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Home My WebLink AboutNyarko 10-10-18INTHEMATTEROFANARBITRATION BETWEEN: THECLARENDONFOUNDATION(CHESHIREHOMES)INC. (the"Employer") -and ONTARIOPUBLICSERVICEEMPLOYEESUNION,LOCAL593 (the"Union") (GRIEVANCEOFJULIANANYARKO) SOLEARBITRATOR:MargoR.Newman APPEARINGFORTHEEMPLOYER: StephenBernofsky,Counsel SarahKravitz PareshLimbachin MoniqueMascoll JeyaManoharan APPEARINGFORTHEUNION: TimMulhall, RegionalGrievanceOfficer CurlineDennie JulianaNyarko AhearingwasconductedinToronto,OntarioonFebrualT23,2010,andthepartiesfiled supplementalwrittensubmissions. DECISIONANDAWARDOFARBITRATOR TheEmployerisanot-for-profitorganizationthatprovidespersonalcareattendant andhousekeepingservicesona24/7basistoitsdisabledclientswhoresideatitstwo facilities.ThegrievanceinthiscasewasfiledinMarch,2003andinvolvestheissueof whetherthegrievor,ahousekeeperemployedsince1991attheEmployer'sBroadway location,isproperlyclassifiedasapart-timeemployee.Italsoraisesthequestionof whetherthearbitratorhastheauthoritytoconverthertofull-timestatus.Aresolutionof theseissuesrequirestheinterpretationandinterplaybetweenthefollowingprovisionsof the2002-2005collectiveagreement: ARTICLE2-RECOGNITION 2.02Theconditionsofworkandbenefitsofpart-timeemployees shallbeonlyasoutlinedintheAddendumtotheCollective Agreementrespectingpart-timeemployees. 2.03Forpurposesofthisagreement,afull-timeemployeeshall bedefinedasonewhoregularlyworksanaverageofthirty(30) hoursperweek. ARTICLE5-MANAGEMENTRIGHTS 5.01TheUnionrecognizesandacknowledgesthatthe managementoftheEmployeranditsfacilitiesanddirectionof theworkingforcesarefixedexclusivelyintheEmployerand withoutlimitingthegeneralityoftheforegoing,theUnion acknowledgesthatitistheexclusivefunctionoftheEmployerto: (b)select,hire,transfel,assigntoshifts,promote,demote, classify,....employees..... (d)....decidethenumberofemployeesneededbytheEmployer atanytime,thenumberofhourstobeworked,thestarting andquittingtimes, 3 (f)theEmployeragreesnottoexerciseanyoftheserightsand powersinamannerthatisinconsistentwithanyofthe provisionsofthisAgreement. 5.02TheEmployer,therefore,retainsallrightsnototherwise specificallycoveredinthisAgreement,providedhowever,that anyexerciseoftheserightsandpowersisnotinconflictwithany oftheprovisionsofthegrievanceprocedureassetout herein. ARTICLE13-ARBITRATION 13.02Thearbitrationboardistobegovernedbythefollowing provision: (e)theboardsshallnothaveanyauthorityorpowertoalter, change,oramendanyoftheprovisionsofthisAgreementor tosubstituteanynewprovisions,inthereof,ortogiveany decisioncontraltototheexpressintentortermsandconditions ofthisAgreementorinanywaymodify,addtoordetract fromanyprovisionsofthisAgreement: ADDENDUMTOCOLLECTIVEAGREEMENT RESPECTINGPART-TIMEEMPLOYEES 1.RECOGNITION 1.01Thepartiesagreetothefollowingdefinitionsregardingpart timeemployees: (a)"RegularPart-timeEmployees"-shallmeanthoseemployees whoareregularlyemployedfornotlessthantwenty(20)hours perweekandnotmorethanthirty(30)hoursperweek. Thestatusofregularpart-timeemployeeswillbereviewedevery three(3)monthsandif,uponcompletionofthethree(3)month review,theemployeeisfoundtohaveworkedanaverageofless thantwenty(20)hoursperweekfortheprecedingthree(3) months,thatemployeewillbeclassedasacasualpart-time employeeforthenextthree(3)monthperiod. 4 (b)"CasualPart-timeEmployees"-shallmeanthoseemployees whoareregularlyemployedforlessthantwenty(20)hoursper week. Thepartiesagreethatthestatusofcasualpart-timeemployees willbereviewedeverythree(3)months.Ifuponcompletionof thethree(3)monthreviewtheemployeeisfoundtohaveworked anaverageofmorethantwenty(20)hoursperweekforthe precedingthree(3)months,thatemployeewillbeclassedasa regularpart-timeemployeeforthenextthree(3)monthperiod. (c)"Equivalence"-Apart-timeemployeewillmoveuponthe salarygridtothenextwagerateforwhichtheyareeligiblein proportiontothehoursworkedwiththeemployeronthebasis thatfifteenhundredandsixty(1,560)workinghourswillbe deemedequivalenttooneyearofserviceandthreehundredand ninety(390)hoursequivalenttothree(3)monthsofservice. 