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HomeMy WebLinkAbout1992-0904.Rolfe.93-09-28 ONTARIO ( , EMPLOYES DE LA COURONNE ( ~ " CROWN EMPLOYEE&<. DEL 'ONTARIO ~ .' . GRIEVANCE COMMISSION DE ; 1111 SETTLEMENT ~ REGlEMENT ~ BOARD DES GRIEFS 180 DUNDAS STREET WEST SUITE 2100 TORONTO, ONTARIO. M5G lZ8 TELEPHONE/TELEPHONE (4.16) 326-1388 180, RUE: DUNDAS OUEST BUREAU 2100, TORONTO (ONTARIO) M5G lZ8 FACSIMILE /TELECOPJE (416) 326-1396 "- -- 904/92 IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION Under THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT Before THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD BETWEEN OPSEU (Rolfe) Grievor - and - The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services) ~ Employer BEFORE: S Stewart Vice-Chairperson I. Thomson Mel)lber F. Collict Member FOR THE I. Anderson UNION Counsel Scott & Aylen Barristers & Solicitor.s ( FOR THE P. Toop EMPLOYER Staff Relations Officer Management Board of Cabinet HEARING March 29, 1993 - ! ..r - ....~_.J"i I , ( ( "v..._~.Jo/ .. " \ DECISION In a grievance dated April 22, 1992 Mr R. Rolfe claims entitlement for "all monies/time lost" for two periods between April 1986 and July 1988 and August 1989 and July 1991 The nature of his claim as articulated by counsel for the Union is that there was a violation of Article 10 of the Collective Agreement resulting from the Employer's failure to assign the grievor to work statutory holidays It is the Union's further position that there has been a failure on the part of the Employer to exercise its management rights in a fair and reasonable manner. Counsel were in agreement that the Board should deal first with an objection by the Employer to the timeliness of the grievance , Counsel were able to agree to all of the relevant facts I for the purposes of this preliminary matter and no viva voce evidence was called Mr. Rolfe is a Correctional Officer and is employed at Metro West Detention Centre. During the periods referred to above, Mr. Rolfe was regularly assigned to work days, Monday to Friday. When the first statutory holiday came along in both of these assignments Mr. Rolfe was told not to report to work. He was paid for the day, however if he had been assigned to work the statutory holiday he would have been paid at a premium rate. Mr. Rolfe assumed that the Employer was acting in accordance with the Collective Agreement in both instances and did not file a grievance -- - - - - ------... ---- - -- --~._-- -- - .-- - ~ - .. ...~- ~ ( (~; '. 2- In July, 1991, Mr Rolfe had a compensable accident. ! He returned to work on March 22, 1992 and was assigned to light ! ! duties. As of April 1, 1992 he was assigned to full regular duties. Upon his return, Mr Rolfe raised an issue of vacation and holiday credits during his workers' compensation leave In the course of his inquiries with respect to this issue he had a discussion witq a Union representative, Mr. T Webber, in which Mr. Webber advised Mr. Rolfe that he had been allowed to work statutory holidays and be paid premium pay after questioning the Employer's practice of not assigning him to work on a statutory , holiday Mr. Rolfe does not recall the precise date of this I conversation, however, his best recollection is that this I L conversation took place about a week after he returned to his full regular duties on April 1, 1992 As previously noted, the ! I grievance was then filed on April 22, 1992. ! We were further advised that Mr Rolfe had previously been involved in the grievance procedure A decision of this Board, Rolfe 1116/89, (Watters), dated February 21, 1990, relating to a grievance of Mr Rolfe dated July 7, 1989 was filed I i with the Board and counsel agreed that we should accept as proven i '- I j.. the facts referred to therein. That decision noted that in addition to the grievance dealt with in that instance, Mr. Rolfe " had filed a series of grievances relating to the conduct of a competition In the Watters decision the grievance was ultimately dismissed because it was not referred to arbitration I I. - j i ( n ! \ '3 i I J I in accordance with the mandatory provisions under the Collective i Agreement However, there was no issue in that case relating to the timeliness of the filing of the grievance ! The provisions of the Collective Agreement that are ! directly relevant are the following: ~ 27.1 It is the intent of this Agreement to adjust 1 as quickly as possible any complaints or differences between the parties arising from the interpretation, application, i administration or alleged contravention of this Agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable 27.2.1 An employee who believes he has a complaint or a difference shall first discuss the complaint or difference with his supervisor within twenty (20) days of first becoming aware of the complaint or difference I : 27.13 Where a grievance ,is not processed within the time allowed or has not been processed I by the employee or the Union within the f time prescribed it shail be deemed to I have been withdrawn It was conceded by the Union that these provisions are mandatory. I I In support of his position that the grievance should be I i dismissed on the basis that it is untimely, Mr Toop referred to I i Ministrv of Correctional Services and OPSEU (Bleach) 