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HomeMy WebLinkAboutGUILBAULT-1994-08-06 ,. 11:'\ r=1 Qr;nll rT""1r::\ 'Pr"nr~'l.q- u.U!lrl,l)~ , f '1 " , ,'" .\ ~ ~ ~ iJ) OJ ~ i U', pi nEe 05 1994 I;.),' h I.i: i lks-GL.::lU U L.::JL:) IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN: --..------------------------- THE EASTERN ONTARIO HEALTH UNIT (The Employer) AND: THE ASSOCIATION OF ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS: ONTARIO (TheAssociation) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE GRIEVANCE OF PIERETTE GUILBAULT BOARD OF ARBITRATION: HOWARD D. BROWN, CHAIRMAN JOE HERBERT, UNION NOMINEE ROBERT WHITTAKER, EMPLOYER NOMINEE APPEARANCES FOR THE EMPLOYER: THOMAS A. STEFANIK, COUNSEL RAYMOND BESNER, DIR. CORP. SERVICES APPEARANCES FOR THE ASSOCIATION: PHILIP G. HUNT, COUNSEL SUE McCULLOCH, L.R.O. BRIAN GRIFFINS, STAFF REP. PIERETTE GUILBAULT, GRIEVOR A HEARING IN THIS MATTER WAS HELD AT OTTAWA ON JUNE 8TH, 1994 AWARD - l - At the hearing the parties filed an Agreed statement of Facts as follows: BETWEEN: ASSOCIATION OF ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS: ONTARIO (The Association) - and - EASTERN ONTARIO HEALTH UNIT (The Employer) AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR GRIEVANCE OF PIERETTE GUILBAULT 1. Pierette Guilbault was hired by the employer in July of 1991, and has at al~ times been employed as an occupational therapist represented for collective bargaining purposes by the Association. Prior to 1991, Pierette Guilbault was employed as an occupational therapist for.a total of 8 years in Europe. From January through April of 1991, Ms. Guilbault was employed with Paramed in ontario. 2. Documentary evidence of Ms. Guilbault's prior experience is attached as Exhibit 1 to this Agreed Statement of Facts. 3. From the inception of the employment relationship to the date of settlement of the Collec~ive Agreement, Ms. Guilbault was paid an actual salary in the amount of $36,794.00 per annum. 4. Upon settlement of the Collective Agreement, Ms. Guilbault was assigned to group 2, level 1 on the salary scale set forth in the Collective Agreement, which would have reduced her salary to $35,655.00, but for article 20.01(b) (ii) of the Collective Agreement. After the completion of one full year, Ms. Guilbault was advanced to group 2, level 2 which resulted in an annual salary of $36,288.00 plus 1% for the percentage increase in transfer payments, for an effective annual salary of $36,650.88, under the Collective Agreement. In fact she continued to be paid at $36,794.00 per annum. 5. It is the position of the grievor that having regard for her more than 8 years of related experience, she should have been placed at group 2, level 3 ($37,821.00 per annum) from the inception of the employment relationship, and that she should have progressed to group 2, level 4 following the completion of her first full year. Dated this ~ day of June, 1994. ~//P/.>77'A/ Assoc tion of Allied Health Professionals: Ontario /.. ,6AA~ Eastern Ontario Health Unit - 2 - The grievance, dated September 2, 1992 is a claim that the Employer did not place the grievor on the salary scale in accordance with her related experience and thereby was in violation of Article 20.0l of the collective agreement which is as follows: 20.0l(b) Starting Salary - Placement on the Grid (i) The Employer shall recognize related experience to the the extent of one increment for two years experience to a maximum of two increments above the start rate. The Employer denied the grievance and referred in its reply to it in part: "It has been the practice of the Eastern ontario Health unit when hiring personnel from outside Canada not to recognize previous experience that may not meet the established Canadian standards. The Health unit has however recognized the 698 hours completed at your previous Canadian employer and your present seniority with the Home Care Program in establishing your current salary." The parties stipulated that the grievor was certified by the Canadian Association of Occupational Therapists for practice in Canada in 1990 prior to her employment with this Health Unit. The parties agreed that the Board has jurisdiction to deal with the grievance. The issue is whether the grievor's experience prior to her certification in Canada as an Occupational Therapist should be considered under the provisions of this Agreement for her placement on the grid. It was submitted by the Association that there was no - 3 - suggestion by the Employer that the grievor's experience in France did not meet the Canadian standards or that it investigated the particulars of that experience to ascertain the appropriate point of placement on the salary grid. Her experience was valued in her hire by the Employer. This Article mandates the recognition of a previous experience which is not restricted to Canada and does not refer to certified experience. In its submission the Employer had a duty to investigate the extent of the grievor's experience not just her qualifications which is a broader concept. To assess the grievor's placement on the grid it must determine her experience which is not specifically referable to Canadian certified experience. Reference was made to the following awards: The Oueenswav Carleton Hospital and the Association of Allied