HomeMy WebLinkAbout2020-2967.Kopec.22-05-12 Decision
Crown Employees Grievance Settlement
Board
Suite 600
180 Dundas St. West
Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z8
Tel. (416) 326-1388
Commission de
règlement des griefs
des employés de la
Couronne
Bureau 600
180, rue Dundas Ouest
Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1Z8
Tél. : (416) 326-1388
GSB# 2020-2967; 2021-1207; 2021-1629; 2021-2487
UNION# 2021-0212-0002; 2021-0212-0003; 2021-0212-0004; 2021-0212-0005
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
(Kopec) Union
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of the Attorney General) Employer
BEFORE Dale Hewat Arbitrator
FOR THE UNION Mae J. Nam
Ryder Wright Blair & Holmes LLP
Counsel
FOR THE EMPLOYER Felix Lau
Treasury Board Secretariat
Legal Services Branch
Counsel
HEARING DATE May 5, 2022
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Decision
[1] This matter involves four consolidated grievances, filed between February 4 and
September 23, 2021 pertaining to the Grievor’s requests for accommodation
relating to her inability, due to a medical condition, to wear a face mask while
working in her position as a Court and Client Representative at the St. Catherine’s
Ontario Courthouse. This Decision deals with the Employer’s request for the
Grievor’s medical records which has been opposed by the Union.
[2] Two grievances dated February 4, 2021 and July 7, 2021 allege that the Employer
violated a number sections of the Collective Agreement including but not limited to
Articles 2, 3, 9 Health and Safety, the Ontario Human Rights Code, the
Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Respectful Workplace Policy and any
other legislation and policies by behaving in an unfair and arbitrary manner related
to failing to ensure a workplace free from discrimination, harassment and bullying.
The Grievor also claimed that the Employer’s behaviour, including a differential set
of expectations and treatment, caused her undue stress and mental anguish which
was injurious to her dignity. The Grievor sought that the Employer allow her to
wear a face shield in the workplace as an acceptable accommodation, be free
from reprisal, and sought other remedies pursuant to the Human Rights Code. A
third grievance, dated August 4, 2021 grieves that the Employer unjustly
disciplined the Grievor by imposing a one-day suspension because the Grievor
attended work without wearing a face mask on July 6, 2021 contrary to her
supervisor’s instructions and continued to fail to cooperate in providing further
medical information in support of her accommodation. The fourth grievance dated
September 23, 2021 arose after the Employer placed the Grievor on an unpaid
leave of absence because of the Grievor’s continued refusal to provide medical
documentation to support her accommodation request. While this last grievance
alleges, among other things, that the Employer failed to accommodate the Grievor,
the Union also takes the position that placing the Grievor on an unpaid leave of
absence was tantamount to unjust termination of employment.
[3] As part of case management of these grievances, it was agreed that the Employer
would call its evidence first on the suspension grievance and the grievance
involving the unpaid leave of absence, with a broad right of reply. The Union would
then call its evidence on the failure to accommodate and other allegations raised in
the grievances.
Overview
[4] During the COVID pandemic, Ontario Courthouses remained open because they
were designated as an essential service. Courthouse staff were subject to the
Ministry’s Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and Critical Supply Usage Policy,
as well as directions from management regarding COVID-19 Health and Safety
protocols and procedures. Courthouse staff were required at all times to wear full
PPE which included a face mask and face shield and were required to practice
other safe social distancing measures. On January 4, 2021 the Grievor advised
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the Employer that she was unable to wear a face mask for medical reasons. The
Employer initially placed the Grievor on an interim accommodation plan pending
receipt of further information from her physician to support her accommodation
request. The Grievor was assigned on-line duties and was not assigned client
facing work. Other terms of the accommodation plan generally included having the
Grievor work in a separate jury room with washroom access and having the
Grievor ensure that she limit her movement, practice social distancing in common
areas and to refrain from using the lunch room when occupied.
