Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout1996-1318.ALEONG97_03_10 O/lffARIO EMPLOY{S DE LA COURONNE CROWN EMPLOYEES DE L'OfolTARIO 1111 GRIEVANCE COMMISSION DE SETTLEMENT " REGLEMENT BOARD DES GRIEFS 180 DUNDAS STREET WEST, SUITE 2100, TORONTO ON MSG 1Z8 TELEPHONE/TELEPHONE (416) 326-1388 180, RUE DUNDAS OUEST, BUREAU 2100, TORONTO (ON) M5G 1Z8 FACS/MILE/TELECOPIE (416) 326-13fJ6 GSB # 1318/96 OLBEU # OLB186/96 IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION Under THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT Before THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD BETWEEN OLBEU (Aleong) Grievor - and - The Crown in Right of Ontario (Liquor Control Board of Ontario) Employer BEFORE o V Gray Vice-Chairperson FOR THE C Flood GRIEVOR Counsel Koskie & Minsky Barristers & Solicitors FOR THE J Brooks EMPLOYER Counsel Genest, Murray, DesBrisay, Lamek Barristers & Solicitors HEARING January 9, 24, 1997 DECISION The employer termmated Quentm Aleong's employment by letter dated March 11, 1996 Over 4 months after he receIved the letter, Mr Aleong grIeved the termmatIOn. The employer says the grievance should be dIsmIssed as un tImely, wIthout consIdermg Its merIts That is the Issue addressed m thIS decI SIon. Facts The grIevor began workmg for the employer a casual employee in July 1980 In December 1995 he was accepted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Pohce ("RCMP") for trammg at Its academy m Regma, Saskatchewan. The trammg pe- riod was 26 weeks begmmng January 29, 1996 Mr Aleong understood that the trammg program was rIgorous. He was not sure he would complete It success- fully He told the employer he dId not want to reSIgn hIS pOSItIOn WIth the em- ployer immediately In fact, he hoped that upon becommg an RCMP constable he would be posted to Toronto and have the opportumty to work at both Jobs. As a result, he asked for a 26 week leave of absence. The employer ImtIally demed the grIevor's request for a leave of absence, then granted a one month leave by letter dated January 26, 1996 That letter read as follows Further to your letter of December 13 1995 and my response of January 8 1996, I have now had an opportumty to further reVIew your request for a 26 week leave of absence WIthout pay Based on my reVIew and takmg mto consIderation the operatiOnal reqmre- ments of your store I am pleased to adVIse that we are able to grant a one month leave of absence WIthout pay commencmg January 29 1996. ThIS IS bemg granted on a once only baSIS and any extension to thIS leave will not be granted. You are requested to nottfy your store manager no later than March 1, 1996 as to your avallablhty If we do not hear from you by March 1st, YOU will be deemed to have abandoned your pOSItiOn and your employment WIth the LeBO shall be termmated. -.. - 2 Please mdicate your acceptance of the above by slgmng and returnmg the ongmal wIthin two (2) weeks from the date of this letter I trust thIS IS of some assistance for you and I wIsh you well m your future endeavours. There IS no eVIdence that the gnevor sIgned and returned the letter, but he and the employer behaved thereafter as though he was on a one month leave of ab- sence Shortly before the gflevor left for Regma m late January 1996, he spoke wIth a umon representative, MIllIe BrIffa. Another employee had made hIm aware of clause 31 5(b) of the partIes' collective agreement, whIch prov1.des 31 5 (b) A casual employee will lose all senioflty and hIs/her employment WIll be deemed to have been termmated If helshe IS unavailable for work for a penod of three (3) months or more exclUSIve of any approved leave of absence. He testified that It seemed to hIm thIS meant that he could be absent from the store for up to three months. He asked her whether that IS what It dId mean, and she replIed that that was what it was supposed to mean. He told her