Health Professionals (I.G. Thorne, March 4, 1987); Re ottawa civic Hospital and Association of Allied Health Professionals (Jane Emrich, November 1985). The submission for the Employer is that the salary scale in the collective agreement must refer to a properly credited Occupational Therapist and related experience to that classification. Where the creditation is not required, it is so stated in the salary scales such as for the Speech Language Pathologist (Non-Accredited). Therefore the Employer correctly considered certification in Canada as the related experience requirement under Article 20.0l (b) for an Occupational Therapist. The grievor was hired after she had obtained that designation and was deemed to be qualified in that classification so that any - 4 - related experience after that qualification was achieved would be and was applied by the Employer. It was submitted the Employer is not required to investigate the experience of an applicant for a position prior to being qualified as an occupational therapist in Canada as certified by the Canadian Association of Therapists. The experience required must be related to the classification of Cccupational Therapist and the person who is credited in that classification. Experience in the job gained prior to that qualification is not part of. the Employer's responsibility to consider for the purposes of placement on the grid under this Article. When the grievor was hired by the Employer she was a credited occupational therapist in Canada and deemed to be qualified in that classification. Her prior employment experience at Paramed was credited by the Employer as related experience to that classification. The grievor claims however, that her past experience as an Occupational Therapist in France should be considered to allow her progress to Group 2, Level 3 at the higher salary rate. There is no doubt on the evidence that the grievor had experience as an Occupational Therapist in France according to her CV and the other documents which were filed and there is no doubt as to her qualifications for that classification. That is. however not the issue which is restricted to the determination of what the Employer must consider in placing the grievor on .the salary grid pursuant to the specific terms of Article 20.0l(p) . - 5 - Arbitrator Emrich referred to the meaning of the term "related with dictionary definitions including Black 1 sLaw dictionary in which it is defined as "standing in relation connected allied, akin". On that basis, "related experience" as set out in Article 21.0l(b) must be considered in relation to that experience which is connected to the classification for the purposes of applying the contractual requirements in a reasonable context. In so doing that must in the context of this article, refer to the classification of Occupational Therapist set out in the salary scale in Schedule A of the Agreement. To hold that classification requires accreditation in Canada and presently in ontario, but at the time of this grievance a certificate was issued by the Canadian Association of Therapists which the grievor obtained prior to her hire by the Employer. We find that it is the experience which relates to that classification which must be considered by the Employer and that classification does not exist for the purposes of this collective agreement without the certification required in this country. In the Ottawa Civic Hospital award the collective agreement specifically provided consideration of related clinical experience in countries other than Canada as distinguished from experience in this country and it is noted that the grievor in that case was hired with regard to his experience in retail pharmacy compared to the responsibilities of a Registered Pharmacist at the Hospital. Arbitrator Thorne dealt with a situation where the Hospital sought to hire a Registered Technologist and the grievor was not - 6 - registered at that time but sought credit for recent related clinical experience as a Non-Registered Technologist. ,That case is distinguished on its facts from the present case where the grievor, was hired by the Employer as a credited Occupational Therapist. In the circumstances of this grievance we find that the related experience for the purposes of Article 20.0l(b) is that which is related to and applies to that classification requiring Canadian creditation. The grievor's experience as an Occupational Therapist in France while significant in the grievor's ability to obtain the Canadian qualification it was gained outside of Canada and was not related to the classification in this agreement which requires creditation in Canada. To provide that link of experience gained outside of Canada would require specific language such as found in the ottawa civic Hospital case. Contrary to the submissions of the Association, we find that Article 20. Ol (b) is restricted and applies to the classifications set out in Schedule A of the Agreement. Accordingly it is experience related to the classification of Occupational Therapist which itself requires certification in Canada at the time of thegrievor's hire by the Employer which the -I.. Employer must consider. For the purposes of this agreement, the grievor's employmenet history in France is not relevant to that consideration. - 7 - We find that