[5] Without getting into the details of all events and email exchanges, which will be
introduced in the case on the merits, the Grievor ultimately provided 2 medical
notes to the Employer, despite the fact that she initially advised that her doctor
refused to provide a medical note to confirm that she could not wear a face mask
at work. She also advised that her doctor would not complete the medical
questionnaire that the Employer had requested. The Grievor claims that she
provided the medical notes despite the fact that she was not required to provide
them pursuant to the medical exemption provisions related to face masks or
coverings in Regulation O.Reg.364/20. She also maintains that she had provided
the Employer with all necessary medical information to support her
accommodation request. As a result, she continued to state that she was within
her rights not to produce more medical information and that the Employer’s
repeated requests were discriminatory and in violation of the Collective Agreement
and other Provincial policies.
[6] The first medical note was provided on March 4, 2021 in which it was indicated
that due to medical reasons, the Grievor had difficulty wearing a face mask and
asked the Employer to take this into consideration in accommodating her. The
second medical note dated July 5, 2021 stated that the Grievor was not able to
wear a face mask for medical reasons.
Employer’s Request for Production
[7] The Employer is seeking an order that the Union provide Dr. Davies’ clinical notes,
tests, and information he gathered from the Grievor that formed the basis for his
recommendations and conclusions in the medical notes of March 4, 2021 and July
5, 2021. The Employer also asks to reserve its right to additional medical
documentation in the event that the Union discloses other medical information that
it intends to rely on in this case.
[8] The Employer argues that the request for medical information is limited in scope
and that the information is arguably relevant to all of the grievances in this case.
The Employer emphasizes that the overriding principle that production of medical
documentation is routinely ordered by arbitrators when medical status is at issue
because of the nature of the grievance. In this case, because the Grievor has
requested a medical accommodation exemption from wearing a face mask, the
Employer states that it is entitled to examine the underlying medical information in
order to examine how the physician reached his medical opinion.
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[9] In addition, the Employer notes that the March 4 and July 5, 2021 medical notes
were inconsistent and that it should be entitled to understand what information
formed the basis for the July 5, 2021 note that stated that the Grievor, due to
medical reasons, could not wear a face mask at work compared to the March 4,
2021 note that stated that the Grievor had difficulty with wearing a face mask, due
to medical reasons. The Employer maintains that in this case it had an ongoing
concern about the sufficiency of the notes and had no information about prognosis
or whether the Grievor was undergoing medical treatment which would have
informed the Employer in its decision making related to all four grievances.
[10] The Employer relies on the following decisions in support of its position: Dufferin
Concrete and TC Local 230 (Storey) (2015), 264 L.A.C.(4th) 1 (Luborsky); Peel
District School Board v Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation, District
19, 2017 CanLII 96315 (ON LA) Wicik v. Sunnybrook Research Institute, 2020
HRTO 158 (McKendy); OPSEU (Horning) and Ministry of the Solicitor General,
GSB No 2016-2754 (Petryshen); AMAPCEO (Szewczyk) and Ministry of the
Environment, January 20, 2014, GSB No 2013-0723 (Herlich).
Union’s Response on Production
[11] The Union urges me to deny the Employer’s request for production arguing that
the Grievor’s privacy outweighs any entitlement to disclosure, that the medical file
is not arguably relevant to the disciplinary aspects of the case, or alternatively that
production of medical information is premature at this stage of the hearing. In the
event that I allow the Employer’s motion for production, the Union asks that I place
conditions on who has access to the medical information and restrictions on its use
and confidentiality similar to those imposed in OPSEU v. Ministry of Community
Safety and Correctional Services GSB No. 2016-1915 (Gee).
[12] The Union claims that in deciding whether to order production, I need to also
consider the issues in the order that are before me, namely; a) was the Employer
justified in issuing a 1-day suspension? b) was the Employer justified in placing the
Grievor on an unpaid leave of absence? c) did the Employer fail to accommodate
the Grievor? and d) what remedies is the Grievor entitled to should I uphold her
grievances? While acknowledging that some medical documentation could be
introduced as part of the Union’s evidence on remedy, Counsel states the current
medical information sought by the Employer is not relevant to the decisions to
suspend the Grievor and subsequently place her on an unpaid leave of absence.
The Union maintains that the Grievor did provide medical notes which formed the
basis of the Employer’s disciplinary decisions and that the Employer should not
need any further medical information. Additionally, Counsel asserts that even on
the accommodation grievances, the medical notes on their face provide a nexus
between a disability and the need for accommodation, and that ordering the
medical documentation sought by the Employer constitutes an unnecessary
invasion of her privacy, including a possible disclosure of diagnosis, which is also
prejudicial to the trust between her and her physician.