2.APPLICATIONOFFULL-TIMEAGREEMENT Thefollowingtermsofthefull-timeAgreementshallalsoapply tothepart-timeagreement:[Article1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11, 12,13,14.05,15,16,17,19.03,19.04,19.05,22.0!,24,25, 26.03,27] 3.EXCLUSIONOFFULL-TIMEAGREEMENT Thefollowingtermsofthefull-timeAgreementshallnotapplyto thepart-timeemployees:[Article14.01,14.02,18,21,23,27, 28] TheUnionistheexclusivebargainingagentforbothfullandpart-time housekeepersandpersonalcareattendants(PCA)underthiscollectiveagreement.Itis obviousfi'omareviewoftheseprovisions,thatArticle2isneitherspecificallyincluded norexcludedfromthePart-timeAddendum,givingrise,inpart,tothedisputebetween thepartiesinthiscase.Itisalsotruethatcertainfactsarenotdisputedbytheparties. First,thegrievorwashiredasapart-timehousekeeperandhasalwaysworkedinthat classification.Second,thegrievor'sschedulebetweenJune,1999andApril,2003 5 confirmsthatshehasbeenregularlyscheduledtowork4shifts(30hours)aweekandhas workedsixty(60)hourseverytwoweeks.Third,thegrievoristheonlypart-time housekeeperregularlyscheduledfor30hours/week.Fourth,therehavebeennofull-time housekeepersformanyyears.Fifth,therearenopostingandbiddingopportunities(under Al"ticle15,JobVacancies)forafull-timehousekeeperposition.Sixth,afterthegrievor filedtheinstantgrievanceherscheduledhourswerereducedtofifty-nineandone-half (59.5)hourseverytwoweeks. TheUnionnotesthatthelanguageofArticle2.03clearlydefinesafull-tinae employeeas"onewhoregularlyworksanaverageofthirty(30)hoursperweek,"and arguesthatthegrievormeetsthatdefinitionbyhavingbeenscheduledandworking30 hoursperweekforanumberofyearspriortoinitiatingthegrievanceherein.It distinguishesthisdefinitionfromtheoneusedinArticle1.01ofthePart-timeAddendum whichdefinesapart-timeemployeeasonewho"isregularlyemployed"foracertain numberofhourseachweek.TheUnionassertsthattheintentionofArticle1.01isthat part-timeemployeesmayhaveflexibleschedulinganddonot"regularlywork"30hours perweek,asshownbythefactthattheycanmovebackandforthbetweenregularand casualstatusbaseduponthenumberofhoursofworktheyaverageoverathree(3) monthperiod. TheUnionmaintainsthatthepartiesturnedtheirmindstothisdistinctionby includingthedefinitionoffull-timeinArticle2.03,andnotesthattheEmployernever reviewedthegrievor'shoursunderthePart-timeAddendumbecauseitunderstoodthat she,andshealoneamongstallpart-timeemployees,metthedefinitionofafull-time employeebyherconsistentschedulingof30hoursperweek.Itreliesuponthefactthat theEmployerreducedthegrievor'sschedulebyone-halfhoureverytwoweeksaftershe filedthisgrievanceasanacknowledgementofitsunderstandingofthemeaningofthe30 hourperweekbenchmarkasdefiningfull-timeemployment.Asaremedy,theUnion 6 requeststhatthegrievorbeclassifiedasafull-timeemployeewithalloftherightsand benefitsattendanttothatdesignationinthecollectiveagreementsinceMarch,2003,and thatshebemadewholeforalllostwagesandbenefits. TheEmployerpointsoutthatArticle2.02makesclearthatalloftheconditionsof workandbenefitsofpart-timeemployeesaregovernedbytheAddendum.Itnotesthat sinceArticle2isnotencompassedwithintheAddendum,Article2.03,uponwhichthe Unionrelies,doesnotapplytopart-timeemployees.TheEmployerarguesthatsincethe collectiveagreementprovidesnomechanismforapart-timeemployeetobeconvertedto full-timestatus,andregularlyworkinganaverageof30hoursperweekisinsufficientto resultinaconversion,thearbitratorhasnojurisdictiontoautomaticallyconvertthe grievortofull-timestatusandisprecludedfromdoingsobyArticle13.02(e),citingRe GrahamBrothersInc.andInternationalUnionofOperatingEngineers,Local12 (February12,1951)andPittsburghTubeCo.andUnitedSteelworkersoAmerica(March 11,1948). TheEmployeralsoreliesuponthedoctrineofpromissoD,estoppelinarguingthat theUnionisprecludedfromgrievingthisissuesinceitreliedtoitsdetrimentuponthe termsandconditionsofaMemorandumofAgreemententeredintobythepartiesonJuly 7,2006,whichstates,inpertinentpart: TheUnionandtheEmployeragreethatthehoursworkedbya part-timeemployeeforthepurposeofbackfillinganincumbent whoisoffworkonanyauthorizedtemporaryleaveofabsence shallnotbeincludedinthenumberofhoursdefiningan employee"whoregularlyworksanaverageofthirty(30)hours perweek"asstipulatedinArticle2.02oftheCollective Agreementinforcefi'omApril1,2005toMarch31,2008. TheEmployernotesthatthislanguagesupportsitspositionthatthehoursworkedbya