HomeMy WebLinkAbout2020-2966.McGann et al.2023-03-02 Decision
Crown Employees
Grievance Settlement
Board
Suite 600
180 Dundas St. West
Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z8
Tel. (416) 326-1388
Commission de
règlement des griefs
des employés de la
Couronne
Bureau 600
180, rue Dundas Ouest
Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1Z8
Tél. : (416) 326-1388
GSB# 2020-2970; 2020-2971; 2021-0499
UNION# 2021-0526-0006; 2021-0526-0007; 2021-0526-0016
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
(McGann et al) Union
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of the Attorney General) Employer
BEFORE Ian Anderson Arbitrator
FOR THE UNION Rebecca Jones
Ryder Wright Holmes Bryden Nam LLP
Counsel
FOR THE EMPLOYER Katherine Ayers
Treasury Board Secretariat
Legal Services Branch
Counsel
HEARING December 16, 2022
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Decision
[1] There are three grievances before me, each referred pursuant to the
mediation/arbitration process described in Article 22.16. Article 22.16.2 provides
that the mediator/arbitrator “shall give a succinct decision within five (5) days after
completing the proceeding, unless the parties agree otherwise.” The parties
agreed to waive this time limit. Article 22.16.7 provides: “Decisions reached
through the mediation/arbitration process shall have no precedential value unless
the parties agree otherwise.” The parties have not agreed otherwise in this case.
[2] All of the grievances relate to a Joint Health and Safety Committee (“JHSC”)
established pursuant to s. 9 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (“OHSA”)
for a workplace at the court house located at 330 University Avenue, Toronto.
[3] The first is a group grievance filed January 29, 2021 on behalf of the worker
members of the JHSC. It relates to the conduct of workplace inspections required
by s. 9(23) of the OHSA. Section 9(23) of the OHSA states in relevant part: “the
members of a committee who represent workers shall designate a member
representing workers to inspect the physical condition of the workplace”. The
grievance alleges: “the employer has arbitrarily directed / assigned a work member
who they believe should do the inspection.” The inspections in question were
conducted in December, 2020 and January, 2021.
[4] I will first consider the workplace inspection of the 8th floor of the building
scheduled for December 10, 2020. On December 4, 2020, Mr. McGann, who is a
worker member of the JHSC, wrote to Christopher Samac, Supervisor of Court
Operations for Civil Court Staff at 330 University Avenue. Mr. McGann stated he
was “required” to inspect the 8th floor on December 10, 2020. Mr. McGann
continued that he was not available to conduct the inspection in the morning
because of a course he was to attend and requested that the inspection take place
at 4:45 PM. Mr. Samac responded later on December 4, that management was
not available at 4:45 PM. Mr. Samac also noted that Mr. McGann’s co-worker
representative on the JHSC, Marie-Paule Duret, could attend to conduct the
inspection on the morning of December 10. Mr. Samac noted that he had made
the necessary arrangements for Ms. Duret to attend. He copied Ms. Duret’s
supervisor, Satie Seeraj. Ms. Duret was also copied on Mr. Samac’s email. Ms.
Duret responded on December 4 stating: “I am not sure if this is the right approach
to volunteer someone without having been informed, and/or consulted for his/her
availability. I am not sure of its appropriateness.”
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[5] The Union argues that “on an objective read”, these emails demonstrate the
Employer dictating which worker member of the JHSC should conduct the
workplace inspection. I am not persuaded that this was the case. In any event,
subsequent emails make it abundantly clear that it was not the case. I will review
those emails in some detail as they are also relevant to the second grievance.
[6] By December 6, 2020 email, Mr. McGann replied to Mr. Samac’s December 4,
2020 email as follows:
Good Day, Mr. Samac
You or Ms. Seeraj are not willing to start the inspection at 4:45 p.m.?
God willing, the inspection of the 8th floor, will be completed by me on Thursday,
December 10/20 after my assign [sic] duties for the courtroom.
Thank you.
This email is disingenuous. Mr. Samac had not indicated that management was
“not willing” to start the inspection at 4:45 PM on December 10, 2020. He had
indicated that management was not available to do so.
