HomeMy WebLinkAboutP-2013-1964 et al.Ronkai.17-10-04 Decision
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PSGB#P-2013-1964; P-2013-3118
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF ONTARIO ACT
Before
THE PUBLIC SERVICE GRIEVANCE BOARD
BETWEEN
Ronkai Complainant
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The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) Employer
BEFORE Kathleen G. O’Neil Chair
FOR THE
COMPLAINANT
Joseph Fera, Counsel (January 14 and
March 21, 2016 only), and Zoltan Ronkai
FOR THE EMPLOYER Peter Dailleboust
Treasury Board Secretariat
Legal Services Branch
Senior Counsel
Thomas Ayers
Treasury Board Secretariat
Legal Services Branch
Counsel
HEARING January 14, March 21, April 22, 27, 29,
May 10, October 4, 12 December 7, 19,
2016, February 14 and April 7, 2017
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D E C I S I O N
[1] This decision deals with the complaints of Zoltan Ronkai in which he contests his
suspension pending investigation, and later termination of his contract as an
Operational Manager, claiming that both employer actions were a reprisal for the
reporting of wrongdoing. The employer is of the view that there was nothing improper in
its actions towards Mr. Ronkai.
The factual context
[2] Mr. Ronkai worked as a Security Manager at Maplehurst Correctional Complex
(referred to below as Maplehurst) for 8 years prior to his retirement in June 2012 after
32 years of service with the Ministry. He returned to work as a part-time Operational
Manager (OM), on a fixed-term contract, at the end of that same summer. His plan was
to work for several more years, to the extent allowed without negatively impacting his
pension. As events unfolded, his contract was terminated by letter dated November 4,
2013, with 16 weeks’ pay. Mr. Ronkai is strongly of the view that the termination of his
contract, and events leading up to it, were a series of illegal reprisals by senior
management because he reported wrongdoing.
[3] Both prior to and after his retirement, Mr. Ronkai was very concerned that
another OM was committing time theft, falsifying time sheets, and getting paid for time
not worked, and that management was not taking it seriously. He started collecting
evidence in 2009, and showed it to three successive superintendents, but asserts that
little or nothing was done about it. In early 2013, he decided to report both his
allegations of fraud, and of inaction by Maplehurst management, to the Deputy Minister,
his Ethics Executive.
[4] Shortly thereafter, Mr. Ronkai was suspended pending investigation of
allegations which he believes were known by management to be groundless from the
beginning. An investigation followed, which exonerated him. He was offered a return to
work at two institutions other than Maplehurst, but he declined on the basis that he
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would not be safe, because staff would know he had turned in a fellow employee, and
make his work life intolerable because of the Code of Silence.
[5] The Code of Silence has been referred to in a 2013 Ombudsman report on the
subject, filed by Mr. Ronkai in these proceedings, as “an unwritten social incentive to
protect and show solidarity for co-workers, even if it means conspiring to lie, destroy
and falsify records.” The report concluded that: “Staff who breach this code become
victims themselves, labelled as “rats”, ostracized, treated as pariahs, subject to direct
and covert harassment and threats, and their personal safety is put in jeopardy.” Mr.
Ronkai asserts that he has lived this, and that once he had reported both his colleague
and his superintendent to higher authorities, he could never be safe in an institutional
setting, because all levels of staff would punish him for reporting his colleagues, and
perhaps not come to his aid when he needed it in the course of his duties.
[6] The complaints now before this Board arose from Mr. Ronkai’s conviction that it
was he, as the innocent party, who uncovered and reported fraud, who was punished,
while his colleague who was defrauding the employer and the public purse, was
protected. Mr. Ronkai claims damages for the loss of income he would have earned if
he had worked on contract for the years he had planned, and asserts that management
should have protected him from the operation of the Code of Silence by finding him
work in a non-institutional setting, or some other Ministry, rather than letting him go.
[7] The factual situation which resulted in the non-renewal of Mr. Ronkai’s contract
has three main elements, which Mr. Ronkai sees as intimately and causally related,
while the employer sees them as separately caused, and interrelated only in timing.
These are:
a) Mr. Ronkai’s allegations that one of his colleagues had been involved in time-
theft for several years.
I note that I have not named the OM accused of time theft, who was not a
party or a witness in this case. This is because neither side’s case, in the
end, requires the resolution of disputed facts about this OM’s behaviour,
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including the question of whether this OM should have been disciplined. Nor
was the OM in question given notice of the possibility of negative findings
about the accusations made by Mr. Ronkai.
b) Mr. Ronkai’s use of a maintenance cart to accommodate a mobility issue; and
c) Allegations against Mr. Ronkai of improper use of keys and access to offices
and computers to which he was not assigned.
An overview of these elements, and how they interacted, follows before the
consideration of the legal issues raised by these facts. I have carefully considered all
the evidence tendered in this hearing, even if not specifically mentioned below, in the
interests of keeping the decision to a reasonable length.
[8] Between 2009 and 2011, Mr. Ronkai dealt with two successive Maplehurst
Superintendents, Doug Dagleish and Tom O’Connell, about his allegations about time
theft. He showed them evidence, and discussed the matter with them, but was
dissatisfied with the fact that no discipline was meted out, although there is some
evidence that the OM in question was spoken to. Mr. Ronkai asserts that the OM in
question was being protected because of family ties in the senior ranks of the Ministry.
[9] Mark Parisotto took over as Superintendent in December 2011, having been in
the position of Deputy Superintendent, Administration, since May 2011. Mr. Ronkai did
not raise the issue of time theft with him prior to his retirement in June 2012. Later that
year, on October 23, a few months after Mr. Ronkai returned as a part-time OM, he
raised his concerns about his colleague’s timekeeping with Mr. Parisotto. Mr. Ronkai
asked the Superintendent to keep the matter confidential because he was concerned
that he would have difficulties at work if news got out, because of the Code of Silence
which deters complaints about work colleagues by punishing those who do. According
to a later fact-finding report, he also indicated at the time that if Mr. Parisotto did not
deal with the matter, he would take it to the Deputy Minister.
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[10] After consulting with Mike Conry, then Regional Director, Mr. Parisotto decided to
use an internal local investigator, Bob Ryan, to look into the matter. In late October, Mr.
Ryan was assigned to do a preliminary fact-finding to see if the information provided by
Mr. Ronkai had validity. As part of this process, information Mr. Ronkai had gathered in
the form of video and sign-in sheets was given to Mr. Ryan, and Mr. Ronkai and another
Security Manager, Michael McDonald, were interviewed. Mr. Ryan was asked to
provide a preliminary report to the Superintendent before he interviewed the OM
accused of time theft, as part of the process of deciding whether a further investigation
was needed, including whether the matter should be assigned to the Correctional
Investigation and Security Unit [CISU], which reports to the Assistant Deputy Minister,
independent of the local institution in question.
[11] The Superintendent delegated the issue to his deputies, Janet Gauthier and
Chuck Marchegiano, and they consulted Bart Nowak of Employee Relations once Mr.
Ryan had analyzed the information provided by Messrs. Ronkai and McDonald. Mr.
