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HomeMy WebLinkAboutSafran 81-01-21 "'~.) IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BET WEE N: THE ONTARIO COUNCIL OF REGENTS FOR COLLEGES OF APPLIED ARTS & TECHNOLOGY (FANSHAWE COLLEGE) (hereinafter called the "Employer" - and - ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION (hereinafter called the "Unionll) '\ GRIEVANCE OF S. SAFRAN (hereinafter called the "Grievor") 30ARD OF ARBITRATIm~: W. B. Rayner, Chairman J. H. McGivney, Q.C., College Nominee R. Cochrane, Union Nominee APPEARING FOR THE UNION: R. Nabi APPEARING FOR THE COLLEGE: C. Murray HEARINGS IN RELATION TO THIS MATTER ~vERE HELD ~N LONDON, ONTARIO ,ON lMAY AND l2 NOVEMBER, 1980 r"""-""",,,,,,,,~~,,,,,~,,-~_,......._.,.,...N!"""'-""~""'~'~"-".", ....... -..'t:);J 2. AWARD This grievance arises from th€ rel~ase of the grievor on October the 5th, 1979. The grievor claims that she was a full time probationary employee at the time of her release and that she was not given the proper notice as required by Article 8.01(c) of the Collective Agreement. That article provides for at least 90 calendar days written notice when a probationary full time employee is released after the first five months of continuous or non-continuous accumulated employment. The g~ievor claims that since she was not given proper notice she has not beeL properly released and still remains an employee of the College. She therefore seeks back pay from the time of October the 5th, 1979 as well as a declaration to the effect that she' still continues as an employee. The College r.:aintains that the grievor wa-s not a full:.time probationary employee at the time that she was released. The grievor was given two weeks notice and the College takes the position that that was the appropriate notice given to the grievor because of . her status at the time that the notice was given. There are really no facts in dispute. Both ,parties agree that the grievance is pro~erly filed and is properly before the board. They both agree that the Board has jurisdiction to hear the grlevance. 3. >",",: ~'~""'.~. The grievor commenced employment at Fanshawe College on December 19th, 1977. She worked occasionally for the college. In 1978, in July, the grievor was offered and accepted three weeks of sessional employment. In September of 1978 the "grievor received certain instructions from her co-ordinator, Mr. McGOwan. In the first- week of September the grievor taught two days as" a substitute teacher. Mr. McGowan th~n asked her to share a class because the" class was too large. Hence, in the next week in September the grievor worked four days. The folloHing week, the week of September 25th hey part of the shared group became her class. Mr. McGowan gave her this class and thereafter the grievor taught for three or four daxs a week with a substitute teacher taking the fifth day. This arrange~ent was unsatisfactory and McGowan asked the grlevor to take the class on all possible days after that. The grievor worked a substantial number of weeks from October 1978 to October 1979 wherein her total days work were five and her hours worked were fifteen. These tigures become important because of the provisions of the collective agreement. The parties filed a list of hours and days worked for each week by the grievor. The Board attaches that as an appendix to this award. ;:.......-- . . '.~:.i 4. On or about December the 1st, 1978 the grievor entered into a verbal agreement with the Employer to teach three hours per day, tweive hours per week until March ]~, 1979. In actual fact, :: for many of the weeks in that period, the grievor exceeded twelve hours per week. The parties agree that the period between December 1977 and September ll, 1978 is not in issue. At all material times the grievor was paid as a teaching master teaching in the adult education division, Level II.in English and Mathematics. The grievor did not however receive benefits under the collective Agreement. " After her termination the grievor advised the Employer she did not consider herself discharged and requested pla~ement in t~J vacant positions for which she was qualified. In response to this, the Employer indicated by a letter from the president of the College, Mr. Rawson, that thegrievor was properly terminated. That letter is important with respect to the College's position and it reads as follows: "I have reviewed the facts surrounding your grievance dated 1979 10 l7, and it is clear that on a number of occasions you worked in excess of the range of hours per week for partial-load teachers as outlined in the Academic Memorandum of Agreement. We therefore have addressed ourselves to what your status would have been if we had reviewed ahead of time the various teaching assignments you have aqtually conducted during the whole of your period of employment with the College. ;.;.~'- .