[7] By a December 8, 2020 email, Mr. Samac replied to Mr. McGann. While re-
iterating that management was not available to conduct the inspection at the time
and date specified by Mr. McGann, Mr. Samac offered three alternatives: one
involved Ms. Duret commencing the inspection and Mr. McGann joining when he
could; two of the alternatives were for the inspection to be conducted on
alternative dates and times when Mr. McGann could be present for the entire
inspection. It is quite clear from this email that there is no basis whatsoever for
the suggestion that the Employer was directing which worker representative would
conduct the December, 2020 inspection, let alone doing so in a manner which was
arbitrary.
[8] I turn now to the January, 2021 workplace inspection. The evidence in relation to
this takes the form of a series of emails between Ms. Duret and Mr. Samac, on
which Mr. McGann was copied. On Tuesday, January 5, 2021, Ms. Duret sent Mr.
Samac an email stating: “I will be conducting a health and safety inspection” either
on January 6 or 7, 2021. Mr. Samac responded on the same day reiterating that
management would be present for all inspections and that inspections should take
place during scheduled work hours. He also indicated that management was not
available for either January 6 or January 7, 2021 and proposed that the workplace
inspections be discussed at the next JHSC meeting scheduled for January 13,
2021. On January 7, 2021, Ms. Duret, who was the worker co-chair of the JHSC,
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responded with a proposed schedule for work place inspections, including January
12, 2021 as one of the dates. Mr. Samac responded on the same date indicating
in part “I am available on January 12/21 to accompany you and complete the …
inspection”. On January 11, 2011, at 3:24 PM, Ms. Duret responded: “It is
inappropriate for you to assume that I will be … the one performing the inspection
on January 12, 2021. Time should be made available for Mr. McGann to perform
the inspection scheduled for January 12, 2021.” On January 12, 2021, at 8:20 AM
Mr. Samac responded that management was simply acting on the statement made
by Ms. Duret in her January 5, 2021 email that she would be conducting the
workplace inspection and the absence of any suggestion in her subsequent emails
to the contrary. Mr. Samac indicated that it was too late to make arrangements for
Mr. McGann to attend the inspection. He offered to reschedule the inspection to
later that week on January 14 or 15, 2021 and asked that Ms. Duret confirm who
would be in attendance.
[9] The Union argues that “on an objective read”, these emails demonstrate the
Employer dictating which worker member of the JHSC should conduct the
workplace inspection. I am hard pressed to see how these emails can be read in
that way. Mr. Samac’s assumption, that Ms. Duret would be conducting the
January, 2021 inspection, was entirely reasonable. In any event, he was prepared
to reschedule the inspection to a later date, requesting only that Ms. Duret advise
who would be attending on behalf of the Union. Once again, there is no basis
whatsoever for the suggestion that the Employer was directing which worker
representative would conduct the January, 2021 inspection, let alone doing so in a
manner which was arbitrary.
[10] Accordingly, the first grievance is dismissed.
[11] The second grievance is an individual grievance filed February 3, 2021 on behalf
of Mr. McGann. It grieves the imposition of a three day suspension for
insubordination in relation to Mr. McGann’s conduct of the workplace inspection on
December 10, 2020. The grounds relied upon by the Employer for the suspension
were that Mr. McGann: failed to follow management directions with respect to the
conduct of the workplace inspection, which directions were set out in emails of
December 4, 8 and 9, 2020 and given verbally by Mr. Samac on December 10,
2020 during a meeting with Mr. McGann; and that Mr. McGann raised his voice at
Mr. Samac during that meeting.
[12] The December 4 and 8, 2020 emails were partially reviewed above in relation to
the first grievance. They establish that on December 4, 2020 Mr. Samac advised
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Mr. McGann that management was not available to conduct the inspection on
December 10, 2020. When Mr. McGann persisted in asserting that the inspection
would proceed on December 10, 2020, Mr. Samac reiterated in his December 8,
2020 email that management was not available to conduct the inspection on that
date and offered alternative dates. In that email, Mr. Samac continued:
As you are aware, these inspections should take place within your scheduled
work hours and management must approve any time away from performance of
your assigned duties, including approving time away from work to conduct JHSC
inspections.
Please note that should you not adhere to any of the above directions, including
initiating the 8th floor inspection at any other time than as stipulated above,
conducting any inspection without prior approval from management, conducting
any inspection without management presence, and conducting any inspection at
a time that is not previously scheduled, such behaviour may be viewed as
insubordination and may be subject to discipline.
[13] Mr. McGann replied by a December 9, 2020, email. In his email, Mr. McGann
failed to acknowledge or in any way respond to the directions given by Mr. Samac.
