HomeMy WebLinkAbout2018-0037.Clark et al.18-11-30 Decision
Crown Employees Grievance Settlement
Board
Suite 600
180 Dundas St. West
Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z8
Tel. (416) 326-1388
Fax (416) 326-1396
Commission de
règlement des griefs
des employés de la
Couronne
Bureau 600
180, rue Dundas Ouest
Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1Z8
Tél. : (416) 326-1388
Téléc. : (416) 326-1396
GSB# 2018-0037; 2018-0040, 2018-0041; 2018-0042, 2018-0043, 2018-0044
UNION# 2017-0727-0011; 2017-0727-0014; 2017-0727-0015; 2017-0727-0016; 2017-0727-
0017; 2017-0727-0018
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
(Clark et al) Union
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The Crown in Right of Ontario
(The Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry) Employer
BEFORE Nimal Dissanayke Arbitrator
FOR THE UNION
FOR THE EMPLOYER
Alex Zamfir
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
Grievance Officer
Carly Jones
Treasury Board Secretariat
Employee Relations Advisor
HEARING November 22, 2018
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Preliminary Decision
[1] Six individual grievances filed in September 2017 by Water Bomber Pilots in the
employer’s fire program came before me for mediation-arbitration under article
22.16 of the collective agreement. The parties had agreed that all of the
grievances should be heard together as a group.
[2] When the Board convened, the parties requested that the Board hear and rule on
a motion by the employer that the grievances should be dismissed on the grounds
that they were referred to arbitration beyond the time limits set out in the collective
agreement.
[3] The union stated that the grievances are about two aspects of distribution of
overtime. First, the union would be submitting that on specific dates the grievors
were denied overtime opportunities in contravention of the employer’s obligation
to do so in a fair and equitable manner. As a result one particular employee
received overtime opportunities far in excess of opportunities offered to the
grievors. The union would be arguing that this resulted from the employer’s failure
to develop methods of distributing overtime at the local workplace as required by
article UN 8.2.1. Alternatively, if it had a system it was not a fair and equitable one.
[4] Ms. Jones for the employer pointed out that the grievances had been referred to
arbitration 16 work days beyond the time limit in article 22.6.1 of the collective
agreement, which she submitted was mandatory. She also pointed out that article
22.14.1 provides that where a grievance is not processed within the time limits, it
is deemed to have been withdrawn. While article 22.14.3 provides that time limits
may be extended by agreement in writing, the union made no request for an
extension.
[5] Ms. Jones reviewed Re Becker Milk Company Ltd. (1978) 19 L.A.C. (2d) 217
(Burkett) and Re Greater Niagara General Hospital, (1981) 1 L.A.C. (3d) 1 (Schiff)
which discuss the criteria arbitrators apply in exercising the discretion to extend
time limits under s. 48(16) of the Labour Relation Act. It was submitted that on the
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facts of this case the Board should find that the requirements of s. 48(16), namely
that there are reasonable grounds for an extension or that the employer would not
be prejudiced by an extension are not met.
[6] The employer asserted the following:
1. The issue at stake in the grievance, denial of overtime opportunities, is not
a significant or serious one, unlike for example, an alleged termination without
just cause.
2. The failure to meet time limits occurred not at the filing stage, but later in the
process. Since the Stage 2 meeting was waived by the employer at the request
of the union, the employer has no information as to the reason for the delay in
referral.
3. The employer has no information as to whether the grievors were
responsible for the delay.
4. The delay was 16 days, which is not insignificant.
5. There were reasonable grounds for the employer to assume that the union
had abandoned the grievances because:
(a) At the request of the union the employer agreed to waive the stage 2
meeting and explicitly stated to the union in so agreeing, to the effect “You
are welcome to file on to the GSB”. There was no response from the union
until it referred the grievances to arbitration 16 days after the expiry of the
time limit. This was a strong signal to the employer that the union did not
intend to refer to the GSB.
(b) The union steward was experienced and would have been familiar with
the time limits for referral to arbitration.
(c) Most of the grievors had filed grievances previously and had complied
with the time limits. So they were also aware of time limits.
6. The union failed to exercise due diligence, and that was the reason for the
delay in referral.
7. There is prejudice to the employer in that it was denied the opportunity to
investigate the circumstances of the alleged violations due to the waiver of the
stage 2 meeting at the union’s request, the delay in referral to arbitration and
the late filing of the union’s particulars, following referral to arbitration.
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[7] The union submitted that the issue in the grievances is not trivial. It is about
entitlement to compensation. The delay of 16 days, compared to the cases
relied on by the employer, is minimal. In Re Greater Niagara General Hospital,
(supra) the union was allowed to proceed despite a delay of 10 weeks, and the
grievance there was about compensation for sick time. It was submitted that
there are no facts before the Board to suggest that the delay was in any way
attributable to the grievors. It was a case of inadvertence on the part of the
union. At the highest, it would amount to negligence on the part of a union
representative. Arbitrators have held that negligence is not by itself grounds to
deny an extension of time limits.
