HomeMy WebLinkAbout2018-2877.Watson.19-08-20 DecisionCrown Employees
Grievance Settlement
Board
Suite 600
180 Dundas St. West
Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z8
Tel. (416) 326-1388
Fax (416) 326-1396
Commission de
règlement des griefs
des employés de la
Couronne
Bureau 600
180, rue Dundas Ouest
Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1Z8
Tél. : (416) 326-1388
Téléc. : (416) 326-1396
GSB# 2018-2877
UNION# 2018-0453-0006
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
(Watson) Union
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(St. Lawrence Parks Commission) Employer
BEFORE
Diane Gee
Arbitrator
FOR THE UNION
Alex Zamfir
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
Grievance Officer
FOR THE EMPLOYER Maria-Kristina Ascenzi
Treasury Board Secretariat
Legal Services Branch
Counsel
HEARING July 18, 2019
-2-
DECISION
[1] Mr. Watson was not offered additional work after his Seasonal Group 3 contract
ended on November 17, 2017. A grievance was filed on his behalf on February
1, 2018 in which it was alleged that Mr. Watson had been “unjustly and unfairly
denied employment.” The grievance alleges violations of Articles 3 and 6 of the
Collective Agreement and section 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act
(“OHSA”). The grievance was denied by the Employer by letter dated February
16, 2018. Article 22.6.1 of the Collective Agreement provides that a grievance is
to be referred to arbitration within 15 days of the date of receipt of the employer’s
decision failing which, according to article 22.14.1 “…it shall be deemed to have
been withdrawn.” In this case, the grievance was referred to arbitration nine
months after the deadline set out in article 22.6.1.
[2] At the commencement of the hearing, the Employer brought a motion that the
grievance is inarbitrable as it had not been referred to arbitration in a timely
manner. The Union asks that I exercise my discretion, recognized by article
22.14.7 of the collective agreement, to apply section 48(16) of the Labour
Relations Act, 1995 (the “LRA”) and extend the relevant time limit.
[3] The parties entered into an Agreed Statement of Facts for the purposes of the
Employer’s motion. The following is a brief summary of the agreed facts:
i. The grievor has held the Seasonal Group 3 position of Assistant
Harbourmaster on a recurring basis from April 15, 2009 to the present.
ii. From April 2009 to the present, the grievor has been offered additional
work, by way of an additional contract at the end of the original seasonal
contract, on seven occasions. At some point in time, during the
performance of this additional work, the grievor built a cabin.
iii. On April 3, 2017 the grievor accepted the temporary position of Acting
Harbourmaster under a Group 1 contact. In this position, the grievor
raised health and safety concerns at work. The grievor asked to be
returned to his Assistant Harbourmaster position in August 2017, and he
did so as of October 2, 2017. He worked in the Assistant Harbourmaster
position until November 17, 2017.
iv. In November 2017, at the end of his contract, the grievor was not offered a
contract extension or a new contract for additional work.
v. On January 25, 2018 the grievor learned of an ongoing project totalling
eight weeks of work that involved the building of a cabin.
vi. The grievor was given seasonal contracts, in keeping with his previous
seasonal contracts, in 2018 and 2019.
vii. The grievor filed a grievance as described above and a formal resolution
meeting was held. The Employer denied the grievance by letter dated
February 18, 2018 and the Union steward forwarded the grievance form
and stage 2 decision to the Union to refer the matter to the Grievance
Settlement Board.
-3-
viii. As a result of a clerical error, this grievance was not referred to the
Grievance Settlement Board until November 26, 2018.
[4] In support of the Employer’s position, reliance is placed on Re Becker Milk
Company Ltd. And Teamsters Union (1978), 19 L.A.C. (2d) 217; Re Greater
Niagara General Hospital and Ontario Nurses’ Association, 1981 CarswellOnt
1881; OPSEU (Kavanaugh) v. Ontario (Community and Social Services), (2009)
GSB#2007-0136, 2007-2649 (Harris); OPSEU (Smith et al.) v. Ontario (Ministry
of Community and Social Services), (2008) GSB# 2006-2107, 2006-2379 (Gray);
OPSEU (Nedai) and Ontario (Ministry of Attorney General), (2016) GSB# 2015-
2063, 2015-2064, 2015-2065 (Briggs); OPSEU (Berday) and Ontario (Ministry of
Transportation), (2008) GSB# 2007-3132 (Devins); OPSEU (Ng) and Ontario
(Ministry of Government Services), (2010) GSB# 2009-3379 (Mikus); OPSEU
(Lachance) and Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional
Services), (2008) GSB# 2006-2093 (Petryshen); and OPSEU (Kevin Gamble)
and Ontario (Liquor Control Board of Ontario), (1998) GSB# 1635/96 (Gray).
[5] In addition to Becker Milk, supra, and Greater Niagara, supra, the Union relies on
OPSEU (Clark et al) and Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry),
(2018) GSB# 2018-0037, 2018-0040, 2018-0041, 2018-0042, 2018-0043 and
2018-0044 (Dissanayake) and Royal Crest Lifecare Group v. Service Employees
International Union, Local 204 (Grossett) (2000), 91 L.A.C. (4th) 389.
[6] Article 22.14.7 of the collective agreement provides that the GSB has the
jurisdiction to apply section 48(16) of the LRA to extend timelines in the collective
agreement. Section 48(16) of the LRA provides that an arbitrator can extend
timelines “where … satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the extension
and that the party opposite will not be unreasonably prejudiced by the extension.”
The purpose of section 48(16) is to provide relief from the consequences that
would result from a mechanical application of timelines but, as stated in section
48(16), such relief can only be given where: (1) there are reasonable grounds for
doing so; and (2) the effect would not result in unreasonable prejudice.
[7] The parties are agreed that the following factors are to be considered in the
course of determining whether the preconditions, necessary for the exercise of
an arbitrator’s discretion to extend timelines, are present:
• The nature of the grievance
• Whether the delay occurred in initially launching the grievance or at some
later stage
• Whether the grievor was responsible for the delay
• The reasons for the delay
• The length of the delay
• Whether the Employer could reasonably have assumed the grievance had
been abandoned
-4-
[8] As recognized by both parties, each case is fact specific. All of the factors must
be considered and weighed by the decision maker. As such I do not consider it
necessary to review the submissions of the parties or the cases in any detail.
This case must be decided having regard to the facts before me.
[9] The Union concedes that the grievor is not responsible for the delay; the delay
was the result of a clerical error on the part of the Union While there is no
suggestion of bad faith or negligence on the part of the Union, the Union was the
cause of the delay. The grievance was filed with the Employer in a timely
manner and hence the Employer had timely notice of the issue raised in the
grievance. However, the passage of nine months beyond the 15 days allowed
for by the terms of the collective agreement without the matter being referred to
arbitration, could reasonably have led the Employer to assume the grievance to
have been abandoned. The nature of the grievance involves a claim of
retribution for raising a health and safety matter and the possibility of eight weeks
pay. While the nature of the issue in dispute in this matter is not trivial, it is also
not of immense significance. Timelines were not extended in Lachance, supra,
wherein the grievance was of a similar nature. Taking into consideration all of
the foregoing, I do not consider there to be reasonable grounds for extending the
timelines set out in the collective agreement.
[10] The grievance is hereby dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 20th day of August, 2019.
“Diane Gee”
______________________
Diane Gee, Arbitrator