HomeMy WebLinkAboutP-2017-3833.Stricko.18-08-13 Decision
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PSGB# P-2017-3833
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF ONTARIO ACT
Before
THE PUBLIC SERVICE GRIEVANCE BOARD
BETWEEN
Stricko Complainant
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The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) Employer
BEFORE Brendan Morgan Vice-Chair
FOR THE
COMPLAINANT
Daniel Stricko
FOR THE EMPLOYER Braden MacLean
Treasury Board Secretariat
Legal Services Branch
Counsel
HEARING August 1, 2018
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DECISION
A. BACKGROUND
[1] The Complainant, Mr. Daniel Striko, is employed by the Ministry of Community
Safety and Correctional Services (“CSCS” or the “employer’). At all relevant
times he has worked at the Employer’s Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre facility
and was classified as a ‘Captain’.
[2] On March 20, 2018, the Complainant filed a ‘Form 1 – Application’ contesting a 5
day (40 hour) disciplinary suspension imposed upon him by the Employer. The
Complainant set out three particular reasons in his Form 1 Application as to why
the discipline was, in his opinion, unwarranted and unjust.
[3] The incident that resulted in the Complainant’s suspension was said to have
occurred on October 25, 2017.
[4] During the course of filing its ‘Form 2 Response’ Counsel for the Employer
advised the Complainant and the Board that the Employer would be challenging
the Board’s ability to hear the complaint. Specifically, the Employer submitted
that the complaint was untimely pursuant to the provisions set out in Regulation
378/07 (the “Regulation”) of the “Public Service of Ontario Act, 2016” (the “Act”).
[5] The Employer further submitted that the discipline imposed upon the
Complainant was justified as was the five day suspension.
[6] A mediation session was scheduled for July18, 2018. However, a dispute arose
as to where the mediation should be conducted. The Complainant, citing health
and other reasons, sought to have the matter held in London, Ontario. The
Employer submitted that the mediation should be held at the Board’s office in
Toronto or, in the alternative, via teleconference call.
[7] Following the Board’s initial decision to have the mediation held in London
Counsel for the Employer sought to make further submissions on the issue. A
teleconference hearing was conducted on July 6, 2018, to allow both parties to
make oral submissions as to the location of the mediation. During the course of
the teleconference hearing both Counsel for the Employer and the Complainant
agreed that a teleconference mediation session was acceptable.
[8] As a result on July 21, 2018, the Board issued an addendum to its original
decision directing that the mediation would be conducted by teleconference call.
The Board subsequently scheduled the mediation to be held on August 1, 2018.
[9] Prior to the August 1, 2018, mediation the Employer advised the Board and the
Complainant that it did not wish to mediate the dispute. As mediation in the
Board’s process is voluntary the only matter left for the Board to consider on
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August 1, 2018, was the Employer’s preliminary objection with respect to the
timeliness of the Complainant’s complaint.
B. Employer’s Timeliness Objection
[10] The Employer submits that the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds
that the Complainant’s application failed to adhere to the mandatory timelines for
the filing of a complaint related to discipline as described in Regulation 378/07 of
the Act.
[11] It is worth noting that the facts surrounding the Employer’s timeliness objection
are largely not in dispute. The Complainant, rather, provided a number of
reasons as to why his complaint unfolded in the manner in which it did and why
the notice of complaint was filed on February 10, 2018.
[12] The incident that resulted in the imposition of the suspension was said to have
occurred on October 25, 2017 at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre. An
‘allegation meeting’ was held between the parties on January 11, 2018. The
Complainant was subsequently suspended on January 24, 2018 for a period of
five days or 40 hours.
[13] It was further agreed by the parties that the Complainant served the suspension
from January 25 until January 31, 2018. It stands to reason that during that
period of time the Complainant had no access to the facility including certain
personal possessions in his locker.
[14] The Complainant returned to work on February 1, 2018.
[15] On February 10, 2018, the Complainant provided a written correspondence to
the Deputy Minister of CSCS advising the Deputy Minister of the Complainant’s
intention to “file a grievance under the Public Service Act” contesting the five day
suspension. A copy of this correspondence was included in the Complainant’s
Form 1-Application. The Complainant acknowledged that this was filed with the
Deputy Minister on February 10, 2018.
[16] The Complainant filed a Form 1-Application with the Board on or about March 20,
2018. The Employer’s Form 2 Response outlining the timeliness objection was
filed with the Board on June 19, 2018.