Nowak raised questions as to whether Mr. Ronkai had been authorized to do the
investigation he had been doing and about the age and comprehensiveness of the
information collected. Neither deputy was aware that Mr. Ronkai had any authorization
for an investigation of his colleague. The subject of the Bill 168 amendments to the
Occupational Health and Safety Act, and the possibility that unauthorized surveillance
could be seen as harassment was raised in the consultation as well. There were also
concerns about whether management would be seen to have condoned the behaviour
given the length of time the behaviour had allegedly gone on without action by
management.
[12] Following the consultation with Mr. Nowak, the deputies concluded that the
evidence collected was not useable, and informed Superintendent Parisotto of this.
Although Mr. Parisotto had authorized Mr. Ronkai to download information for Mr.
Ryan’s factfinding, the Superintendent had seen no indication that the evidence
collected earlier had been authorized by the previous Superintendents. He had found
no documentation of any investigation, despite having read everything in the office
when he took over as Superintendent. Nor had he heard anything about it, despite his
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overlap with Messrs. O’Connell and Dagleish in various roles, including time as Deputy
Superintendent, during which he thought he would have heard about any active
investigations.
[13] It was later established that Mr. O’Connell had authorized Mr. Ronkai to collect
information on his colleague’s timekeeping, but I accept Mr. Parisotto’s uncontradicted
evidence that he did not know this at the time he was considering the matter in the fall
of 2012 and winter of 2013. Mr. Parisotto did not contact Mr. O’Connell, who was then
superintendent at another provincial institution, or Mr. Dagleish, who had retired,
because he did not want to risk compromising any further investigation of the matter, by
having contacted them himself outside of an investigation.
[14] In any event, after consultation with the deputies, and the Regional Director,
Superintendent Parisotto determined that the local investigation would not proceed
further, and that the Deputy Superintendents would speak to the OM in question about
proper timekeeping and signing in and out accurately. Deputies Gauthier and
Marchegiano met with the OM on February 5, 2013 raising the issue of discrepancies
regarding sign in sheets. The OM was forthright with the deputies, and provided an
explanation which they accepted. The explanation was that, although the sign in and
out sheets were not accurate in many instances, it was a way to compensate for
overtime worked but not claimed as such, so that it all evened out. Essentially, the idea
presented by the OM was that there was no personal gain involved, but rather a saving
of overtime payments for the Ministry. Direction was given to the OM about signing in
and out accurately, and claiming for overtime going forward.
[15] In the meantime, on January 25, 2013, at 5:00 p.m., not satisfied with the pace of
the internal investigation, Mr. Ronkai had complained to the Deputy Minister, by email.
In the email, Mr. Ronkai noted he had complained about his colleague’s time theft to Mr.
Parisotto in October, and given him further evidence in November, but that his
colleague was still at work. He reiterated his allegations that time sheets were being
falsified, characterizing the behaviour as fraud and breach of trust, and stating, “We
have inmates in our jails for less than this.” He closed the email with a paragraph
stating that he felt he was being ostracized by Maplehurst’s leaders, that he had been
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told that the Superintendent was displeased with him because he had to deal with Mr.
Ronkai’s complaint, and that he was afraid that “as a retaliation for coming forward and
causing the Superintendent grief I will be let go from my job at some point.”
[16] Earlier that same day, January 25, 2013, Mr. Ronkai had been informed by
Deputy Superintendent Todd Smith, that a complaint had been received concerning his
use of an electric cart to escort an inmate through the institution. Mr. Smith
communicated a direction from Mr. Parisotto that Mr. Ronkai was not to escort inmates
while riding the cart unless he had a Correctional Officer with him as well. Mr. Ronkai
saw this as discrimination on the basis of his disability and filed a complaint in that
regard. Mr. Ronkai had a mobility issue, for which his previous superintendent had
allowed him to use the electric cart, without a formal accommodation plan, or medical
evidence. Mr. Ronkai also received an email from Deputy Smith on January 25,
instructing him to provide a doctor’s note regarding any accommodation requirement.
[17] This was the second time in less than two months that the issue of the cart had
been raised. On December 15, 2012, a Correctional Officer had objected to Mr.
Ronkai’s escorting an inmate while riding an electric cart used by the maintenance
department to transport tools and equipment for their work around the institution. The
concern raised was that the inmate could commandeer the cart and injure staff with it.
Mr. Ronkai responded the same day with a complaint that he was being discriminated
on the basis of his disability. The documentation of the incident indicates that Mr.
Ronkai had been advised after the first occasion to cease the practice of escorting
inmates with the cart.
[18] As a result of the complaints about the use of maintenance carts, senior
management reviewed the whole issue of the use of carts, and decided that it was
better not to use maintenance carts as assistive devices. In her interview with the
CISU, Ms. Gauthier said that, in consultation with other members of senior management
and staff with expertise in attendance and employee relations issues, she determined
that there were a number of issues about the use of the maintenance carts as assistive
devices, including the speed and the fact that they are not seat belted. A memo dated
February 6, 2013 was sent to Mr. Ronkai, and two others who had been using the carts,
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stating that they would no longer be permitted as assistive devices, but other
accommodations would be provided upon presentation of appropriate medical
information.
[19] After the January complaint about the maintenance cart, Deputy Superintendent
Smith had directed Mr. Ronkai to present a doctor’s note about his accommodation
needs. On February 9, 2013, Mr. Ronkai presented a note dated January 30, 2013,
which said that he required the use of an electric cart. The employer decided it needed
more information, being of the view that other accommodations might be possible, such
as assigning Mr. Ronkai to a post that did not require much walking. A standard letter
dated February 12, 2013 asking for more information from his doctor was prepared.
The evidence is unclear on whether Mr. Ronkai ever received it, but other events
overtook the accommodation issue, so not much turns on whether he did. Mr. Ronkai
feels it was discriminatory not to allow the use of the cart on the basis of his first
doctor’s note.
[20] Mr. Ronkai sees the restriction of the use of the cart as part of the reprisals for
complaining to the Deputy Minister. He did not dispute that bargaining unit staff had
complained about the use of the carts, and did not assert that management and the
union were colluding in bringing up the issue. However, he did assert that management
had seized on the complaint in order to punish him for having reported on the
timekeeping issue to the Deputy Minister, when it could have acted otherwise.
[21] On February 12, Deputy Superintendents Gauthier and Marchegiano met with
Mr. Ronkai to inform him that Mr. Ryan’s local investigation was not proceeding further
because of the problems with the evidence collected since 2009. At this meeting, Mr.
Ronkai let the Deputies know that he had already complained to the Deputy Minister
and that a CISU investigation would be conducted into the allegations of time theft. The
deputies informed Superintendent Parisotto of this shortly after.
[22] On February 13, Mr. Ronkai filed a report with the Superintendent indicating that
he considered that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his disability.
According to a summary of events prepared close to the time by Deputies Gauthier and
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Marchegiano, he also alleged that the administration was retaliating against him
because he had taken his complaint to the Deputy Minister.
[23] Around the time of the meeting on February 12, Deputy Superintendent Gauthier
received information from another OM that Mr. Ronkai was in possession of restricted
keys without authorization. This was one of several queries she had received from OM’s
who had observed Mr. Ronkai’s cart near the security office, when they knew he was no
longer assigned as a security manager. Security Manager positions are coveted ones,
and normally given to full-time OM’s. Deputy Gauthier had been asked on a number of
occasions why Mr. Ronkai was in the security office, even though he was now a
contract employee, and she did not have an answer.
[24] At this point in time, Deputy Gauthier was in charge of the institution, as the
Superintendent was on vacation. In order to check whether the information that Mr.
