HomeMy WebLinkAbout2010-0838.McGowan.11-03-14 Decision
Commission de
Crown Employees
Grievance
UqJOHPHQWGHVJULHIV
Settlement Board
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Couronne
Suite 600 Bureau 600
180 Dundas St. West 180, rue Dundas Ouest
Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z8 Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1Z8
Tel. (416) 326-1388 7pO
Fax (416) 326-1396 7pOpF
GSB#2010-0838
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Association of Management, Administrative and
Professional Crown Employees of Ontario
Association
(McGowan)
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Northern Development, Mines and Forestry)
Employer
BEFORENimal Dissanayake Vice-Chair
FOR THE UNIONJames McDonald
Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
FOR THE EMPLOYERCathy Phan
Ministry of Government Services
Labour Practice Group
Counsel
HEARING
February 28, 2011.
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Decision
[1]The grievor, Ms. Doreen McGowan, has grieved a job competition for the position of
Forest Environmental Assessment Implementation Coordinator in which she participated
unsuccessfully. The Board has satisfied itself that the successful applicant, Mr. John Sullivan,
was provided proper notice of this proceeding. He was not in attendance at the hearing.
[2] The association has challenged the results of the competition on several grounds.
However, the parties agreed that the Board should initially determine a narrow issue which goes
to the appropriate standard or test to be used by the employer in assessing the qualifications and
abilities as between the grievor and Mr. Sullivan. The facts pertinent to this issue were presented
through opening statements of counsel and documentary evidence. The parties agreed that for
the purposes of this decision only, the facts so presented may be accepted as proven.
[3] The relevant provisions of the collective agreement are as follows:
11.1 Employees from outside the bargaining unit temporarily
assigned to an AMAPCEO position for a period of more than thirty (30)
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calendar days will on the 31 calendar day commence paying dues and be
governed by the terms of the AMAPCEO collective agreement except that
pensions and insured benefits, as well as job security entitlements, will
continue to be governed by the rules applicableWRWKHHPSOR\HH¶VKRPH
position.
18.3.1. In filling a vacancy, applicants¶TXDOLILFDWLRQVIRUWKHSRVLWLRQ
VKDOOEHDVVHVVHGUHODWLYHWRWKHVHOHFWLRQFULWHULD±WKHNQRZOHGJHVNLOOV
abilities and experience required to perform the duties of the position. The
most qualified applicant for the position shall be selected to fill the vacancy.
18.3.2 Where the qualifications and ability are relatively equal
between an AMAPCEO unit applicant and a non-AMAPCEO unit applicant
preference will be given to the AMAPCEO unit applicant.
[4] The general test for job competitions, as set out in article 18.3.1, is that the most qualified
applicant must be selected to fill a posted vacancy. Article 18.3.2, however, creates an exception
ZKHUHWKHFRPSHWLWLRQLVEHWZHHQ³DQ$0$3&(2XQLWDSSOLFDQW´DQG³DQRQ$0$3&(2XQLW
DSSOLFDQW´,QVXFKFDVHVSUHIHUHQFHLVJLYHQto the former provided his/her qualifications and
ability are relatively equal.
[5] The appointment in question was based solely on the marks achieved by the applicants in
an interview process consisting of an oral interview, a presentation and a practical test. While
five applicants participated, the two top achievers were, Mr. Sullivan with 77.00 marks and the
grievor with 74.75 marks. The employer conceded that given the difference of 2.25 marks, the
JULHYRU¶VTXDOLILFDWLRQVDQGDELOLW\DUHUHODWLYHO\ equal to those of Mr. Sullivan. However, it is
WKHHPSOR\HU¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWWKHUHlative equality standard in article 18.3.2 had no application as
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between the grievor and Mr. Sullivan. In the emSOR\HU¶VYLHZWKHDSSOLcable standard is the
³PRVWTXDOLILHGDSSOLFDQW´standard in article 18.3.1.
[6] It is agreed that at all relevant times, the grievor waVDQ³$0$3&(2XQLWDSSOLFDQW´
within the meaning of article 18.3.2. The dispute isDERXW0U6XOOLYDQ¶VVWDWXVDWWKHWLPH:DV
he an AMAPCEO unit applicant as the employer submits or a non-AMAPCEO unit applicant as
contended by the Association? In the formerFDVHWKH³PRVWTXDOLILHG´WHVWLQDUWLFOH
would govern, while article 18.3.2 would require the DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH³UHODWLYHHTXDOLW\WHVW´LI
Mr. Sullivan was a non-AMAPCEO applicant.
[7] The position in question was posted on January 4, 2010, with a closing date of January
18, 2010. The grievor submitted her application on January 14, 2010. On January 18, the
closing date for applications, two things happened with Mr. Sullivan, who at the time was a
member of the OPSEU bargaining unit and was covered by the OPSEU collective agreement.
First, effective January 18, 2010, he was appointed on a temporary basis to a position within the
AMAPCEO bargaining unit. Second, the same day he applied for the posting in question.