[8] It was further submitted that there could not have been any prejudice to the
employer’s ability to prepare its defence of the grievances as a result of the 16
day delay in referral to arbitration. The grievances themselves clearly set out
the alleged violations, as well as the specific dates on which the violations
occurred. If the employer wanted to investigate, it had all relevant information
needed. The fact that a stage 2 meeting did not take place or that the union’s
particulars were not filed until October of 2018 could not deprive the employer
of an opportunity to prepare its case.
DECISION
[9] In Re Chu, 2015-2559 (Petryshen), at paragraphs 10-12, the Board wrote:
[10] The effect of this provision is that a time limit can be extended if the
arbitrator is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the extension
and that such an extension will not substantially prejudice the opposite
party. The relevant factors for consideration when determining whether to
exercise the discretion to extend time limits were canvassed in Becker Milk
Company and Teamsters Union, Local 647 (1978), 19 L.A.C. (2nd) 217
(Burkett) and Greater Niagara General Hospital and O.N.A. (1981), 1
L.A.C. (3rd) 1 (Schiff). Arbitrator Burkett identified the following factors:
1. The reason for the delay given by the offending party.
2. The length of the delay.
3. The nature of the grievance.
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After identifying these factors, the arbitrator went on to state:
If the offending party satisfies an arbitrator, notwithstanding the
delay, that it acted with due diligence, then if there has been no
prejudice the arbitrator should exercise his discretion in favour of
extending the time limits. If, however, the offending party has been
negligent or is otherwise to blame for the delay, either in whole or in
part, the arbitrator must nevertheless consider the second and third
factors referred to above in deciding if reasonable grounds exist for
an extension of the time limits.
[11] Arbitrator Schiff referred the following factors:
1. The nature of the grievance.
2. Whether the delay occurred in launching the grievance or at a
later stage.
3. Whether the grievor was responsible for the delay.
4. The reasons for the delay.
5. The length of the delay.
6. Whether the Employer could reasonably have assumed the
grievance had been abandoned.
[12] The above decisions contain examples of how these factors are
applied in different factual contexts and suggest that the various factors are
not considered in isolation. In essence, the decisions illustrate that the
extent of the delay and the reason for the delay will be considered in light of
the seriousness of the subject matter grieved.
[10] There are no facts asserted from which I can even infer that any of the grievors
were responsible for the delay. The delay occurred not at the filing stage. It was
a delay in referral, a responsibility of union officials. Employer counsel seemed
to recognize this when she referred to the experience of the union steward and
the failure to exercise due diligence on the part of the union. I find that the union,
and not the grievors, was responsible for the late referral of the grievances.
[11] Negligence on the part of the union, however, is not by itself fatal to the union’s
request for an extension of time limits pursuant to S. 48(16). See, Re Greater
Niagara General Hospital (supra) at para. 15. The Board must go on to assess
all of the relevant factors before deciding whether there are reasonable grounds
to extend time limits.
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[12] As observed by the Board in Re Chu (supra) the test on the issue of prejudice
is whether an extension of time would substantially prejudice the opposing party.
Mere inconvenience is not enough. I have no hesitation concluding, especially
in comparison to other cases where an extension of time limits was granted.
(see, review at para. 18 of Re Greater Niagara General Hospital, (supra), that
the delay of 16 days is minimal. I also conclude that the delay of 16 days could
not have prejudiced the employer’s ability to investigate or prepare its case in
defence of the allegations clearly set out in the grievances. While asserting
“prejudice”, the employer did not specify how it was prejudiced due to the delay.
For example, fading memories, lost documents, or that potential witnesses no
longer available. (See, Re Royal Crest Lifecare Group, (2000) 91 L.A.C. (4th)
389 (Craven) at para. 35.)
[13] I agree with the union that the waiver of the stage 2 meeting or the late filing of
the union’s particulars has no bearing on the issue here which is about delay in
referral to arbitration. I conclude that the employer had no reasonable basis in
the circumstances to assume that the union had abandoned the grievances,
when the union missed the time limit for referral to arbitration by 16 days.
[14] I agree with the employer that a claim of lost overtime opportunities is not as
significant as a grievance alleging termination without just cause. However, it
is a claim relating to compensation. The decision whether reasonable grounds
exist for extension, under S. 48(16) must be made upon a consideration of all of
the relevant factors, and balancing the interests of both parties.
[15] Having done so, I am satisfied that reasonable grounds exist for extension of
the time limits in the exercise of my discretion pursuant to S. 48(16) of the
Labour Relations Act. I am also satisfied that such extension would not result
in prejudice to the employer.
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[16] Therefore, this matter may proceed to hearing on the merits. The Registrar is
directed to schedule the hearing in consultation with the parties. I remain seized
in that regard.
Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 30th day of November, 2018.
“Nimal Dissanayake”
Nimal Dissanayake, Arbitrator