HomeMy WebLinkAbout2019-2371.Holder-Regis.20-11-17 Decision
Crown Employees Grievance Settlement
Board
Suite 600
180 Dundas St. West
Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z8
Tel. (416) 326-1388
Fax (416) 326-1396
Commission de
règlement des griefs
des employés de la
Couronne
Bureau 600
180, rue Dundas Ouest
Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1Z8
Tél. : (416) 326-1388
Téléc. : (416) 326-1396
GSB# 2019-2371; 2020-0929
UNION# 2019-0502-0031; 2020-0502-0007
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
(Holder-Regis) Union
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of the Attorney General) Employer
BEFORE Ian Anderson Arbitrator
FOR THE UNION
Anjana Kashyap
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
Grievance Officer
FOR THE EMPLOYER Andrew Lynes
Treasury Board Secretariat
Legal Services Branch
Counsel
FOR LAURA
HOLDER-REGIS
HEARING
Laura Holder-Regis
November 2, 2020
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Decision
[1] Did the Employer, the Union and Ms. Holder-Regis enter into a binding settlement
on October 28, 2020? That is the issue before me and determined by this
decision.
[2] The grievance which is the subject of GSB File No. 2019-2371 was scheduled for
arbitration before me on October 28, 2020. As is typical, the Union and the
Employer elected to use that first day for mediation. At the conclusion of the day,
representatives of the Employer and the Union both signed a Memorandum of
Settlement which named the Employer, the Union and Ms. Holder-Regis as
parties. When presented with that document for her signature, Ms. Holder-Regis
refused to sign. Further, she advised counsel for the Union that in her view there
was no settlement. The Employer requested a hearing on an urgent basis so that
it might bring a motion to argue that a binding settlement existed.
[3] That hearing was conducted on November 2, 2020. The Employer and the Union
were in agreement that the settlement recorded in the Memorandum of Settlement
was reached on October 28, 2020. The Memorandum of Settlement contains a
confidentiality clause, but some of its terms are relevant for the purposes of this
decision. I omit the other terms. For ease of reference, I have also underlined
certain language in paragraphs 7 and 10 which was added during the course of
negotiations, as discussed further below.
GSB# 2019-2371, 2020-0929
OPSEU# 2019-0502-0031, 2020-0502-0007
HRTO File No. 2020-43232-I
Memorandum of Settlement
Between:
Laura Holder-Regis
Grievor
- and -
The Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU)
Union
- and -
THE CROWN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO as represented by
the Ministry of the Attorney General
Employer
WHEREAS the Grievor filed the above-noted grievances dated October 22, 2019 and
June 17, 2020 alleging, inter alia, harassment and discrimination, and failures to
accommodate and to provide a safe workplace;
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AND WHEREAS the Grievor filed the above-noted Application to the Ontario Human
Rights Tribunal dated October 15, 2020, alleging, inter alia, harassment and
discrimination, and failure to accommodate;
THEREFORE the Parties agree to the full and final settlement of the Grievances, without
precedent and without prejudice to any other matter between the Parties, on the
following terms:
[Paragraphs 1 - 3 omitted]
4. The Grievor and Union agree that the Grievances are hereby fully and finally
resolved and withdrawn.
5. The Grievor agrees that the HRTO Application is hereby fully and finally
resolved and withdrawn. The Application [sic] agrees to file a Tribunal Form 9, to
be delivered to the Employer’s counsel, within ten (10) days of the date of this
settlement.
6. The Grievor and Union agree to release and forever discharge the Employer,
its servants, agents, directors of and from all actions, causes of actions, claims
and demands of every nature and kind arising out of the circumstances of the
Grievor’s employment with the Employer up to the date of this settlement,
including but not limited to all claims under the collective agreement, the
WDHP/Respectful Workplace Policy, the Public Service of Ontario Act, the
Human Rights Code, the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and the
Employment Standards Act. The Grievor and the Union further agree that any
facts related to these Grievances will not form the basis of any future proceeding
against the Employer, its servants, agents, and directors.