the Employer correctly applied the terms of Article 20.0l(b) in the placement of the grievor on the salary grid by properly crediting the grievor with her experience at Paramed in Ontario prior to her employ at this Health Unit. We find that is the extent of consideration required to be given by the Employer which need not under these terms investigate experience prior to the grievor obtaining the designation of occupational Therapist and certified in Canada. Whether that experience contributed to or was the basis for the Canadian certification does not bear on the Employer's responsibility to place employees on the salary grid under Article 20.0l. For all these reasons we find that the Association did not establish a violation of the collective agreement as alleged. Therefore it is our award that the grievance is dismissed. DATED AT OAKVILLE, THIS 22nd DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1994 at ^ . WItt. r-- HOWARD . vB"t.o , CHAIRMAN '".\z..e r- \~.l.'h"t"-...." ~,../J"..,.. JOE HERBERT, UNION NOMINEE ;-' '-,/ ~ "'^ -vt. ,1i-~.. ROBERT WHITTAKER, EMPLOYER NOMINEE " IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN: EASTERN ONTARIO HEALTH UNIT the Employer - and - ASSOCIATION OF ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS: ONTARIO the Union AND IN THE MATTER OF THE GRIEVANCE OF P. GUILTBAULT ADD END U M without disagreeing with the result of the chairman I s award, I wish to express a different view of the collective agreement requirements. It appears to me that an employee wishing to seek credit for recent related experience must place themselves within the collective agreement provision by demonstrating that the experience is directly related to the work which they presently do. That would appear to entail evidence concerning the work presently done, the duties of the previous work, and if necessary, evidence of the relationship. I would agree that in this case, the evidence necessary to establish that the employee meets the threshold requirements was not put before us. Dated at ottawa, ontario this l4th day of November, 1994. I ..1 If C.:.{:. /J /C e Herbert, Union Nominee .' '-. _ il": IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN: THE EASTERN ONTARIO HEALTH UNIT (The Employer) AND: THE ASSOCIATION OF ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS: ONTARIO - ~. (The Association) AND IN THE MATTER OF AN ASSOCIATION POLICY GRIEVANCE BOARD OF ARBITRATION: . HOWARD D. BROWN, CHAIRMAN JOE HERBERT, UNION NOMINEE ROBERT WHITTAKER, EMPLOYER NOMINEE APPEARANCES FOR THE EMPL9YER: THOMAS A. STEFANIK, COUNSEL RAYMOND BESNER, DIR. CORP. SERVICES j' APPEARANCES FOR THE ASSOCIATION: PHILIP G. HUNT, COUNSEL SUE, McCULLOCH, L.R.O. BRIAN GRIFFINS, STAFF REP. -.-. A HEARING IN THIS MATTER WAS HELD AT OTTAWA ON JUNE 8TH, 1994. :',' -' '.., AWARD .; .,;. ~.:" :; , - l - The Association claims the Employer unilaterally changed the transportation allowance contrary to Article l6.0l of the collective agreement which is: ARTICLE lEi - ~SPORTATrON i\LLOW1\NCE 16.01 Effective January 1, 1991, the Em~loyer agree~ to reimburse the employee for all kJ.lometers dr.l. Yen for business purposes at the following rates: o 4,000 km 4001 10,700 km 10,701 24,000 km over 24,000 km~ 30.5c per km. 2G.5c per km. 22.SC per km. 19.DC per Jan. 16.02 parking expenses for business purposes will be fully reimbursed. The grievance dated October 23rd, 1992 requests a re- calculation of the mileage payment with retroactivity. The issue concerns the interpretation of the kilometers driven by an employee "for business purposes". The mileage rates are not at issue. The grievance was denied by the Employer and was subsequently submitted to arbitration and came on for hearing as above noted. There is no dispute between the parties as to the Board's jurisdiction to deal with this grievance. It is the Association's position that the practice prior to October l6th, 1992 when the Employer's policy was changed, was that - 2 - the employees were paid portal to portal for kilometers driven and requests that payment be restored. When an.employee drove directly from her home .to se.rve.clients,~f the Health unit without first reporting to her office and returned home at the end of the last client call of the day the employee had been paid for all kilometers from and to her home. After October l6th, 1992 the Employer paid mileage claims calculated. from the office to which the employee is assigned excluding lithe distance. to and from assigned office and place of residence. The Association further claimed that the Employer was estopped during the life of this collective agreement from changing the previous practice for transporation allowance claims. Ms. McCulloch testified that she attended the negotiations between the parties for this agreement which took over.a year to conclude and stated that they were aware of the pre-existing transportation policy and that the transportation allowance was one of the most contentious issues. It is a significant benefit to.the employees who make home visits to clients. A number,of.,proposals were exchanged by the parties on this issue including the mileage rates. When .the MOH rates were conceded by the Association the members wanted a broad meaning given to the application of:. .the' rates which were to be calculated portal to portal that ,is; the calculation of the mileage starts when an employee leaves. home:;'ito:.: service a client and ends at her home unless the employee ,.travels'.: directly from her home to the Health unit office. ., 'In .