-,.' ' -:~;j 5. It is our Vlew that during the 6 months of July and November, 1978, and February, March, June and July, 1979, your employment would have been considered "full-time sessional" since during those months you taught in excess of the part~al load limit for a period of more than 15 days in each of the months mentioned. l'le believe that "full-time sessional" is a reasonable classification for those 6 months in the light of Article &.01 bf the Collective Agreement, which indicates how an employee may accrue seniority when employed on a full-time, but non-continuous basis. During the remainder of your period of employment, you would have been classified'as a.partial-load teacher. Since the College's normal practise is to pay full-time sessional teachers based on an annual salary rather than hourly rates, we will ensure the necessary financial adjust~ents are made to reflect the above conclusions. In addition, we will reimburse you at an hourly rate for those hours about which there is some discussion as to whether or not the work was properly authorized. The college considers the tWQ week notice period appropriate in view of the fact that you would have been considered either as a sessional or partial-load eMployee." " The parties agree that during the period when the Employer cor:sidered the grievor as a sessional employee, she was compensated as if she was a teaching ffiaster, a step on the salary,grid except that she did not recelve any of the benefits provided by the Cdllective Agreement. .f The grievor, on cross-examination, was questioned by the Employer's counsel with respect to those weeks wherein she worked. less than five ~ays. The grievor had several different reasons why she did not work five days for most of those weeks. In some instances the reason was because a statutory holiday fell within the week. In other instances the grievor did not work because of illness or death in the family. In one instance she did not work because it was a ""--~^""-""'~-~:'."'""7;:WP"--'l\"'.""i<'.'~"w'<'""_'~"r;;;:"!!~~'t'?\.,.,...,,"~"-. -'~:'~-..: '6. professional development day at the college. In other instances' the grievor took time off for personal reasons including both extension o,f vacation and religious hol-iday. ,"I ,-:~~;~ The grievor testified that she had no difficulty in getting time off when requested. However, during the month of -September, 1979, the grievor was told by her co-ordinator that her- hours were too high and that she wassuppos~d to ta~e off one day a week. Hence for the weeks in September of 1979 the grievor worked only 4 days per week. It should be remembered that the co-ordinator is a member of the bargaining unit. The grievor testified that she was paid mo~thly and that on occasion she had t~ouble rationalizing h~r pay with the hours worked. She indicated that her pay cheques were wrong at least twice and perhaps four times. However she said the normal pay cheque matched her work. Finally, the,grievor indicated that her class was her responsibility. She did however indicate that she would teach one -) --~-"'&l hour English and two hours Math to her class and then a second person - would teach two ,hours English and one hour Math to'the same class. Nevertheless, she was responsible for the progress and records of her students. She also planned her own curriculum. ., The Union argues that since October of 1978 the grievor was employed as a full time teaching master. -.... " .,,, i ......,/. 7. Mr. Nabi indicated" that there were six types of " employees who worked in teaching capacities at the college. ~'-."i;;~' The first type of employee he classified as a part-time employee and that vas an employee who worked six hours or less per week. That employee is excluded from the operatio~ of the collective agreement by article lOl of the agreement, the recognition clause. · The second type of employee according to Mr. Nabi's breakdown was a sessio~al employee. That employee is also excluded under the recognition clause of the collective agreement. A sessional employee is defined in appendix three of the collective agreement, section lea) as Ita full-time employee appointed on a session~l basis for up to twelve full months of continuous or non- continuous accumulated employment in a 24 calendar month period.>> The third type of employee is a sessional probationary employee. Under the append~x just quoted a sessional employee ~ho stays on for more thq.n the l2 full months goes into the probationary stream. That result is set out in section l(c) of the appendix." '::~'{~"'y,- The fourth class of employee is a full time probationary employee. Under the provisions of sec~ion 8.0l (a) a full time employee is on probation until he has completed 2 years continuous employment. Article 8.01(b) sets out the method of calculating that -.~. "': , .~"".~.. 