Ronkai was in possession of unauthorized keys had any validity, she asked a former
security manager to run a report from the computerized key-watcher system, so she
could see who had accessed restricted keys. As she was not familiar with these
reports, she had it interpreted for her by Rick Markell, Deputy Superintendent of
Operations, who advised that keys had been drawn by Mr. Ronkai to the offices of the
Deputy Superintendent of Operations, an office reserved to the Peel Regional police,
the administrative area and the key vault. These are keys that are to be accessed only
by security managers or senior administrators. Deputy Gauthier was particularly
concerned about access to the key vault, through which one can access every key in
the jail.
[25] As the Superintendent was away, Deputy Gauthier consulted the Regional
Director, Mike Conry on February 15, who directed her to immediately suspend Mr.
Ronkai with pay, pending investigation. As Mr. Ronkai was not due to work until
February 22, it was decided to wait until then. Mr. Ronkai was asked to write a report
about his key access, and then was suspended by the Superintendent who had
returned by then. By this time, the Deputy Minister had arranged to have the CISU
investigate Mr. Ronkai’s allegations, and Mr. Ronkai had been interviewed by the CISU
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two days before his suspension and connected the two events. However, there is no
evidence that Maplehurst management or Mr. Conry knew that Mr. Ronkai had been
interviewed by the CISU when the decision to suspend was made and implemented.
[26] Ms. Gauthier testified without contradiction that the decision to suspend Mr.
Ronkai was made on the phone by Mike Conry because of the issue with the keys; he
wanted Mr. Ronkai removed from the situation, so a proper investigation could be done.
She said that neither the issues about the investigation into time theft, nor the issue
about accommodation was any part of the discussion. She denied that reprisal against
Mr. Ronkai was involved.
[27] In cross-examination, Mr. Ronkai asked Ms. Gauthier when the information about
his cart being outside security came to her attention, and she was not sure. Moreover,
she had not received written reports of the dates or circumstances of the incidents
reported to her. In his closing remarks, Mr. Ronkai asserted that the lack of writing or
specifics was confirmation of the Code of Silence, which directs that staff do not tell the
superintendent anything. He further submitted that if Deputy Gauthier had gotten
specifics in writing from the individuals involved she would never have received
information from them again.
[28] The CISU conducted an investigation into Mr. Ronkai’s allegations concerning
his colleague’s timekeeping, as well as his allegations of reprisal by management for his
report to the Deputy Minister. A separate report was prepared on each, substantiating
most of the allegations made by Mr. Ronkai against his colleague, and exonerating Mr.
Ronkai of the allegations of improper access to restricted keys and locations at
Maplehurst. The CISU did not make a conclusion one way or the other as to reprisal,
because that jurisdiction lies with the Ethics Executive.
[29] After Mr. Ronkai was exonerated by the CISU investigation, Assistant Deputy
Minister of Institutional Services, Stephen Small asked Mr. Calverley, then Deputy
Regional Director, to contact Mr. Ronkai to offer him return to work options. He offered
work in two institutions other than Maplehurst. Mr. Ronkai declined both on the basis of
his belief that news of his having turned in a colleague would follow him and, because of
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the Code of Silence, he would never be safe in any institutional setting. Therefore, he
requested an assignment outside of a correctional institution, or in another Ministry.
[30] The termination of Mr. Ronkai’s contract followed by letter dated November 4,
2013, saying that because Mr. Ronkai had declined the offers, the ministry had decided
not to renew his fixed term contract. The letter, signed by Mr. Calverley, also noted that
he and Mr. Ronkai had discussed that the Ministry would have been prepared to take
appropriate steps regarding his safety, should he return to active employment.
[31] On November 20, 2013, Mr. Ronkai wrote the Deputy Minister complaining that
the termination of his contract constituted a further reprisal for reporting his colleague’s
fraud and its cover-up by management.
The Legal Context, Issues and Conclusions
[32] Relevant provisions of the Public Service of Ontario Act (PSOA) and case law
referred to in argument are attached as Appendices for ease of reference.
[33] The case law on reprisal is consistent to the effect that the burden of proof is on
the employer to show that the reasons given for the contested actions were the true
reasons, and were not intended to punish or “get back at” the complainant for the
protected activity. In this case, the protected activity is reporting wrongdoing to the
Ethics Executive. In several of the cases cited, the protected activity was seeking the
protection of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, or exercising rights under other
statutes, such as the Labour Relations Act, and the Environmental Protection Act. The
case law acknowledges that reprisals are rarely practiced in the open, and that valid
reasons may exist at the same time, and be used as a cover or pretext for illegal ones.
Inferences from all of the evidence may be drawn, where necessary. If an explanation
from the employer is unreasonable, unfair, or out of line with a rational response in the
circumstances, concern about whether the action complained of is a reprisal will be
increased.
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[34] Nonetheless, the issue is not whether there was “just cause” for the action taken,
or whether the complainant agreed with the choices made by the employer. The burden
of proof remains that of the balance of probabilities, rather than the criminal standard of
“beyond a reasonable doubt”. Mere possibility of an intent to punish a complainant for
engaging in protected activity is not enough to base a finding that there has been
reprisal. See the following cases filed by the employer, which I find representative of
the state of the law on the subject of reprisals in various employment contexts: York
(Municipality), [2002] OLRB Rep. May/June 481 (June 10, 2002) (Herlich); Grifferty and
The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Government Services), GSB No. P-2010-
2240 (October 16, 2012) (Devins); Lyndhurst Hospital, [1997] OLRB Rep. July/August
616 (August 15, 1997) (O'Neil); Hy's Steak House, [1990] OLRB Rep. February 163
(February 20, 1990) (Gray); Sobey's Inc., [1996] O.L.R.D. No. 3565 (October 7, 1996)
(Whitaker); Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878, (April 22, 2010) (Gottheil); Jones
v. Amway of Canada, [2002] O.J. No. 1504, 159 O.A.C. 331 (Ont. S.C.J.).
[35] When Mr. Ronkai filed these complaints, he was a fixed-term on-call employee.
As such, he was not eligible to bring a complaint to this Board concerning his terms and
conditions of employment, including any issues as to whether the termination of contract
was for just cause. This is a result of the provision of s. 5(2) of Regulation 378/07 under
PSOA, which puts limits on the Board’s jurisdiction, in terms of who may and may not
bring certain kinds of complaints. However, s. 5(3) of the same regulation permits him
to file a complaint of reprisal for the reporting of wrongdoing under s. 140 of the PSOA,
often referred to as the “whistleblower” protections. Thus, the main focus of the
decision is whether or not Mr. Ronkai’s suspension and non-renewal of his contract
were reprisals for reporting of wrongdoing.
[36] In order to establish a successful case for a reprisal for disclosure of wrongdoing
in an application under s. 140 of the PSOA, such as this one, there must be a report of
wrongdoing, made in accordance with Part VI of the Act, meaning to the Deputy
Minister, Mr. Ronkai’s Ethics Executive, or the Integrity Commissioner, and then
subsequent negative consequences because of that reporting, i.e. motivated by the
reporting rather than by bona fide managerial reasons.