0020/88 ) (McCamus) That decision dealt with an issue of whether grievances had been filed in a timely fashion under provisions of a predecessor Collective Agreement which are similar in a~l \ essential respects The grievance in that case dealt with the claim of two employees for lieu day and statutory holidays while I . -. r { ( -- / 4 off on workers' co~pensation. Some years later the grievors became aware that a grievance with respect to a similar decision affecting another employee had been successful and promptly filed grievances. In that case the Board reviewed a number of decisions of the Grievance Settlement Board which were described on page 11 as "apparently contradictory" At page 12 of its decision the Board concludes as follows In our view, an objective approach to the interpretation of Article 27.2 1 ought to be adopted as a matter of general principle, provided that a subjective approach may be used in cases where that approach is more appropriate. The critical distinction to be drawn between cases in which the objective approach is appropriate and those where it is not rests on a determination as to whether or not the matter which is subject of the "compla~nt or difference" under Article 27.2.1 is one which obviously raises issues related to the administration of the Collective Agreement An employee who becomes aware of a "complaint or difference" concerning such a matter, should, in our view, be assumed to realize, that this is a matter which he or she could pursue t~rough the dispute resolution procedures of the Collective Agreement. Thus, an employee who is disappointed by an Employer decision with respect to a matter of this kind must, whether or not he or she "subjectively" believes the matter to be potentially grievable, pursue the matter within the time frame stipulated in Article 27.2.1 Any other interpretation of the Agreement would be inconsistent, in our view, with the stipulation in Article 27 1 to the effect that "It is the intent of this agreement to adjust as quickly as possible to any complaints or differences between the parties arising from the interpretation, app!lication, administration or alleged contravention of this agreement.. " and, its underlying rationale Were this interpretation not adopted as a general matter, the Employer could regularly find itself in the following circumstances. The Employer could adopt an interpretation of the Agreement and plan and administer its affairs, including their ~- -- -- - -- --.. - - - - --. c ( 5 budgetary implications, on the assumption that this particular interpretation of the agreement is acceptable to the Union, as evidenced by the fact that it has not been the subject matter of a grievance Several years, indeed, could pass on this basis only to have a grievance ultimately surface and reveal that the interpretation is not a proper one. If on adopts the "subjective" approach to Article 27.2.1 in such circumstances, the implication would be that all past conduct would be subject to further grievances on the theory that only after the first grievance succeeded did various individuals appreciate that there had been a violation or possible violation of the provisions of the Agreement. In theory, then, grievances relating to incidents, perhaps running back over a period of several years, could be the subject of timely grievances This is a result which we view to be inconsistent with the P9licy expressed in Article 27 1 concerning finality and expedition in the resolution of disputes Accordingly, we adopt the view that where obvious matters of contractl administration are concerned, an objective test should be adopted in the interpretation of Article 27 2.1. It follows from this that we view the previous Board / decisions in Lam, Goheen and Graham as consistent with this approach. On the other hand, there may well be unusual circumstances in which a subjective approach of the kind utilized in Mitchell and pierre is appropriate Thus, where the nature of the problem is one which an employee may reasonably not have understood to be a matter covered by the Collective Agreement or relating to its administration, it may be appropriate to delay the running of time under Article 27.2.1 until such time as the employee comes to appreciate that this is the case. In both Mitchell and Pierre, there were grounds on which the Board could have satisfied itself that the grievor in each case had initially reasonably failed to understand the potential applicability of the Collective Agreement to the situation at hand In summary, then, it is our view that the require- ment for the commencement of the running of time under Article 27.2.1 is that the employee has a "complaint or difference" with the Employer and has reasonable grounds to believe, in the language of Article 27.1 that the complaint or difference is " (: ( \:;,,"," \, 6 .J one which is "arising from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged contravention of this Agreement ." Where the matter is one which the employee ought reasonably to understand to be a matter of contract administration, the test is an objective one and the time will begin running under Article 27 2 1 at the time when the employee becomes aware of the decision or act of the Employer which adversely or prejudicially affects the employee