7. The parties agree that they have discussed or otherwise canvassed any and
all human rights complaints, concerns, or issues, arising out of or in respect to
the employee's employment with the Employer up to the date of this settlement.
8. Nothing in this settlement constitutes an admission of liability by any party.
9. The Parties agree that this settlement constitutes the entire agreement
between the Parties and supersedes any and all prior oral or written agreements,
arrangements or understandings between them.
10. The Parties agree to keep the terms of this settlement strictly confidential,
with no disclosure except to the Grievor’s immediate family, union, legal or
financial advisors, or as required for the settlement’s implementation, and as
required by law.
11. The Grievor agrees that she has voluntarily entered into this settlement and
is fully informed of and understands the consequences of this settlement.
12. The Parties agree that the Arbitrator Ian Anderson of the Grievance
Settlement Board shall be seized with jurisdiction if any disputes regarding the
implementation or interpretation of this settlement should arise.
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Dated at Toronto, this 28th day of October, 2020.
___________________________ _”L. Sciarria”_______________
For the Grievor For the Employer
_[Illegible Signature]____________
For the Union
[4] At the outset of the hearing, Ms. Holder-Regis disputed that she had agreed to the
settlement set out in the Memorandum of Settlement, indicating that she did not
agree to “the removal of the human rights part”.
The Legal Framework
[5] There is no question that the Employer and the Union agreed upon the settlement
set out in the Memorandum of Settlement. The issue is whether Ms. Holder-Regis
is bound by that settlement. If not, a further issue arises as to whether the fact she
is not bound vitiates the agreement of the Employer and the Union.
[6] In general, while individual grievances complaining of a breach of a collective
agreement are filed by the aggrieved employee, the grievance itself belongs not to
the employee but to the union which is the party to the collective agreement with
the employer. That is, the union has carriage rights of the grievance and the
grievor has no independent legal standing to advance the grievance through the
grievance or arbitration process. Consequently, the union and the employer may
settle the grievance without the agreement of the grievor. Such a settlement may
extend beyond the scope of the grievance to other employment related issues for
which the union holds exclusive representation rights, including other grievances
filed by the grievor. It is not uncommon, however, for a grievor to be made a party
in their own right to the settlement of their grievance, even when not legally
necessary to do so.
[7] Further, it is not uncommon for settlements to address complaints for which a
union does not hold exclusive representation rights, such as alleged breaches of
the Human Rights Code. Indeed, where there are or may be proceedings before
the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (“HRTO”) which raise some or all of the issues
addressed by a grievance, an employer will typically have little interest in settling
the grievance without at the same time resolving the Human Rights Tribunal
proceedings. This is because there is generally little benefit to an employer in
providing consideration to settle an employee’s grievance if the prospect of
litigating the same issues before the Human Rights Tribunal remains. Accordingly,
employers will typically seek a “global settlement” of all complaints which the
employee may have, or at least all complaints related to the issues raised by the
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grievance. Such a settlement, of necessity, must include the grievor as an
independent third party.
[8] During arbitration proceedings the legal representative of a union is just that: they
are not the legal representative of the grievor. Similarly, during negotiations of a
settlement, the union’s representative, by virtue of being its representative, has
authority to bind the union, not the grievor. This distinction is generally of little
practical consequence as the interests of the union and the grievor typically
coincide, nonetheless it is real.
[9] Where, as here, the union and the employer seek to a negotiate a settlement to
which the grievor will be a party in her own right, the union’s representative
assumes a dual role. They continue to make representations as to the union’s
settlement position, but they may also make representations as to the grievor’s
settlement position, effectively becoming the grievor’s agent. The employer is
entitled to rely on the representations made as to the grievor’s position.
Application to the Facts
[10] No evidence was called during the hearing on November 2, 2020. Rather, counsel
for the Employer, Mr. Lynes, made certain representations of fact with reference to
various documents which were filed as exhibits. The Union’s representative, Ms.