Rather, he simply persisted in asserting that he would conduct the inspection on
December 10, 2020 after the completion of his courtroom duties, notwithstanding
the clear direction from Mr. Samac that he not do so.
[14] By responding email of December 9, 2020, Mr. Samac noted that Mr. McGann’s
response was “inconsistent with my direction to you.” Mr. Samac again
specifically warned Mr. McGann that failure to adhere to management’s directions
with respect to the inspection “may be viewed as insubordination and may be
subject to discipline.”
[15] Once again, Mr. McGann simply ignored Mr. Samac’s direction. At 3:09 PM on
December 10, 2020 he sent Mr. McGann an email that stated:
I’m going to start the inspection of the 8th floor. I have completed most of my
courtroom duties for today.
[16] The Employer notes that Mr. McGann’s email indicates that “most” of his
courtroom duties for the day had been completed. The Employer argues that not
only had Mr. McGann not completed all the courtroom duties which he had been
assigned, but in the ordinary course if he had completed those duties he was
required to ask if there were other duties to which he could be assigned The
Employer argues his failures in both respects constitute culpable conduct. I do not
find that argument of assistance for the issue before me. The grounds relied upon
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by the Employer in the letter of discipline were that Mr. McGann had conducted the
inspection on December 10, 2020 despite being repeatedly told not to do so and
that he raised his voice in the meeting with Mr. Samac. Leaving his assigned
duties incomplete and not determining whether or not there were other duties
which he could perform were grounds set out in the letter of discipline.
Accordingly, it is not an issue before me.
[17] In any event, Mr. McGann then went to Mr. Samac’s office. Mr. McGann told Mr.
Samac that he was going to do the inspection and Mr. Samac directed him not to
do so. Mr. McGann ultimately left and conducted the inspection on his own
notwithstanding this direction. There is some dispute about some of the
statements made during this conversation and accordingly both Mr. McGann and
Mr. Samac gave oral evidence before me. There were a few differences in their
evidence as to the conversation. I do not find it necessary to resolve them for the
purposes of this decision. Rather, where there is a difference I will simply assume
that Mr. McGann’s recollection is correct.
[18] According to Mr. McGann, most of the conversation took place with him standing
in the doorway of Mr. Samac’s office. The team lead, Chevaughn, was less than
four feet away. Ms. Seeraj, the other supervisor, was about eight feet away. Mr.
McGann thought that Chevaughn probably heard what he said, but was not sure if
she could hear Mr. Samac. Mr. McGann thought that Ms. Seeraj would not have
been able to hear the conversation. In fact, Ms. Seeraj was able to hear the
conversation. What is relevant to the issue of insubordination is that the
conversation between Mr. McGann and Mr. Samac was not private and could not
have been considered as such by Mr. McGann.
[19] It is not necessary to set out all the details of the conversation. Mr. McGann’s
version includes reference to the fact that Mr. Samac told him that he had already
responded to Mr. McGann giving other dates for the inspection to which Mr.
McGann responded “I was tired of responding”. Mr. McGann and Mr. Samac then
had a discussion about whether or not Mr. McGann was authorized to conduct the
inspection. Mr. Samac clearly and repeatedly told Mr. McGann that he was not
authorized to do so. Mr. McGann, however, was of the view that he was
authorized to do so by the OHSA and told Mr. Samac as much repeatedly. At
separate times each asked the other if they would like an inspector from the
Ministry of Labour to be called. Ultimately, Mr. McGann stated, he “advised Mr.
Samac that “you are wasting my time, I’m going to do the inspection”. He then
proceeded to conduct the inspection. Mr. McGann conceded in his oral evidence
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that he raised his voice during his interaction with Mr. Samac, but stated that he
did so because he was wearing a mask.
[20] Simply stated, insubordination is the flouting of a clear order given by a person in
authority. There can be little question that Mr. McGann’s conduct during the
December 10, 2020 meets two elements of this definition. During the meeting,
and in the emails before the meeting, Mr. Samac clearly ordered Mr. McGann not
to conduct the inspection on December 10, 2020, and Mr. McGann clearly
disobeyed that order. Mr. McGann, however, challenged, and challenges, the
authority of Mr. Samac to make the order.
[21] Mr. McGann’s view appears to be that under the OHSA he has the authority, if not
the obligation, to conduct workplace inspections at the time, or at least on the date,
“scheduled” for that inspection.