8 . period. It reads: "ARTICLE 8 - SENIORITY 8.0l (b) Effective September 1, 1976, the probationary. period shall also consist of twenty-four (24) full months of non-continuous employment (in periods of at least one (l) full month each) in a forth-. eight (48) calendar month period. For this purpose, only the period after September 1, 1975 shall be . taken into account or credited. However, an employ~e'~ continuous service acquired in accordance with the provisions of the previous agreement dated the l7th day of September 1975f as at August 31, 1976 for the period back to September 1, 1975 shall count as . continuous employment or months of non-continuous accumulated employment for the purpose of this Sec.tion. ~.; For the purpose of this paragraph, effective September 1, 1976, a calendar month in which the employee completes fifteen (15) or more days worked shall be considered a "full month" "\ The fifth category of employee is a full-time employee described in section 3.03 (a) of the collective agreement. That Article reads: "ARTICLE 3 - SALARIES 3.03 (a) Persons who teach thirteen hours or more will be salaried, the salary range to be determined according to the proportion that the individual's part-time teaching load is to the average full-time teaching lpa;.9: of the department of the particular College concerne~d.--..i' (This pro-rating of salary does not apply to any full- time teacher who for whatever reason may at some time have a reduqed teaching duty of. less thart thirteen hours per week.) Effective September 1, 1977 pro-rata salary pay~ ment under this article ~ill be discontinued and the salary scales as set out in Appendix I will apply to persons teaching fourteen (14) hours or more on a regular basis. Persons teaching over six (6) and up to and including thirteen (13) hours on a regular basis will be covered by paragraph (b) hereof and Appendix II." -'~:'" : \.'~"".~.. 9. Mr. Nabi pointed out that under that provision it is possible for a full-time employee to work less than fourteen hours per week. :--'.~ ,~, The last type of employee is a partial load employee. That type of employee is described in Article 3.03 (b) of the Agreement. That Article reads: ,.if' f""'" "3.03 (b) Persons who teach over'six (6) and up to and including thirteen -(l3) hours per week on a regular basis shall be referred to as "partial-load" employees and shall not receive salary,- vacations, holidays or fringe benefits (except for coverage of Workmen's Comp8nsation and liability insurance) under this Memorandum and Appendix I but shall be paid fer the performance of each teaching hour at an hourly rate within the range of hourly rates set out in Appendix II and in accordance with the other provisions of Appendix II." '\ The Union argues that the grievor is not a part-time employee as she clearly worked more than, six hours per week! There is no doubt that t~is is the case and indeed the College does not even suggest that the grievor was a part~time employee., The Union also argues that the grievor was not a,sessional 'employe~ as her only appointment as a sessional teacher was for; ~~~."-...~ - July of 1978. Mr. Nabi argued that a sessional employee mus~ be appointed by the College as a sessiona,l employee and that that was riot done. Hence,the grievor could not be a sessional emp16yee. I He also argues that the Employer could not appoint the grie~or as I . a sessional employee retroactlvely as Mr. Rawson attempted to do in his letter. Although Mr. Nabi recognized the need for sessional employees, and recognized the fact that iessional employees c6uld -'~'0.f lO. be appointed for more than one session, he denies any right of the college to make that appointment retroactively. At this point it should be pointed out that schedule Iof the College's.Collectiv~ ~ Bargaining Act S.D. 1975, c. 74 section (viii) contemplate~ an appointment for more than one session. ~ -.;;~~ Mr. Nabi referred the Board to Article 12-.02 of the Collective Agreement which provides in part that "if requested by the local Union, the rationale for a sessional appointment by the College shall be the s~bject of discussion." Obviously, the Union has some concern in protecting the integrity of the bargaining unit. ~his section indicates that concern. Mr. Nabi argues that if the college can rnake' sessional appointments retroactively, \ Article12.02,would be rendered meaningless. Mr. Nabi argues that since the grievor is not a sessional employee she clearly is not a probationary sessional employee. He, argues as well that the grievor cannot be considered a partial load employee. He indicates that for a considerable period ~.' of time the grievor worked weeks where her hours exceeded thirteen. , ' Indeed, according to his figures for the majority of the time the grievor worked fifteen hours per week. This then, according to the Union's position, means that the grievor can only be considered a full-time employee. Mr. Nabi says that the grievor should be considered a full-time probationary . , '~ ll. employee as she had,at the time of release, not yet completed the period of time set out in Article 8.01 for probation. ~ .The second major point raised by the Union is that the grievor, being a probationary full-time employee, was entitled to 90 days riotic~ under Article 8.0l (c). Since-she did not receive.; this notice she was still an employee~ In other words, the giving of notice was a mandatory condition precedent to a-valid release. In support of that proposition, Mr. Nabi relies on Re ClP Containers' 2 L.A.C. (2d) 308 (Brown). In that case the learned arbitrator referred to Re