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[37] It is clear that Mr. Ronkai experienced negative employment consequences that
meet the definition of reprisal under s. 139(2) of PSOA, as he was suspended, albeit
with pay, and his employment was later ended. It is not in dispute that, since the
Deputy Minister was his Ethics Executive, in reporting to him, Mr. Ronkai was in
compliance with the statute in the route that he took. The central issue in this case is
whether management’s actions were taken because he reported wrongdoing. Mr.
Ronkai finds it obvious that his reporting of wrongdoing was the motivation for the
employer’s actions. The employer entirely denies any improper motivation, and the
employer witnesses testified that they were motivated by concerns other than Mr.
Ronkai’s report to the Deputy Minister in acting as they did.
[38] The employer defense is two-fold. Firstly, in the employer’s view, what Mr.
Ronkai reported to the Deputy Minister was not the grave kind of wrong-doing which
falls within the very specific definition of that term in s. 108 (1) of the PSOA. Secondly,
the motivation for the management decisions in question were appropriate in all the
circumstances.
[39] Before dealing with those defenses, it is appropriate to note that Mr. Ronkai’s first
complaint, as filed, complained that those responsible for the reprisals were Mr. Mark
Parisotto, the Superintendent at Maplehurst, and his deputies, Janet Gauthier and Todd
Smith. In his second complaint, he named Mr. Calverley who authored the letter
terminating his contract. During the hearing, Mr. Ronkai alleged that Deputy Minister
Stephen Rhodes was also involved in a reprisal by his inaction in not correcting the
suspension or termination and letting them stand. Since there were no allegations
against Mr. Rhodes in the complaints, and no suggestion that he was involved in the
decisions to suspend or terminate Mr. Ronkai, the Board found that it was not likely that
he would have any evidence relevant to the complaint as filed, and declined to issue the
subpoena for him which Mr. Ronkai had requested.
[40] Mr. Ronkai did not name Mr. Conry in the complaint, but the evidence is clear
that he was involved in the decision to suspend. Mr. Conry has since retired, and did
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not testify, but a transcript of an interview of him by the CISU was part of the record,
and I have considered it as part of my decision making.
[41] Returning to the necessary elements for a successful complaint, I have
considered whether what Mr. Ronkai reported to the Deputy Minister qualifies as
wrongdoing, as defined in s. 108(1) of the PSOA. The kinds of wrongdoing by public
servants listed in section 108 of PSOA are divided into four general categories:
(a) breach of a federal or provincial statute or regulation;
(b) an act or omission that creates a grave and unreasonable danger;
(c) gross mismanagement;
(d) directing or counselling such wrongdoing.
[42] The employer argues that performance issues of the sort reported are not at the
level of gravity intended to be captured by the legislation. In the employer’s view,
timekeeping issues should not be considered at the same level as the categories
specifically mentioned in the statute as wrongdoing, such as gross mismanagement or
something creating a grave danger. Although there is merit to the idea that
performance issues correctable by progressive discipline are not likely what the
Legislature had in mind in s. 108 (1), it is clear that Mr. Ronkai characterized the
conduct he reported as criminal fraud. This characterization falls into the first branch of
the definition in 108(1) (a), as a breach of an Act of the Parliament of Canada, i.e. the
Criminal Code of Canada. In the circumstances of this case, which include that there
was no suggestion that Mr. Ronkai was insincere in his belief that his colleague’s
behaviour was criminal, this decision proceeds on the basis that his report to the Deputy
Minister qualifies as a report of wrongdoing within the meaning of s. 108 of the PSOA.
[43] This leaves the question of motivation, i.e., on all the evidence, is it more likely
than not that the managerial decisions in question, the withdrawal of Mr. Ronkai’s use of
an electric maintenance cart, the suspension pending investigation and the termination
of his contract, were motivated by the fact that, prior to these events, he had forwarded
his complaint about time theft and inaction by senior management to the Deputy
Minister?
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[44] As employer counsel conceded, the timing of the events is a factor that could
support such a notion. In reviewing the evidence about timing, I have looked at each of
the negative consequences complained of in turn, starting with the removal of the cart
Mr. Ronkai was using as a mobility device. Timing is the weakest for this aspect of the
complaint as the issue had been raised by the union in December, 2012, before Mr.
Ronkai had reported his concerns to the Deputy Minister and in a period when the
parties were in collective bargaining, not infrequently a circumstance associated with
increased union activity around health and safety. Although the matter was raised
again early on January 25, 2013, the same day as Mr. Ronkai reported his allegations
of wrongdoing to the Deputy Minister, there is no evidence that Mr. Smith or Parisotto
knew at that time that Mr. Ronkai was going to report anything to the Deputy Minister.
[45] As well, I do not find the fact that the Maplehurst administration was trying to
regularize the accommodation process for Mr. Ronkai, as well as others, to be
suggestive of a reprisal. Mr. Ronkai had not previously been required to follow the
standard process of presenting medical evidence so that a formal accommodation plan
could be prepared. Nonetheless, given the complaints about the carts, and the fact
that, given the size of Maplehurst, several people wanted to use them, it does not seem
unreasonable or suggestive of a reprisal that management was trying to deal with the
whole issue on a standard basis. The employer never suggested that Mr. Ronkai’s
disability would not be accommodated.
[46] The memo informing Mr. Ronkai that he was not to use the cart any longer as a
mobility device was dated February 6, 2013, but there is no evidence that either Mr.
Parisotto or any of his deputies knew Mr. Ronkai had gone to the Deputy Minister
before February 12, when Mr. Ronkai informed Deputies Gauthier and Marchegiano
that he had done so. Therefore, for this aspect of the complaint, I find no basis, even in
timing, to find that there was a reprisal involved.
[47] For the suspension, the timing link is the strongest, as the decision to suspend
was made a few days after Mr. Ronkai’s disclosure to the deputies that he had gone to
the Deputy Minister. Further, Mr. Ronkai highlights two aspects of the investigations
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preceding his suspension as indicative of management’s improper motivation. First, the
investigation done by Mr. Ryan was incomplete when management decided to end Mr.
Ryan’s work on the file and counsel the OM rather than suspend pending further
investigation or impose more severe discipline. Secondly, there was limited inquiry into
the allegations against Mr. Ronkai before management suspended him pending
investigation, and he was not interviewed in detail until after he was suspended. In Mr.
Ronkai’s view, these flawed investigations are transparent covers for the protection of
Mr. Ronkai’s colleague, followed by reprisals against himself for reporting his colleague
and then the Superintendent.
[48] One of Mr. Ronkai’s concerns is the fact that, as part of the initial fact-finding into
Mr. Ronkai’s timekeeping allegations, Mr. Ryan was assigned to interview Messrs.
Ronkai and McDonald but not the OM against whom the allegations were made. This
was a frustration to Mr. Ryan, a very experienced investigator, who is committed to
thorough investigations, and suggestive of a cover-up to Mr. Ronkai. Nonetheless, Mr.
Ryan’s straightforward evidence acknowledged that each investigation is different and
indicated that, as an employee of the institution, as opposed to the external CISU
investigators, he might have been seen as too close to the senior administrators to
continue the investigation. In any event, the decisions about the initial fact-finding were
made before the Maplehurst administration knew that Mr. Ronkai had complained to the
Deputy Minister.
