HomeMy WebLinkAbout2002-2375.Ranger.11-05-16 Decision
Commission de
Crown Employees
Grievance
UqJOHPHQWGHVJULHIV
Settlement Board
GHVHPSOR\pVGHOD
Couronne
Suite 600 Bureau 600
180 Dundas St. West 180, rue Dundas Ouest
Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z8 Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1Z8
Tel. (416) 326-1388 7pO
Fax (416) 326-1396 7pOpF
GSB#2002-2375, 2004-1217, 2005-2232, 2005-2768, 2006-0421, 2006-0632
UNION#2002-0411-0038, 2004-0411-0071, 2005-0411-0080, 2005-0411-0081,
2006-0446-0001, 2006-0446-0002
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
Union
(Ranger)
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services)
Employer
BEFOREVice-Chair
Deborah J.D. Leighton
FOR THE UNION
Don Eady
Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
FOR THE EMPLOYER
Sean Kearney
Ministry of Government Services
Legal Services Branch
Senior Counsel
Paul Meier
Ministry of Government Services
Legal Services Branch
Counsel
HEARINGFebruary 11, 2011.
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Decision
INTRODUCTION
[1] On January 18, 2010 the board released the GHFLVLRQRQWKHPHULWVRI5REHUW5DQJHU¶V
grievances upholding both his complaint that he had suffered discrimination and harassment at
the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) and that the employer had failed in its duty to
accommodate him, when he became ill as result of the harassment and discrimination. Since that
date the parties have worked diligently to resolve the outstanding issues on remedy. To further
that end they entered an agreement on NovePEHUWKH³1RYHPEHU$JUHHPHQW´
WKDW
outlined a procedure for dealing with the outstanding remedial issues. The parties agreed to
LQFOXGHDOO0U5DQJHU¶VRXWVWDQGLQJ grievances to the date of this agreement. Included on that
list is a grievance filed February 16, 2006, seeking to set aside minutes of settlement executed in
1998 (the 98 MOS) because the employer had failed in the years after the settlement to provide
him with a workplace free of discrimination and harassment. This is an interim decision on the
HPSOR\HU¶VPRWLRQWRGLVPLVV0U5DQJHU¶V)Hbruary 16, 2006 grievance and to exclude
evidence of events which occurrHGGXULQJWKHJULHYRU¶VHPSOR\PHQWDW/¶2ULJQDO-DLOLQ
and 1997.
[2] The November Agreement also provided that instead of tendering viva voce evidence on
the issue of remedy, the parties would prepare statutory declarations to be filed with the board to
supplement the record on the merits of the case.7KHJULHYRU¶VVWDWXWory declaration includes
UHIHUHQFHVWRRFFXUUHQFHVZKHQKHZRUNHGDW/¶Orignal Jail, which were the subject matter of the
98 MOS and predate the events of the January 18, 2010 decision.
[3] The employer seeks to have the February 16 2006 grievance dismissed and objects to the
LQFOXVLRQRIWKH/¶2ULJQDOHYLGHQFHLQWKHVWatutory declaration on three grounds: 1) the
grievance is untimely, having been filed eight years after the execution of the 98 MOS; 2) the
evidence is barred by the 1998 MOS, which settled all matters and complaints arising out of the
JULHYRU¶VHPSOR\PHQWDW/¶2ULJQDO
WKHLVVXHRIZKHWKHUWKLVHYLGHQFHLVDGPLVVLEOHZDV
decided by the board in a decision dated July 29, 2005, which held that the evidence of these
events was not admissible.
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[4] Counsel for the employer argued that any one of these objections should prevent the
grievance going forward and the information being included in the statutory declaration. He
noted further that the board could only hear the evidence of the evHQWVWKDWRFFXUUHGDW/¶2ULJQDO
if it granted the 2006 grievance. The grievance seeks to have the 1998 MOS set aside on the
grounds that the employer failed to provide a safe workplace free of harassment and
discrimination after the signing of the agreement. There is a further reason to preclude the
JULHYDQFHLQFRXQVHO¶VVXEPLVVLRQ7KHEHKDYLour which is complained about after the 98 MOS
is the subject matter of the grievances decided on January 18, 2010.
[5] Counsel for the union relies on the language of the November Agreement wherein the
parties agreed to a process to resolve the outstanding remedial issues flowing from the January
18, 2010 decision. Counsel submitted that the parties were attempting to find a sensible way to
put all of the grievances that the grievor had made up to the signing of this agreement before the
board for decision without calling many witnesses and unnecessarily prolonging the hearing. He
argued that the parties decided to put all of the issues before me and this is why the union
LQFOXGHGDGHVFULSWLRQRIHYHQWVRFFXUULQJDW/¶2ULJQDOLQ0U5DQJHU¶VVWDWXWRU\GHFODUDWLRQ
Counsel emphasized that the purpose of deciding on this procedure was to resolve all outstanding
claims for the grievor.
