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HomeMy WebLinkAboutGravelle 18-04-28In the Matter of an Arbitration Between The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa (Hereinafter referred to as “the Society”) And Ontario Public Service Employees Union – Local 454 (Hereinafter referred to as “the Union”) Regarding: Grievances of Theresa Gravelle Sole Arbitrator: Felicity D. Briggs For the Society: Carole Piette, Counsel For the Union: Jessica Greenwood, Counsel 1 Ms. Terri Gravelle, Youth Services Worker (Child Protection Worker 1), filed two grievances that alleged the Society violated various provision of the Collective Agreement by failing to award her any of five recent posted CPW2 positions. The Union contended the grievor was denied the opportunity to compete for any of the positions because she does not hold a uni versity degree. The remedy requested on one grievance form states that she wishes to “be given due consideration and allowed to compete in internal competitions. Ms. Gravelle currently occupies the second highest position in the bargaining unit. Her only o pportunity for further advancement is to obtain the position of CPW2. The Union’s view was that notwithstanding the Society’s usual right to set qualifications for work to be performed by members of the bargaining unit, in this instance, the Society failed to assess the grievor on the basis of her skill, competence, reliability and efficiency. Rather, it allowed her education to act as a complete bar to her candidacy for the positions at issue. The Society took the position that the grievor was screened out from all of the CPW2 positions because she did not meet its reasonable minimum educational requirements or the equivalent. At our first day of hearing it became apparent that two incumbents should be given notice. The matter adjourned, notice was given. One incumbent chose to attend throughout although he did not actively participate. The relevant portions of the Collective Agreement are as follows: ARTICLE 5 – Management Rights 5.01 The Union recognizes and acknowledges that the management of the Society’s operations and direction of the employees are fixed exclusively in the Society and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the Union acknowledges that it is the exclusive function of the Society to: (a) maintain order and efficiency; (b) hire, promote, demote, classify, transfer, lay off and suspend employees, and to discipline or discharge any employee provided that a claim by an employee who has acquired seniority that he has been discharged or otherwise disciplined without just cause may be the subject of a grievance and dealt with as hereinafter provided; (c) make, enforce, and alter from time to time, reasonable rules and regulations to be observed by the employees, provided that they are not inconsistent with the Agreement; and (d) determine the nature and kind of business conducted by the Society, the kinds and locations of operations, equipment and materials to be used, the control of materials and parts, the methods and techniques of work, the number of employees to be employed, the extension, limitations, curtailment or cessation of operations or any part thereof. 2 5.02 To determine and exercise all other functions and prerogatives which shall remain solely with the Society except as specifically limited by the express provisions of this Agreement. The rights reserved to management herein are subject to the other provisions of this Agreement, and shall be exercised in a manner that is fair, reasonable and consistent with the terms of the Agreement. 5.03 Without limiting the generality of the foregoing provisions, it is expressly understood and agreed that breach of any of the Society’s rules, or of any of the provisions of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be sufficient cause for discipline up to and including dismissal of an employee, provided that nothing herein shall prevent an employee going through the grievance procedure. ARTICLE 24 – Job Posting and Filling of Vacancies 24.01 Job Posting a) When a vacancy exceeding 3 months is to be filled, or a new position is crated in side the Bargaining Unit the Society shall post notice on bulletin boards designated for this purpose in the main building, at decentralized offices and on the electronic bulletin board. A copy of the notice shall be forwarded to the Union. The posting sha ll be for a minimum of seven (7) working days. When a vacancy exceeding 3 months is to be filled, only the original vacancy and two resulting vacancies shall be posted. All other vacancies that occur as a result of having filled the original vacancy shall be filled at the discretion of the Society. Vacancies that are not expected to exceed three (3) months including vacancies caused due to illness, accident and leave of absences may be filled at the discretion of the Society. When filling such vacancies, the Society will give consideration to qualified and available bargaining unit employees prior to considering external applicants. b) Such notice shall contain the following information: Nature of the position; qualification; required knowledge and edu cation: shift; wage or salary rate or range. c) If the employer is not to fill a position previously filled by a permanent employee within ninety (90) days, notification will be given to the Union. 24.05 Selection (Regular Positions) (Collective Agreement expiring December 31, 2015) a) All cases of filling vacancies, promotions and transfers shall be based on the following factors: 3 i) skill, competence, reliability, and efficiency for a particular positon; and ii) seniority Where, in the judgement of the Society, the qualifications in factor a) above are relatively equal, seniority will govern. b) Before the employee proceeds on transfer or promotion, she shall satisfy her Supervisor that case recording, reports and other duties of the positions are up - to-date. 24.05 Selection (Regular Positions) (Collective Agreement expiring December 31, 2017) a) All cases of filling vacancies, new positions and transfers shall be based on the following factors: i) skill, competence, reliability, and efficiency for a particular positon; and ii) seniority Where, in the judgement of the Society, the qualifications in factor a) above are relatively equal, seniority will govern. b) Before the employee proceeds on transfer or a new position, she shall satisfy her Supervisor that case recording, reports and other duties of the positions are up-to-date. The job competition postings for various CPW2 positions that are at issue in these proceedings were provided. In each case, the relevant qualifications were:  BSW or MSW or Bachelor’s degree in a related field with relevant work experience. Much of the evidence about the workplace and the grievor’s history there was not in dispute. Ms. Gravelle is presently a CPW1 working on the Adolescent Protection Team (APT). Ms. Gravelle reviewed her education and experience. After high school the grievor attended Algonquin College to obtain a diploma in the Correctional Worker program. Courses taken included sociology, psychology, criminal law and community service for young offenders. She was hired in 1990 as a casual youth counsellor in a group home. She later worked in a group home for individuals with special needs. She also worked for other employers while working with CAS as a causal employee. She worked in a young offender’s home for women and for another organization that dealt with mental health clients. Her first full time position with CAS was as a non-residential child and youth worker. In that position she oversaw supervised visits between children and their parents. From time to time in this role she was asked to provide an affidavit for the courts regarding those visits. She continued in this role until 1999 when a position for Semi-Independent Living Worker was posted and she won the competition. The role of those on this team was to work with extended care and maintenance youth who were 4 high risk. The youth were 16 and 17 years of age. Her day to day activities included working with youth to persuade them to attend school, drug counselling, attending at court with youth when needed. When this team disbanded she was placed on the Child in Care team. In October of 2006 her position was re-classified to Child Protection Worker 1, which is her current position. She works on the Adolescent Protection Team and has a caseloa d of approximately two dozen youth. She reviewed her “normal day” activities which include meeting with youth to assist them with future planning, finding housing, relationship difficulties, drug and alcohol related matters, legal matters and other issues that the youth are facing in their lives. She works with other various other agencies in these pursuits. Ms. Gravelle has taken further training while at CAS. A list of over eighty courses taken since 1998 was provided covering a myriad of topics includin g Drug Awareness Information Session, High Risk Infants Training, Gender Frameworks, Symposium of Aboriginal Culture, Forensic Interviewing of Children and Health and Wellness to name a few. By way of example, she