[49] Further, Mr. Parisotto testified that a CISU investigation was a possibility at the
outset of his consideration of the matter in October 2013, so that he made an effort not
to compromise an eventual wider investigation if that was the route they chose after the
initial fact-finding. This was, for instance, his rationale for not contacting the former
superintendents to discuss whether they had authorized Mr. Ronkai’s investigation of
his colleague, and for keeping the fact-finding confidential from the OM whose conduct
was in issue. The CISU report was critical of this restrained approach and concluded
that Maplehurst management had not done due diligence before suspending Mr.
Ronkai.
- 17 -
[50] Nonetheless, Mr. Parisotto and Ms. Gauthier testified credibly that it was their
conclusion after consultation about the problems with the evidence collected by Mr.
Ronkai and the length of time the time- keeping practices had been going on, that the
best course was for the deputies to speak to the OM themselves. Once they did that,
the OM in question admitted to much of what was alleged, but explained it in a way that
the institution’s administrators found credible. According to the transcript of Ms.
Gauthier’s interview with the CISU, the OM corrected the problematic behaviour after
the counselling.
[51] It is of note as well that there was a substantial amount of evidence indicating
that there was an institutional culture at Maplehurst involving many instances of lack of
precision in signing in and out. The CISU report concluded, for instance, that there was
“a wide-spread practice amongst staff leaving prior to the end of their scheduled shifts.”
I take this as a significant back-drop for the fact that more severe action was not taken
against the OM, since, as employer counsel noted, this might well have been an issue if
the OM had been disciplined, and had complained that there was inequality of
discipline. Further, there were several indications in the evidence that Mr. Conry did not
view behaviour such as a manager working extra hours one day, and leaving early the
next, rather than claiming overtime, as tantamount to time theft.
[52] Both the oral evidence and transcripts of the interviews demonstrate that there
was a wide spectrum of opinion on how to characterize the timekeeping behaviour that
Mr. Ronkai adamantly insists was criminal fraud, the CISU characterized as breach of
policy by falsification of time sheets, and others saw as acceptable give and take for
trusted managers. As Mr. Bandhu, Manager, CISU, put it during his interview with Mr.
Ryan, there was a question of whether the behaviour was culpable, as in intentional
time theft, as opposed to non-culpable, which would include participation in the
institutional practice of signing in and out in a particular way.
[53] I emphasize here that the issue of how culpable the OM’s behaviour was is not
for this Board to decide in the context of this complaint, as it would be if this were a
complaint by that OM of discipline without just cause. However, the spectrum of opinion
- 18 -
is an important element in the resolution of this case, which revolves around the
credibility of management’s rationale for the decisions it made which negatively affected
Mr. Ronkai, which he sees as a continuation of their improper protection of his
colleague. The evidence indicates that Mr. Ronkai had a fixed view of the matter dating
back to 2009, which was not the same as those in charge of managing the situation.
For him, his view is obviously correct, and anyone seeing it differently is perhaps
involved in, or being taken in by, managerial cover-up and/or the Code of Silence. He
sees management’s choices as pretexts for a reprisal against him for complaining about
someone they were intent on protecting, failing to accommodate his disability, then
finding reasons to suspend him, when there were no valid ones, and then “not taking
care of him” when he was exonerated.
[54] It was Deputy Gauthier whose actions were the impetus for Regional Director
Conry’s direction to suspend. Does the evidence support a finding that in asking for the
key watcher reports, and then reporting the results to the Regional Director, Deputy
Gauthier was reacting to the fact that Mr. Ronkai had reported to the Deputy Minister?
The timing makes it possible, and the sequence of the receipt of the allegations of
improper key use were not well-detailed in the evidence. Nonetheless, having
considered all the circumstances, I do not find it likely that Deputy Gauthier was
motivated by the report to the Deputy Minister. Rather, I find that the evidence
establishes that there was a bona fide exercise of managerial discretion in following up
on the information received and consulting the Regional Director, the result of which
was the direction to suspend Mr. Ronkai with pay, pending investigation.
[55] Deputy Gauthier had been part of the issues surrounding Mr. Ronkai’s
allegations of time theft, and the allegations about his use of the electric cart, long
before the report to the Deputy Minister. She knew that Mr. Ronkai had been highly
critical of three successive superintendents for not acting on information in respect of
alleged unauthorized activity by the OM he accused. At the time she received the
information suggesting unauthorized access to keys, Deputy Gauthier was acting as
Superintendent. In participating in the consultations around the issue of time theft,
Deputy Gauthier had become quite concerned about Mr. Ronkai’s surveillance of his
- 19 -
colleague, which at the time she did not know had been authorized at all. When she put
this together with the information suggesting that Mr. Ronkai had been accessing keys
and restricted areas without authorization, her concern was heightened. She took the
time to check the information she had received by asking for the key-watcher report,
and having it interpreted for her by an ex-security manager who was much more familiar
with reading them. The information appeared to support the idea that Mr. Ronkai had
accessed sensitive areas to which he should not have had access.
[56] Deputy Gauthier’s credible evidence was that there was nothing mysterious
about her decision to act on the information. She acknowledged that Mr. Ronkai could
have been completely innocent, but said the process was basically that she received
information that he had been in places that he should not have been. She consulted the
Regional Director in the absence of the Superintendent, who gave a straightforward
direction to suspend with pay, so they could find out the truth of the situation. Deputy
Gauthier had cautioned Mr. Conry that Mr. Ronkai would likely allege that the
suspension was retaliatory, to which he responded that he would take responsibility for
the decision.
[57] Deputy Gauthier did have the disadvantage of not knowing that Superintendent
O’Connell had authorized Mr. Ronkai’s collection of evidence before his retirement, and
that Superintendent Parisotto had authorized collection of evidence by Mr. Ronkai about
his timekeeping allegations, even after Mr. Ryan had been appointed to do a fact-
finding. As well, she was perhaps most affected by the idea that what she genuinely
believed to have been unauthorized surveillance of a colleague for a number of years
could be seen as personal harassment under the Bill 168 amendments to the
Occupational Health and Safety Act. I am persuaded that, when confronted by the
evidence of the key watcher report, that she truly believed there was potential for a very
serious issue with Mr. Ronkai’s behaviour. The common thread that emerged from her
evidence was that Mr. Ronkai was engaged in unauthorized “looking around”.
[58] The fact that Deputy Gauthier was not inclined to think that the charges were
obviously groundless, as Mr. Ronkai thought she should have, was also coloured by her
work history with Mr. Ronkai. She had supervised Mr. Ronkai in another institution
- 20 -
earlier in their careers, and although she described their work relationship as generally
good, she did not approve of some of his methods in dealing with inmates in the
treatment setting where they worked together. There is no issue in this hearing about
those incidents, and it is important to be clear that I make no finding about them. The
background is clarifying, nonetheless, because it tends to support the credibility of
Deputy Gauthier’s testimony that she thought the information she had received
indicated potentially serious problematic behaviour. Her evidence persuades me that
she was genuinely concerned that Mr. Ronkai might have been taking what she thought
was unauthorized investigation of his peer even further, to the extent of accessing the
Deputy Superintendents’ offices and information that could be found there. Although
Mr. Ronkai is of the view that it should have been obvious that he was not doing
anything wrong, the evidence persuades me that Deputy Gauthier genuinely saw it
differently. Neither cross-examination or the rest of the evidence gave sufficient reason
to disbelieve her evidence.
[59] There were other choices of course, that could have been made. When
allegations are made to an administrator, a decision has to be made as to what action to
take. Deputy Gauthier could have done nothing, or engaged in further investigation
before consulting Mr. Conry. However, I do not find her choice to consult, or Mr.