Valade and Eberlee, (l972) 1 O.R. 682. We will refer to this decision in more detail later. ~ Finally, the Union contends that sinc~ th~ grievor was not properly released and still remains an employee, she is entitled to compensation from the time that the invalid release was made. Not unnaturally, the Employer disputes the Union position. Mrs. Murray argues that the Union's argument is based on a false premise. She says that there are no air-tight compartments in the Collective Agreement. She says that there are various ways people can be employed and a person can enjoy a hybrid stat~~. In essence, this argument requires the Board to find that for the period of time when the grievor worked in excess of thirteen hours per week, she was a sessional employee and for the period of ti~e ;,1 -: '" i ~.~"".~.. l2. When she worked thirteen hours or less per week she was a parti~l load employee. -f, In support of this position, Mrs. Murray breaks the period of employment down into three separate components. She says that from September II th to December 30th the grievor \,'asa p:i.rtial -loa~ teacher. During that period of time she worked six weeks over thirteen hours per week and six weeks under,thirteen hours per \'leek. The second period of time is between December 4th and March 31st, 1979. Again, the teacher was a partial load teacher accord- ing ~oMrs. Murray. By agreemen~ the grievor agreed_to provide ; twelve hours per week. During that period of time the grievor in actual fact worked seven weeks under thirteen hours and ten weeks over thirteen hours. The final period of time occurs after March 3lst. There Mrs. Murray says that a day-to-day arrangement was in effect. <<. Mrs. Murray indicates that there can be more than one session for a sessional teacher. This is contemplated by'the provis~ons of the Act referred to earlier. ;t Alternatively, the Employer says that if it is necess.ary to label the grievor, she is best labelled as a partial load teacher. Mrs. Murray says that the grievor, on-a regular basis, worked ";.,.. ,J ." ; .'~"'.:~ 13. between six and thirteen hours. In essence, the Employer says that the gr iev~r did not work su'fficiently over thirteen hours peL week, to say that on a regular basis, she was working more than as a partial load t~ac;:h~r. According to Mrs. Murray's figures, the: grievor workeq somewhere between 56 and 57 percent of her time at fifteen hours per week or more. Using the test enunciated- by the Labour Relations Board in Re SydenhamHospit~~, the grievor fa~led to establish that she worked the 5/7th ratio in the ~ategory as set out in that decision. Mrs. Murray also indicates that all other indcia of the relationship ind~cate a partial load employee. The grievor did not receive benefits of the full-time employees. The " . Collective Agreement prevents partial load employees from receiving those benefits. The grievor had a very flexible- relationship with respect to time off and vacations. Finally, the Employer argues that even if the_Union'is correct in all its submissions, the proper remedy tobe.given to the grievor is damages for failure to give the 90 days notice. She is not, however, to be reinstated. In' essence$ the College saying that Article 8.0l (c) of the Collective Agreement is not a true mandatory condition precedent to a proper release. If it has been bkeached, the proper remedy lies in'damages in lieu of notice.. Finally, the College says that if the Union is correct in all of its submissions, including th~ invalidity of the release ~'~. .~. .. ;J#f<~ ,._,......,.,-.,-<"",-"".__,,'''"_.'",._,.,"'.?'~_.'...-_M_,.'~., ,,-_,....,~,=~..~:':~~,~.~?t'';j>..'_~~')''''.-~_...,;~.).-,_._O..."''',- ,. ~..'. .: .' ':~.j l4. the Board should not award damages until argument and evidence be. led on the quantum of damage, a9 there will be some difficulty in calculating damages and seniority. Indeed; both parties asked the Board to remain'seized'ofthis issue if the need arises and! accordingly, we propose to say no more about it at this stage of the award. ." ~." We are of the view that the grievor cannot be considered to be a partial load employee within the meaning of Art.1.cle 3.03 (b) as she did not usually teach between six and thirteen hours per week. The evidence is that the grievor on a regular basis worked more than thirteen hour per week. '\ We are also of the view that the grievor is not a sessional employee as set for in the appendix to the Collective Agreement. We do not feel.that the.College can retroactively appoint a person to the sessional status, in Vieltl of the particular. provisions of the Collective Agreement relied upon by the Union, i.e., Article 12. Moreover! the Boatd is not convinced that an. employee should move from one category to another on a weekly basis as suggested by Mrs. Murray. Rather, we are satisfied that thegrievor was a full-time probationary employee wi thin the meaning of the Collective Agreement. It-is also clear that the grievor was a full-time probationary employee as suggested'by the Union, under the provisions of Article 8.0l (a). . .. - '..,.,~--- ,;<-." :,~;j-"" - --.