took a course in strength based practices which focussed on how to find client strengths and build upon them to manage best outcomes. Other courses were reviewed by Ms. Gravelle in her evidence and she noted that a number of CPW2s attended the same courses. Ms. Gravelle testified that the first time that prior to this proceeding she was unaware that she was entitled to apply for all other CPW1 positions. She noted however that there are few CPW1 positions remaining in the bargaining unit because a number were recently reclassified to CPW2. Indeed, she said that if she had held one of those positions at the time of reclassification she would herself be a CPW2 now. The grievor reviewed each of the job postings at issue. She testified that she has experience relating to the CPW2 position on the Protection Team. She said that she has twenty-seven years of working with children and families. While she has been with adolescents exclusively she is familiar with the standards set out in the Act. She said that she is fully aware of the standards, the Society’s expectations and community resources necessary to do the work. She is also aware of the work needed to be done to perform the functions of the aboriginal position. Indeed, she was of the view that with the exception of possessing a BSW or an MSW she meets all of the qualifications needed for the other positions at issue. While she is not fully knowledgeable about all of the regulations regarding adoption, she has had some experience and could learn what was needed. She stated she is highly organized, “on top of her work”, able to work well with a team and knowledgeable about the programs and community resources. The grievor reviewed her present job description and noted that the Education and Experience required states: 5  BSW, MSW or equivalent is required.  Experience working with families and children.  Excellent oral and written communication skills.  Possession of a valid driver’s license. Ms. Gravelle testified that she has attempted to apply for CPW2 positions in the past and has been told that she was not allowed to compete. This time when given that as an answer she decided to file a grievance because she is confident that she could perform the work at issue. Her performance appraisals over the years have been very good and she has been told she i s a valued employee. She stated that the work in the positions at issue is paired to her current role. She is not afraid to be challenged and would meet this challenge. In cross-examination Ms. Gravelle was asked about the experience she had giving evidence in court on behalf of the Society. She said that the one instance was regarding potential child abuse involving a child that had been adopted from the Society. She was given nine hours of time with the child and mother and was called upon to testify re garding her observations. She conceded that she was not tasked with giving recommendations. She has never dealt with a Justice of the Peace or appeared before one. Further she has never completed an intake investigation or an ongoing investigation. The grievor was asked about her reclassification in 2006. When it was suggested that her reclassification was as the result of strengthened standards within the Society Ms. Gravelle disagreed and said that her classification was improved because she and another employee approached a supervisor and asked for a review of their job description. That review was undertaken and then a recommendation was sent to the job evaluation committee for approval. She said that her job was reclassified and changes to her job desc ription were made. However, when pushed she conceded that her duties were unchanged. Ms. Gravelle had no recall of a discussion in 2006 regarding equivalencies. The grievor did not remember being told that the need for a university degree for a child worke r would not change. In cross examination the grievor was asked about the number of files she manages. She had mentioned in her evidence in chief that – unlike many of her co-workers – there was no cap on the number of files in her workload. She agreed th at – unlike many of her co-workers - the youth she worked with were not considered “children in care”. Accordingly , their participation is voluntary. She also conceded that although she helps others on her team she is not called upon to act as a backup in a protection function and she is not on the back up schedule for this reason. 6 In re-examination the grievor said that although she has not actually written a warrant she understands the process and thought she could quickly develop the necessarily skills . Dr. Kelly Raymond, Service Director, testified for the Society. As Service Director she has primary responsibility over child protection services. Her overall portfolio is all related to children and youth in care with a new focus on native communities. According to Dr. Raymond, this agency is one of 46 non-profit community agencies legally mandated by the Ministry for the safety and wellbeing of children and youth in the Province. Their work is regulated by the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c C.11. Dr. Raymond testified that in 2006 the Auditor General of Ontario conducted a review of this community and one of the resulting recommendations focused on the transitional aged youth population. It was thought that transition planning for this a ge group had been insufficiently detailed and accountability for this group was a matter of concern. As a result, governing standards for this population were revised and enhanced especially in three areas. The first was for the developmentally challenged population; second, overall transition planning for those youth over the age of 18; finally, was the area of plans-of-care which were to be more detailed. Dr. Raymond gave evidence regarding the grievor’s reclassification in 2006. Ms. Gravelle went from a Level 8 to CPW1 after a reclassification process. Dr. Raymond recalled that the grievor understood that she did not have the educational requirements needed for the CPW1 role and that her being grandfathered into the position was because her previous team was being dismantled. Dr. Raymond also addressed the recent reclassification of various employees from CPW1 to CPW2. These positions were reclassified higher due – in part – to the advent of CPIN (Child Protection Information Network) - a new provincial database and recording management system. As a result, the load needed to be shared so protection functions from the C workers were transferred to the foster, kin and adoption workers. Dr. Raymond said that she knew the grievor has been told that she can apply for other CPW1 positions. The reason that she is able to do this is because all CPW1 positions are non- protection. She thought there had been a number of opportunities offered but Ms. Gravelle has wanted to stay in the APT. Much time was devoted to the reasons for the educational requirement of a university degree for CPW2 positions in Dr. Raymond’s evidence. It was explained that in an inquiry report written by Justice Allen following the death of a child in 1982, one of the many recommendations was that child protection workers should have a minimal educational requirement of a BSW or equivalent. That recommendation was sent to the provincial 7 government who in turn recommended to all agencies that the minimum academic requirement for a child protection worker be a BSW or equivalent. According to Dr. Raymond, the Child and Family Services Act defines a child protection worker as a delegated authority by the Director – meaning the Ministry and Local Executive Director. In her view, the Allen Report and the definition set out in the Act set the minimum requirements for child protection workers at BSW. She testified that any function within the protection umbrella has followed that guideline and recommendation. Dr. Raymond also testified regarding two more recent inquests that dealt with the matter of – amongst other things – minimal educational requirements. Enhancements for the regulations were recommended for child protection workers which brought about a change from recommendations to a mandated approach. The authorization process was adopted in 2017 and has completely revamped the child welfare professional series curriculum. There are eight modules that are taught and tested over a four-month period for Child Protection Workers and at the end of the program the Child Protection Workers are able to present court applications, conduct child protection investigations and be responsible for any coding of information without a mentor. There are guidelines to academic alternatives which have been in place at the Society since 2003. These guidelines are used by Human Resources to measure equivalencies of applicants to various positions within the Society according to Dr. Raymond. They were developed following the recommendations of the Allen Commission – in part – to ensure the equivalences are transparent to all staff. While it was conceded that there is some overlap between a College Diploma and a Bachelor’s Degree, it was determined that they are not equivalent. In explaining the rationale