[22] It appears this view is mistaken. The issue was addressed by Vice Chair Derek
Rogers in CUPE Local 4400 v Toronto District School Board, 2021 CanLII 132871
(ON LRB). After a careful review of the sections of the OHSA related to workplace
inspections, Vice Chair Rogers stated at para. 75:
I am of the view that “schedule” referred to in subsection 9(28) is and was
intended to be the arrangement by which the workplaces referred to in
subsection 9(27) are to be inspected — partially at least once each month
and completely at least once each year. In common with the inspection
under subsection 9(26), the particular days and hours on or during which
the inspections for the purposes of subsection 9(27) and 9(28) might be
conducted are of no concern or interest under the statute .…
[23] However, I do not find it necessary to determine whether the OHSA gives a worker
representative the authority to conduct a workplace inspection at the “scheduled”
time. Rather the issue before me is whether the OHSA authorizes a worker
representative to persist in conducting the investigation in the face of a direct order
by a supervisor not to do so when there is a difference of opinion as to what the
OHSA requires. In my view it does not.
[24] The OHSA contains several provisions which by necessary implication give
workers a limited right not to follow countervailing orders from an employer, for
example the right of individual workers to refuse unsafe work under s. 43 and the
right of certified members of the JHSC to direct a work stoppage where dangerous
circumstances exist under s. 47. The authority to conduct a workplace inspection
pursuant s. 9(23) is not such a provision. Rather, if there is a dispute between a
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worker representative and a supervisor with respect to a workplace inspection, the
worker representative’s recourse is first to raise the issue at the JHSC and if that is
not satisfactory to seek a compliance order from an inspector of the Occupational
Health and Safety Branch of the Ministry of Labour pursuant to s. 57 or s. 55 of the
OHSA. Just as workers are generally required to “obey now, grieve later”, so a
worker representative is generally required to obey now and seek a compliance
order later.
[25] The Union suggests that the onus lay upon the Employer to seek an order under
the OHSA if it was of the view that Mr. McGann’s conduct of the workplace
inspection, contrary to the direction of a supervisor, was in breach of the OHSA.
With respect, I disagree. The OHSA does not confer a general licence upon
worker representatives to ignore or act contrary to directions given by supervisors
until such time as the Employer is able to obtain an order to the contrary. It
requires little imagination to see the chaos which could ensue in a workplace from
the opposite conclusion.
[26] The Union argues that Mr. McGann’s desire to conduct the workplace investigation
was prompted by a genuine concern on his part about the health and safety of his
co-workers in the workplace. In this respect, the Union notes that the incident took
place during the pandemic and shortly after employees were returning to the
workplace. Mr. McGann had concerns, for example, with respect to whether water
fountains had been left in operation notwithstanding a directive that they be shut
down and in fact his December, 2020 inspection revealed one which was still
operational. I do not doubt that Mr. McGann had genuine concerns. Those
concerns did not, however, rise to the level of imminent harm such as would
support an exception to the work now grieve later principle.
[27] The Union argues that workers acting in the course of their duties as worker
representatives under the OHSA should be afforded leeway analogous to that
afforded workers acting in the course of their duties as union stewards. I agree
with the Employer that this analogy is not entirely apt. The role of a union steward
is to advocate on behalf of bargaining unit members, which by its nature may
result in contention and disagreement. By contrast the internal responsibility
system, of which a JHSC is an important part, in theory at least, seeks to promote
cooperation between the parties. Nonetheless, as acknowledged by the
Employer, there may well be disagreements between worker and employer
members of a JHSC. In my view, it follows that a worker member should not be
disciplined simply because they disagree with members of management.
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[28] That, however, is not what happened here. Mr. McGann was not disciplined
because he disagreed with management with respect to the authority of a worker
representative to conduct a workplace inspection. He was disciplined because he
persisted in acting in accordance with his opinion as to the scope of that authority
notwithstanding clear and repeated directions to the contrary from Mr. Samac. In
my view, that conduct warranted discipline.
[29] The Union argues that the three day suspension is too severe. The Employer
argues that it is within the range of appropriate discipline and should not be
disturbed.
[30] Mr. McGann has a letter of reprimand dated November 5, 2020 covering several
incidents in which he was alleged not to have followed management directives.