about rus opportumty to go to Regma. He testIfied that she advised hIm to go to Regina and saId that when he came back If there was any problem "we'll file a grievance for you." When It was put to hIm m cross-exammatIOn that that had been rus tes- tImony, the grievor testified that Ms BrIffa had saId "we'll fight for you." He saId he assumed thIS meant "a gnevance or whatever they decIded to do " As hIS first month of RCMP trainmg was commg to an end, the gnevor was still not confident of success He testified that m a weekly telephone call home several days before March 1st, he asked hIS mother to call the manager, tell hIm that the trammg was very hard and ask for an extenSIOn of hIS leave He had frostbIte and severe bronchItis at the time, and may have told her that. HIS mother testified that as a result of that call she thought the gnevor was SIck. She called the store manager and told hIm the gnevor could not come back because he was SIck. She testified that he replIed that the gnevor would have to prOVIde a doctor's note. In the thIrd or fourth week of March, the gnevor receIved the following letter from the employer dated March 11, 1996 -. 3 - ThIS letter IS further to my prevIOUS correspondence of Januarv 26th con cermng your request for a 26 week leave of absence wIthout pay You will recall that you were granted a one month leave wIthout pay com mencing January 29, 1996 You were further advIsed that you were to con tact your store manager no later than March 1, 1996 and advIse hIm of your avaIlabilIty To date you have failed to do so. As outlmed m our January 26th letter, your faIlure to advIse your manager of your availabIlIty would be deemed as abandonment of your pOSItIon and, as such, your employment with the LeBO would be termInated. In lIght of your failure to comply wIth thIS letter, I regret to advIse you that effectIve immedIately, your employment wIth the LeBO IS hereby termmated. The grievor testIfied that he was shocked and surprIsed by the letter He testI- fied m chIef that durmg hIS next weekly call home he asked hIS mother whether she had spoken to the store manager, and that she replIed that the manager had saId that the only way he could come back was WIth a doctor's note. He was asked m cross-exammation why he had not asked hIS mother about the outcome of her call to the manager m any of the weekly calls home he made after the one m whIch he asked her to call the manager and before he receIved the letter He then testIfied that he had asked about It In one of those earlIer conversations, and had also been told that the store manager had said he would have to supply a doctor's note. The grIevor did not do anythmg about the letter whIle he remained In Re- gma. He saId It seemed 80 final, he dId not know what he could do He did not attempt to contact the employer hImself, eIther after hIS mother told hIm that the response to hIS request for extended leave was that he would have to prOVIde a doctor's note or after receIvmg the letter of March 11, 1996 He testIfied at length about how busy hIS weekdays were durmg tramIng, the lImIted opportu- mtIes to make telephone calls and hIS lImIted financIal resources In relatIOn to the cost of long dIstance calls He dId not ask hIS mother to contact the employer agaIn. He dId not attempt to contact MIllIe BrIffa or any other umon representa- tIve from Regma. When asked why, he saId that he dId not have the umon's tele- phone number and that hIS mother had been unable to find It for hIm m the To- ronto telephone book. After receIvmg the termmatIOn letter, the grIevor carrIed on WIth hIS RCMP traInIng He dId not complete It, though. He was dIscharged from the -~ 4- trammg program in mId June 1996 after faIlmg to perform to a satIsfactory level m the use of firearms. The grievor returned to Toronto on June 14, 1996 He was exhausted and depressed, and dId not do much of anythmg for the first few days after hIS re- turn. Thereafter, he attended to other personal busmess and spoke to a couple of lawyers concermng hIS dIscharge by the employer He dId not contact the umon untIl early July He wanted to speak to MIllIe Bnffa. She was then on vacation or otherwIse unavailable He finally dId speak WIth her on July 23, 1996 and, as a result, the grIevance dated July 29, 1996, now before me was prepared, SIgned by the gnevor and filed. ArtIcle 27 of the partIes' collective agreement prOVIdes, m part, as follows. 