for this decision Dr. Raymond spoke of “BIRT”. The breadth, intensity, research and theory are fundamentally different between the college and university programs. A college diploma will expose a student to general knowledge and a more focused area of study in the particular area they are studying while a Bachelor’s Degree – utilizing BIRT – involves systematic inquiry, critical analysis and gathering of information and explanations. In a university program one is taught not only to look at knowledge but learns how to critique and assess the theory and consider alternatives. Another of the major differences in the programs is standardized examination which is more intense in a university program. Some BSW programs have practicum requirements with field placements wh ich are in excess of 800 hours. Dr. Raymond testified that those acting in a supervisory role at the Society have at least an MSW or equivalent which would be an MA plus related skills and experience. Dr. Raymond gave evidence about the Child Protection Worker role. She said that there are there are three functions. The A worker is the intake investigation role; the B worker is the 8 ongoing worker role; and the C worker is the child-in-care role. Any of these functions may be called upon to assess and determine if risks to a child can be mitigated. If this is not possible then a determination is made regarding the removal of a child from parental care. In seeking permission to apprehend a child a representation is made to a judge or justice of the peace by a Child Protection Worker. The facts and analysis are presented regarding the child’s safety. This process typically involves the preparation of warrants, applications and affidavits. The affidavits, which are prepared by the Child Protection Worker, set o ut a summary of the family’s involvement with child welfare and an analysis of factors which contribute to the child’s mistreatment and neglect. There are frequently many recommendations made regarding the best interests of the child. Dr. Raymond was asked about the difference between the nature of the investigations done by Child Protection Workers and those that would be performed by the grievor. She said that Child Protection investigations are legally mandated as set out in the Act. The Child Worker is required to undertake a systematic inquiry involving critical judgement and analysis of various factors – not only knowledge but a thorough understanding of the Act is needed to be able to make a determination regarding child safety and well-being. The investigations undertaken by Ms. Gravelle are not legally mandated. In her work she would be supporting a young person and ensuring that they are aware of all their options and rights. She works with emancipated adults - that is to say those 18 years of age and older. Accordingly, all of her investigations are done conjointly and with the consent of the youth with whom she works. Dr. Raymond was asked about the differences in governing standards between the CPW role and the grievor’s role. She explained there are in excess of four hundred standards that guide the work an A, B or C worker. These standards govern their day to day work and are established by the Ministry. For youth over 18 - or for those currently between 16 and 17 who fall under the Renewed Youth Support Agreement – there are few standards. There are minimal required visits of one every three months and a plan of care are the standards. However, Dr. Raymond was of the view that the grievor would certainly see her youth more often. Dr. Raymond testified that the Society is subject to performance indicators by the Province, one of which is regarding education background of staff. She noted that over the years that Ms. Gravelle has been with the Society she has taken much additional training. Sh e testified that she admired the grievor’s willingness to take on new learning. Some of the training is mandatory such as “signs of safety”, and other training is elective but still touching upon relevant themes such as mental health, addictions and working with traumatized children. 9 Dr. Raymond did not take issue with the grievor’s evidence regarding her accompanying a CPW to a home for safety reasons. However, she noted that there is a difference between accompanying a CPW and acting as back-up. Accompanying is to assist the primary worker doing her primary work. A back-up worker is required to exercise protection duties so that when the primary worker is absent and attention is required, the back -up worker has been authorized to undertake that work. Dr. Raymond was asked to comment on the agreed statement of facts put before the Board by the parties. Those facts were:  Paul Page was hired in 1981 as a Social Worker with a college diploma, as the Employer did not have the same educational requirements at that time. He retired in 2010 and was rehired in 2013 as a casual worker classified as a CPW2. He works in a protection unit, however, he does not perform the full scope of the protection role. He completes RRN’s (reports received and not investigated), logs police reports and works with files related to community links. These are what are referred to as “below the line” cases that do not require protection investigations. He does not do investigations and would never have to attend court. He works a few hours a week. He is set to retire November 24, 2017.  Danielle Belisle was hired in 1985 as a Child and Youth Counsellor (CYC). She was later promoted to a protection worker in the Special Needs Department. In 2006 she was reclassified from a CPW1 to a CPW2. Ms. Belisle obtained a Developmental Service Worker Diploma prior to commencing employment with the SASO and never obtained a university degree. She performed the full scope of her duties as a CPW2 until her retirement in 2014. The position of Ms. Belisle vacated upon her retirement was one of the two positions grieved.  Venetia Henry was hired in 1991 as a CYC and had a Bachelor of Science. Ms. Henry moved into a CPW1 role in 2006. The Employer found she was qualified as she has a Bachelor’s Degree and experience.  Jenn Presse was hired in 1997 as a CYC, the same year she obtained her BL Law. She moved into a CPW1 position in 2008 and met the educational requirements at that time as she had a Bachelor’s degree and experience.  Dominique Leeman was hired in 1999 as a CYC and had a college diploma at that time. He moved into a temporary CPW2 position for the first time in August 25, 2008 and finished he BA – Psychology – degree that month. The Employer found he was qualified as he has a Bachelor’s Degree and experience.  Linda Gervais was hired as the CYC in May 1999 and had a College Diploma at that time. She went back to school and completed her Bachelor of Social Sciences and provided the Employer with proof of completion in July 2016. She started in a CPW1 rol e on 10 August 29, 2016 as the Employer determined that she met the qualifications based on her Bachelor’s Degree and experience. She has since moved into a CPW2 position as she meets the educational requirements for that position as well. Ms. Gervais applied for the CPW2 positions throughout the first half of 2016 and was denied an interview based on the fact that she did not possess a university degree.  David Falardeau was hired in 2005 as a CYC. He had a college diploma at that time. He moved into a temporary role as a Youth Resource Facilitator (CPW1) in 2011. The Employer waived the credential requirement as this move was as a result of a restructure of the crown ward teams where his position was being eliminated and he was already enrolled in his second year of his BSW. The Employer noted in his letter of offer that should the position be posted permanently; he would be required to finish his degree. He won the position permanently in April 2013 and provided the Employer with confirmation of completion of his BSW in October of 2014. The Youth Resource Facilitator is a position that works with programming with teens and does not have the same standards or court requirements as a protection worker. Thus, this was the reasoning the Employer was more lenient with regards to the academic credentials. According to Dr. Raymond testified that Mr. Paget was hired in 1981 before the Allen commission recommendation. He was hired into the francophone protection team where he worked in the Child Protection role until his retirement. He was re-hired in 2013 as a casual worker in the CPW2 role. However, when rehired he was not working in a child protection role. He was receiving police reports, inputting data into the computer system. According to Dr. Raymond, Ms. Belisle was hired as a Child and Youth Counsellor in 1985 – before the Allen Commission. In 2006 when the team she was working on was being disbanded she was reclassified to a CPW2 role. It was explained that she was reclassified at the CPW2 level because she had been doing the child protection role for some time. Ms. Henry was hired in 1991 with a Bachelor of Science degree. Dr. Raymond noted that her degree, coupled with her years of experience qualified her for a CPW1 role in the foster care and adoption area. That entire department