Where, on the other hand, the decision or act is one with r~spect to which the employee can reasonably maintain that he or she did not understand that a matter of contract administration was involved, a subjective approach to the operation of Article 27 2.1 may, in our view, be utilized The case for doing so in Mitchell, we would add, appears considerably strengthened by the alleged failure of the ~ Employer in that case to provide notice to the Union in the manner required by the Collective r Agreement to ensure that the employee in such a situation would receive timely advice from the Union Mr. Anderson drew the Board's decision to a subsequent decision of this Board, Ministry of Correctional. service and.OPSEU (Bondy) 1203/89 (Wilson). In that decision, the Board also refers to Ministrv of Correctional services and OPSEU (Pierre), 492/86 (Verity), a decision which proceeded to judicial review and was upheld by_ the Divisional Court In Pierre, the Board concluded that it is a sUbjective test that is applicable in connection with the commencement of the running of time limits That case involved a health and safety grievance/relating to exposure to a tuberculosis infected inmate Some time after becoming aware of the exposure the employee spoke with a union representative ~ho advised her that her concerns could be the subject of a grievance The employer argued that the grievance was untimely " ( I 7 At p. 14 of the pierre decision the Board states as follows: What is required on the part of the employee to comply with the mandatory 20 d~y limit, is knowledge or awareness that there has been a violation or a possible violation of the provisions of the Collective Agreement Article 27.2.1 contemplates the knowledge on the part of the employee - a subjective concept Vice-Chairman Samuels makes that point in OPSEU (P. Mitchell and Union Grievance) and Ministry of Government. services, 1614/85 and i615/85 at p.6: Article 27.2 1 establishes a time limit which does not begin to run until the employee first becomes aware of the complaint or difference And the words "complaint or difference" refer to "complaints or differences" between the parties arising from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged '\ contravention of this agreement". (Article 27.1) In other words, the time does not begin to run until the employee is aware that there is a complaint or difference under the collective aqreement. Her complaint 9r difference in this sense is .not being declared surplus, or being laid off, but her feeling that she has not been treated according to the collective agreement. On the other hand, in the filing of union grievances under either Article 27 8 1 or ,27.8 2, there is no subjective component In Bondv, the Board concluded that the actual reasoning in pierre was not applied in Bleach. The Board in Bondv states the- following at pages 14-15: As I understand the reasoning in Pierre, it is awareness that the dispute is arbitrable under the collective agreement Le in the sense that this is an arguable case. This is to be contrasted with the language of union grievances under s.27.12.1 where it is "the occurrence or origination of the circum- stances giving rise to the grievance" which starts the clock running But there is no reference in ( (. , 8 section 27 2 1 to "ought reasonably to understand" or "reasonably maintain" Nor frankly do I find such a gloss compatible with the actual wording of section 27 2 1 In that respect, I find Mr Verity's language truer to the actual wording of the section. In the Bleach grievances, there was the issue that the policy of the employer had been declared in violation of the Collective Agreement by the Board in other grievances and that the Grievors had not learned of that until sometime after the events on which their grievances were based The policy changed as a result effective August 5, 1987. The Grievors claimed for days prior to that change in policy but after the original Charbonneau (544/81) decision. Mr McCamus applied section 27 2 1 to the time at which the Grievors were denied the lieu days they claimed rather than to the time that they learned that they had an arguable case under the Collective Agreement because of the GSB decisions. I, cannot see that this is compatible with the approach taken by Mr Verity in Pierre It seems to me as well that the concerns that Mr McCamus had would have been better examined under the question of remedy. In this regard, I would refer the parties to my own reasoning in Speer and Minist~ of Education 1221/88. In th~ context of remedy or estoppel possibly, it is, I believe, more open to the Employer to raise questions of whether the Grievor ought to have known whether the issue was grievable and whether old events that preceded a change in interpretation of the Collective Agreement can be compensated In that context there. is more scope for submissions on policy analysis and I discretion than by the use of what I feel are, to say the very least, strained interpretations of the wording of the Collective Agreement The other decisions referred to by the parties are subsumed within the analysis in pierre and Bleach I would note that since argument in this case, Pierre has been followed by vice-Chair Dissanayake in Gordon and LCBO 48/89 which cites the Divisional