[8] The interviews for the job competition were held on February 5, 2010 for the grievor and
on February 8, 2010 for Mr. Sullivan. The interview panel consisted of Mr. Dan Pyke, Manager
Forest Management Planning Section, and Mr. Brian Hillier. After the panel members had
scored and tallied the scores, references were done. One of the references for Mr. Sullivan was
dated February 19, 2010. On February 19, 2010, Mr. Pyke advised the grievor WKDWWKH'LUHFWRU¶V
rd
approval had to be obtained before declaring the winner of the competition. On February 23,
Mr. Pyke verbally informed Mr. Sullivan that he was the successful applicant, and that
information was verbally conveyed to the grievor on February 25, 2010. A formal letter of
appointment dated February 26, 2010 was received by Mr. Sullivan. He accepted and
commenced in the position on March 7, 2010.
[9] The critical language on which this dispute turns is in article 11.1. The parties agree that
st
under its terms, Mr. Sullivan acquired AMAPCEO unit status on the 31 calendar day following
his temporary appointment to the position within the AMAPCEO bargaining unit, namely,
February 18, 2010. The disagreement is as to whether that qualified Mr. Sullivan as an
AMAPCEO applicant for purposes of the competition. The employer takes the position that
where an applicant has AMAPCEO unit status as of the date the employer makes the final
selection of the successfulDSSOLFDQWWKHDSSOLFDEOHWHVWLVWKH³PRVWTXDOLILHGDSSOLFDQW´WHVWLQ
rd
article 18.3.1. The final decision was made and conveyed to Mr. Sullivan on February 23.
th
Since Mr. Sullivan had acquired AMAPCEO unit status on February 18, the employer contends
that the applicable test was WKH³PRVWTXDOLILHG´DSSOLFDQWWHVWLQDUWLFOHDQGVLQFHKH
scored higher than the grievor, he was the most qualified applicant and entitled to be appointed.
[10] Counsel noted that article 11.1 explicitly provides that an employee from outside the
AMAPCEO bargaining unit, who is temporarily assigned to an AMAPCEO position for the
specified period and thus obtains coverage under the AMAPCEO collective agreement, is still
not covered by that collective agreement for purposes of pensions, insured benefits and job
security entitlements. However, there is no similar exclusion of the right to be covered by the
AMAPCEO collective agreement for purposes of applying for job postings.
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[11] Employer counsel also submits that both articles 18.3.1 and 18.3.2 imply that at the time
of their application the employer had already assessed the qualifications and ability of the
applicants. In that light, the better interpretation is, according to her, that the AMAPCEO unit
status must be determined as of the time when the final selection is made. While counsel
presented two arbitration awards, I will not review them in this decision because they are not in
any way relevant or of assistance in determining this dispute, which turns on the particular
language in the collective agreement between these parties.
[12] The Association takes the position that in order to be considered an AMAPCEO unit
applicant for purposes of articles 18.3.1 and 18.3.2, Mr. Sullivan must have acquired that status
on the day the posting closed, namely January 18, 2010. He clearly did not meet that
requirement. Counsel for the Association pointed out that articles 18.3.1 and 18.3.2 use the
SKUDVH$0$3&(2XQLW³DSSOLFDQW´,WLVQRWDERXW successful candidates or appointees. He
submits that on the date a posting FORVHVWKHOLVWRI³DSSOLFDQWV´LV established for all purposes.
7KHHPSOR\HUEHFRPHVDZDUHRIWKH³DSSOLFDQWV´LWKDVWRLQWHUYLHZDQGDVVHVV$QGHDFK
applicant knows who he/she is competing against. 6LQFHWKH³DSSOLFDQW´VWDWXVLVFU\VWDOOL]HG
and determined at the closing of the posting, submits counsel, it makes sense to make the
determination of whether or not an applicant was an AMAPCEO unit applicant, also as of that
point in time.
[13] Association counsel also argues that the employer has sole control over the timing of the
final selection. The Association has no say or input in that regard. TherHIRUHLIWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
position is upheld, it would allow the employer to manipulate the process. By advancing or
delaying the final selection, the employer would be able to either hinder or enhance the chance of
success for particular applicants. The parties would not have, submits counsel, intended to
confer such authority on one of the parties.
[14] The parties agreed that there is no guidance in the collective agreement as to the relevant
point of time in a competition process when AMAPCEO unit applicant status must exist for
article 18.3.1 to apply.No case law has been presented either, that would be of assistance.
Nevertheless, the Board must, as best as it can, determine what the parties reasonably would
have expected when it negotiated the language.
[15] Having carefully examined the provisions in question and the submissions of the parties,
I have concluded that the better and more reasonable interpretation is that advanced by the
Association. I agree with employer counsel that an employee from outside the AMAPCEO
bargaining unit who obtains coverage within the AMAPCEO collective agreement under article
11.1 following a temporary assignment is not denied access to the job posting provisions of the
AMAPCEO collective agreement. However, that begs the question as to which job posting
provision, article 18.3.1 or 18.3.2, governs.
[16] I am persuaded that the parties would have intended to have certainty in the timing for
SXUSRVHVRIHVWDEOLVKLQJ³$0$3&(2XQLWDSSOLFDQW´VWDWXV$V Association counsel argued,
who is an applicant for purposes of a job competition is settled once and for all when the posting
FORVHV7KDWLVZKHQ³DSSOLFDQW´VWDWXVLVHVWDblished. Therefore, logically any determination as
to the type or category of applicant, should also be made as of that same date.
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