interview.
Counsel for the Union regarded the three interim decisions
relied upon as having established the Board's position, in cases
where a grievance is based on an alleged violation of the
collective agreement on the grounds that a grievor was denied an
11
interview in a promotion competition: that the onus of establishing
that the employer acted properly in denying the grievor an
interview was on the employer.
Counsel for the Employer argued that the finding as to where
the onus lay in ~Qrec~ki cannot be extended to other cases. Counsel
noted that, in Roreck~, there was no indication that counsel for
the employer in that case had taken exception to the direction by
the Board as to where the burden of proof lay. In the case before
us, the Employer does take strong exception to any finding which
would impose upon it a burden of proof or an obligation to proceed
first. We were also asked to find that in the Dale and Balics
cases there was no issue as to either the order of proceeding or on
the question of where the burden of proof lay. In Balics, the
Board did state that the decision that the onus rested with the
employer to establish that it acted properly was as a result of
the parties agreeing that this was the case. It is not clear from
the decision whether this was an agreement entered into for the
purpose of the case or whether the parties agreed that this
represented the procedure that ought to be followed in this kind of
case. The Board does note, at p.2, that it was following the
procedure established in Borecki.
In Dale, the Board indicates not that the onus rested on the
employer because of an agreement of the parties, but that "the
board was persuaded to follow the wisdom of [Balics and Borecki]
that the Ministry has the onus of establishing that the employer
acted properly in denying the grievor an interview." It is
interesting to note that a respected and experienced arbitrator
such as Professor Delisle did not merely indicate his view of where
the onus lay but characterized the decision as one based on
"wisdom."
We have not performed a comprehensive search of cases relating
to where the onus of proof lies in grievances involving allegations
that an employee has bee~ screened out of a competition provided
for under art. 4.3. We note, however, that in another pre-
screening grievance, ~D~¢Y and Reid 659 and 660/88 (Waters), the
Board indicated that in i%s view the onus rested with the employer
to establish that it acte~ properly in denying an interview to the
grievor. The Board noted that it was relying on the Comments found
in Borecki and in Balic~i
Counsel for the Employer referred to Eaton 629/85 (Knopf).
Although the Eat~n case, which was also 'a promotion case, did not
involve an allegation that the grievor had been denied an interview
and that the employer .had failed to properly carry out its
· obligations with respect to carrying out pre-screening, counsel for
the Employer submitted ~hat the statements in that case dealing
with the onus and the obligation to proceed ought to be followed by
us. At p.2 of the F~ case, the Board stated:
After considering the submissions, the Board ruled
that the Union should be required to present its evidence
13
first. Having heard that the Union was provided with
full disclosure and that an application to cross-examine
the incumbent would not be challenged, we could see no
reason why the Union would be placed in an unfair or an
untenable position if it proceeded first. Further, since
the Union was promised a full right of reply, the Board
could see no reason to depart from its regular practice
of having the order of presentation reflect the placement
of the legal onus, which is clearly upon the Union.
Further, it is preferable to have the Union present its
Case first so that the respondent and the Board can be
made aware of the basis of the Union's case. Thus, the
Union did proceed first.
The Board, h6wever, noted the special obligation that existed
on the part of the employer under art. 4.3 (at p.13):
Given the grievor's lesser seniority to the
incumbent, we accept the Ministry's argument that Mr.
Eaton must demonstrate superior qualifications and
ability to Mr. Beagan in order to succeed under Article
4.3 of the collective agreement (See Seres, [139/79
(Jolliffe)]). However, the Board's function while
hearing ~ grievance under Artiqle 4.3 is to determine
whe~er the requirements of the ~rtic]e have been met b~
the Employe~. We agree with the following statement
contained at page 7 of %he Quin~ award [9/73
(Pritchard)]).
· .. It is important to emphasize that in meeting
the obligations under that article the employer
must employ a process of decision-making designed
to consider the relative qualifications and ability
of the candidate in a competition which will ensure
sufficient relevant information is adduced before
the decision-makers in order that they may make
their comparisons in the confidence that they are
able to thoroughly and properly compare the
qualifications and abilities of the competing
applicants. Similarly, before this Board is able
to review any result of a job competition, it must
also be provided with this requisite background
information collected in a systematic and
comprehensive manner so as to provide the Board
with a sufficient factual basis on .which to make
the comparison demanded by Article 4.3.
(Emphasis added.)