>that', situation the mileage.calculation would commence from that .office., : , - 3 - The employee would not be compensated for mileage from her residence if the office was her first or last stop in her day. She said the parties agreed to maintain the status quo with regard to the calculation of the transportation allowance with the applicable rates. The Association did not attempt to alter the wording of Article l6 on the basis that the practice would continue for the term of this collective agreement which expires on March 3lst, 1996. She said that by the prior policy of the Employer, time at work and business mileage were considered to be the same but after October 1992 the time worked started at the same point at the employee's residence but the allowance was differently calculated from the office. That change was significant to a number of the employees who live up to l50 kilometers from their office. If an employee travelled directly from her home to her office or from the office to her home that mileage was not paid and that policy has not changed. Ms. McCulloch agreed that during the negotiations the Employer did not represent that it would change that practice. She said that the terms of Article l6 were drafted by the Employer during negotiations as this was not the Association's proposal. She agreed that the Employer did not refer to the status quo in relation to this section or that the mileage would be calculated from travel to the first to the last client. She agreed that the '.. . - 4 - Employer did not change its position during the bargaining; The Association sought to improve the calculation of mileage by reference to portal to portal but agreed with the terms of Articl~ l6 as drafted. Each employee has an office designated' by the Employer even if she works at other Health unit offices. When they travelled to other offices an allowance was paid for business purposes. .'j' It is the submission for the Association that the Employer cannot be permitted to unilaterally change the application of an important monetary issue to the detriment of the employees during the term of the agreement. When an employee travels from client to client in a discrete circle and away from home it has been recognized as business mileage and compensated under Article l6.0l. That was a long standing practice with a common understanding of the calculation made under this Agreement which cannot be changed during the course of that Agreement. The Association relied on the Employer's agreement at negotiations to maintain the status quo and therefore did not bargain the guideline language. It relied to its detriment on the Employer's position on this issue at bargaining. It was argued that the Employer cannot implement policies inconsistent with the terms of the collective agreement while-it' is in effect. Where the Employer's present policy applies'tothe start and end of the workday from the employee's place" of ',' work " there is no dispute but the practice of calculating mileage'from the employee I s home when the first and last visit' is that 'o'f' a client should be maintained. Re OPSEU and the Crown in Riqht of - 5 - Ontario, a decision of the Grievance Settlement Board (Kates, July 1988) . It was submitted for the Employer that its policy set out in October 1992 repeats the terms of and is not inconsistent with Article l6. It excludes the calculation of the distance from the employee's residence to her office which is not business travel. The Employer does not pay employees for their travel from home to their work place. The Employer is not estopped from reverting to the system of calculation which is consistent with Article l6. In its position the portal to portal claim of the Association is not reasonable. It was further submitted that there was no clear representation by the Employer at negotiations which was intended to be relied on by the Association that the status quo would be maintained. While Ms.' McCulloch had an understanding that the employees would not be worse off in the application of Article l6 then before there was no clear evidence of representation on this issue and there was no effort to define a designated office for the purposes of the transportation calculation. The Employer is therefore not estopped from applying its mileage policy in October 1992. Re Cancoil Thermal Corp. and UFCW, LOCAL l75, 34 L.A.C. (3d) l74 (Little); Re The Eastern Ontario Health unit and the Association of Allied Health Professionals: Ontario - policv Grievance, Job Postinq (Jamieson, June 7, 1994). - 6 - The issue arising in this grievance can be determined on the application of the language of Article l6. Ol in which :the !", .:. condition for the reimbursement for the transportation allow~nce is that such kilometers be driven "for business purposes". , . I . When ,an -.'J.. employee is required by direction of the Employer which c,~nbe both by individual direction and by general practice relating to all employeesthrough,a pOlicy,such as that in place to travel,2~cits behalf to attend matters of which the Employer is ~esponsiblein its operations, such travel time by its very nature is travel for business purposes of the Employer. That concept applies whether the employee sets out from her residence or from the, office, to attend to the Employer's business. The key to this conside,ration is the requirement placed on the employee to service the Employer's needs in this manner. On the facts of this case, it has been obviously beneficial to the Employer to have the employees attend at its:.client's, residences to carry out the service required by th~~.before,or if at all, travelling to their designated office. Arbitrator Jamieson acknowledged in his award that travel allowances for these employees were "clearly the primary concern,for the Association" and that, -''''.. . . . .'