---- ; , _,.., :1 .:~,/ 15. The issue that now remains before the Board is wh~ther the grievor retains that -status because of the improper notification given to her by the College. :~. ~.. -.7?> The Union takes the position that the grievor remains an employee because the proper notification period as set out in ;;;~,_. Article 8.0l (c) has not been given. The Union says this is a true condition precedent to the grievor's termination, and since this condition precedent h~s not been met, the termination is ineffective. The Union relies on on Re ClP Containers 2 L.A.C. (2d) 308 (Brown). In that case the collective agreement required the '\ company to state in writing the reason for the discharg~. That requirement was not met and the Board concluded that that requ~re- ment was a mandatory requirement, and failure to meet it rendered the discharge nugatory. In so doing, the Board relied on Re Valade and EberJiee, [1972r 1 O~R.682. Again, -in that case, the court concluded that failure to give reasons for the discharge as re- quired by statute~ rendered the discharge invalid. In our view, both of those cases are easily dlstinguishable from the pres~nt case. The purpose of giving the reason for the discharge is to permit the employee to determipe whether and how he or she should contest the discharge. In this particular case, what is complained about is the length of notice. The purpose of anY,notice provision-with respect to the ter~ination of -'c,.',',: ". ~.., .~. l6. employment is to provide the employee with some time in order to locate alternate employment. If the notice period is not given, the normal course of events in any civil action is to award damage~~' , 1- Similarly, in the present case, an award of damages would' make tne::~: grievor whole. The breach of the Collective Agreement is that the Employer did not give the proper period of notice and can result only >l>\"clr-' in an award of damages. That award adequately compensates the grievor. Mr. Nabi also referr.ed the Board t.o another decision be- tween the parties where the question was raised at least tangentially. However, we are not of the opinion that that case requires a conclusion that failure to give notice under Article 8.0l (c) '\ renders the discharge invalid. The Union also relied on section 65 of the College's Collective Bargaining Act~ 1975. That section provides in part that "for the purposes of this Act, no person shall be-deemed to have ceased to be an employee ... or by reason only of his being dismi,ssed 'by his employer contrary to this Act or to a collective- \1' ;-Wf'",-,: agreement". The Union says that the g:rievor was dismissed contrary''''' to the provisions of Article 8.01 (c) ~nd hence, because of section 65 of the Act, still remains an employee. However, that argument overlooks the opening words of the section, "fot the purposes of~ this Act." If an employee is improperly dismissed, the employee still remains an employee under Section 65 for the purposes of the Act. It is interesting to note that the Act contains several -C'~,_,: l,_. ~ 1 provisions which amount to unfair labour practices under the Ontario Labour Relations Act~ It is obvious that the intention of Section 65 is to maintain the employer/employee relationship ln order that the "err.ployee can maintain his rights under t.he Act. I;f~'t; ,.J,~,; t;'. ,;:~:,,:; However, the section does not require that relationship be maintained in order that the employee maintain any rights under the collective' '.$~.~",.. agreement. This section is limited in, its operation by its opening words "for ,the purposes of this Act." Since we are of the view that the employer did not give proper notice under Article 8.01 (c), but since we are of the view that that giving of ~otice is not a mandatory condition precedent to the termination of the grievor, we are of the view that the "\ Union is not entitled to aVdeclaration that the grievor be rein- stated in her job ar.d be paid for the entire period from the date of termination. Rather, what the grievor is entitled to is ninety days pay in lieu of notice-less the adjus-tment for the two-week written notice previously provided to her by the College. This award places the~rievor in the sa~e position she would have been in if the Employer had, in fact, complied,with the notice provisions of the Collective Agreement. .t ~~.- In that regard, the award fulfills the functions of the Collective Agreement and the most important' function of any award, that is, to place the injured party in the same position that that party ~ould have been in if the ~ Agreement had been properly carried out. ~~.".~~,.-.-, -":'G,j l8. As requested by the College particularly, and the Union In general, the Board will remain seized of the matter in case the parties have any difficulty in working out the precise amoun~ ~ of money owing to the grievor. ~.... -f.i1:::.p DATED at- London, Ontario, this ;)l~ day of t~~l I:~. ~ - ~"" W.-B. Rayne , Chairman II I concur/di::]:Jcnt. ::r " I-{' f1~ Gw~ " .J. H. McGivney, Q.C., College Nominee I concur/di33ent' ~..~I/' R. Cochrane, Union Nominee ~i