Conry’s direction, unreasonable in the circumstances, or indicative of a reprisal. It is
clear from the evidence that there are many issues, including allegations by or against
inmates or staff, at any given time in a large correctional institution like Maplehurst, and
that sometimes the clearest path to an effective investigation is to remove the person
concerned from the situation, to prevent further allegations or issues from complicating
the situation. Although Mr. Ronkai was affronted by the idea that the allegations against
him would not be seen as obviously unfounded, I find senior management’s decision to
act in a way that made sure a proper investigation could be done a rational one in the
circumstances.
[60] Mr. Parisotto signed the letter suspending Mr. Ronkai, and in his submissions,
Mr. Ronkai focused on his role in the suspension. Moreover, the CISU investigation
report was critical of Mr. Parisotto for not doing more due diligence before suspending
- 21 -
Mr. Ronkai. However, other evidence indicates that the CISU investigator was not
aware that Mr. Parisotto had not been at work at the time of the consultation that lead to
Mr. Conry’s decision to suspend. The evidence is that, in suspending Mr. Ronkai, he
was acting in accord with the direction given to Deputy Gauthier by Mr. Conry, who had
the authority to give direction to both of them.
[61] It seems likely that Mr. Ronkai’s activities and complaints about his colleague
brought more attention to his own actions during the time period in question as
management considered matters after Mr. Ryan’s fact-finding. Nonetheless, I find the
evidence of Deputy Gauthier and Superintendent Parisotto a credible factual basis for
the finding that it is likely that the motivation for his paid suspension pending
investigation was to contain a potentially serious issue so that an investigation could be
done, rather than being related to the fact that Mr. Ronkai had referred the matter of his
longstanding allegations against his colleague to the Deputy Minister.
[62] More specifically, I find that the evidence does not support Mr. Ronkai’s claim
that senior management knew that the allegations about improper access to keys and
restricted areas were without foundation from the start. The evidence did not deal with
whether the people who gave the information to Deputy Gauthier believed the
allegations to be true, but there is no evidence on which I could make a finding that any
of Deputy Gauthier, Superintendent Parisotto or Regional Director Conry knew they
were without culpable substance at the time of the suspension. It is true that the CISU
investigation found that Mr. Ronkai had innocent reasons for being in the security office
and accessing restricted keys from time to time to help out other managers at their
request. As well, through an oversight, the access code that he had had as a Security
Manager had not been removed when he returned as a casual employee. Moreover,
there was a method, known to several of the witnesses including Mr. Ronkai, for
managers to access keys without leaving their personal code, which Mr. Ronkai could
have used if he had been doing anything covert. Nonetheless, the evidence did not
establish that these facts were known to Deputy Gauthier when she consulted Mr.
Conry on February 15, and was directed to suspend him.
- 22 -
[63] As well, evidence of other witnesses, including Mr. Parisotto, and Mr. Ronkai’s
own witness, Bob Ryan, was that even though the access code had not been removed,
someone with Mr. Ronkai’s background should have known not to use it when not
assigned as a Security Manager. Mr. Ryan also testified that it was a judgment call
whether to suspend a person before interviewing them about an allegation or not.
Moreover, the information received was that the access to sensitive areas was on
evenings and weekends, which would have been a concern even if Mr. Ronkai had still
been a Security Manager in Mr. Parisotto’s view. He indicated that, even if Mr. Ronkai
had been assigned as Security Manager, if he needed something from the Deputies’
offices, he should be calling the on-call Deputy, rather than accessing the area without
specific authorization.
[64] Nor do I find any basis in the evidence to find that Mr. Conry’s motivation in
giving the direction to suspend was to punish Mr. Ronkai for reporting to the Deputy
Minister, something Mr. Ronkai did not allege in his complaint in any event. However,
during the hearing he asserted that Mr. Conry and a previous superintendent were
friends of the father of the OM accused of time theft. Mr. Ronkai asserts that this
friendship is also evidence of the fact that management’s motivation was a reprisal for
reporting time theft and its cover-up. Given the other credible evidence of bona fide
reasons for the decisions in question, I do not find the friendship between Mr. Conry and
the OM’s father to be a sufficient basis to find that the decision to suspend was in
response to Mr. Ronkai’s reporting his allegations to the Deputy Minister. Moreover, Mr.
Conry told the CISU investigators that he had fired another member of the same family,
and had not talked to the father in years. There was no evidence before me to
contradict this part of the record, which further tends to minimize the likelihood that the
friendship played the role Mr. Ronkai suspects.
[65] As well, I note that there was the idea in the transcript of the CISU’s
investigation, and Mr. Ronkai’s remarks, that there was something suspicious about the
fact that more preliminary investigation had been done about the time-keeping issue
than about Mr. Ronkai’s access to unauthorized areas. It appears to me that, in a
correctional institution, access to keys is so fundamental to the security of everyone
- 23 -
who works and is detained there, that it is not unreasonable that the latter was thought
to warrant a more immediate response than time-keeping accusations that had been
outstanding for years.
[66] Mr. Ronkai is also critical of the CISU investigation into his complaint to the
Deputy Minister that the suspension pending investigation was itself a reprisal, because
no finding was made in that investigation on the question of reprisal. Lisa Kitchen,
CISU investigator, and her superior, Sandeep Bandhu, Manager CISU, testified about
that aspect of the investigation. To Mr. Ronkai’s questions as to whether she had ever
been told not to make certain findings in any other investigation, Ms. Kitchen testified
that this was a unique investigation because it came from the Deputy Minister’s office.
As well, the uncontradicted testimony of her manager, Mr. Bandhu, was that the CISU
makes findings of fact, and does not make findings of reprisal because the PSOA gives
that authority to the Ethics Executive. Mr. Ronkai seemed to believe that the CISU
investigation had somehow been interfered with improperly in this respect, but there is
simply no evidence to support that idea.
[67] Turning then to the termination of Mr. Ronkai’s contract, the main evidence that
could support the finding of a reprisal is that it occurred after he had reported the
alleged wrongdoing to the Deputy Minister. This timing is not as strong a relationship as
for the suspension, since it happened about 9 months later.
[68] Mr. Calverley testified credibly that he offered Mr. Ronkai two opportunities to
return to work at the request of senior management. Mr. Ronkai presented no evidence
on which I could base a finding that these were not real offers. They were declined
because Mr. Ronkai feared that he would not be safe because of his complaints about
his peer, in that he believes the Code of Silence would operate to punish him. Mr.
Calverley had not seen the Code operate as Mr. Ronkai feared it would among
managers. Rather, he found that even where there were hard feelings between
managers, they managed to find a way to work together professionally. However, when
Mr. Ronkai stated that he could not give an assurance one way or the other as to
whether the issue would follow him to an institution other than Maplehurst, Mr. Calverley
- 24 -
agreed that he could not give assurances in that respect. Nonetheless, he said if
problems had arisen, management would have seen what could be done about it, as
with anyone else. There was no suggestion in Mr. Ronkai’s cross-examination of Mr.
Calverley of any reason why he would have been motivated to terminate his contract as
a reprisal for having reported to the Deputy Minister. Nor was there any other evidence
before me which warrants the inference that Mr. Calverley had any improper motivation.