27.3 Stage 1 (Complaint Stage) (a) (i) An employee who has a complamt or adrlIerence shall dIS- cuss the complaint or drlIerence WIth hls/her supervIsor, as desIgnated by the Employers, WIthin ten (10) days of the em ployee fIrst becommg aware of the CIrcumstances glVmg rIse to the complamt or drlIerence. (c) If the complamt or drlIerence IS not satisfactonly resolved by the supervIsor It may be processed withm an addItional ten (10) days from the date of the supervIsor's response or the eXpIratIOn of the tune hnllts set out m (b) above, in the followmg manner 27.4 Stage 2 (a) The employee may file a gnevance m wntmg with hls/her super visor specuymg the clause or clauses m thIS Agreement alleged to have been violated. (b) The supervIsor shall complete an mvestIgation of the gnevance and prOVIde the gnevor WIth hIs/her wntten deCISIOn wIthm fIf teen (15) days of receIVmg the gnevance The mvestIgatIOn may mclude a meeting WIth the employee affordIng hIm an opportu mty to be heard. 27.5 Stage 3 (a) (i) If the gnevance IS not resolved under ArtIcle 27 4, the em ployee may submIt the gnevance to the ChaIrman .of the LCBO or ChaIrman of the LLBO or their respectIve deslg nees [SIC] withm five (5) days of the date that he/she receIved the deCISIOn under Article 27 4. - - 5 - 27.6 Stage 4 If the grievor IS not satisfied wIth the decIsion of the Chmrman or desIgnee [sic] or if a decIsIOn IS not received withm the specIfied time lImits, the gnevor may apply to the Crown Employees Grievance Set tlement Board for a heanng of the gnevance wIthm five (5) days of the date helshe received the decisIOn or wIthin five (5) days of the expIration of the speCIfied time hmIt for receIVmg a decIsIOn 277 An employee claImmg helshe has been msmIssed wIthout Just cause shall be entitled to file a gnevance commencmg at Stage 3 prOVIded helshe does so withm ten (10) days of the date of the dIsmissal. The wntten gnevance here was submItted at stage 2, not stage 3 There IS no eVIdence of any pre-filmg dISCUSSIOn of the sort contemplated by ArtIcle 27 3(a), nor any suggestIOn that the absence of such a dISCUSSIOn IS of any sIgmfi- cance Jean Chaykowsky, an OLBEU representatIve for 20 years, testified that of the 5000 LeBO employees covered by the partIes' collectIve agreement, 3000 are casual. She saId that the Issue raIsed here - whether article 31 5(b) allows a casual employee to remain unavaIlable without leave for up to 3 months WIthout nskmg termmatIOn - is Important to the UnIon and to those casual employees and has not been addressed m any preVIOUS arbitratIon award. There IS no evidence that the gnevor's delay in filing this grievance preJu- dIced the employer's abIlIty to respond to It on the ments at arbItratIOn. Indeed, the employer conceded that there was no prejUdICe Argument Umon counsel argued that smce artIcle 27 7 does not require that a dIS- charge grIevance be filed at step 3, such a grIevance can be filed at eIther step 2 or step 3 The tIme lImIt for filmg at step 2 depends on when the gnevor first be- came "aware of the CIrcumstances gIvmg rIse to the complamt or dIfference" ThIS IS a subjectIve test. OPSEU (P~erre) and Mimstry of Correctwnal Sermces, 0492/86 (February 22, 1988, VerIty), Jud. rev demed sub nom The Queen m R~ght of Ontano as represented by the Mimstry of Correctwnal Serv~ces v