Court's endorsement on pierre upholding a subjective test . I am satisfied that pierre correctly interprets section 27.2.1 and Bleach manifestly does not The decision in Bleach has been referred to with approval in I decisions such as Mirasol, 1389/90 (Knopf), however we note that no reference is made in that decision to Bondv or to the ( ~---- 1 (;' (\i " I 9 decision of the Divisional Court in Pierre. The policy considerations referred to in Bleach are significant, and ~itigate strongly in favour of the interpretation that was articulated in that case. Mr Toop emphasized the significance of the prompt and final resolution of disputes in labour relations matters and we agree entirely with the thrust of his submissions in this regard However, it is the language of the Collective Agreement that must prevail. We note that at the time of the decision in Bleach, the decision of the Divisional Court in pierre had not been issued and accordingly, that decision was made without the opportunity for the Board to consider the decision of the Divisional Court on this point The I Divisional Court's endorsement is dated July 11, 1990, and states as follows. \ We are all of the view that the Board was correct in its conclusion that the 20-day time period within which the grievor had to bring her grievance, began to run only when she became aware that she had a complaint that was based on a violation or possible violation of the collective agreement In our view, the "complaint or difference" referred to in Article 27.2 1 of the collective agreement is the same kind of complaint(s) or difference(s) mentioned in Article 27 1, that is to say a complaint or difference "between the parties arising from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged contravention of this agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable". I The grievor knew at least by November; 1985 that she was unhappy about a possible exposure to T B , but she was not aware until late February, 1986 that such exposure might constitute a complaint or difference with her employer arising out of a cont~avention by it of the collective agreement. ./ - ( ( 10 \ until she became so aware she could not have believed she had such a complaint. It is impliqit in the reasons of 'Ehe Board that the grievor first became aware that she had a complaint based on a violation or possible violation of the collective agreement on February 25, 1986 w~en her Union representative told her she could file a grievance The grievor filed her complaint on March 4, 1986 well within the 20-day time limit for doing so The words "believes" and "becominq aware" found in Article 27.2.1 clearly establish that it is only the subjective awareness of the em~loYee that she has a complaint arisinq out of a possible violation of the aqreement that sets the 20-day time limit running. [emphasis added] Having found the Board was correct in its interpretation of the collective agreement, it is not necessary for us to decide whether this application would also have failed if it could be said that the interpretation placed on the agreement by the Board was not patently unreasonable. The application is dismissed with costs to the Union ) In Gordon, 48/89, (Dissanayake), the Board considers the effect of the Divisional Court decision in connection with provisions of the LCBO agreement, which the Board found to be of similar effect to the provisions of the OPSEU agreement that were interpreted by the Court. At p 15 of that decision the Board states as follows As under the OPSEU agreement, the "complaint or difference" referred t9 in article 27 3(a)(i) must be a complaint or difference under the collective agreement In our view, the "circumstances" giving rise to such a complaint or difference are two fold First, there must be a right under the collective agreement. Second, there must be an act or omission by a party to the agreement which the other party feels has abridged or contravened that right Before an employee can be said to have become aware of "the circumstances giving rise to the complaint or difference" under Article 27 3(a) (i), he or she must be aware of both [emphasis in the original] the existence of a right and a factual basis which may contravene that right c (; " 'l,;, > 11 As Mr Toop notes, the provisions of the Collective Agreeme~t have been changed since the time of the pierre decision I to provide for an expedited arbitration procedure. However, the language of Article 27.2 1 remains the same and we cannot accept his submission that the new provisions providing for expedited arbitration ought to compel the conclusion that the interpretation given by the Divisional Court to Article 27 2 1 can no longer have application The decision of the Divisional Court is clear with respect to the interpretation to be given to Article 27 2.1 of the Collective Agreement. The decision indicates that this provision contemplates a subjective test In our view, this clear statement of the Court in the paragraph emphasized above cannot be reconciled with the application of a subjective test in some instances but not in others As previously noted, the Bleach decision, which articulates that \ approach, was decided prior to the issuance of the Court decision. Accordingly, and notwithstanding the valid policy