HomeMy WebLinkAbout1993-0123.Armes.94-11-07
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ONTARIO EMPLOYES DE LA COURONNE
CROWN EMPLOYEES DE L'ONTARIO
1111 GRIEVANCE COMMISSION DE
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SETTLEMENT REGLEMENT
BOARD DES GRIEFS
180 DUNDAS STREET WEST SUITE 2100, TORONTO, ONTARIO, M5G lZ8 TELEPHONE/TELEPHONE (416) 326-7388
180, RUE DUNDAS OUEST BUREAU 2100 TORONTO (ONTARIO) M5G lZ8 FACSIMILE /Tt:LECOPIE (416) 326-1396
123/93
IN' THE HATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
OPSEU (Armes)
Grievor
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Health)Halton-Mississauga Ambulance
Employer
BEFORE: B Kaplan Vice-Chairperson
J Carruthers Member
F Collict Member
FOR THE P Lukasiewicz
UNION Counsel
Gowling Strathy & Henderson
Barristers & Solicitors
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FOR THE D Gorelle
EMPLOYER Counsel
Mathews Dinsdale & Clark
Barristers & Solicitors
HEARING March 25, 1993
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2.
Introduction
By a grievance dated March 1, 1993, Gord Armes, an Ambulance Officer
employed by the Halton-Mississauga Ambulance SerYice, grieves a violation
of the health and safety provision of the Collective Agreement. The case
proceeded to a hearing in Toronto, at which time evidence and argument
were heard In brief, the union alleges that on February 24, 1993 a certain
work assignment jeopardized the grievor's health and safety The employer
took the position that the assignment in question was well within its
management rights and, moreover, that the grievor's health and safety was
not placed in jeopardy because of it. Most of the facts were not in dispute
The Union's Case
Evidence of Gord Armes
Gord Armes testified. He has been employed by the Halton-Mississauga
Ambulance Service (hereafter "the Service") for more than twenty years. On
February 24, 1993 the grievor was initially assigned to work at a particular
station For reasons which will be outlined below, the grievor was directed
to drive his ambulance to a different station On his way to that station he
received a Code 4 call Code 4 is the highest priority call, and indicates
either an unknown or life threatening situation. Upon receiving a Code 4
call, drivers are generally expected to respond as quickly as possible with
lights and sirens on. When responding to Code 4 calls, drivers may
cautiously exceed the speed limit, and may also go through red lights after
making a complete stop. On this particular occasion, the incident in
question was a motor vehicle collision. En route to the acciden.t, the
grievor was advised that another ambulance was also responding on a Code
4 basis Ultimately,one person was transported by that other ambulance to
the hospital
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According to the grievor, hi,s health and safety was jeopardized as a result
of this assignment. He testified that Ambulance Officers do not know what
they are going to find when they arrive in response to a Code 4 call If an
Ambulance Officer arrives on the scene in an ambulance, but he or she is
alone, as was the case on February 24, 1993, he or she is not permitted to
transport a patient to the hospital as both a driver and an attendant must be
present in order to do so The grievor testified that persons in need of
assistance may not be familiar with this requirement, or sympathetic to it.
In the result, Ambulance Officers arriving alone in an ambulance at an
accident might be attacked if they refuse to transport someone to the
hospital '
The grievor testified that he would have been subject to discipline had he
not responded to the Code 4 call. In his view, an ambulance staffed by one
Ambulance Officer, should not be directed to the scene of an accident,
rather, the Service should direct one of two other types of emergency
vehicle~ which it operates One of these other vehicles is referred to as
the Emergency Support Unit. It is a large cube van equipped with some
emergency equipment. It is not equipped for the transport of patients. The
other type of vehicle is referred to as the Emergency Response Unit. It is a
smaller van and is also equipped with some emergency equipment. It cannot
be used to transport passengers
Cross-Examination of Gord Armes
In cross-examination, the grievor testified that when he received the Code
4 call he put a sign up designating that his ambulance was not in service.