Kashyap indicated that the Union did not dispute any of those facts. Ms. Holder-
Regis specifically disputed certain facts related to her application to the Human
Rights Tribunal, as noted below.
[11] At various times during his representations of fact, Mr. Lynes referred to the
“parties” having reached agreement on one point or another. It is important to note
that at no point during the negotiations did Ms. Holder-Regis directly communicate
anything to the Employer or its counsel. Rather, Ms. Kashyap advised counsel for
the Employer of positions taken by both the Union and Ms. Holder-Regis.
[12] The facts before me for the purposes of this decision are as follows.
[13] The Union and the Employer agreed to use October 28, 2020 in mediation of an
attempted settlement. Their representatives on that day were Ms. Kashyap and
Mr. Lynes respectively. I would note that as is the norm for these parties, the legal
representatives of the Union and the Employer met together with me as the
mediator at the outset of the day to outline the facts and legal issues involved and
begin to outline possible settlement positions.
[14] In the grievance before me, Ms. Holder-Regis alleged bad faith failure to
accommodate disability and discrimination on the basis of age. During the course
of this initial session, there was reference to a second grievance filed by Ms.
Holder-Regis (scheduled for arbitration at a later date before me) which alleged
ongoing failure to accommodate. There was also reference to the fact that Ms.
Holder-Regis had filed an application with the HRTO. Mr. Lynes indicated that
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from the Employer’s perspective, settlement discussions would be predicated upon
a global settlement of both grievances and the HRTO application. Ms. Kashyap
was asked to confirm with Ms. Holder-Regis that she was prepared to settle on
that basis. Ms. Kashyap left the virtual meeting room, returned within a minute or
two and confirmed that Ms. Holder-Regis was prepared to settle on that basis.
[15] Offers to settle with respect to substantive issues were exchanged. At
approximately 3:50 PM, Mr. Lynes communicated to Ms. Kashyap the Employer’s
acceptance of the last offer she had presented.
[16] At 4:21 PM, Mr. Lynes sent Ms. Kashyap an email with the subject line “Holder
MOS”. The text of the email reads “WITHOUT PREJUDICE Please see attached
for review”. A document called “Holder-Regis, Laura MOS (DRAFT).docx” is
attached. That document is identical to the Memorandum of Settlement ultimately
signed by the Employer and Union except it lacked the words underlined in
paragraphs 7 and 10 as reproduced above. (There were also two pluralization
errors which were subsequently corrected, as described below.)
[17] Ms. Kashyap and Mr. Lynes had some direct communication during which Ms.
Kashyap raised issues about the scope of the release clause in paragraph 6 and
the scope of the human rights issues described as having been canvassed in
paragraph 7. Those were the only issues raised. At 4:47 PM, Ms. Kashyap sent
Mr. Lynes a reply to his earlier email. The text of her email reads “WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Please see attached revised MOS”. The attached document is the
same as the Employer’s 4:21 PM draft, except that the words “up to the date of
this settlement” have now been added to paragraph 7.
[18] At 4:55 PM, Mr. Lynes replied to Ms. Kashyap’s email. The text of his email reads:
Please see attached with Employer’s signature.
We made two clerical corrections, pluralizing “Grievances” in the “Therefore” clause
and at the end of para. 6.
Notably, the words “Without Prejudice” do not form part of this email. The
attached document is called “Holder-Regis, Laura - MOS - October 28, 2020 - LS
signed.pdf”. It contains the change requested by Ms. Kashyap in the attachment
to her 4:47 PM email, the corrections described in Mr. Lynes 4:55 PM email and is
signed by L. Sciarria on behalf of the Employer.
[19] Following this, Ms. Kashyap advised Mr. Lynes that she had further consulted with
Ms. Holder-Regis and that they were seeking another amendment, this time to the
confidentiality clause so that Ms. Holder-Regis could speak to her legal advisors.