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[13] The Union also asks me to consider the Employer’s request within the context that
these grievances relate to the Ontario Government’s mask mandate set out in
Regulation O.Reg.364/20 which provided for exemptions in subsection (5) that the
mask mandate does not apply to a person (h) with a medical condition that inhibits
their ability to wear a mask or face covering or (l) is being accommodated in
accordance with the Human Rights Code. Furthermore, subsection (8) provides
that it is not necessary for a person to present evidence that they are entitled to
the exceptions set out in subsection (5). In light of this Regulation, the Union notes
that the Grievor fell under an exempted group and was not required to provide
evidence to explain why she could not wear a mask. Therefore, ordering
documents now from her medical file is inconsistent with the Regulation and,
production of medical documents places an additional burden upon the medical
community.
[14] In support of its position, the Union relies on two cases, both denying production
requests for medical evidence following a termination of employment. In West Park
Hospital v Ontario Nurses ‘Association, 1993 CanLII 16806(ON LA), an Employer’s
request for a medical file was denied where the Employer had discharged a Nurse
for competency. In that case, prior to her termination, the grievor had provided a
certificate of competency to the Employer but no other medical information. The
Board of Arbitration found that there was not a clear nexus between the
information being requested and the positions in dispute. In that regard, the Board
found that the discharge itself was not based on health-related problems
compared to other situations where the discharge and medical information are
inextricably connected (p.16) and also questioned even whether the medical
disclosure request was arguably relevant at the early stage of proceedings. In
addition, the Board was not satisfied that there was a reason to undermine the
confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship (p.17). The Union asks that I draw
an analogy in the instant case, especially at this juncture of the hearing, that the
decisions to discipline the Grievor were based solely on the medical notes that she
provided. In that regard Counsel submits ordering further production is
unnecessary and would be prejudicial to the Grievor’s privacy rights.
[15] In Peel Regional Paramedic Services of the Regional Municipality of Peel vs
OPSEU Local 277 (Reed) 2018 CanLII 44272(ONLA), the Employer sought all
medical documentation in a case involving termination of employment due to
frustration of contract following a 2-year medical leave. In denying the Employer’s
production request, the Arbitrator found, (p.5) that the primary issue in the case
was whether the Employer violated the Collective Agreement and the Human
Rights Code when it terminated the Grievor’s employment for purported frustration
of contract. While the Grievor’s medical condition was central to the dispute and
relevant to the proceeding, the Employer was required to justify its decision to
terminate based on the information it had when it made the decision. For that
reason, the Arbitrator concluded that additional information regarding the Grievor’s
medical condition at the time of termination or post-termination was not relevant at
that stage of the proceeding. However, the Arbitrator noted that additional medical
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information may become relevant and producible in the event that a Code violation
is found in terms of assessing remedy.
Decision
[16] Having considered the Parties arguments and the caselaw presented, I am
allowing the Employer’s motion for the production of medical documentation
subject to conditions with respect to access and confidentiality noted below.
[17] Fundamentally the central issues in the case concern the Grievor’s request for a
medical accommodation and the fallout from that request. While I appreciate that
at this stage of the proceeding, the Employer’s evidence on the one-day
suspension and the unpaid leave of absence is being adduced first, I do not agree
that the case can be divided, as the Union suggests, in a way that limits sharing
arguably relevant evidence, at this stage of the proceeding, that is central to the
dispute. The Employer’s decision to suspend and place the Grievor on an unpaid
leave of absence was linked, in large part, to the sufficiency of the two medical
notes provided and the Employer’s repeated requests for medical information to
support the accommodation request. Unlike the decision in Peel, this case deals
with an ongoing disability and request of further medical information in addition to
a disciplinary suspension and unpaid leave of absence. Given the consolidation of
the grievances before me, this case involves more than assessing the onus of
proof and what is arguably relevant evidence in a disciplinary proceeding. This
case is also distinguishable from the decision in West Park Hospital because here
there is a clear nexus between the information being requested and the positions
of the parties in the dispute.