Ontarw PublLc Servtce Employees Unwn and the Gnevance Settlement Board (1990), 74 OR. (2d) 700 (ant. DIV Ct.), OLBEU (Gordon) and LCBO, 0048/89 (January 10, 1991, DIs.sanayake), OPSEU (Vandenheuvel et al) and Mimstry of the Enmron- ment, 2086/91 (May 7 1992, Low), OLBEU (M) and LCBO, 727/91 (July 9, 1992, - 6 - Roberts} He argued that thIS SUbjectIve test IS not satIsfied unless and untIl the gnevor knows of three thmgs the eXIstence of the facts on whIch the complamt IS based, the alleged nghts on whIch the complaint IS based and the process m whIch the complamt could be asserted The gnevor here dId not know of the pro- cess in whIch hIS complamt could be asserted untIl he met wIth MIlhe BrIffa on July 23, 1996, less than 10 days before the grievance was filed. Accordmgly, he submItted, the grIevance was not untImely In the alternatIve, umon counsel submItted that If I found that the griev- ance was not tImely filed I should extend the tIme for filmg m the exerCIse of my JurisdIctIOn under subsectIOn 48(16) of the Labour Relatwns Act, 1995, SO 1995, c. 1, Sch. A ("the LRA"), whIch apphes to these proceedings by VIrtue of subsec- tIon 7 (3) of the Crown Employees Collectwe Bargammg Act, 1993, S 0 1993, c. 381 as amended. SubsectIOn 48(16) of the LRA provIdes (16) Except where a collective agreement states that thIS subsection does not apply, an arbItrator or arbItratIOn board may extend the time for the takmg of any step in the grIevance procedure under a collectIve agree. ment, despIte the expIratIon of the time, where the arbItrator or arbItratIOn board IS satIsfied that there are reasonable grounds for the extenSIOn and that the OpposIte party will not be substantially preJudIced by the extenSIOn. Umon counsel submItted that the dIscretion afforded by what IS now sub- sectIOn 48(16) of the LRA should be exercIsed as arbItrator Burkett suggested in Re Becker Milk Company Ltd. and Teamsters Umon, Local 647 (1978), 19 L.A.C (2d) 217 at 220-221 The exerCIse of the eqUItable dIscretIon vested m an arbItrator under s. 37(5a) [now 48(16)] of the Act reqUITes a consIderatIOn of at least three fac tors. These are (i) the reason for the delay gIVen by the offendmg party; (ii) the length of the delay' (hi) the nature of the grIevance If the offendmg party satIsfies an arbItrator, notwIthstandmg the delav that It acted WIth due diligence, then II there has been no prejudIce the arbItrator should exer CIse hIS dIscretIOn m favour of extendmg the tune-lImIts. If however, the of fendmg party has been neglIgent or IS otherWIse to blame for the delay, el ther m whole or m part, the arbItrator must nevertheless conSIder the sec ond and thud factors referred to above m decldmg II reasonable grounds ex 1st for an extenSIOn of the tIme-lImIts In so far as Re Pamour Porcupme Mines Ltd. (Schumacher DunstOn) and Us. IV (1976) 12 L.A.C (2d) 122 (Dunn), stands for the propOSItIOn that the only factor to be conSIdered IS the "reasonableness of the excuse for the delay, I respectfully dIsagree The purpose of the sectIOn IS to alleViate agamst techmcal bars If the offendmg party has been neglIgent m Its processmg of the grIevance but the delay has been of short duratIOn an arbItrator would be permitted to rely on the short penod of delay as constltutmg reasonable grounds for an extenSIOn If the - 7 - grIevance mvolves the termmaLion of an employee, as distinct from some lesser form of dlsclplme, thIS IS also an eqUitable conSIderatIOn whIch must be taken mto account, m deCIding If there are reasonable grounds to extend the bme-lImIts. One arbItrator has gone so far as to state that m a dIscharge grIevance, there would have to be a very clear case of unexcused, unreasonable delay and prejUdICe to the employer before It would be proper to deprIve the gnevor of the nght to a hearmg on the ments. (EmphasIs added.) See Re Lincoln Plcue Nursmg Home and SerVLce