was reclassified in approximately 2106 as the result of child protection duties being transferred to that department. While a BSc degree was not on the list of equivalent degrees an assessment of the program was undertaken with a decision that her degree and fifteen years of experience was equivalent. Ms. Presse was hired in 1997 as a Child and Youth Counsellor. As with Ms. Henry, Ms. Presse’s Bachelor of Law degree qualified her for a CPW1 position. Dr. Raymond testified that she was reclassified with others in 2015 or 2016 to the CPW2 role. 11 Dr. Raymond said that Mr. Leman was hired in 1999 as a Child and Youth Counsellor. He held a temporary position in August of 2008 when he received his Bachelor’s degree. His degree and years of related experience qualified him for the CPW2 role. Ms. Gervais was hired as a Child and Youth Counsellor in 1999, according to Dr. Raymond. She completed a Bachelor of Social Science in 2016 which qualified her for the CPW1 role. She was moved into CPW2 in francophone services because of her years of experience and it was determined that her degree was related. Dr. Raymond testified that Mr. Falardeau was hired in 2005 as a Child and Youth Counsellor. He was in a temporary CPW1 role in 2011 in a non-protection role in the youth transition team. He was in his second year of his bachelor degree and has related experience. It was determined that because he was in a temporary role and had related experience he was moved to CPW2. It was set out in his contract that in order for him to become full time in this role he had to finish his degree. Dr. Raymond noted that research has shown that promotion and succession planning from within inevitably yields better outcomes for employers. For that reason , the Society will work with anyone wanting to pursue their education by scheduling time off, assisting with tuition fees and flexing work schedules. The grievor was offered assistance in this regard as Dr. Raymond “firmly believes” that she has the capacity and ability to achieve a university degree. Ms. Gravelle has not accepted this assistance. In cross examination Dr. Raymond agreed that there is considerable overlap in the community resources used by the grievor and CPW2 workers. She also agreed that Ms. Gravelle has more experience with some services such as ODSP and OSAP but noted that this is because those services are utilized by the youth population. She readily agreed that the grievor is a team player who is frequently involved in problem solving with her colleagues and so would have been exposed to their work to some extent. Dr. Raymond was challenged in cross-examination regarding her view that those with a university education are much better prepared for many of the functions necessary for the jobs at issue in this proceeding. In defending her view, she stated that there is research indicating a “major difference” between a college diploma and a bachelor degree. It was urged upon her that those skills could be learned elsewhere but she would not agree. When it was suggested that two years of college – such as taken by the grievor – and three years of university are not significantly different she again disagreed saying that the difference between a diploma and a 12 degree is generalized exposure. A university education provides a deepening of a skill set as the result of the BIRT principle. In cross examination Dr. Raymond was asked why equivalencies are considered differently for reclassification than for job competitions. She explained that the grievor’s reclassification in 2006 was the result of substantive changes to the work that she was doing following the various reports and recommendations. The decision to reclassify the grievor at that time was based on set criteria and determined by a committee o f union and employer representatives. The reclassifications of 2015 and 2016 were reviewed with Dr. Raymond in cross-examination. She explained that with the introduction of CPIN there was a change in the work of some of the CPWs. She agreed that the grievor works with CPIN as well. Dr. Raymond conceded that the discussion regarding minimum academic requireme nts has been ongoing for thirty-one years. When questioned about the exceptions set out in the agreed statement of facts Dr. Raymond said that a coup le were hired prior to the Allen Report and the others had a bachelor’s degree except Ms. Belisle. When her team was being disbanded in 2006 she went through a reclassification process and was grandfathered into the CPW2 role because she had been exercising the full scope of the CPW2 role. She also agreed that Mr. Paget is presently working as a temporary CPW2 and does not have a bachelor’s degree. It was noted by Dr. Raymond that he is working on a casual basis and is only inputting data and therefore performing non protection functions. When asked if there is any provincial mandate that prevents the Society from hiring a CPW2 without a bachelor’s degree, Dr. Raymond again reviewed the authorization process which requires a minimum standard of education. Following the Allen commission there has been consistency across the province. Now most agencies have in place a minimum requirement of education which is set out at Section 37.1 of the Child and Family Services Act. This provision, Dr. Raymond said gives the Ministry and the local Executive Director the power to authorize “a worker to begin court proceedings and inherent within that authorization is educational requirements.” She stated that the basic minimum standard was established provincially and that is “what we have always guided our practice on.” When asked which provision requires a university degree for authorization of child protection workers Dr. Raymond was unable to do so “without research”. Dr. Raymond readily conceded that the grievor is competent and an asset to the Society. Indeed, she said that Ms. Gravelle is a great worker who always goes above and beyond. She noted that the grievor is a passionate advocate for her youth. Dr. Raymond agreed that Ms. Gravelle is qualified to perform in her current role and that her education has not limited her 13 ability to perform capably. Although Dr. Raymond did not participate in the 2006 reclassification process for the grievor she thought the committee would have taken all factors into account. Dr. Raymond was reminded in her cross-examination she underwent in a proceeding that took place in 2014 she had agreed that the grievor should be reclassified to a CPW2 level. After providing some historic provincial context Dr. Raymond explained that in an effort to keep a valued employee, discussions turned to reclassification. However, Dr. Raymond said that she made a mistake because of her ignorance of the Collective Agreement and of the reclassification process. This led to an unfortunate situation where t he grievor believed she was to be reclassified. At the time Dr. Raymond apologized to the grievor in writing explaining that every reclassification had to be taken through the process and in accordance with the Collective Agreement. It was ultimately determined at that time that Ms. Gravelle’s position did not warrant a reclassification. Dr. Raymond agreed in her cross-examination that not all CPW2s do the same work but added that it is important to note that they are all exercising child protection functions. The only exception is Mr. Paget, whose scope of work is non-protection or “below the line – threshold cases”. He is receiving police reports and inputting that data into the CPIN system. She testified that his different scope of work would have been spelled out in his service agreement. Dr. Raymond was asked about a similar agency in Prescott where she had worked prior to returning to Ottawa. When asked if she recalled that the agency had a Protection Worker pay scale for employees with either a college diploma or a university degree. She said that this was the case when she left in 2008 but went on to explain that Prescott has a multi-service agency with five different mandates which account for different levels of education. She thought that some of the discrepancy may have been due to the newly devolved indigenous workers. In cross-examination Dr. Raymond agreed that many factors have to be taken into account to determine the best measure of an employee. When it was put to her that only one facto r – that being education – was considered in these job competitions as it related to the grievor, Dr. Raymond again stated that the minimum educational requirement for the positions was not met and that is what screen Ms. Gravelle out of consideration. She was steadfast in her opinion that the nature of the work in these job competitions requires a bachelor’s degree. Ms. Amy Bennett, Director of Human Resources, also gave evidence in these proceedings. She has been in the human resources department with the Society for approximately seven years and presently has overall responsibility for organizational changes, leadership and labour 14 relations. She explained the staffing process. When a vacancy occurs a job posting is issued and posted for seven business days. Candidates apply directly to human resources and once the posting