[17] Counsel for the Employer submitted that the agreed-upon chronology of the
Complainant’s complaint demonstrated a ‘prima facie’ violation for the filing of a
complaint as set out in the Regulation 378/07. As a result, Counsel argued, the
Board lacked the jurisdiction to review the merits of the case.
[18] Specifically, the Employer directed the Board’s attention to Section 8(4)(2) of the
Regulation which states that where discipline is imposed a Complainant is
required to adhere to the following:
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“8(4) The notice must be given within the following period
2. For a complaint about a disciplinary measure, within 14
days after the complainant receives notice of the imposition
of the disciplinary measure.”
[19] The Employer submitted that the Complainant received notice of the imposition
of discipline on January 24, 2018. This was in the form of a correspondence
addressed to the Complainant from Mr. Jeremie Brooks, Deputy Superintendant,
Operations at CSCS. The correspondence noted that it was “Hand Delivered” to
the Complainant.
[20] While the Complainant took the position that he did not agree with the objectivity
of the individuals conducting the investigation that led to his being disciplined he
did not dispute the fact that he received the notice of the imposition of discipline
on January 24, 2018.
[21] Having received the notice of discipline on January 24, 2018, Counsel for the
Employer submitted that the “14 day clock” described in Section 8(4)(2) had
begun to “count down”. Counsel submitted that the Complainant therefore had
until February 7, 2018, to file a complaint.
[22] Instead, the complaint was filed on February the 10th, 2018. This, Counsel
submitted, was three days outside of the time frame provided for by the
Regulation. As a result, the Board was without jurisdiction to hear the complaint
and it must therefore be dismissed.
[23] Counsel for the Employer provided the Board with four Board authorities in
support of the position that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis that it
did not comply with the filing requirements set out in Regulation 378/07, Section
8(4)(2). These authorities are discussed at greater length later in this Decision.
[24] While the Complainant in his oral presentation did not dispute the accuracy of the
chronology of this matter as described by Counsel for the Employer and as
acknowledged by the Complainant’s written materials he did provide submissions
as to why he was unable to adhere to the timelines for filing.
[25] Firstly, the Complainant stated that he was placed at a disadvantage by being
suspended and thus being barred from the workplace for a period of five days.
This prohibition from the workplace made it impossible for him to access certain
documents that were in his personal locker. It was the Complainant’s submission
that these unspecified documents were necessary for him to initiate a complaint.
Without these documents and access to certain individuals who are familiar with
the Regulation and its processes he had effectively lost five days to file his notice
of complaint.
[26] Secondly, upon returning to work after the suspension the Complainant found
himself with very little opportunity to file the notice of complaint. The Complainant
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submitted that he was required to constantly work upwards of twelve and a half-
hour shifts and thus had no realistic opportunity to research what was necessary
for filing and then to complete the actual task of filing the notice of complaint.
This was further compromised, again, by his inability to contact certain
individuals who are known locally to have a certain ‘expertise’ in matters
involving the Regulation on and its processes.
[27] Finally, the Complainant cited his on-going health problems as an over-arching
reason for how this matter evolved. The Complainant directed the Board’s
attention to a letter that had been previously provided to the Board from the
Complainant’s health care practitioner, dated June 14, 2018. This particular
correspondence was provided to the Board in support of the Complainant’s
request to have the mediation session moved to London.
[28] The Complainant suggested that he felt “muddied” during this period. While he
did not elaborate further on his situation he did ask the Board to review the
contents of the letter from the Complainants health care practitioner. This would
suggest that at the time of his suspension he was suffering from the same
conditions as those described in the June 14, 2018 correspondence.
[29] To summarize, the Complainant did not provide any evidence to refute that which
was provided by the Employer. The chronology of events as supported by the
January 24 and February 10, 2018 documents was not challenged by the
Complainant. When asked during the course of the hearing the Complainant did
not question the accuracy of these documents or the dates upon which they had
been filed.
[30] The Complainant’s argument rested on the three factors described above in
paragraphs 25 through 28, above. These address reasons why the Complainant
may have had difficulties in meeting certain requisite time-lines as set out in the
Regulation. However, they do not provide a rebuttal to the Employer’s legal
interpretation and application of the Regulation.
C. Decision – Timeliness
[31] For the reasons that follow I must determine that the complaint initiated by the
Complainant was not filed by the Board in a timely matter. As a result the
complaint must be dismissed.