Employ- ees Unwn, unreported, July 8, 1977 (Rayner) The term "reasonable grounds for the extensIOn" as found in s.37(5a) of the Act is not synonymous wIth the reasonableness of the excuse advanced by the offendmg party Havmg re- gard to the purpose of the section the term carries a broader slgmficatIOn whIch requrres the arbItrator to wClgh a number of factors, mcludmg but not necessarily restncted to those whIch have been set out above. Counsel for the umon argued that m considermg the delay here I should take mto account the gnevor's dIfficulty dealmg with matters from Regma. He noted that the dIscharge letter dId not refer to cause for dIscharge or to the nght to grIeve The grievor had testified that he was not famIlIar wIth the detaIls of the grievance process, and that he dId not know what he could do Counsel sub- mItted that m any event the fact that the grievance here concerns the termina- tIon of the grIevor's employment, together wIth the Importance to the umon of the Issue It raIses, should outweIgh any madequacy m the explanation for the delay In addItIOn to awards already mentIOned, umon counsel referred m argu- ment to Re Toronto Western Hospaal and Ontano Nurses' Assoc~atwn (1983) 9 L.A.C (3d) 91 (Tephtsky), Re Corporatwn of the C~ty of Toronto and Canadwn Unwn of Pubhc Employees, Local 43 (1983) 12 L.A.C (3d) 355 (Knopf), Be St Jo- seph's Hospaal, Guelph and Ontano Nurses' Assoc~atwn (1984) 15 L.AC (3d) 376 (Brent), Re Peterborough Cw~c Hosp~tal and Canadwn Unwn of Pubhc Em- ployees, Local 19 (1990), 11 L.AC (4th) 186 (Emrich), Re Corporatwn of Cay of Toronto and Canad~an Unwn of Pubhc Employees, Local 43 (1990) 17 L.A.C (4th) 420 (Sprmgate), Re FerrantkPackard Transformers Ltd. and Umted Steel- workers of Amerwa, Local 5788 (1993) 36 L.A.C (4th) 307 (Haeflmg), Be Metro- pol~tan L~censmg Comnnsswn and Canadwn Unwn of Publlc Employees, Local 79 (1995) 47 L.A.C (4th) 182 (Sprmgate), Re T.R.E Inc, WeIland and Umted Steelworkers, Local 8696 (1983) 10 L.AC (3d) 295 (Brent), Be John Zmer Lum ber Ltd. and Teamsters Unwn, Local 230 (1996), 56 L.AC (4th) 429 (MItchmck), --; .8. Re Queensway General Hosp~tal and Ontarw Nurses' Assocmtwn (unreported, August 22, 1996, Kaplan), and Re Corporatwn of CLty of Thunder Bay and Ca- nadmn Unwn of Publtc Employees, Local 87 (1991) 20 L.A.C (4th) 361 (Char- ney) Counsel for the employer argued that the tIme lImIt for filmg a grievance about dIsmIssal IS as set out m artIcle 27 7, whIch has no subjective element, and that filIng at set 2 IS not an option for dIsmIssed employees. In the alternatIve, he submitted that the decision in Gordon mIsinterpreted the test for tImehness at step 2 when It found that "CIrcumstances" embraced anythmg other than facts. In any event, the grIevor clearly knew of the alleged right on whIch he now rehes even before he left for Regma, so even on the mterpretatIOn m Gordon the tIme began to run when the gnevor received the letter On that view, he noted, the correctness of the deCIsion in Gordon would not have to be resolved here OLBEU (M) and LCBO, 727/91 (July 9, 1992, Roberts) With respect to tImeli. ness, counsel also referred to Re Leo Baeck Day School and Assoc~atwn of Gen- eral Studws Teachers m Hebrew Day Schools (1995) 52 L.A.C (4th) 235 (Sargeant) With respect to the claim for rehef from the tIme lImIts under subsection 48(16), counsel for the employer argued that the sIgnIficant delay IS not reasona- bly explamed by real or anticIpated dIfficulties of communIcation by telephone from Regma. Counsel noted that the gnevor could have communIcated by mail. He mVIted me to conclude that the gnevor was SImply not concerned enough to make the effort eIther to clanfy the apparent mIsunderstandmg about what hIS mother was supposed to have asked nor, later, to protest the termmatIOn of hIS employment. He also noted in that regard that after he returned