is closed a candidate table is created. The applications are reviewed and points are assigned for various factors such as education, experience, language and specific skills or training. The candidate table is reviewed with the hiring manager and together with the human resources department a decision is made regarding who will be interviewed. The interviews are held and then the top scoring candidate is offered the position unless there are two employees who are relatively equal. In that event seniority is taken into account. Ms. Bennet confirmed that the grievor was not granted an interview for any of the job competitions at issue in this hearing. She said that this was because she di d not meet the basic educational requirement. When this occurs a person is “screened out”. A review of the grievor’s reclassification of 2006 was undertaken by Ms. Bennet. She testified that the grievor was already performing the duties of the position. There were some enhancements to that job as a result of changes brought about by the Ministry. The job evaluation process was undertaken and it was determined that the position required a university education. However, the team that the grievor was working with in 2006 was being dismantled and the changes to the job being performed by Ms. Gravelle did not include any protection duties. It was decided to reclassify her to the role of CPW1. According to Ms. Bennet, the CPW2 role is a protection role and the requirements are much broader and those of a CPW1 in terms of accountability and Ministry standards. It has been decided provincially that a minimal educational requirement is a university degree. The situation the Society found itself in for the grievor in 2006 was quite different than a job competition. In 2006, there was no waiving of the educational requirement for those in a working in a protection role. Ms. Bennet noted that eighty-five percent of the workforce is female and the majority are working in a CPW2 position. There are approximately 274 CPW2s and 10 CPW1s. In cross- examination Ms. Bennet was asked about whether all CPW2s have a protection role. It was suggested that the foster care/adoption workers do not have protection duties. Ms. Bennet disagreed and explained that the foster care/adoption workers were reclassified to the CPW2 position because some protection duties were transferred after the introduction of CPIN. However, they do not have the full spectrum of protection duties. It was conceded that their identification does not denote them as protection workers because the ID considers the ability to apprehend which is not a part of protection role that was transferred to the foster care workers. It is similar to the unauthorized protection workers. Reference was made to a CPW2 15 foster care/adoption recruiter position. It was put to Ms. Bennet that there are no protection duties for this position. Ms. Bennet did not agree and said that the recruiter has the same job description as other foster care/adoption workers. While it may be a specialized role she could be called upon to perform any of the tasks in the job description at any time. She testified that although the duties of the recruiter position generally might be different , that would not be considered at the time of hiring into that position. Because the role is a CPW2 the full job duties and requirements would be dictate the educational minimum of a university degree. It was put to Ms. Bennet in cross-examination that no thought was given to the grievor’s abilities when she applied for the positions at issue. Ms. Bennet replied that thought is given to the role and the requirements of the role. Ms. Bennet did not disagree that the grievor has considerable experience but replied that the process begins with the determination as to whether the minimum educational requirement has been met. Ms. Bennet conceded that the grievor would be considered for other CPW1 roles despite her lack of university education. In re-examination it was explained that because all CPW1 positions have no protection role, the Society would honour the grandfathering of the grievor that took place in 2006 for any lateral positions. The Union raised the possibility that the grievor could take the eight module program given to new employees about to work in protection roles. Ms. Bennet explained that this program is designed to authorize employees for working in a protection role. While it may be that if there was available space a CPW1 could take the training but under the new worker authorization, the training is designed specifically to authorize new employees to perform the full scope of the protection role. As only those with a university degree can work in those positions, this training is no longer available for those outside the scope. When asked why there is this level of educational minimum Ms. Bennet said that it was decided by the Province. She was unable to point to any legislation in this regard and referred to an inquest – many years ago – with recommendations regarding educational requirements. UNION SUBMISSIONS The Union submitted that the Society failed to assess the grievor on the factors set out clearly in the Collective Agreement. It acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or in bad faith when it exercised its management’s rights by failing to assess her based on the contractual provisions. The denial of a right to compete – in and of itself – violates the Collective Agreement and the grievances should be allowed on that basis. The Society’s evidence underscored that there was no 16 assessment of the grievor’s education or experience at the time she was denied the right to an interview for the positions at issue. Her lack of university degree was the sole rationale given by the Society thereby denying Ms. Gravelle any consideration. Ms. Greenwood reviewed the evidence at some length citing both the grievor’s related education and considerable experience within this workplace. The reclassification of the grievor in 2006 to the CPW1 role led to increasing responsibility and accountability of her youth services role. This reclassification – and that of Ms. Belisle – was implemented because of a confluence of factors which were taken into account notwithstanding the lack of educational requirements. The Union noted that the Society has steadfastly taken the position that the reclassification of the grievor in 2006 and her history of excelling in that role does not mean that she has been implicitly deemed to possess the equivalent of a u niversity degree. The Society’s stated reasons for the 2006 reclassification of Ms. Gravelle were of a benevolent nature. It was suggested that the grievor would have been laid off but for the reclassification. However , that explanation does not make sense. She would have had the right to bump into another position as set out in the Collective Agreement. The only logical explanation for the reclassification in 2006 was because the Society determined that the grievor was deemed to possess the educational equivalent needed for a CPW1 role. The Union urged that the Society’s assertion that allowing the grievor to work in this CPW2 role without a university degree is contrary to the recommendations from the Baldwin Inquest and the Allen Commission is – simply put – not accurate. Further, there is no provincial mandate that all in CPW2 positions must possess a university degree that either Dr. Raymond or Ms. Bennet could point to. The Baldwin recommendations were that each society will give in house training before a worker is given a protection role. Further, the Allen Commission specifically speaks to equivalencies. Nowhere therein is it said that a university degree is a requirement. Ms. Greenwood reviewed the contentions of Dr. Raymond regarding the BIRT principles which are taught in university. She was of the view that these principles are required for the successful performance of the CPW1 and CPW2 roles. When asked if these principles could be learned elsewhere Dr. Raymond was equivocal. And no doubt that is because the s olid and sustained exemplary performance of the grievor and others in CPW1 and CPW2 roles which ostensibly require a university degree demonstrates that the BIRT principles can be learned outside of a university setting. 