[69] Mr. Ronkai was on paid suspension between February 22 and the end of
October 2013, while the CISU investigations were conducted, and the Ministry
considered its reports. The evidence is clear that he would have been assigned work
again if he had accepted the assignments offered by Mr. Calverley. Thus, the employer
sees the termination as the result of a decision on Mr. Ronkai’s part to decline their
genuine offers. Mr. Ronkai requested work outside of a correctional institution, but there
is no evidence that there was such work available for an on-call contract employee or
that Mr. Ronkai made any specific proposal of available work he would be prepared to
accept.
[70] Nor did he advance any legal principle or precedent that would create an
obligation on the employer to offer him work outside of a correctional institution or in
another Ministry.
[71] Fundamental to Mr. Ronkai’s claim is his belief that he could not have gone back
to work safely in any correctional institution in the province. It is Mr. Ronkai’s view that
the whole sequence of events described above must be understood as an example of
the operation of the Code of Silence, from the inaction of management in response to
his complaints before his retirement, through to the termination of his contract. Mr.
Ronkai sees the existence of the Code of Silence as proof that what happened to him
was a reprisal for “ratting out” his colleague and his Superintendent for what he sees as
a cover-up because no action beyond verbal counselling was taken against the OM in
question. He refers to the findings of the Ombudsman in his 2013 report that some
managers were affected by the Code of Silence, and relies on the experience of his
colleagues at Maplehurst as proof that the Code exists in the ranks of management as
well as unionized staff.
- 25 -
[72] The credible evidence of Mr. Ronkai’s colleagues, Messrs. Boorsma and
McDonald, was that they were both subject to negative treatment from some co-
workers, including some managers, after it became known in the institution that they
had been associated with Mr. Ronkai and his complaints against their peer. The
behaviour reported by one or both of them included being shunned, given the “silent
treatment”, not being spoken to or acknowledged on entering a room as they had been
in the past, having phone calls from them answered with silence, or not answered at all,
being given the “evil eye” and having car tires flattened. They both attributed this to the
operation of the Code of Silence whereby anyone who gives evidence against another
staff member is made to pay for it. They heard the OM accused of time theft saying he
would go after anyone who was behind the allegations of time theft, and Mr. Boorsma
was sure the OM in question was behind the negative treatment he received.
[73] Both Messrs. McDonald and Boorsma attribute their retirements, earlier than they
had intended, to the stress caused by their peers and what they see as management’s
inadequate response, in the context of the fear that other staff would not come to their
aid if they were in a dangerous situation at work. They both believe that the Code
affects managers and unionized staff alike. Nonetheless, they also acknowledged that
not all managers or staff treated them badly. In cross-examination of Mr. Ronkai’s
witnesses, employer counsel succeeded in establishing that the negative behaviour was
not as widespread as Mr. Ronkai suggested. As well, they each remained assigned to
the institution where the events had unfolded, where it seems likely that feelings about
the events in question would have been the strongest. Further, other factors, personal
to each of them, were involved in their retirements. Mr. McDonald retired in late
November 2014 and Mr. Boorsma in early April 2016, both a considerable period after
they had become associated with the allegations of time theft in early 2013. Moreover,
there was no suggestion that any of the negative behaviour towards Messrs. Boorsma
and McDonald was connected to the administrators who made the decisions to suspend
Mr. Ronkai and later terminate his contract.
[74] Managerial witnesses such as Messrs. Parisotto and Calverley did not share the
view that the Code of Silence operates among the managerial ranks in the way Mr.
- 26 -
Ronkai and his colleagues believe. In the end it is not necessary to make a general
finding about managers and the Code of Silence as Mr. Ronkai invited the Board to do.
It is enough for the purposes of this case to deal with the allegation that the negative
things that happened to Mr. Ronkai were related to the Code of Silence and his
managers’ participation in it by reprising against him for going to the Deputy Minister
with his concerns. Even accepting that Mr. Ronkai’s colleagues retired earlier than they
would have, but for the behaviour of their colleagues related to Mr. Ronkai’s allegations
of time theft, the evidence does not justify the inference that the managers who made
the decisions affecting Mr. Ronkai were punishing him for “breaking the Code” in
general, or specifically because he reported his allegations to his Ethics Executive, the
Deputy Minister. Without such a causal connection, these complaints cannot succeed.
[75] The above deals with the issues necessary to this decision. However, it is
appropriate to comment on Mr. Ronkai’s claim to work outside a correctional institution.
He made clear he was not willing to go back to work in an institution, the work he had
been contracted to do after his retirement, when management offered a return to work
after the CISU investigations. Mr. Calverley’s assurances that any problems which
arose would be addressed, were not shown to be insincere, or a pretext for setting Mr.
Ronkai up for retaliation from staff. Mr. Ronkai did not take the offered work, so there is
no direct evidence that his fears would have materialized in another institution, or that
any problems that arose would have been insoluble. His position in this case amounts
to a request that an inference be made from all of the evidence about the Code of
Silence, and the experience of Messrs. McDonald and Boorsma at Maplehurst, that he
would not have been safe in any institution in the province, no matter what
arrangements were made. To make the finding Mr. Ronkai requests would require being
persuaded that the Code of Silence is so pervasive, among unionized staff and
managers, that no one who gives evidence against other staff could ever safely work in
a correctional institution again. The evidence does not persuade me of such a far-
reaching proposition.
[76] In any event, as noted above, the evidence does not convince me that Mr.
Ronkai was the victim of a reprisal by his managers for making allegations of
- 27 -
wrongdoing to his Ethics Executive, the Deputy Minister. Without such a finding, there
is no basis on which I could require the employer to offer him other work or compensate
him in lieu of doing so.
***
[77] To summarize, having reviewed all the evidence, I have not come to share Mr.
Ronkai’s view that management’s decisions in this matter were a reprisal against him. I
am persuaded that it is not likely that reporting to the Deputy Minister motivated the
choices of Maplehurst management or their superiors. There were many factors
affecting the situation, which lead me to conclude that management had bona fide
concerns that motivated their decisions. One can criticize any of the decision makers
for not taking a different approach, with hindsight and all the information that is now
available, including what portions of Mr. Ronkai’s initial investigative efforts were taken
on his own initiative, and which were specifically authorized. But it is important to
remember that the issue is not whether management could have handled the situation
in a way that was less disruptive to Mr. Ronkai, or been more assertive about
disciplining his colleague, or investigated the various issues that arose in a way that Mr.
Ronkai found less flawed. Nor is the issue whether there was just cause for removing
the maintenance cart as a mobility aid, suspending Mr. Ronkai or terminating his
contract. Nor is it, “How should such an issue be handled next time?” The legislation
sets the issue here, and, to repeat, it is whether or not the decisions were made
because of Mr. Ronkai’s reporting of alleged wrongdoing to the Deputy Minister.
[78] The employer provided credible explanations for each of the aspects of the
situation that Mr. Ronkai sees as suspicious anomalies. As to the role and existence of
the Code of Silence, it is an important background to how things unfolded, particularly in
terms of Mr. Ronkai’s view of events. Nonetheless, it does not explain everything. In
particular, it does not detract from the coherence of the employer’s witnesses, and their
credible explanations of how they came to the decisions they made in carrying out their
responsibility to manage a large correctional institution, on the information they had at
the time.