[6] Counsel for the union noted that the parties were aware of the 1998 MOS and my decision
in 2005 when they made the agreement in November 2010. Further, counsel argued that not all
RIWKHHYLGHQFHRIHYHQWVDW/¶2ULJQDOVKRXOGEHH[FOXGHG7KHXQLRQVXEPLWWHGWKDWDQ,,8
investigation substantiated the grLHYRU¶VFRPSODLQWVDW/¶2ULJQDO&RXQVHOVDLGLIWKHXQLRQLV
VXFFHVVIXOZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶VPRWLRQKHUHKH will seek disclosure of the IIU reports on
WKHJULHYRU¶VFRPSODLQWVPDGHGXULQJKLVHPSOR\PHQWDW/¶2ULJQDO&RXQVHODUJXHGWKDWWKLV
evidence is probative of what damages I ought to award in the circumstances of this case.
[7] Thus, counsel relied on the November Agreement which provides that all of the
outstanding claims and grievances are to be before me. He argued that I should hear all of the
evidence and give it whatever weight it is due at the end of the day.
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DECISION
[8] The central issue before me is whether the union should be permitted to tender evidence of
HYHQWVZKLFKRFFXUUHGDW/¶2ULJQDOLQDnd 1997, which were the subject matter of minutes
of settlement signed in 1998 and which this board held was not admissible in an interim decision
dated July 2005. The union supports its claim to be allowed to submit this evidence on the
strength of the February 16, 2006 grievance and the November 2010 Agreement between the
parties, which provides in part at paragraph 9:
The parties agree and jointly submit that for the purposes of this proceeding, the
GSB shall exercise its full authority in finally and fully determining any and all
outstanding claims, grievances, disputes, complaints, actions and causes of action
concerning the Grievor up to the date of the signing of this Agreement, including
its decision and the above- noted Grievances.
The purpose of this agreement was to expedite the hearing into the remedies of this case and to
determine any and all outstanding claims, grievances, and disputes that the grievor has up to the
date of the signing of the November Agreement. On the basis of a grievance challenging the 98
MOS, filed in February 2006, some eight years after the agreement, the union argues that it is
reasonable to submit evidence of events that occuUUHGDW/¶2ULJQDOZKLFKSUHGDWHVWKH026
[9] Having carefully considered the submissions of the parties I have decided to dismiss the
February 16, 2006 grievance and not to allow the information relating to these events to be
LQFOXGHGLQWKHJULHYRU¶VVWDWXWRUy declaration for three main reasons. First, the February 16,
2006 grievance is not timely. SecoQGWKHHYHQWVDW/¶2ULJQDOZKLFKWKHXQLRQZLVKHVWRUHO\RQ
now, in the remedial phase of this hearing, are the subject matter of the 98 MOS. Third, this
evidence was excluded by an order of this board in July 2005.
[10] The February 16, 2006 grievance is certainly not timely, having been filed some eight years
after the settlement and many years after the events at OCDC. There is no evidence before me as
to the reason for the delay. There is ample evidence that the grievor was aware of his right to
grieve generally. Moreover, the complaint alleges that the MOS was breached because the
grievor was not provided with a workplace free of discrimination and harassment at OCDC.
These are the very events that were grieved in 2002 and are the subject of one of the complaints
decided February 18, 2010. Thus, the grievor could have included the allegations in his 2002
grievance, that these subsequent events were a breach of the 98 MOS, but he failed to do so.
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Thus even on a generous interpretation the grievance is four years late with no excuse for the
delay.
[11] More importantly, I have decided that in essence the union is seeking to introduce the
HYLGHQFHRIHYHQWVDW/¶2ULJQDOIRUWKHYHU\VDPH purpose that they sought to tender the evidence
on the merits of this case back in 2005. Counsel for the union submitted that this evidence was
probative of what damages I should award in the circumstances at the end of the day. This was
the position argued by the union and rejected in my 2005 interim decision. In 2005 the union
argued that it did not
...seek to introduce this evidence for the purposes of proving the merit of the
grievances before the board. Thus the proposed evidence is tendered only to
provide proof of the extent of the harm suffered by the grievor and as basis for
the argument for remedial entitlements. (at p.3)
In 2005 counsel for the union argued that the board should make an exception to the general
principle that evidence which is the subject matter of minutes of settlement is not generally
admissible.