17 The Union relied upon Re Seneca College and OPSEU Local 563 (2014), 159 L.A.C. (4th) 414 (Keller); Re Toronto Public Library & CUPE, Local 1996 (1989), 70 L.A.C. (4th) 192 (Burkett); Re The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) and OPSEU (O’Brien/Lepage) (2011), GSB#2009-0692 (Dissanyake); Re The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) and OPSEU (Smith) (2007), GSB#2002-1243 (Mikus); Re The Corporation of the City of Calgary and Calgary Police Association (2007), 162 L.A.C. (4th) 169 (Tettensor); Re The North Bay Police Services Board & North Bay Police Association (2006), 153 L.A.C. (4th) 336 (Marcotte); Re Metropolitan General Hospital & Ontario Nurses’ Association (1990), 57 L.A.C. (4th) 57 (Roberts); and Re Newfoundland (Treasury Board) and Newfoundland Association of Public Employees (1995), 49 L.A.C. (4th) 257 (Oakley). The Union noted that there have been a number of instances in the past when the Society has looked past the educational requirements and put people without university degrees into positions such as those at issue in this matter. If university education was a bona fide minimum requirement the grievor and others would not have been able to succeed in the CPW1 and CPW2 roles without a degree. The fact that the Society repeatedly stated that it would be prepared to consider the grievor for any other CPW1 role – which also requires a university degree – is baffling and underscores the unreasonableness of its position. There is no language in the Collective Agreement that limits the Society’s ability to consider equivalencies, according to the Union. In view of that absence and taking into account that the Society bears the onus to show that its process was reasonable and fair, the Society was obliged to take into account all of the grievor’s attributes, not just her educational deficit. As set out in Re GSB (Smith) (supra), if the screening process does not take into account a comprehensive view of the abilities of the applicant, the process is faulty and the result cannot s tand. To exclude the grievor from consideration based solely on the fact that she does not obtain a university degree is unreasonable and ensures that the Society cannot undertake the analysis it is obliged to do as set out in Article 24.05. There must be a determination as to whether the Society acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in the exercising of its management’s rights by failing to consider the grievor’s overall abilities. This is not a case where there was any individual assessment of the grievor’s experience and education were taken into account. The Society simply used the lack of a university degree as an absolute bar to participate in a job competition. There was no fair or reasonable assessment of Ms. Gravelle. The Union requested that the Board declare that the Society’s actions in denying the grievor the opportunity to compete in the posted positions was arbitrary, unreasonable and in bad faith. An order for the Society to process the grievor through the screening process and be 18 assessed was requested. Finally, it was suggested that the Board remain seized and allow the parties to reconvene to determine the final outcome. SOCIETY SUBMISSIONS Ms. Piette, for the Society, took issue with the Union’s characterization of this matter. It reminded the Board that while the grievor has worked for the Society for twenty-seven years, all of that time has been spent working with youth needing service and continued care support. The positions that are at issue in this matter are CPW2 positions working wi th children. She has worked exclusively with adolescents and these are not “children in care”. The oversight of the population with whom the grievor works is voluntary. She cannot intervene without the consent of the youth. That work is considerably differ ent than the work of the positions at issue. Regarding the grievor’s 2006 reclassification the Society again disagreed with the Union’s contention. It was urged that the evidence before this Board was clear. When the grievor’s team was disbanded the Society decided to reclassify the grievor into the CPW1 role to avoid her being laid off. While she did not possess the education requirement for the CPW1 role , the Society determined that given the grievor’s long service and, more importantly, the fact that she had essentially been doing the work it was decided that she would be grandfathered into that position. The Society acknowledged that the grievor is – as she testified – sought out by colleagues but only about matters touching upon youth and adolescents. Again it was acknowledged that she is an asset to the Society in her role. However, she has never performed protection work and that is the work of these positions. Indeed Ms. Gravelle testified that she could not even act as a backup for protection work because she is presently not authorized to do so. The evidence of Dr. Raymond was reviewed. Ms. Piette noted that she has worked in a variety of positions and presently oversees the supervisors of the child protection program. She testified that as a result of the 2006 Auditor General’s report wherein recommendations were made regarding standards for youth, the CPW1 position was reviewed and reclassified to a Level 8 needing a university degree to possess. It was at this time that the grievor and othe rs were reclassified. Dr. Raymond also gave evidence regarding the findings of the Allen Inquiry which recommended that the minimal educational requirement for child protection workers should be a BSW or a Bachelor degree. The same recommendation was put f orward from both the Baldwin and Samson Inquiries. There can be no doubt that the qualification set by the Society in this instance was reasonably related to the job at issue. 19 According to the Society, Dr. Raymond was clear in her evidence that the 2002 guidelines which flow from the Allen report delegates authority to the local Executive Directors to set requirements. While there are instances when equivalencies have been considered, a University degree is always a minimum standard. The reasons for this are fairly straightforward as set out by Dr. Raymond. While there may be some overlap between a College education and that provided by a University, there are major areas of distinction. Foremost amongst these differences is the “BERT” principle. Colleges educations do not provide the same level of breadth, intensity, research and training as those in universities. The critical analysis is lacking. Dr. Raymond noted that CPW2s are called upon to conduct child protection investigations. That is to say they assess and determine if a child’s safety is compromised and determine how to mitigate that risk and if that is not possible then decide to remove the child from parental care. The education acquired at university is paramount in these functions. Further, the Society submitted that its evidence regarding the staffing process established appropriate rationale as to why the grievor was not granted an interview. Simply put, she did not meet the minimum necessary educational requirements which have been determined as the result of recommendations from numerous sources and Ministry directions. The Society reviewed the evidence of Dr. Raymond regarding the difference between the work presently performed by the grievor and the work of the CPW2. The grievor is responsible for supervising young people and ensuring that they are familiar with their rights and options. She works with emancipated adults and whatever decisions are ultimately made, they are made with the consent of the client. In that work Ms. Gravelle works with a few established standards while CPW2s work with in excess of four hundred standards mandated by the Ministry. Ms. Piette reviewed the list of employees contemplated in the Agreed Statement of Facts. Mr. Page was hired before the Allen report and while he exercised protection work until he retire d, when he was rehired on a part time basis it was not for protection work. Ms. Belisle also began the full scope of protection work prior to the issuance of the Allen report and similar to the grievor she was grandfathered into her position as a CPW2. Both Henry and Presse were hired prior to the Allen report although Presse obtained a degree subsequently. Ms. Gervais moved into a CPW2 position upon completion of a degree. It is worthy of note that she was denied interviews for the CPW2 role in 2016 because she did not yet hold a university degree which illustrates that the Society is not acting in an arbitrary fashion in the case before this Board. Finally, Mr. Falardeau was enrolled in university for h is BSW degree when he got a temporary youth facilitator role. In that position he worked with teens which again did not have the same standards or court requirements as others. He was informed at the time that in the event the 20 position became permanent he would not be able to complete if he had not yet completed his university degree. The Society reminded the Board that the grievor had been offered time off to attend university including assistance with tuition. She was offered a flexible work schedule an d assistance with her studies. She declined that offer and the Society should not be responsible for Ms. Gravelle’s choices. The standard of review for job posting requirements is reasonableness not correctness, contended the Society. This Board can set aside a Society requirement only if the Union has discharged its onus of establishing that requirement was made in bad faith or in instances when there is no reasonable relationship between the requirement set and the duties of the position. The minimum educational requirement that is at issue before this Board was established more than ten years ago. It is not an instance where the Society suddenly altered its requirement. For that reason, it simply cannot be found to be a requirement made in bad faith. I t is conceded that the Collective Agreement mandates that the notice of job posting should set out qualifications and the required knowledge