to Toronto, the gnevor waIted over a month before dIscussmg hIS SItuatIOn WIth someone at the UnIon. WhIle acknowledgmg that thIS IS a dIscharge gnevance, counsel argued that the arbItral Junsprudence dId not say that thIS IS enough by Itself to war- rant an extenSIOn. It IS a factor, he saId, not the factor SImIlarly, the Importance of the questIOn of mterpretatIOn IS a factor, not the factor In addItIOn to awards mentIOned earlIer, employer counsel referred to Re General Freezers Ltd. and Umted Steelworl?ers, Local 7455 (1983), 9 L.A.C (3d) 279 (O'Shea), Re Bakery Glaco I nc and Canadmn Automob~le Workers (1991), 21 L.A.C (4th) 116 -- 9 - (O'Shea), and Re Bakery Glaco (Ecko Canada Inc.) and Canadwn Automobtle Workers, Local 124 (1991),21 L.A.C (4th) 116 (WarrIan) Decision When the grIevor left for Regma, he knew about ArtIcle 31 5(b) of the col- lectIve agreement. He belIeved It meant that his being unavaIlable for a perIOd of less than three months beyond any leave the employer granted should not result in terminatIOn of his employment. He knew that the umon shared that VIew, and that the union would fight for hIm If the employer acted m a manner mconsIstent wIth that VieW He thought that fightmg would or might mvolve fihng a griev- ance. He had been a bargammg umt employee for 16 years He knew enough to speak to a umon representatIve when he was unsure what hIS rights were under the collective agreement. Although he had never filed a grievance hImself, he knew that grievances are filed to deal wIth dIsputes He saId his knowledge of the right to file a grievance was "hmIted," that It was a "process not completely unknown to me, but much of It was a mystery " The Gordon deCISIOn does not appear to me to say that the time hmIt de- scribed in article 27 3(a) runs only when the grIevor has a thorough, detaIled un- derstandmg of the grIevance process. In Gordon, the grIevor was not aware that the right on wluch she relIed had been added to the collectIve agreement untIl shortly before she made her complamt about earlIer events The board saId that As under the OPSEU agreement, the "complamt or dIfference" referred to m artIcle 27 3 (a) (i) must be a complamt or dIfference under the collectIve agreement. In our view, the "cIrcumstances" gIvmg rIse to such a complamt or dIfference are two fold. First, there must be a rIght under the collectIve agreement. Second, there must be an act or omISSIOn by a party to the agreement whICh the other party feels has abridged or contravened that nght. Before an employee can be SaId to have become aware of "the CIrcum stances gIvmg nse to the complamt or difference" under artIcle 27 3(a)(i) he or she must be aware of both the eXIstence of a nght and a factual baSIS whIch may contravene that nght. As under the OPSEU agreement, the par ties, by alludmg to the employee's awareness, have mtended to mtroduce a sUbjectIve test. The mtent IS that an employee must act expedItIOusly once he or she becomes aware that a nght under the collectIve agreement may have been contravened, When he learned that the employer had purported to termmate hIS em- ployment, the grIevor here already knew of the right that he says that contra vened Indeed, he already knew that a contraventIOn was somethmg that could -. .".... - 10 - be the subject of a fight the UnIon would take up for hIm. Accordmgly, the mter- pretatIOn m Gordon does not aSSIst the gnevor I do not have to decIde whether the interpretation in Gordon IS correct, nor whether a dIscharge grIevance can be filed at step 2 of the grievance procedure Assummg that the UnIon IS rIght on both pomts, thIS grIevance IS out of time. That IS so, of course, whether the grIevor was actually aware of the apphcable tIme hmlts or not. The grIevor's explanatIOn for hIS delay m takmg actIOn IS not reasonable Indeed, parts of It are dIfficult to believe After he receIved