He also told the Board that Code 4 is a tiered response That means that
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police, fire and ambulance services all respond to a Code 4 call. On
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February 24, 1993, when the grievor arrived at the scene the Fire
Department was already there. A fully staffed ambulance arrived within
two minutes of the grievor's arrival The grievor was asked whether his
health and safety was jeopardized in those two minutes, and he agreed that
in this particular instance it was not, but noted that had the circumstances
been different his health and safety easily could have been placed in
jeopardy
As local union president, and as an employee of long-standing, the grievor
was familiar with various Service policies relating to the "first response"
responsibilities of Ambulance Officers The policy in effect on February
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24, 1993. was as follows:
RESPONSIBILITIES
It is the responsibi1ity of each employee, while on duty, I
to respond to a call in an ambulance, emergency support
unit or emergency response unit as a first response when
required
PROCEDURES
A. General
1 Employees responding alone in an ambulance as a first
response will ensure NOT IN SERVICE signs are
prominently displayed in the front windshield and rear
window
2 An employee responding on a first response should
keep in mind his/her own personal safety (as with all
calls) If a threat or possible threat to health and safety
exists, the employee will remain in a safe area until
appropriate back-up has arrived
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3 The employee responding will provide casualty care as
required and remain at the scene until patient care
responsibilities are transferred to appropriate personnel
(Le ambulance crew,doctor)
The grievor was familiar with this policy, and its predecessor He testified
that he has long, been opposed to it, and noted that February 24, 1993 was
the first time he was required to respond alone to a Code 4 call
The grievor agreed that the other emergency vehicles which he described
were primarily used for disasters There was no disaster on February 24,
1993 The grievor was asked a number of questions about downstaffing
Ambulance Officers work in pairs. lf one employee books off sick, instead
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of replacing that employee, which was the practice in the past, the Service
attempts to "marry" the remaining employee with some other employee
elsewhere in the Service who is without a partner And that explains why
the grievor was alone 'driving an ambulance from one station to another on
February 24, 1994 when the Code 4 call. came in
The Employer.s Case
Evidence of Peter Dundas
Mr Peter Dundas testified on behalf of the Service He is the District
Supervisor, and has been employed in various capacities with the Service
since 1981 Mr Dundas testified that on February 24, 1993, the grievor was
assigned to a shift beginning at 8 00 a m. When he arrived at the station, he
was advised that his partner had booked off sick. In the result, the grievor
was directed to a different station and a new partner While en route to
that station, the grievor received the Code 4 call The Fire Department was
at the scene of the accident when the grievor arrived at 08 34 14 The fully
staffed ambulance arrived just over one minute later at 08 3S 41 A t the
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conclusion of the call, the grievor, as required, filled out an Ambulance Can
Report. It was introduced into evidence, and it d,oes not refer to any health
and safety concerns It does, however, express concerns with respect to
the downstaffing practices of the Service
Mr Dundas was asked a number of questions about the downstaffing policy
He testified that the policy came into effect in 1991, and that the Service
only engages in downstaffing during day shifts. If an Ambulance Officer
calls in sick at any other time, he or she is replaced
According to Mr Dundas, first response assignments will not always be the
result of downstaffing In some instances, an Ambulance Officer may be
working alone at a Station and be directed to a first response Sometimes
supervisors are directed to first responses. Mr Dundas has responded to
many first response calls in that capacity, and he told the Board that the
job of the person responding to these calls is to render necessary
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assistance until the fully staffed ambulance arrives
Mr Dundas does not share the grievor's concerns with respect to health and
safety Mr Dundas noted that the Service's policy, referred to above, gives
the employee complete discretion not to respond until appropriate back-up
assistance has arrived, and he also pointed that a first response is part of a
tiered response. In the result, the person responding is well aware that
other emergency vehicles are on their way if, in fact, they have not already
arrived Mr Dundas testified that it would not be practicable to limit first
response responsibilities to the Emergency Support Units and the
Emergency Response Units These vehicles are not as well.,.equipped as
ambulances, and are not sufficiently available
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Cross-Examination of Mr. Dundas
In cross-examination, Mr Dundas agreed that if the Service had more
Emergency Response and Emergency Support vehicles they could be used for
first response calls He also agreed that members of the public, seeing an
ambulance arrive at the scene of an accident, or arriving in response to a
call, would expect that ambulance to be able to take someone to a hospital.