and education. That was done and again belies the allegation of bad faith. The Society asserted that the arbitral jurisprudence is clear that an arbitrator should afford considerable deference to management’s decision regarding the establishment of various requirements for positions. The Society is better equipped to assess the needs of workplace and the nature of the work. The Union must show that there is no reasonable relationship between the educational requirement and the work or that the decision was made in bad faith. It cannot. There is no evidence of bad faith in the instant matter. Indeed, it should be take n into account that the Society attempted to assist the grievor in obtaining the needed degree. In the event that this Board has been persuaded that an individual’s experience equates to an educational requirement it must be recalled that in the instance matter the grievor’s experience in the work place has been exclusively with youth and not in child protection which is the job at issue. The grievor has never acted in this role. In conclusion the Society stated that it set the reasonable educational requirements for positions in the bargaining unit and there is nothing in the Collective Agreement that precludes it from screening out those who do not meet that bar. It did not in an arbitrary or bad faith manner and accordingly, the grievance should be dismissed. 21 The Society relied upon Re General Dynamics Canada and Independent Union of Defense Contractors (2006), 150 L.A.C. (4th) 41 (R. Brown); Re Kingston General and CUPE Local 1974 (2010), 191 L.A.C. (4th) 97 (Chauvin); Re Township of Schreiber and CUPE Local 87 [2003], O.L.A.A. No. 674, 75 C. L.A.S. 51 (Dissanyake); and St. Joseph’s at Fleming Long Term Care Facility and CUPE Local 2280 (2017), 278 L.A.C. (4th) 183 (Davie). UNION REPLY SUBMISSIONS Ms. Greenwood noted that much emphasis was put upon the Allen report by the Society. A review of that report reveals that equivalencies are taken into account. It is a misstatement to suggest that the report recommended only university degree holders could work in these positions. Regarding the fact that the grievor has not worked in the child protection role , the Union responded that new hires would be in that position as well. However, the grievor is better placed than a new hire because she has experience in the workplace and equivalencies. It is not being contended that a university degree is not related to the CPW2 role. However, it is unreasonable to determine that the possession of such a degree to the exclusion of all other experience and education is a violation of the Collective Agreement. Equivalencies must be considered. DECISION The Union properly conceded at the outset of these proceedings that – generally speaking – the Society has the right to establish the educational requirements for various position within its organization. However, it was of the view that in this instance, given the particular facts of this case, the Society violated the terms of Article 24.05 the Collective Agreement which mandates a consideration of skill, competence reliability and efficiency when it improperly screened the grievor out from being considered from the posted CPW2 positions due solely to her lack of university degree. It was further of the view that the Society acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or in bad faith in the exercising of its management’s rights. The jurisprudence makes clear that an arbitrator’s role is not to determine whether the established qualifications for any position are correct. Rather, when called upon to review the appropriateness of the standards an employer has used to make a choice in job competitions, a number of factors may be taken into account. Those criteria include:  Were the standards contemplated by and consistent with the job posting?  Were the standards contrary to the collective agreement and/or statute? 22  Do the standards bear reasonable relationship to the work to be performed?  Did the standards lack clarity or were too subjective?  Are the standards arbitrary, discriminatory or contrary to human rights legislation?  Were the standards established in good faith?  Were the standards not fairly or uniformly applied? I turn first to the determination of whether failing to interview the grievor was a violation of Article 24.05 of the Collective Agreement. I appreciate the Union’s view that Article 24.05 – Selection - does not set out credentials or educational qualifications and therefore the Society must take into account skill, competence, reliability and efficiency only. Indeed, the Union would have me find the Society cannot consider educational requirements in carrying out its authority under Article 24.05 let alone bar one from the process due to a lack of a particular educational credential. It also submitted that the requirement to possess a university degree to the exclusion of all other experience and education does not comply with the Collective Agreement. I understand that contention and that argument would have attraction but for Article 24.01(b). That provision states that notices for vacancies that exceed three months “shall contain the following information: nature of position; qualifications; required knowledge and education; shift; wage or salary rate or range.” I note that these two provisions of the Collective Agreement taken together do not provide a model of clarity. It is apparent that the Society has set out in the job postings at issue exactly what is required in Article 24.01(b). It was clearly stated under the Qualifications section – “BSW, MSW or Bachelor’s degree in a related field with relevant work experience.” The Society would argue that once the educational requirements set out in its posting are met only then does it next look to the factors set out in the Article 24.05 “selection” process to determine who – amongst the qualified candidates – scores the highest and is therefore entitled to the position. If an employee does not meet the “required knowledge and education” they do not proceed to the selection process. A reading of the Collective Agreement, at Article 24.01(b) reveals that the parties turned their minds to the issue of educational requirements. The parties agreed that that the Society is required to make known the “required knowledge and education” for any vacant position. Accordingly, I am led to the inevitable conclusion that the Society has not violated the Collective Agreement. However, that is not the end of the matter. That finding leads to a consideration of the last four criteria set out above, that is, whether the education requirements set by the Society are unreasonable, arbitrary, made in bad faith or not uniformly applied. 23 In consideration of whether the Society’s requirement for a university degree for the CPW2 positions at issue was arbitrary, the Society’s evidence revealed that the establishment of the educational requirement was first determined approximately ten years ago. This fact was not contradicted. The Society submitted that for this reason and because the Collective Agreement at Article 24.01(b) mandates that qualifications and required knowledge be set out in the job posting it is difficult to find that the Society has been arbitrary. I agree. This is not a case where the Society suddenly changed its requirements after years of a lesser standard. The requirements have been clear and presumably well known for a long time. There was evidence that at least one other employee has been denied an interview due to the lack of a university degree. I found the evidence regarding the rationale for the minimum standard of a univers ity degree persuasive. As attested to by Dr. Raymond, there have been tragic cases in the past that have brought about Inquiries and Commissions. There have been many recommendations made, some regarding the level of knowledge of staff who care for children. While it may well be said that there is no legislated mandate stating that a child protection worker at the 2 level must have a BSW, nor was there a clear recommendation that only BSWs can do the work at issue, I am still unable to find that the Society’s educational requirement is arbitrary. Turning to the matter of reasonableness, the Union conceded in its reply submissions that a university degree is related to the work but suggested that the requirement was nonetheless unreasonable. It urged that much should be made of the inconsistent approach that the Society has taken regarding the grandfathering of the grievor into her CPW1 role. It recalled the evidence wherein Dr. Raymond stated that the Society accepts that the grievor is qualified in all respects including education for any CPW1 role but not for CPW2 positions. The Union was of the view that because she has been grandfathered into a position that requires a university degree she must be considered to meet that qualification for all positions including a CPW2 role and that the Society’s failure to do so is unreasonable. I must disagree. The work at issue in the job postings have been grieved by Ms. Gravelle involves child protection work. Her entire experience with the Society has been with adolescents. This Board heard that the work is significantly different. For example, the evidence revealed that there are hundreds of standards that apply to child protection work and a handful for those on the Adolescent Protection Team. There is an eight module training component to be taken prior to undertaking the role of child protection worker. That is not the case for the CPW1 role. None of the CPW1 positions involve child protection work. I do not find the Society’s determination that the grievor is qualified for any CPW1 role but not for the role of a CPW2 to be unreasonable. 