- 28 -
[79] In the end, without a finding of causation between the negative job
consequences and the report of alleged wrongdoing to the Deputy Minister, there is no
legal basis on which I could award any remedy to Mr. Ronkai.
[80] For the above-noted reasons, the complaints are dismissed.
Dated at Toronto this 4th day of October, 2017.
_____________________________
Kathleen G. O’Neil, Chair
- 29 -
APPENDIX A
Excerpt from Regulation 378/07 under The Public Service of Ontario Act
4. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a public servant who is aggrieved about a
working condition or about a term of his or her employment may file a
complaint about the working condition or the term of employment with the
Public Service Grievance Board,
(a) if the public servant is eligible under sections 5 and 7 to file such a
complaint;
(b) if the public servant gives notice in accordance with section 8 of his or her
proposal to file the complaint; and
(c) if the public servant complies with the filing requirements set out in
section 10.
…
5. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a public servant or other person is
eligible to file a complaint if he or she was appointed by the Public Service
Commission under subsection 32 (1) or (2) of the Act to employment by the
Crown.
(2) If any of the following circumstances existed at the material time, a public
servant or other person is not eligible to file a complaint:
1. He or she was a member of a bargaining unit represented by a bargaining
agent under the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 1993 or under
the Ontario Provincial Police Collective Bargaining Act, 2006.
2. He or she was represented by the Ontario Crown Attorneys’ Association or
the Association of Law Officers of the Crown under an agreement between
the Crown and one or both of those Associations.
3. He or she was employed in a position that was classified under subsection
33 (1) of the Act as a term classified position.
4. He or she was employed for a fixed term,
i. on a non-recurring project,
ii. in a professional or other special capacity, or
iii. on a temporary work assignment arranged by the Public Service
Commission in accordance with a program for providing temporary help.
- 30 -
5. He or she was employed for a fixed term for fewer than 14 hours per
week, employed for a fixed term for fewer than nine full days in four
consecutive weeks or employed for a fixed term on an irregular or on-call
basis.
…
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not affect the right of a public servant or other
person to file a complaint under Part V of the Act (Political Activity) or a
complaint under Part VI of the Act (Disclosing and Investigating
Wrongdoing).
Excerpts from The Public Service of Ontario Act:
Ethics executive for public servants
62. (1) The ethics executive for a public servant is determined as follows:
1. The ethics executive for a public servant employed under Part III who
works in a ministry, other than in a minister’s office, is the deputy minister.
…
PART VI
DISCLOSING AND INVESTIGATING WRONGDOING
Interpretation
108. (1) In this Part,
“wrongdoing” means,
(a) a contravention by a public servant, a minister or parliamentary assistant
of an Act of the Assembly or of the Parliament of Canada, or of a regulation
made under such an Act,
(b) an act or omission of a public servant, a minister or parliamentary
assistant that creates a grave danger to the life, health or safety of persons
or to the environment, where the danger is unreasonable having regard to his
or her duties, powers and functions and any other relevant circumstance,
(c) gross mismanagement by a public servant, a minister or parliamentary
assistant in the work of the public service of Ontario,
- 31 -
(d) directing or counselling wrongdoing within the meaning of clauses (a) to
(c) by a public servant, a minister or parliamentary assistant. 2006, c. 35,
Sched. A, s. 108 (1).
…
Disclosure, procedures
114. Where a public servant or former public servant has reason to believe
that there has been wrongdoing, he or she may disclose the wrongdoing in
accordance with the procedures established under section 115. 2006, c. 35,
Sched. A, s. 114.
Directives, Public Service Commission
115. (1) The Public Service Commission may by directive establish
procedures to deal with disclosures of wrongdoing by,
(a) a public servant who works in a ministry; and
(b) a former public servant who worked in a ministry immediately before
ceasing to be a public servant. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 115 (1).
…
(3) Without limiting the generality of subsections (1) and (2), directives
issued under those subsections may,
(a) establish procedures by which a public servant or former public servant
may make disclosures of wrongdoing, including directions as to the persons
to whom disclosures may be made;
(b) establish procedures to protect the identities of persons involved in the
disclosure process, including persons who make disclosures, witnesses and
persons alleged to be responsible for wrongdoing; and
(c) provide for exceptions to be made to procedures described in clause (b)
where the interests of fairness require that a person’s identity be disclosed to
one or more persons. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 115 (3).
Same
(4) Directives issued under this section may be general or particular in their
application. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 115 (4).
Interpretation
…
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Protection from Reprisals
No reprisals
139. (1) No person shall take a reprisal against a public servant because he
or she has,
(a) sought advice about making a disclosure about wrongdoing in
accordance with this Part;
(b) made a disclosure about wrongdoing in accordance with this Part;
(c) co-operated in an investigation or other process related to a disclosure of
wrongdoing made in accordance with this Part;
(d) acted in compliance with this Part; or
(e) sought enforcement of this Part. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 139 (1).
Same
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a reprisal is any measure taken
against a public servant that adversely affects his or her employment or
appointment and includes but is not limited to,
(a) ending or threatening to end a public servant’s employment or
appointment;
(b) disciplining or suspending or threatening to discipline or suspend a public
servant;
(c) imposing or threatening to impose a penalty related to the employment or
appointment of a public servant;
(d) intimidating or coercing a public servant in relation to his or her
employment or appointment. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 139 (2).
Complaint about reprisal
140. (1) A public servant described in subsection (2), (3) or (4) may
complain under this section that he or she has suffered a reprisal prohibited
by section 139. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 140 (1).
…
Public servant not subject to collective agreement
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(3) A public servant employed under Part III who is not subject to the terms
and conditions of a collective agreement may file the complaint with the
Public Service Grievance Board. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 17, s. 10 (15).
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APPENDIX B
AUTHORITIES
1. Kutchaw and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and
Correctional Services), PSGB No. P-2016-0184 (February 24, 2017) (O’Neil).
2. MacKinnon and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety
and Correctional Services), PSGB No. P-2015-2662 (September 20, 2016)
(Nairn).
3. Binda and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Environment), PSGB No. P-
2011-2193 (March 9, 2012) (O’Neil).
4. Ois and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and
Correctional Services), PSGB No. 2013-0884 November 13, 2014) (O’Neil).
5. OPSEU (Press) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care), GSB No. 2003-1461 (October 9, 2007) (Mikus).
6. York (Municipality), [2002] OLRB Rep. May/June 481 (June 10, 2002) (Herlich).
7. Grifferty and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Government Services),
GSB No. P-2010-2240 (October 16, 2012) (Devins).
8. OPSEU (Reale) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Solicitor General
and Correctional Services), GSB No. 1996-0606 (October 9, 1997)
(Dissanayake).
9. Lyndhurst Hospital, [1997] OLRB Rep. July/August 616 (August 15, 1997)
(O’Neil).
10. Hy’s Steak House, [1990] OLRB Rep. February 163 (February 20, 1990) (Gray).
11. Sobey’s Inc., [1996] O.L.R.D. No. 3565 (October 7, 1996) (Whitacker).
12. Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878, (April 22, 2010) (Gotthiel).
13. Jones v. Amway of Canada, [2002] O.J. No. 1504, 159 O.A.C. 331 (Ont. S.C.J.)
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14. OPSEU (Ghiandoni) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Solicitor
General and Correctional Services), GSB No. 1994-0518, 1994-0519 (June 8,
1998) (Mikus).