[32] As has been noted in a number of previous decisions of the Board all complaints
that come before the Board are subject to specific requirements set out in the Act
and its regulations. Complaints relating to discipline are subject to the following
provisions under Reg. 378/07:
Complaint about a disciplinary measure
3. (1) A public servant who is aggrieved by the imposition of a
disciplinary measure under section 34 of the Act, other than dismissal
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for cause, may file a complaint about the disciplinary measure with the
Public Service Grievance Board,
(b) if the public servant gives notice in accordance with section 8 of his or
her proposal to file a complaint; and..
8. (4) The notice must be given within the following period:
2. For a complaint about a disciplinary measure, within 14 days after
the complainant receives notice of the imposition of the discipline
measure.
[33] The Board’s decision in St. Amant v The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of
Community Safety and Correctional Services) (Carter), P-2012-0601, 2013
CanLII 4673 (ON PSGB), described the limits of the Board’s jurisdiction where a
Complainant failed to comply with the mandatory time limits as established by the
Regulation.
[34] At paragraph 10 of the decision the Board commented that:
“compliance with these time limits is a precondition to the PSGB assuming
jurisdiction over a matter. Given the mandatory nature of those time limits
and the lack of express statutory authority to relieve against these
mandatory time limits, the Board must conclude that it has no power to
alter the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to comply with the 14 day
time limit.”
[35] In Strong and the Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Youth
Services) (Devins), P-2015-0638, 2016 CanLII 89880 (ON PSGB), the Board
declined jurisdiction over a complaint that had been filed some fifty–six days after
the initial discipline was imposed upon the Complainant. The Complainant in
Strong waited until he had returned from his rather lengthy suspension to initiate
the complaint.
[36] In dismissing the complaint on the Employer’s timeliness objection the Board
commented at paragraph 10 that:
“While I appreciate that it was easier for the Complainant to advise the
Deputy Minister of his intention to complain about his suspension once he
returned to work, the Regulation is very specific about when the time limits
start: the notice must be given “within 14 days after the complaint receives
notice of the imposition of the disciplinary measures.” There is no
ambiguity in this provision and I have no discretion to allow for a later filing
date.”
[37] Similar to the Complainant in Strong, the present Complainant is effectively
asking the Board to relieve against the mandatory time lines for filing a complaint
as described in the Regulation based on certain personal circumstances. The
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Complainant cited a number of issues ranging from an inability to access
paperwork and assistance due to his suspension from the workplace, to a heavy
shift schedule to health concerns as reasons for not filing within the 14 day
period set out in Regulation 378/07, Section 8(4)(2).
[38] Unfortunately for the Complainant the Board has no discretion to provide for such
relief in the circumstances that were raised during the course of the hearing. The
Regulation does not provide for any relief against a Complainant’s failure to file
within the requisite time lines as set out in the Regulation.
[39] The same rationale was applied in two other authorities cited by Counsel for the
Employer; Taylor and the Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community
Safety and Correctional Services) (Devins), P-2016-2281, 2017 CanLII 65620
(ON PSGB), and Noel and the Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community
Safety and Correctional Services) (Morgan), P-2017-174, 2018 CanLII 14213
(ON PSGB).
[40] In both decisions the Board declined jurisdiction over the respective complaints
involving discipline complaints that were filed outside of the mandatory time
limits. The Board reiterated the well-entrenched position that the time limits were
mandatory and the Board lacked the discretion to relieve against a Complainant’s
failure to comply with that which is set out in the Regulation.
[41] The written and oral submission of both parties clearly establish that the notice
filed by the Complainant on February 10, 2018, exceeded the 14 day period set
out in Section 8(4)(2) of the Regulation. I have no discretion to relieve against the
Complainant’s failure to comply with the time limits.
[42] The Complainant relied upon a number of factors to seek relief against his failure
to abide by the Section 8(4)(2) time requirements. Such factors as an inability to
access paperwork, advice or a difficult work schedule are not matters that the
Board has discretion to consider against a violation of the time limits.
[43] Given the Complainant’s failure to abide by the provisions set out in Section
8(4)(2) the Board’s consistent practice with respect to the application of the
Regulation I am left with no alternative but to decline jurisdiction to entertain the
Complainant’s complaint regarding his five day suspension.
[44] As a result the Employer’s preliminary objection is upheld and the complaint is
dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 13th day of August, 2018.
“Brendan Morgan”
_______________________
Brendan Morgan, Vice-Chair