24 The grievor contended that it is not necessary to have a university degree to do this work. It was suggested that Ms. Gravelle’s years of experience and considerable knowledge would allow her to do the work with little training beyond that which is given to newly hir ed employees. That may well be so although I again note that she has not worked in a child protection role. However, the issue before me is not whether she could do the work without a university degree. As noted above it is whether the Society’s requirement of a university degree was unreasonable, arbitrary, made in bad faith or inconsistently applied. In attempting to convince the Board of inconsistent application of the Society’s educational requirement, the Union pointed to various employees without a BSW who were reclassified in the past or hired directly into what is now the CPW2 position. As is apparent in the agreed statement of fact and through the evidence of Dr. Raymond, some of those employees were hired into a position akin to the CPW2 role prior to the Society’s establishment of the present educational requirements. Some were reclassified but had actually performed many of the child protection tasks prior to reclassification. One was rehired after his retirement from a CPW2 position but into a ca sual role without child protection duties. Most had university degrees in something other than social work – or had almost completed their degree - which the Society ultimately assessed as being equivalent. There is no one whose situation is like that of the grievor, that is to say without a university education, with all of her work experience being with adolescents and grandfathered into a CPW1 role. It may be that the Society’s approach to determining qualifications has not been identical in each situation as there have been many different employees with varying factors to consider. However, I cannot find that the Society has inconsistently applied its educational requirements in an unreasonable fashion to the detriment of the grievor. The Union asserted that the Society has exercised bad faith in its dealing with the grievor and the job postings at issue. In my view, simply put, there is no evidence of bad faith. The Society has made clear that it values highly the work of the grievor. It reclassified h er in 2006 into the role of CPW1. I agree with the Union that this reclassification may not have been entirely benevolent given that in all likelihood she would have had bumping rights had she been laid off after her team was disbanded. However, I disagree with the Union that nothing should be made of the fact that the Society has offered on more than one occasion to assist the grievor to obtain a university degree. In the absence of any evidence that would lead to such a finding, I cannot agree that the Society has engaged in bad faith. There can be no doubt that the grievor has become frustrated and disappointed as the result of the educational requirements that are necessary for reclassification and job competitions. I understand her exasperation and I t ruly sympathize. The need for educational requirements for one who is otherwise quite capable may seem harsh. However, as is noted in all of the jurisprudence provided by the parties it is not for an arbitrator to determine what she would do 25 in the circumstances. It is not even an exercise of determining correctness. My role is to review the evidence and the provisions of the Collective Agreement and determine whether the Society has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or in bad faith. It has not. The Union relied upon a number of cases including Re Ministry of Northern Development (supra). It was brought to this Board’s attention that Vice Chair Dissanayake stated that “it is now settled that in grievances such as these where grievors claim that they were imp roperly screened out of a competition by the denial of an interview, the onus is on the employer to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the screening process was fair and reasonable”. In that case, a review was conducted of the applicants and assigned a score to each based on six weighted criteria. The grievors did not meet the threshold score established by the employer. In dismissing the grievances, the Vice Chair found that an employer is not obliged to grant interviews to all applicants. He opined that the screening process itself usually takes one of two forms. The first – which applies to the matter before this Board – is that “the employer may establish a threshold standard which the applicants must meet in order to be selected for an interview”. In the case before this Board, I am of the view that the Society established clear and reasonable standards that had to be met in order to be interviewed for the position, that is – amongst other things – a university degree. It is trite to say that matters such as those at issue before this Board will be determined upon the provisions of the Collective Agreement and the facts presented. In Re Metropolitan General Hospital (supra), it was decided that the requirement for an applicant to possess a B.Sc.N. was not justified. However, the evidence before that Board was an acknowledgement from the employer’s witness that “she did not consider the lack of it necessarily to disqualify an applicant.” The same is not the case in the matter at hand. Dr. Raymo nd was clear and unwavering in her evidence that a university degree was essential to performing the work of a CPW2 performing child protection work and that had been the Society’s practice for over a decade. The Union submitted that Re Seneca College (supra) was a case that is very similar to the instant grievances. I cannot agree. The evidence before Arbitrator Keller was that the grievor had performed in the posted position successfully for over three years but merely lacked the educational qualification set out in the job posting. Again, that is not the case before this Board. The grievor has never performed the duties of a CPW2 or undertaken child protection work. Her work has been exclusively with youth and the standards that apply to that population are entirely different. Therefore, there is no “demonstrated ability” for the very work at issue which was the basis upon which Arbitrator Keller upheld the grievance before him. 26 Arbitrator Burkett had to consider the matter of equivalent qualifications in Re Toronto Public Library (supra). He determined that “an employer, in determining whether an applicant is, in fact, qualified (that is, meets the qualifications established by the employer), must consider whatever equivalent qualifications are brought to the competition by the individual”. In the case before him, Arbitrator Burkett had a grievor who was denied an interview for a job competition because she was considered not to have met the requirements stated in the job competition. Specifically, what was required was – amongst other things – a library science degree and a minimum of four years’ professional library experience. The grievor had the necessary educational requirements but only three years and ten months of library experience at the time she applied for the position. In that case the Union was not challenging the minimum requirement of four years of experience but the employer’s reliance on that requirement to categorize the grievor as unqualified and thereby deny her an interview. In upholding the grievance, the Arbitrator found that the employer should have considered whether the grievor had equivalent qualifications. In doing so he relied upon the language of that particular Collective Agreement, agreements outside the Collective Agreement regarding equivalencies and a finding that the refusal to consider equivalencies did nothing to further the business interests of the employer. That is not the case before this Board. The present case is not a simply shortfall of a few months of experience with the work of the posted position. Further, the Society set out in its evidence – at some length – why its decision was based on its business interests. However, even if I am wrong that the Society in this instance was not obliged to consider equivalencies I am not completely convinced that the grievor would have been entitled to an interview. The positions at issue are all with child protection. Although the grievor has considerable and exemplary experience with the Society it is all in the area of adolescents. Equivalency of work was not established. For all of those reasons, I must deny the grievances. Dated in Toronto this 28th day of April, 2018. Felicity D. Briggs