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HomeMy WebLinkAboutUNION-1994-07-06 JON 1 6 1994 I~ -'" ~,,--,1I . ~ i.,1 .".": "-0'..1 '. I IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION --_.~-.,--- -. BETWEEN: THE EASTERN ONTARIO HEALTH UNIT -and- THE ASSOCIATION OF ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS: ONTARIO RE: POLICY GRIEVANCE - JOB POSTING BEFORE: HUGH R. JAMIESON, Sole Arbitrator APPEARANCES: MR. THOMAS A. STEFANIK, for the Employer MS. SUE McCULLOCH, for the Association HEARD: At Cornwall, on May 31, 1994 DECISION: June 7, 1994 (2) This award deals with a policy grievance dated April 14, 1994 over an alleged improper job posting which was taken by the Association of Allied Health Professionals: ontario (the Association), against the Eastern ontario Health unit (the Employer). The issue in dispute was set out in the grievance as follows: " The Employer has improperly posted a Health Educator/Promoter position which provides for two(2) offices." The job posting in question, which was dated March 17, 1994, called for the successful candidate to work three days a week at Casselman and two days a week at Winchester. The Employer apparently operates an office at each of these towns which are located in Eastern ontario approximately 65 kilometers apart. At the hearing into this matter which was held at Cornwall on May 31, 1994, it became readily apparent that the Association's concern was the possible negative impact on benefits under the current collective agreement which it claimed could result from the Employer specifying two office locations on a single job posting. While hours of work were mentioned as a possible problem area, travel allowances were clearly the primary concern for the Association. While the Association conceded that employees do (3) presently operate from more than one office and they do service clients in more than one area, it took the position that the collective agreement contemplates that each employee in the bargaining unit be assigned a single work location or a "home office". Any requirement to work at locations away from that "home office" is compensated for under the hours of work and transportation allowance provisions in the collective agreement. According to the Association, if the Employer was permitted to name two "home offices", complications could arise in calculating the remuneration to which the employees were properly entitled. To this end, the Association was prepared to provide me with certain documents which purportedly set out some of the Employer's policies pertaining to transportation allowances. However, it decided to rely solely on the wording of the collective agreement to make its point after the Employer raised the issue of relevance considering that the instant grievance was limited to the job posting. The Employer pointed out, correctly in my view, that the single narrow issue before me was the Employer's right or lack thereof to specify more than one office as an employment location on a job posting. Depending on my ruling on that issue, the Association would be free to bring another grievance on any other alleged breach of the collective agreement if and when the circumstances arise. (4) On the specific question of the job posting, the Association went on to refer to several provisions of the collective agreement where it claimed the wording clearly called for an interpretation that a single employment location was intended. These included Articles 3.02, 9.06(b), 9.07 and 16.01. For my purposes, I need not reproduce all of those articles here, suffice it to say, with the utmost respect, that I cannot read into these provisions what the Association asks me to. To begin with, there are no references to be found anywhere in the collective agreement to a "home office". Further, while there is no specific definition of "employment location" in the agreement, it seems to me that the use of this term in Article 3.02 for example, cannot be read strictly in the singular as the Association urges: "3.02 An employee shall, at the time of hiring, be provided with written notification of her job classification, salary rate, and employment location as well as any other conditions which may apply to her employment together with a copy of the collective agreement." Emphasis added In my view, in the absence of anything more definitive in the collective agreement and, given that it is common practice for employees in this bargaining unit to operate from offices in more (5) than one town as evidenced by the Association's own witness, Ms. Leslee Brown, a Drug and Alcohol Addiction Worker, who spends four days at Cornwall and one day at Alexandria on a regular weekly basis, "employment location" in the context of this collective agreement must taken to include a geographic area. At the very least, it must surely mean the towns where the offices are located from which employees are required to work. with that in mind, the job posting requirements under this collective agreement are set out in Article 9.06(a) : "9.06(a) A job vacancy that occurs within the bargaining unit shall be posted on designated bulletin boards for a period of seven(7) working days for the benefit of interested employees which shall occur prior to external advertising. Applications received from members of the bargaining unit shall be given due consideration before the processing of other applications." Unlike many other collective agreements, there is nothing in this agreement setting out what information a job posting must contain. Nor is there anything that determines the source of the information to be used in job postings, like approved job descriptions for example. More importantly, there is nothing in this collective agreement that can even vaguely be construed as restricting management's right to determine the "employment location" for the purposes of job postings. In short, I can see (6) nothing to support the Association's contention that for a job posting, the "employment location" is somehow restricted to a single office location. In fact, I would go further and suggest that the Employer is probably obligated to do what it did here, i.e., be up-front about the geographic scope of the job in question. I base this on the premise that notwithstanding the silence of the collective agreement regarding the contents of a job posting, the process of filling any vacancy must in any event be conducted in good faith and within the accepted standards of fairness. This would include in my view, a fundamental requirement that job po stings contain ample accurate information regarding the applicable conditions of employment and the necessary qualifications to allow prospective candidates to rationally consider their options and to provide a meaningful opportunity for them to apply for the job. In the circumstances here, where the successful candidate would be required to operate from more than one office as a condition of employment, it seems to me that the Employer could be found to be failing to meet its obligations vis-a-vis fair process if it did not disclose this requirement on the job posting. In light of these considerations and, taking into account the aforementioned lack of restrictions in the collective agreement (7) on the Employer's right to determine the "employment location" for the purposes of job postings, I am compelled to find that the grievance must fail. It is therefore dismissed accordingly. Dated this 7th day of June, 1994.