the letter, he could have promptly done somethmg to commUnIcate to the employer or the UnIon hIS dIsagreement WIth what the employer had done. It IS hard to beheve that some- one whose only defiCIency as a potential pohce officer was an mabIlity to shoot people could not figure out how to contact the UnIon from Regma. Nevertheless1 I agree WIth arbItrator Sprmgate's observatIons at page 194 of his award m Re Metropohtan L~censmg Comm~sswn and Canadwn Unwn of Publw Employees, Local 79, supra. Although General Freezers and certam other cases have held that the reason for a delay must Itself be reasonable before a mIssed trme-hrrnt can be extended, thIS approach has now generally been rejected. Instead most arbi trators follow the reasoning m Re Becker Milk Co. and Teamsters Unwn, Loc. 647 (1978), 19 L.A.C (2d) 217 (Burkett), where It was held that the term "reasonable grounds for the extenSIOn" m the Act IS not synonymous WIth the reasonableness of the excuse advanced by the offendmg party In the result, while the reason for the delay IS one of the factors looked at, other consIderatIons are also taken mto account, mcludmg the length of the delay and the nature of the grievance. WhIle the nature of the grIevance IS not the only factor m assessmg whether there are reasonable grounds for extenSIOn, It IS a very Important factor m dIscharge cases In Re Becker Mill? Company, arbItrator Burkett quoted arbI- trator Rayner's VIew that "there would have to be a very clear case of unexcused, unreasonable delay and prejUdICe to the employer before It would be proper to deprIve the grIevor of the rIght to a hearmg on the ments." WhIle other arbItra- tors mIght not be so categOrIcal, those who reject the General Freezers mterpreta tIOn of what IS now subsectIOn 48(16) of the LRA do seem generally to reheve agamst poorly explamed delays of a matter of months occaSIOned by grievors m dIscharge cases, when the employer would suffer no prejUdICe ~. 7 11- SubsectIOn 48(16) identIfies two cnterIa. reasonable grounds and the ab- sence of substantIal preJudIce. The award m Re Becker Milk Company IdentIfies three conSIderatIOns m assessing reasonable grounds. the reason for the delay, the length of the delay and the nature of the grIevance. One mIght ask what SIg- mficance the length of the delay has m the analYSIS when It has not caused the employer any preJudIce. A delay may reflect bad faIth, or a deliberate or reckless dIsregard for negotiated time hmits. That would be dIfficult to countenance, par- tIcularly If the delay was caused by a person or persons actmg on behalf of the umon that agreed to the tIme hmIts. There IS none of that here. There IS no sug- gestIOn that the umon knew of the dIscharge or of the grIevor's deSIre to chal- lenge It before the grIevor spoke WIth MIllie Briffa. I do not thmk it can be as- sumed WIthout proof that a rank and file employee would be aware that there are short tIme hmIts on the filmg of a grIevance. I accept that the grIevor was not. The delay here does not reflect bad faith, or a deliberate or reckless dIsre- gard for negotIated tIme hmits There may be other ways m whIch non- prejudIcial delay mIght outweIgh the Importance of havmg a dIscharge grIevance heard on Its merIts, but none has been demonstrated here. Accordingly, havmg regard to the importance of the grIevance to the gflevor and the union and the fact that an extenSIOn would cause the employer no preJudIce, notwIthstandmg the length of the delay I grant the requested ex- tensIOn of the tIme hmit for filing tills gflevance The delay m fihng the grIev- ance WIll be taken mto account m assessmg any compensatIOn for whIch the em- ployer may be found hable If the grIevance succeeds on its merIts. The grIevance IS to be rescheduled for hearmg III consultatIOn with the parties Dated at Toronto thIS 10th day of March, 1997 ~V. Owen V Gray, VIce- haIr