considerations that support the approach taken in Bleach and Mirasol, it is our view that the approach taken in Bondv and Gordon is the approach that t~e Divisional Court decision in pierre compels and therefore the approach that ought to be adopted Therefore, while it is clear that Mr Rolfe was aware of the facts giving rise to his grievance at the time he was not \ -. ~- /'" ( ( , 12 assigned to work on statutory holidays, on the facts set out before us in this case, he was not aware of "the existence of a right", as it is described in Gordon, ~ntil his discussion with Mr Webber We are unable to accept Mr Toop's submission that the fact that Mr Rolfe assumed that the Employer was acting in accordance w~th the Collective Agreement establishes the subjective awareness that is necessary for the time limits to commence running As Mr Toop emphasized, it is apparent from the Watters decision that Mr Rolfe had knowledge of the grievance procedure. However, aside from the fact that the timeliness issue in that case relates to the time limits in connection with the referral of a matter to arbitration rather than to the time limits in connection with the filing of a grievance, a familiarity with the provisions relating to mandatory time limits in the Collective Agreement has no bearing on the issue of Mr. Rolfe's subjective belief with respect to whether his work assignment could give rise to a complaint under the Collective Agreement It is only at the point of the discussion with Mr Webber that Mr Rolfe can be said to have the subjective knowledge necessary for the time limit of 20 days to commence. On the facts before us it is apparent that the grievance was filed within this time period Accordingly, the Employer's objection to the grievance on the basis of timeliness must be denied. A hearing to deal with the merits of the grievance is to be scheduled by the Registrar in consultation . -- - - ---- ---.... - ( (' 13 ~ with counsel for the parties. Dat~d at Toronto this :l8th day of September , !993. ~~~ S.L stewart - Vice-Chairperson ~ ,;- I ._--- - ~--e:~-c:::.J ~.~Thomson - Member '-- "I Dissent" (dissent attached) F Collict - Member ( I , r 1- .u J ( - ". DISSENT Re GSB #904/92 (ROLFE) ,; This Member is not in agreement with the award in this case The reasons for this positibn are set out below 1 The jurisprudence is clear that the time limit requirements in Article 27 2 1 are mandatory Both parties are agreed on this matter ( 2 This Member is in agreement with the Divisional Court ruling concerning PIERRE as related to the circumstances in that case 3 However, this Member is not in agreement with thest~tement at page 11 of this ROLFE award, as follows - "The (DIvisional Court) decision indicates that this provision / contemplates a subjective test. In our view this clear statement of the Court in the paragraph emphasized above cannot be reconcileQ with the application of a subjective test in some instances but not in others" (underscoring added) 4 FOR EXAMPLE, in G S B #2652/91 (KING), heard on January 20, 1993, the concept of - "KNEW, OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN", was introduced, as follows "We are of the view that Mr King, as an experienced union steward and union employee, knew, or should have known on August 16, 1991 that he had a complaint or difference with the emplover and he should have brouQht that complaint or difference to the attention of the emplover within the time limits established in the collective aQreement. He did not do so and we are not convinced by the explanation he offered for his failure to file a grievanc!3 '- _. ~- - ~~ (~: "; ( , 2 .~ The grievor's vacation and severance payments were due immediately upon his resignation unlike his deferred pension If Mr King was dissatisfied with the calculation of the amount owing he should have taken formal steps with respect to bnnging his dissatisfaction to the attention of the r employer after August 16, 1991 when he was advised that his request for recalculation had been rejected Instead he did nothing for four months" - (page 9, G S B #2652/91, (KING) underscoring added) 5 Similarly, and to take a hypothetical case in the extreme - Can an employee with five_years of service, - an employee who has paid union dues for five years and has received a new collective agreement (or had one available to him) on the occasion of the negotiation of each new agreement, - and who is terminated (for whatever reason), - come forward one year after the - termination and claim unjust dismissal on the basis that he had the right to , grieve his dismissal, - and that the agreement time limits under Article 27 2 1 should therefore not apply? Clearly, this analogy makes a mockery of the time limits in Article 27 2 1 in the collective agreement, the intent of the parties, and the purely legalistic interpretation of Article 27.2 1 by the Divisional Court in PIERRE , However, this is the potential result of claims where grievors can simply state subjectively with reference to time limits - "I didn't know I had the riqht to file a qrievance!" Hance, when the subjective test is applied to Article 27 2 1 of the collective agreement, one must consider the circumstances of the case and, as indicated in KING, G S B #2652/91, one must consider whether or not the grievor, as