The obligation on an employer referred to· in in cases
involving competition clauses such as art. 4.3 is found in a
decision of the. Ontario Divisional Court: Canadian Food & Allied
Workers' Union, Local 175 v G~eat Atlantic and pacifkc Co. o~
Ca~ada Ltd. et aiL, 76 C.L,L.C. 14, 056, leave to appeal to C.A.
refused 13 L.A.C. (2d) 211 n.
In Kuyntjes and Larman 920/85, the Board stated at pp.5-6.:
If the eventual decision about who gets a job is to be
based on relative qualifications and abilities, it
follows that all steps leading up to that decision must
also satisfy the requiremeat that they lead to valid and
relevant information about'qualifications and abilities
being b~ought to the attention of the selection Board.
.If the pre-screening decision screens out a better
qualified candidate, the eventual decision cannot help
but be faulty. 'Therefore, while there is clearly no
right to an interview in the collective agreement, the
nature of the eventual decision to be made requires that
the pr~-interview screening be done in a comprehensive
and fair manner.
Although the O. uinn case (atlRr~) dealt with the complete
selection process, the quoted comments are applicable to the case
of pre-screening.
We emphasize that we do not regard the Kuyntjes case as
requiring that the pre-screening process, being a step leading up
to the final decision, has to be conducted in exactly the same
manner as the process carried out by an employer to determine who
should get the job. If this were the case, it would not be a pre-
screening. What is necessary, however, is that the pre-screening
results in "valid and relevant information about qualifications and
15
abilities being brought to the attention of the selection board"
that is appropriate at the pre-screening stage.
The result of an arbitration in a pre-screening case, as
counsel for the Union acknowledged, could not result in the
awarding of the posted position to the Grievor. The Board in
Boreck%, Bal%¢~ and ~ did not consider whether the grievors, in
those eases, had established a prima fag~e case that they had the
necessary skill and ability to perform the posted position and that
they were relatively equal in terms of qualifications and ability
to the incumbent. That would be a requirement if they grieved
following their being denied the position after being permitted to
pass through the pre-screening to the interview stage. In none of
those cases does it appear that the Board placed an onus on a
grievor to establish a prima fac%~ ease that he had the bare
qualifications to perform the posted position. Rather, the Board
required the employer to satisfy the test of completeness as it
related to the pre-screening mechanism as it would, with necessary
adaptations, be required to do in the case of a promotion grievance
where a grievor had passed through the pre-screening stage and had
been granted an interview.
Where the Board, as in the above noted pre-screening cases,
placed the onus on the employer to demonstrate that it employed a
basis that was both fair and reasonable in screening out a grieuor,
it did not alter the rule with respect to how the burden would be
allocated should the grievor succeed, and after failin9 to be
appointed after being granted an interview, file another grievance.
In Sopinka, Lederman~and Bryant, The LaN of Evidence.~ Canada -
-Butterworth's - 2nd Edition, at p.83, the authors, in referring to
various attempts that have been made to create formulae to
determine the allocation of the burdens, refer to R. Cross and C.
Tapper gross on Evidence 7th Ed. (London: Butterworth's, 1990), at
120, where Professor Tapper states that: "As a matter of common
sense, the legal burden of proving all facts essential to their
claims normally rests upon the plaintiff in a civil suit...".
Professor Tapper also notes that the question then arises as to
what facts are essential to one's claim and he concludes that since
the incidence ~of the burden in some actions is arbitrary, the
matter must be determined by precedent (ibid., at p.124).
In The Law p~ Evidence in Canada, op. cit.,, at p.91, the
authors note: "Courts do not examine the underlying reasons for the
incidence of a burden unless there is no binding precedent, the
common law or a statutory rule is unclear, a party challenges a
well-settled rule, or a constitutional consideration arises. The
authors also note, at p.93, that:
In civil cases, the legal burden is more susceptible to'the
influence of policy. A party who traditionally has the legal
burden has been able to argue, successfully, on policy grounds
that the burden should be reversed. The fact that one party
is peculiarly situated to prove a fact resulted in the
reversal of the traditional burden of bailee to disprove
negligence,
The authors also note, at p. 94, that sometimes " After
17
reviewing policy and fairness considerations, the Court concluded
that the difficulties in proving causation could be met without
reversing the burden of proof. Rather what wa~ required was a more
pragmatic approach to the weighing of evidence."
It appears to us tha~ in grievances arising out of alleged
violations of art. 4.3, where a grievor claims that she has been
improperly screened out of a competition by being denied an
interview, the onus should fall on the employer to demonstrate that
the means that it employed in the screening process whereby the
grievor was denied an interview were fair and reasonable, being the
party in the best position to do so. The jurisprudence, as
gathered from the decisions of other panels of the Board, places
the burden on the employer in such cases.