[20] At 5:17 PM, Mr. Lynes sent Ms. Kashyap an email the text of which reads: “See
attached with legal advisor edit”. The attached document is called “Holder-Regis,
Laura - MOS - October 28, 2020 - LS signed.pdf”. The word “legal” has now been
added to paragraph 10, so that the text of the document is now identical to the one
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ultimately signed. This document is also signed by L. Sciarria on behalf of the
Employer.
[21] Subsequently the 5:17 PM document was signed by Ms. Kashyap on behalf of the
Union. Ms. Holder-Regis declined to sign the document.
[22] Following Mr. Lynes’ representations as to the facts, Ms. Holder-Regis was asked
if she disputed any of those facts. She stated that when she was discussing the
Memorandum of Settlement with Ms. Kashyap, she noticed that it covered her
application to the HRTO. She also noticed that the confidentiality clause did not
permit her to speak to the lawyer who was handling her human rights application.
She asked for the confidentiality clause to be amended and she spoke to the
lawyer handling her human rights file. She confirmed that she did not ask Ms.
Kashyap to strike from the Memorandum of Settlement any reference to her
human rights application, stating that she “did not know that I could”.
[23] On the facts set out above, I conclude the Employer was entitled to assume that
Ms. Kashyap was negotiating on behalf of both the Union and Ms. Holder-Regis.
Such an assumption would reflect the normal practice, there was absolutely no
suggestion to the contrary during the negotiations over the course of the day and
indeed Ms. Kashyap communicated requests to the Employer as having been
specifically made by Ms. Holder-Regis. I therefore conclude the Employer was
entitled to treat Ms. Kashyap’s oral request for the amendment to its 4:55 PM
document as an offer made on behalf of both the Union and Ms. Holder-Regis to
the effect that the terms of the 4:55 PM document were acceptable provided the
amendment was made. I note that Ms. Holder-Regis confirmed that she did not
ask Ms. Kashyap to request any other amendments. The Employer’s 5:17 PM
response, containing the requested amendment, constituted its acceptance.
Given this conclusion, I need not consider whether there was oral offer and
acceptance at some earlier point in time.
[24] Following Mr. Lyne’s submissions, Ms. Kashyap indicated the Union had no
submissions. Ms. Holder-Regis was asked if she had any submissions she would
like to make. She stated that she did not agree to her HRTO application being
dismissed and that is why she did not sign the Memorandum of Settlement. She
stated that the discussion was “mostly about accommodation, accommodation,
accommodation”, so she did not even think about her HRTO application. She also
stated that at the time she thought it was only when she signed the Memorandum
of Settlement that it became legal binding. She indicated that she now understood
that the settlement was considered to be legally binding, but stated that she
disagreed.
[25] I need not comment on Ms. Kashyap’s additional factual assertions. As stated by
Arbitrator Lynk in Ontario Public Service Employees Union v Crown in Right of
Ontario, 2013 CanLII 74176 (ON GSB) at para. 33(d):
The parties can be bound by oral commitments, as long as the evidence
demonstrates that they have unconditionally agreed to settle the substantive issues
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between them (City of Toronto v. Toronto Civic Employees Union, Local 416
(Lewis), [2002] O.L.A.A. No. 531 (Luborsky)). Reducing the settlement to writing is a
procedural, and not an essential, feature of an agreement. Signatures on a
document are usually conclusive that an agreement has been reached, but a
binding agreement does not necessarily depend on the presence of signatures.
(OPSEU v. Ministry of Community and Social Services (Corbiere), [2013]
O.G.S.B.A. No. 124 (Dissanayake)).
[26] In the result, I conclude that the Memorandum of Settlement dated October 28,
2020 which was signed on behalf of the Employer and the Union sets out the
terms of the settlement agreed to by Ms. Holder-Regis as well. As such, it is
binding on all three parties to that document. Given this conclusion, I need not
consider whether the settlement would have been vitiated had Ms. Holder-Regis
not been bound.
[27] For all of the foregoing reasons, the Employer’s motion succeeds.
Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 17th day of November, 2020.
“Ian Anderson”
________________________
Ian Anderson, Arbitrator