He testified, however, that transport to a hospital would usually only take
place after the Ambulance Officers rendered immediate emergency care
which generally takes some time. He also agreed that members of the
public are not generally familiar with the concept of tiered response
The evidence having been completed, the case proceeded to argument,
Union Argument
In union counsel's .submission, not only does the Service's first response
policy potentially jeopardize the health and safety of Ambulance Officers,
it also exposes them to civil liability given the requirements of the
Ambulance Act. Counsel noted that section 23 of the Ambulance Act
provides for a fine for persons contravening that Act or any regulation made
thereunder Counsel explained in some detail how the Act and its
Regulations were contravened in the circumstances of this case
Section 1 of the Act provides
"ambulance" means a conveyance used or intended to be
used in an ambulance service for the transportation of
persons requiring medical attention or under medical
care,
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"ambulance service" means a service held out to the
public as available for the conveyance of persons
requiring medical attention or under medical care, and
includes the service of dispatching ambulances,
Regulation 41 provides
An operator shall not refuse and shall not permit any
employee to refuse to provide ambulance service unless
directed or permitted to do so by a dispatcher
Regulation 52 provides'
Every operator shall ensure that each ambulance of the
operator that responds to a call for ambulance services
is staffed with a crew of at least two emergency
medical attendants each of whom holds the appropriate
qualifications "
Regulation 54 provides
(1) No person may drive an ambulance that is not
available for the provision of ambulance service unless a
sign is displayed in a conspicuous manner, both at the
front and rear of the vehicle bearing the words "Not in
Service" and the words of each sign are clearly visible to
the public
(2) No person may drive an ambulance that is available
for the provision of ambulance service unless the staff
required by section 52 for responding to a call are
present in the ambulance and,
(a) the ambulance is equipped in accordance
with this Regulation and the ambulance and
its equipment are in the condition and order
required by section 17, or
(b) where the ambulance accessory equipment
or medical equipment is temporarily
deficient, a dispatcher has directed that the
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ambulance be used to provide ambulance
services
(3) Every operator shall ensure that every ambulance
used in the operator's ambulance service is used only in
accordance with this section
Union counsel argued that this regulatory scheme did not anticipate the use
of ambulances as first response vehicles Counsel noted that the
regulations provided for two types of ambulances, those in service and
those not in service, and argued that the regulations required that
ambulances in service be staffed by two attendants. In counsel's
submission, if an Ambulance Officer was in an ambulance, than he or she
was providing ambulance services and this meant that two attendants had
to be present. Accordingly, any time that an Ambulance Officer was alone
in an ambulance, he or she could not, under the current regulatory scheme,
lawfully respond to a call or an accident. And this meant that if an
Ambulance Officer was driving alone in an ambulance and cal1'e across an
accident, he or she was not, because of the Regulations, entitled to lawfully
render assistance
Union counsel pointed out that the public expects that ambulances will, as
indicated in the definition, be avaiiable to assist and convey, and that it
was inconsistent with this expectation, as well as the statute and
regulations, to direct an ambulance to a first response on the basis that the
ambulance was not in service. In counsel's view, every time an ambulance
is directed to a call, the expectations of the public, the statute and the
regulations demanded that it be staffed by two Ambulance Officers, and he
noted that the Act ~ and Regulations did not make provision, as they might
have, for the use of ambulances as first response vehicles. Nevertheless,
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the evidence indicated that this is exactly how these vehicles were being
used, and counsel argued that this use placed the grievor at risk given that
the public had an exaggerated expectation of the services he could provide
In anticipation of the employer's position that first response services were
not ambulance services, union counsel pointed out that the Highway Traffic
Act limited the use of sirens to ambulances as defined in the Ambulance
Act, and further limited the right to proceed through an intersection
without a green light to ambulances as defined in Ambulance Act The
relevant sections of this Act, an extract from which was provided by union
counsel, are as follows
43 In this Part (a) "ambulance" includes an ambulance' as
defined in the Ambulance Act and a cardiac arrest
emergency vehicle operated by or under the authority of a
hospital,
18 Notwithstanding subsection (16), a driver of an
emergency vehicle, after stopping the vehicle, may
proceed without a green indication being shown if it is
safe to do so
(6) No vehicle other than an ambulance, fire, or police
department vehicle, public utility emergency vehicle or
vehicle operated by the Ministry shall be equipped with a
siren horn ora device producing sound which so nearly
resembles that produced by a siren horn as to deceive or
confuse
Given these provisions, when the grievor turned his siren on to respond to
the Code 4 call he was in contravention of the Highway Traffic Act. Counsel
argued that this was another reason to find that the grievor's health and
safety had been placed in jeopardy
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Counsel referred to a number of cases in support of his submissions
includrng Stockwell 1764/87 (Wilson), Watts/King 1367/90 (Kaplan) andRe
Thibodeau-Finch. Express Inc. and Union des Chauffeurs de Camions. Local
'06 30 L.A.C (3d) 58 -(Frumkin) Counsel argued that a precondition to the
balancing of interests common in health and safety cases is the pursuit of a
lawful objective In the instant case, counsel submitted, the -Service's
objective, while laudable, was unlawful in that the Ambulance Act required
two Ambulance Officers in every ambulance Accordingly, this was not, in
the union's view, an appropriate case to balance the interests of the
employee with those of the employer The only solution, counsel argued,
was for the Act and Regulations to be amended so as to provide for the use
of ambulances staffed with only one person as a first response In the
meantime, counsel urged the Board to uphold the grievance and issue an
order requiring the Service to cease and desist from directmg Ambulance
Officers to first response calls if working alone in an ambulance Such a
remedy, counsel observed, would not prevent the Service from directing
Ambulance Officers to first response calls when driving an emergency
vehicle other than an ambulance
Employer Argument
Employer counsel began his submissions by suggesting that this grievance
was not really about health and safety It was, instead, about staffing, and
counsel referred to both the grievance form and the grievor's February 24,
1993 Ambulance Call Report which make mention of the grievor's concerns
with respect to downstaffing In counsel's submission, staffing was a
matter of management rights, and the Board was, accordingly, without
jurisdiction with respect to it.