an (i".'Y ~ I ~:J: 3 " experienced union employee, knew, or should have known that he had a complaint or difference with the employer " (page 9) (underscoring added) 6 Just as important as KIN(J., however, is the findmgin G S B #1389/90 (MIRASOL), at page 6, "The evidence before us was that the Grievor did not know or appreciate that any problem existed with reqard to her salary until the sprinq of 1990 This is not disputed. Nor is it surprising, given the complexity of the salary structure and the complicated impact of unusual negotiations on this particular class of employees But no matter when she may have become subiectively aware of a potential breach of the collective aqreement, she must be credited with knowledqe of the "decision or act" of the chanqe in her salary when she received her adiusted pay cheques So, it cannot objectively be said that she filed her grievance within 20 days of knowing of the Employer's decision to peg her salary at a rate that she now protests." (underscoring added) In effect, therefore, MIRASOL must be credited with the knowledge of the actions of the Employer relative to adjustments in her pay cheques, and, as per KING, she should have known that she had a complaint or difference with the Employer Clearly, this ROLFE case parallels KING and MIRASOL in the sense of, a) knowledge of the Employer's actions, (MIRASOL), and b) as a union employee, Mr Rolfe should have known that he had a complaint or difference with the Employer (KING) 7 In a comparison of"PIERRE and ROLFE, the latter is clearly distinguishable from the former on the basis of the following (,,': ,,--r.,,. ~ I 4 a) Service. Mr Rolfe 'had a service level of approximately 14 years b) Procedure. Mr Rolfe had experience with complaints under the grievance procedure c) Remoteness. The PIERRE 'case involved distant issues of exposure to tuberculosis, absence from work, stress, performance appraisal problems, and then much later, - a suggestion that there might be a violation of the collective agreement and that a grievance should be filed - By comparison, Mr Ralfe had to. have been aware almast immediately that his incame had dropped as a result of his reassignment, and madified work schedules which did nat include weekend and statutary haliday assignments. Natwithstanding the abave, including Mr Ralfe's knawledge af the grievance procedure, his length af service and his knawledge o.f his changed wark schedules, he failed to. grieve within 20 days of the Emplayer's acts which impacted his wark assignments and his salary SUMMARY 1 In the view af this Member, the claims by Mr Ralfe are nat credible 2 Mr Ralfe knew, from "day ane", that he was no. langer being assigned to. wark an statutary halidays and weekends, - days an which he narmally wauld have been assigned to. wark as a Carrectianal Officer As a result, his salary level wauld have been impacted immediately ( , d .' ( 5 I In effect, and as stated in G S B #1389/90 (MIHASOL), at page 6, .. no matter when she may have become subjectively aware of a potential breach of the collective agreement, she must be credited with knowledoe of the "decision or act" of .- \ the change in her salary when she received her adjusted pay cheques." (underscoring added) Mr Rolfe clearly was subjectively aware that his earnings had been affected by his revised assignment and work schedules As stated in KING, if Mr Rolfe did not know that he had a complaint or difference with the employer - he should have known. J CONCLUSION 1 ROLFE is, readily distinguishable from PIERRE where the relationship between the employer's alleged failure to act was not readily recognizable as a potential violation of the collective agreement as opposed to ROLFE, an experienced and knowledgeable 14 year employee who must be creGlited with the knowledoe of the act of the employer which affected his total income Furthermore, as stated in KING, G S B #2652/91, Mr Rolfe .. knew, or should have known that he had a complaint or difference with the employer .. (page 6, underscoring added) ~ 2 The parties, in their negotiations have turned their minds to the issues of time limits and retroactive liability of the Employer and one surely cannot simply negate these time limits relative to Article 27 2 1 through a ?imple statement that - - "I was not aware of my right", or, - "I was not aware of that provision of the collective agreement. " ,. \. . \'c,,:;;' ...." ;;, 6 3 It is a common place to state that ignorance of the law is no excuse Similarly, however, union members not only have a responsibility but can be expected to know the various provisions of the collective agreement that have been ;. negotiated on their behalf In particular, they may be expected to know those matters which are associated with their day to day conditions of work (wages, schedules of work, grievance procedure, etc) 4 It is in this sense therefore, that Mr Rolfe should have known'that his work conditions had been affected negatively and that he was, therefore, subjectively aware of a potential breach of the collective agreement by the Employer as assignment and work schedules affected him personally 5 Accordingly, this Member would have upheld the preliminary objection in this case and would have dismissed the grievance f/{J~- /Mt(~/-.f~A3 . I F T COLLlCT DATE