[12] In my 2005 interim decisiRQ,UHMHFWHGWKHXQLRQ¶VDUJXPHQWDQGJUDQWHGWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
PRWLRQWRH[FOXGHHYLGHQFHRIWKHJULHYRU¶VFRPSODLQWVDW/¶2ULJQDOEHIRUHWKHGDWHRI'HFHPEHU
8, 1997, the date of the grievance. In making this decision I relied in part on the clear language
of the 98 MOS: clause 2 of the MOS provides as follows:
The parties agree that these Minutes of Settlement and any consideration are
deemed to be no admission of liability whatsoever, on the part of the Crown, nor
will these Minutes and/or the underlying facts ever be referred to in any other
administrative, quasi-judicial or legal proceeding.
,QUHMHFWLQJWKHXQLRQ¶VDUJXPHQWWRDGPLWWKH/¶2ULJQDOHYLGHQFH,KHOGDVIROORZV
I have come to the conclusion that it would be inequitable and prejudicial to the
employer in this case to defend the allegations of discrimination and harassment
ZLWKUHJDUGWR/¶2ULJQDO-DLOVRORQJDIter they have occurred, but primarily
because they were the subject of Minutes of Settlement. The parties to Minutes
of Settlement must be able to rely on the terms which they have negotiated in
good faith. Further, it would not be fair to require an employer to preserve
evidence indefinitely to defend itself against the possibility of having to refute
allegations, which were the subject of Minutes of Settlement.
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In support of the current motion employer counsel argued that it would be inequitable and
SUHMXGLFLDOWRDOORZWKH/¶2ULJQDOHYLGHQFHQRZ. He submitted that the November Agreement
was never intended to allow the union to revisit matters that were settled or the subject matter of
a decision of this board. I agree. I am satisfied that the language of paragraph 9 of the
1RYHPEHU$JUHHPHQWGRHVQRWVXSSRUWWKHXQLRQ¶VVubmission here that it should be able to rely
on evidence of events which occurred fifteen years ago and which were never admitted by the
employer. It would be inequitable and prejudicial to the employer to allow this evidence now.
[13] The reasons for excluding this evidence in 2005 are as applicable today. It is a
fundamental principle of the board that without some significant reason to make an exception,
once a complaint has been fully and finally settled, the settlement will be upheld. The principle,
referred to as the recognition of the sanctity of settlements is essential to labour relations
between the parties. This board will not countenance a settled complaint coming back in another
guise. The February 16, 2006 grievance is an attePSWWREULQJEDFNWKH/¶2ULJQDOJULHYDQFHVLQ
another guise and seek additional compensation. The grievor received compensation in the 98
MOS. Therefore, for the same reasons enunciated in my 2005 decision the evidence must not be
admitted.
>@7KHWKLUGUHDVRQIRUJUDQWLQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶VPRWLRQKHUHRQWKHDGPLVVLELOLW\RIWKLV
evidence needs no explanation: the decision in 2005 clearly decided the issue and the February
16, 2006 grievance does not change the outcome.
[15] One final issue must be addressed. The union made a special request for Mr. Ranger to be
permitted to make a ten minute statement to the board regarding the impact of the grievances on
him. Counsel suggested that the statement be made after thHXQLRQ¶VDUJXPHQWLQFKLHIRQ
damages. Counsel for the employer noted that the request was exceptional and in effect this
would allow the grievor a third opportunity to speak to the adverse impact of the events at
OCDC and the aftermath on him. He asked that I stipulate a time limit and direct the grievor to
address only events that occurred at OCDC and after that, if I decided it was appropriate. I have
GHFLGHGWRDOORZWKHXQLRQ¶VUHTXHVWKHUH0U. Ranger shall be provided with ten minutes to
address the board on the impact of his grievances after his counsel has made his submissions in
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chief on remedy. Mr. Ranger must restrict his comments to events that were the subject matter
of his 2002 and 2005 grievances.
[16] Thus, for the reasons above the February 16, 2006 grievance is hereby dismissed and
paragraphs 11 to 90 in the grievoU¶VVWDWXWRU\GHFODUDWLRQPXVWEHVWUXFNIURPWKHJULHYRU¶V
statutory declaration. I note for the record that this decision does not affect the evidence on the
record on the merits of the case. The union may rely on anything on the record of the case to
make its submissions on remedy.
th
Dated at Toronto this 16 day of May 2011.
Deborah J.D. Leighton, Vice-Chair