The Union notes that letter is the subject of a separate grievance and argues that
no weight may be placed on it for the purposes of a “record”. I do not find it
necessary to decide that issue. In my view, Mr. McGann’s conduct in this incident
standing alone is sufficiently serious that it warrants a suspension.
[31] The typical progression for suspensions between these parties is a one day
suspension, followed by a three day suspension and suspensions of greater length
thereafter. There is, however, no lock step requirement that this progression be
followed. Individual circumstances may result in a suspension of greater or lesser
length than the normal progression.
[32] In this instance, Mr. McGann deliberately and repeatedly first ignored and then
acted contrary to express directions given to him by Mr. Samac. Part of this
insubordination was a public conversation in front of other employees. During that
conversation, Mr. McGann did not simply disagree with Mr. Samac, he made
disrespectful comments in particular that he was “tired of responding” to Mr.
Samac and that Mr. Samac was “wasting my time”.
[33] The countervailing consideration is that while Mr. McGann’s actions were
deliberate, they were based on a sincere, albeit mistaken, belief that he was
entitled to ignore clear directions from Mr. Samac. I would give weight to this
consideration but for the fact that Mr. McGann appeared to persist in that belief up
to and including the hearing of this matter.
[34] In all of the circumstances, I conclude the three day suspension imposed by the
Employer was reasonable and that there is insufficient basis for me to substitute a
lesser penalty.
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[35] Accordingly, the second grievance is dismissed.
[36] The third is a group grievance filed March 31, 2021 on behalf of the worker
members of the JHSC. It seeks payment for time to review the minutes of the
JHSC meeting of January 13, 2021.
[37] The Union argues that under the OHSA there is an obligation to maintain minutes
of the JHSC and a general duty on the part of an employer to afford assistance to
the JHSC. Accordingly, the Union argues, there is an obligation on the part of the
employer to give JHSC members paid time to review JHSC minutes. Reliance is
placed upon: s. 9(22), (34), (35) and s.25(2)(e).
[38] I am not persuaded by this argument. The cited sections read as follows:
s. 9(22) A committee shall maintain and keep minutes of its proceedings and make the
same available for examination and review by an inspector.
….
s. 9(34) A member of a committee is entitled to,
(a) one hour or such longer period of time as the committee determines is
necessary to prepare for each committee meeting;
(b) such time as is necessary to attend meetings of the committee; and
(c) such time as is necessary to carry out the member’s duties under subsections
(26), (27) and (31).
s. 9(35) A member of a committee shall be deemed to be at work during the times
described in subsection (34) and the member’s employer shall pay the member for those
times at the member’s regular or premium rate as may be proper.
s. 25(2) … an employer shall,
(e) afford assistance and co-operation to a committee and a health and safety
representative in the carrying out by the committee and the health and safety
representative of any of their functions;
[39] Section 9(22) creates an obligation on the part of a JHSC to maintain and keep
minutes. Section 9(35) specifically addresses the times in which a JHSC member
is deemed to be at work and entitled to be paid. This rebuts the suggestion that a
JHSC member is entitled to be paid for other times. Section 9(35) indicates the
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times for which a worker is entitled to be paid are the ones described in s. 9(34).
Section 9(34)(c) has no application: s. 9(26) and (27) relate to workplace
inspections and s. 9(31) relates to the investigation of accidents in which a worker
was killed or critically injured. Section 9(34)(a) and (b) deal with the time
necessary to prepare for JHSC meetings and the time necessary to attend JHSC
meetings respectively. This rebuts the suggestion that the open ended time for
attendance at meetings referenced in s. 9(34)(b) includes preparation time. The
review of minutes can fall within preparation for a meeting. There is no suggestion
however, that the minutes were being reviewed for this purpose. Further, and in
any event, the time for preparation is capped by the s. 9(34)(a) at one hour or such
longer period of time as determined by the JHSC. There is no suggestion that the
JHSC determined that more than one hour was required for preparation. There is
no suggestion that the members of the JHSC were not paid for one hour
preparation or such longer period which had been determined by the JHSC.
[40] Finally, the more specific provisions of s. 9 just reviewed rebut the inference that
an obligation to pay JHSC members for the review of meeting minutes can be
found in the more general obligation of s. 25(2)(e).
[41] Accordingly, the third grievance is dismissed.
Conclusion
[42] For the reasons stated, all three of the grievances are dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 2nd day of March 2023.
“Ian Anderson”
Ian Anderson, Arbitrator