.. . . ,.. '", ,~ it was conceded that employees "presently operate froni'.' more than one office and do service clients, in more,than one area, it took the position that the coll'ective. "._- agreement contemplates that each employee in the, " . ','_ , bargaining unit be assigned a single work location'or a home office: Any requirement to work at locatior;s,,:away - 7 - from that home office is compensated for under the hours of work and transportation allowance provision in the collective agreement." The issue in that award did not involve the application of Article l6 but was an allegation of an improper job posting where the Employer has specified two office locations for a single job. In the present issue however, it is not the location where the employee is assigned as her office but whether the employee is required by the Employer to travel to do work for it before giving to her designated office. There is no dispute that if the employee reports to the office before an assignment to a client, the mileage fr.om her residence to that office' is not calculated or paid under Article 16.01 and we agree that such mileage which is travel to and from the office at which the employee is assigned and reports is not for business purposes which would be covered under the terms of Article 16.0L That situation must be separated from the Employer's policy whiph by direction or permission of the Employer has been to direct its employees to travel from their residences to service a client without first reporting into their office and to return home without reporting to her office. The whole of that work day involves travel from client to client of the Employer which we find is travel for business purposes. That distinguishes the concept for the purposes of the Employer from personal mileage driven to report to the Employer'S premises in whichever location the employees are assigned, before carrying out any work for the Employer. . - 8 - ,The parties have not specifically defined the meaning of "business purposes" but the use of that term reflects that the travel of employees for which the expectation of reimbursement can be reasonably expected and the use of the employee's vehicle for " the purposes of the conduct of any responsibilities in the . .",:! Employer's operations to which the employee'has been assigned or expected to be carried out. In our view, to direct these employees ., i to service clients by travelling from their residences to those of the clients falls within the purpose and intent of this clause. , '," In the Kates award the Board dealt with a travel' allowance policy which did not include commuting between an employee'; home and headquarters. It was found that the employee who was required to attend a training course and was authorized to use his own automobile for that purpose and was not required to report to his regular place of employment to achieve his destination but began and ended his trip at his residence, "as such he was on' travel . ',' : -.~. status at that point". That finding is consistent' with the ordinary meaning of travel for business purposes which relate to the operational requirements of the Employer. ~~~..:~.J .'. . In the present case, when the employee reports to 'her designated office before attending any client of the Employer her travel to and, from that office has not been claimed and'is clearly ;;' "'f!", ~-"f.' 1':' '. .:. ,.[ ;. in that cont~xt,understood to be part of the policy which has been '"; :.~ '. ~ 1",. , ;-;.- : ~ ....,.. .; To extend however, that restriction in effect since at least 1987. ;~... ~~-;.; .~".r).r.. f.~ to all circumstances' is to deem that the employee who'is' req~ired /~.' :.: .~; -.- -, 'J ,', ;-" - 9 - to give service to a client and does not report to her office at the start or the end of the day that has it started and ended her day at her designated office regardless of the Employer's requirements to service its clients. That is not consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the purpose for which a transportation allowance is applied. There is no dispute that such an allowance is not paid for commuting from an employee's place of residence to her office. When however, an employee is required to proceed to deal with a client of her Employer outside of that parameter, we find such travel is for the benefit of the Employer and falls within the term of "business purposes" for which the employee is entitled to compensation under Article l6.0l of this Agreement. That conclusion is consistent with the Employer I s practice prior