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Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that the grievance was really
about health and safety, counsel argued that there was, on the facts of this
case, no breach of the health and safety provisions of the Collective
Agreement.
Article 24 01 is as follows:
The Employer shall continue to make reasonable
provisions for the safety and health of its employees
during the hours of their employment. It is agreed that
both the Employer and the Union shall co-operate to the
fullest extent possible in the prevention of accidents and
in the reasonable promotion of safety and health of all
employees.
Counsel argued that not only was there no violation of this provision in this
particular case, but that the Service's policy with respect to first response
granted employees the discretion to decide not to respond if, upon arriving
at a call, they concluded that responding alone might place them at risk. On
this basis alone, counsel asked that the grievance be dismissed Counsel
referred to a number of cases in support of this submission including Brlek
et al 1466/87 (Dissanayake), MacPhee et al 352/92 (Kaplan) and Sullivan
2889/91 (Gorsky)
With respect to the requirements of the Ambulance Act. counsel argued that
that statute dealt with the provision of ambulance services. When the
grievor was directed to a first response while in an ambulance he was not,
counsel submitted, providing ambulance services as defined in the Act The
fact that he posted a sign indicating that the ambulance was not in service
proved this point. Counsel took the position that there was nothing in the
Act prohibiting the use of the ambulance for the provision of first response
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services Rather, the Act set oUt minimum staffing requirements for an
ambulance providing ambulance services Accordingly, counsel asked that
the grievance be dismissed.
Union Reply
In reply, union counsel argued that this case could be decided ina fairly
straightforward way In counsel's submission, the dispatcher received a
call for ambulance services. Those services, and their staffing
requirements, are defined and established in law The grievor was in an
ambulance and was directed to respond The public could only expect when
the grievor arrived that he was arriving as an Ambulance Officer ready to
perform ambulance services, and this included transporting patients to the
hospital. The grievor, however, could not do so This placed his health and
safety potentially at risk, and also placed him in contravention of the law
Counsel again urged that the grievance be upre1d
Decision
Having carefully considered the evidence and arguments of the parties, we
are of the view that this grievance should be dismissed.
While it is true enough that the grievor, when responding to the Code 4 call
on February 24, 1994, was driving an ambulance, that ambulance was not in
service, and it was clearly designated as such The grievor, in responding
to that call, was not rendering ambulance services Rather, he was
rendering emergency medical services as part of a tiered response directed
at ensuring the expeditious response to emergency calls. The fully staffed
ambulance which arrived just over one minute after the grievor, and which
subsequently transported a patient to the hospital, was rendering
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ambulance services and was, as required by the statute, staffed with two
Ambulance Officers There was, in our view, no breach of either the
Ambulance Act or the Regulations made thereunder
There also was, in our view, no breach of the provisions of the Highway
Traffic Act referred to by union counsel. A reading of those provisions does
not lead us to conclude that the gnevor, in turnmg on his siren, or in
proceeding throu.gh an intersection without a green light, was required to
violate the law One of those provisions refers to an emergency vehicle,
and another explicitly provides for ambulances to be equipped with sirens
Obviously, had we found that the Service was requiring the grievor to
violate any statute we would have almost certainly upheld the grievance
However, we have not found this to be the case, and there is, accordingly, no
basis for us to uphold the grievance on this ground
Turning to the allegation that the grievor's health and safety was somehow
placed in jeopardy on February 24, 1993, we simply cannot find that this
occurred The Service policy explicitly provides that employees, when on a
<first response, need not respond if they have reason to believe that their
health or safety might be jeopardized by doing so This policy gives effect
to Article 24 01 of the Collective Agreement. While it is certainly possible
that a member of the public, seeing an ambulance arrive at the scene of an
accident or a call, will have the expectation that that vehicle will be in a
position to transport patients to a hospital, we cannot find that that
expectation, along with the grievor's concerns about how some members of
the public might possibly respond to him after learning that he could not
immediately transport a patient to the hospital, is a sufficient basis to
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find that the Service was, on February 24, 1993, in breach of its obligations
under the Collective Agreement. Certainly, it would not take long for the
grievor to explain that another ambulance was on Its way, and that in the
meantime he was there to render emergency medical care In this case, not
only was the Fire Department already on the scene when the grievor arrived,
but the fully staffed ambuiance arrived just over one minute later
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the grievance is dismissed
DATED at Toronto this 7th day of November , 1994
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William Kaplan
I, Vice-Chairperson~c
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J Carruthers
Member a CJ. ~J
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F Collict
Member
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