[18] While I also acknowledge the sensitivity of a patient’s medical records, I am
satisfied that the Employer’s request is limited in scope because it relates only to
the medical opinion underlying the 2 medical notes submitted. The Employer’s
request in this case is different than a production request that seeks a patient’s full
medical file and record. In addition, I am not satisfied that an order for the medical
production request is inconsistent with Regulation O.Reg.364/20 as the Grievor did
provide medical notes which may be subject to the Employers’ right to make
further inquiries as part of the accommodation process. However, this conclusion
does not limit the right of the Union to make further arguments, on the merits,
regarding its view of the impact of O.Reg.364/20 on the accommodation process
including the rights and obligations of the parties.
[19] Looking at this case in its entirety, I adopt the analysis for ordering production in
Dufferin Concrete, also applied in the other arbitration cases submitted by the
Employer. In Dufferin, an employee had been away from work due to injuries. To
assess whether the employee was ready to return to work, the employer requested
medical information. While the employee willingly submitted a series of medical
notes/opinions from his physician, he would not provide his complete medical
records. The employer sought a production order for the complete record
pertaining to the employee's injuries that had kept him away from work. Starting at
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paragraphs 24, Arbitrator Luborsky sets out the applicable principles: First, the
information requested must be arguably relevant. Second, the requested
information must be particularized so there is no dispute as to what is desired.
Third, the Board of Arbitration should be satisfied that the information is not being
requested as a "fishing expedition". Fourth, there must be a clear nexus between
the information being requested and the positions in dispute at the hearing.
Further, the Board must be satisfied that disclosure will not cause undue prejudice.
Equally applicable in this case are the Arbitrator’s comments at paragraph 32: “that
once the Grievor and/or Union has placed medical notes before the Employer (and
ultimately the arbitrator), the Union has opened the door to the proper admission of
all of the documentation that the author of the medical reports relied upon in
arriving at the conclusions stated in those reports, and any other documentation in
the Grievor's medical file arguably related thereto. This may include information
evidencing the physician's knowledge of the physical demands of the Grievor's job,
records of meetings with the Grievor (including what the Grievor is reported to
have said to his physician on the matter), clinical notes of physical examinations,
testing and other assessments the physician may have conducted in coming to the
specific conclusions or recommendations reflected by the medial notes presented
to the Employer.”
[20] Counsel for the Employer has asked that he be permitted to share the medical
documentation produced with the ERA, two instructing clients and the Disability
Accommodation Specialist. The Union maintains that the Grievor’s medical
documents contain personal information that should not be disclosed unless
absolutely necessary. Having regard to balancing the Grievor’s right to privacy
against what is arguably relevant in what the Employer needs to know in order to
prepare its case, I have determined that the Employer’s request of how it intends
to share the medical information is too broad, at this stage. Similar to the
reasoning in OPSEU v. Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services
GSB No. 2016-1915 (Gee), I conclude that disclosure be restricted to Counsel and
one instructing advisor. However, I will also allow Employer Counsel, if necessary
for case preparation, to share medical disclosure with the Disability
Accommodation Specialist assigned to the Grievor’s accommodation file. I also
adopt the same ruling noted by Arbitrator Gee, at paragraph 6, that “Should a need
arise for Counsel to disclose the documents to a potential witness, for the
purposes of getting instructions, or in order to get an expert medical opinion, the
Grievor’s consent can be requested and, if denied, an order can be sought from
the Board.”
[21] Accordingly, I hereby order that, no later than 45 days before the next hearing
date, the Union produce Dr. Davies’ clinical notes, tests, and information he
gathered from the Grievor that formed the basis for his recommendations and
conclusions in the medical notes of March 4, 2021 and July 5, 2021. The clinical
notes and other medical information disclosed to the Employer in this proceeding
shall be subject to the following conditions:
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i. The documents or material will only be released to Employer
Counsel, one instructing advisor and the Disability Accommodation
Specialist assigned to the Grievor’s file.
ii. The documents or material produced must be maintained as
confidential.
iii. The documents or material produced must not be disclosed to any
person or party not a participant in these proceedings.
iv. The documents or material produced can only be used for
purposes relating to this proceeding and not for any other purpose
or proceeding.
v. Documents or material produced shall only be copied for purposes
relating to this proceeding and any medical documentation
produced and, in the Employer’s possession, shall be returned to
the Union or destroyed at the conclusion of the proceeding.
Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 12th day of May 2022.
“Dale Hewat”
_________________
Dale Hewat, Arbitrator