to October 6, 1992. We find that the change to the policy implemented by the Employer after that date was improper as it was inconsistent with the requirements for payment of the travel allowance provided by Article l6.0l. Having regard to the foregoing decision, it is not necessary for the Board to deal with the estoppel issue raised by the Association. We find that the Employer's practice as it was with regard to the payment of Transportation Allowance when the collective agreement was entered into was consistent with the terms Article l6.0l and its change of policy in October 1992 contravened those terms by failing to recognize the nature of the travel it DISSENT Robert Whittaker, Employer Nominee Re: The Eastern Ontario Health Unit & The Association of Allied Health Professionals Transportation Policy Grievance I must dissent from the majority decision of the Board in an arbitration award with respect to the above referenced grievance. The provisions of the collective agreement are relatively straight forward on the issue in dispute. Employees are entitled to be compensated for mileage that is incurred while on company business. I am fully in agreement with this principle which is articulated several times in the award. My dissenting opinion flows from that portion of the award that would designate as "business travel" that mileage travelled by employees, from their residences, where they do not first travel to their designated office at either end of the work day. For the majority of the employees of the Health Unit, the practice of the employer in calculating mileage is not an issue, as they regularly report to their home office before beginning the days assignment, and return to the office at the end of the work day. Mileage from the office to the various call locations and back to the office is compensated at the applicable rate per kilometre and is truly "business'travel" as anticipated by the provisions of the collective agreement. - The problem arises with those employees who have chosen to live some distance from their home office. More specifically, employees who live in Ottawa and Montreal. Employees living at these distant locations have been permitted by the employer, in many instances, to report directly to the location of their first client call in the morning and return home at the conclusion of the work day after their fmal client call. The award, as currently drafted, will compensate these employees on what is referred to as a "portal to portal" basis. Such a practice would unfairly favour those employees who have chosen to reside a great distance from their home office as well as require the employer to compensate them for greater mileage than would be incurred if they were required to report to their home office before beginning the days assignments. .....2 -2-, In the alternative, the employer could require all employees to report to their home office at the beginning and conclusion of the work day, While such a practice would alleviate the problem of compensating employees for mileage which is properly personal rather than business in nature, it would cause some employees to spend significantly more time on the road at either end of the work day which is not necessarily a productive use of time. The practice of the employer with respect to employees who are not required to repo,rt to their home offices on a daily basis, however, should not result in the employer having to compensate employees for what in my opinion is properly personal business mileage. As an alternative, for those employees who begin the work day at a clients residence rather than their home office it would be more appropriate to provide compensation for mileage incurred starting at the first client in the morning and ending with the last client in the day where the employee returns directly home, rather than home to home as provided for in the award. In my opinion, I do not believe the award will serve the parties well. I further do not believe that the parties intended, by the language of the collective agreement, to have some employees financially advantaged at the employers expense through a practice of accommodation. ' Respectively submitted, r--. \. Robert M. Whittaker Employer Nominee RMW:sem STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT ARSSEV LIMITED P.O. BOX 249. 228 LAKESHORE ROAD EAST. OAKVILLE. ON L6J 5A2 IN THE MATTER OF: TWO ARBITRATIONS BETWEEN: EASTERN ONTARIO HEALTH UNIT AND: ASSOCIATION OF ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS; ONTARIO AND IN THE MATTER OF THE GRIEVANCE OF PIERETTE GUILBAULT AND ASSOCIATION POLICY GRIEVANCE FOR THE SERVICES OF: HOWARD D. BROWN TO hearing room expense $316.75 TO travel and hearing expenses 851. 00 $1167.75 GST: (7%) 81. 75 TO arrangements for and attendance at hearings at Ottawa on June 8, 1994, to consideration and ' preparation of two awards, to receipt and consideration of addendum and dissent and completion with board members, to correspondence, telephone and other expenses in total: GST: (7%) TOTAL FEES AMOUNT lD BE PAID BY EACH THE EMPLOYER AND THE UNION $4400.00 308.00 $~6~~LO~EES & EXPENSES:$5,957.5S $2,978.7~ ACCOUNTNo. 16-85 GST # RlO0245844 November 22, 1994 Please make cheque payable to ARBSEV LIMITED Please include account number with payment to ensure proper credit