In Bo~ecki at pp.7-8, the Board stated:
Did the employer act improperly, then, in failing to
interview the grievor? In conducting a job competition,
an employer can not be required to interview all the
applicants, regardless of their suitability. When
numerous applications come forward, as is common in the
public service with its large number of employees,
questions of efficiency and cost may require some
screening of applications. At times, only those meeting
the basic qualifications may be considered. Of course,
these qualifications must be reasonably related to the
job in question. At other times, the pool of apparently
qualified applicants may be so large that a ranking of
the most qualified will have to occur and only those with
the highest scores will be called for an interview and
further consideration. The ranking, again, must be
reasonable, in the sense that each candidate's
qualifications are reasonably evaluated ....
The Boreck~ case noted the two situations that can arise in
18
pre-screening grievances: (a) where the employer has screened out
a grievor because she does not meet the basic qualifications and
(b) where only those employees ranked~ as being most qualified:
"those with the highest scores will be called, for an interview and
further consideration."
In the case before us we do not know which of these reasons
caused the Employer to deny.the Grievor an interview. The Employer
is also in the best position to establish the basis for its choice
of criteria, the weight given' to each element of the pre-screening.
and the reason for arriving at its evaluations.
In the circumstances, we also see the "good sense" in
following the four pre-screening cases above referred to in placing
the .burden on the Employer to establish that it has properly
carried out the pre-screening and to require it to go first. Such
a ease as is before, us, and was before the four panels of the Board
in Bore~k~, ~alics, Dale and ~inkley and Reid, raises a different
issue than Comes before the Board in cases where a grievance is
based not on the denial of an interview as a result of an allegedly
improper pre-screening but on an allegation that an employer has
failed to appoint a grievor contrarY to the provisions of article
4.3. In The Law of ~vidence in canada, op..cit., at p.59, the
authors note: "In most eases there are multiple factual and legal
issues. Where there are several disputed facts or issues in a
case, the legal burden of proof in relation ~o different issues may
19
be distributed between the parties."
We would also note that the allocation of the legal burden of
proofin the latter kind of grievance is usually of little
importance. In The LAw of Evidence in Canada, op. cit., at pp. 59-
60, the authors note:
In civil proceedings, the legal burden does not play a part in
the decision-making process if the trier Of fact can come to
a determinate conclusion on the evidence· If, however, the
evidence leaves the trier of-fact in a state of uncertainty,
the legal burden is applied to determine the outcome.
We do not believe that the parties are really concerned with which
party should have the legal burden of proof. Rather, neither of
them wishes to go first, and the issue of burden of proof arose in
the context of the fundamental question for the parties: What is
the order of proceeding?
In a case involving a grievor who had been denied an
interview, but which actually proceeded as One where the ultimate
selection process was challenged: Re The Crown In Right of Ontario
(Ministry of College8 and Universities) aBd Ontario Public Service
Employees Union (1982), 7 L.A.C. 415 (Roberts), the Board, at p.
416, noted the usual, sensible practice of the parties:
Most of the facts regarding the selection procedure used in a
Competition are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
employer and not the grievor who has the burden. In
recognition of this, other "representatives of the employer
have made what might be called 'full disclosure' by calling
witnesses, including those who made the selection, so that the
board can be informed as to how the competition was conducted
and the reasons for which the choice was made": Re Genys and
Min%stry of the Environment, G.S.B. No. 52/80, at p. 7
[unreported].
20
The latter case acknowledges that merely furnishing raw data
relating to the evidence relied upon by an employer in a promotion
case is not "full disclosure." It is the evidence of the witnesses,
especially those who made the selection, the satisfies the
requirement of full disclosure. It is evident that the Roberts'
~anel were disturbed by the unfairness that could result of having
the union go forward without the kind of full disclosure referred
to. See OPSEU case, at-p. 416.
In such cases as the one before us, the other panels of the
Board referred to have placed the burden of proof ~n the issue of
whether the pre-screeninq was.properly carried out on the party
with the knowledge as to how the pre-screening was formulted and
conducted, and the obligation to procee~ first should normally
follow the allocation of the burden. We see no reason to depart
from this decision.
We have requested that the Registrar schedule to further dates
for the hearing of evidence and argument,
Dated at Toronto this 29ch day of July, 1992.
M. Gorsky - ViCe Chairperson