part-timeemployeeforthepurposeofbackfillinganincumbentwhowasoffonan 7 authorizedleaveofabsence(LOA)arenottobeincludedinthenumberofhoursfor purposesofdefiningafull-timeemployee.Itallegesthattheadditionalhoursworkedby thegrievorwerenot"regularwork"butwereadirectresultofherbackfillingco-workers offoneitherauthorizedpregnancy,parental,orsickleave,andthattheUnionisestopped fromrequestingthatthearbitratorrelyuponthefactthatthegrievorworkedthirty(30) hoursperweekassufficientevidenceofherfull-timestatus,citingMeO'opolitanTotvnto CivicEmployeesUnionLoeal43v.MetropolitanToronto(Municipality)(1958)50O.R. (2d)618,andReCN/CPTeleeommunieationsandCanadianTeleeommunieationsUnion (1981),4L.A.C.(3d)205(Beatty),aff'd34O.R.(2d)385(Ont.Div.Ct.). Inreply,theUnionnotesthattheschedulesofthegrievorprovethatshewas regularlyscheduledforthirty(30)hoursperweek(thedefinitionoffull-timeinArticle 2.03),andthatthosehoursdidnotincludeanyextraorreplacementshifts.Itassertsthat sincetherewerenofull-timehousekeepersatthetime,thegrievorcouldnothavebeen backfillinganyoftheirregularhours.Furthel,theUnionpointsoutthattheMemorandum ofAgreementrelieduponbytheEmployerinsupportofitsestoppelargumentpostdates thisgrievancebyoverthree(3)yearsanddoesnotapplytothegrievor.Finally,theUnion arguesthatifanemployeehiredaspa1-timecouldneverbecomefull-timeunderthis collectiveagreement,Article2.03wouldhavenomeaningwhatsoever.Rather,it contendsthatsuchprovisionisevidencethatthepaltiesturnedtheirmindstohowapart timeemployeecanbecomefull-time-byregularlyworkinganaverageofthirty(30) hoursperweek,asisthesituationinvolvingthegrievor. Thisgrievanceseekstohavethegrievorconvertedtofull-timestatusbasedupon thefactthatshemetthedefinitionoffull-timeinArticle2.03byregularlyworkingan averageof30hoursperweekovermorethanathreeyeartimeperiod.Thebasic differencebetweenthepartiesisthattheEmployerdoesnotbelievethatArticle2.03 appliestoanemployeehiredonapart-timebasis,suchasthegrievor,andassertsthat 8 thereisnomechanisminthecollectiveagreementtoconvertapart-timeemployeeto full-timestatus.Ontheotherhand,theUnioncontendsthatthisisoneoftheintended purposesofArticle2.03,whichwouldhavenomeaningifnottodesignateamethodby whichapart-timeemployeewhoregularlyworks30hoursperweekeanbecomefull time. IamunabletoagreewiththeEmployerthatArticle2isnotrelevantorapplicable topart-timeemployeesbaseduponitsexclusionfi'omthePart-timeAddendum.Inote thattheEmployerreliesuponArticle2.02(whichisalsoneitherincludednorexcluded fromtheAddendum)inarguingthatthetermsandconditionsofemploymentofpart-time employeesaregovernedsolelybytheAddendum.Itmakeslittlesensetopermitthe EmployertorelyuponpartofArticle2(2.02)asapplicabletopart-timeemployees despiteitsabsencefi'omtheAddendum,butnottherestofArtiele2(2.03)whichdefines afull-timeemployee.SinceAlticle2isnotmentionedatallintheAddendum,Ifindthat itwasintendedtoapplytoallemployeescoveredbythecollectiveagreement.Byits termsitseparateswhichemployeesarefull-tilne(bydefinitioninArticle2.03)andwhich collectiveagreementbenefitsapplytopart-timeemployees(undertheAddendum referencedinArticle2.02).Article2.03wouldhavenomeaningifitwerenotutilizedto characterizeanemployeeasfull-time,asopposedtopart-time,basedontheaverage numberofhoursworkedperweek.Itispossiblethatanemployeehiredinafull-time capacitywouldnotalwaysremaininthatstatusifs/liedoesnotmeetthedefinitionof full-timeinArticle2.03(despitetheworkguaranteesapplicabletofull-timeemployees). Itisalsopossiblethatanemployeehiredasapart-timercould,atsomepoint,meetthe definitionofafull-timeemployeesetforthinArticle2.03.Thereisnolimitation containedinArticle2.03indicatingthatitwasintendedtoapplyonlytoemployeeswho wereoriginallyhiredonafull-timebasis. 9 Theseprovisionsarethemechanismagreedtobythepartiesfordeterminingwho isfull-timeandwhoispart-timeandrestrictedtothebenefitsandworkconditionslisted intheAddendum.Idonotacceptthefactthatbecausethepartiesspecificallydesignated amechanismintheAddendumtoreviewpart-timeemployeehoursofworkforthe purposeofmovingthemfromregulartocasualstatusevelz¢3months,andhavenotused similarlanguagewithrespecttoconvertingpart-timeemployeestofull-timestatus,they havenotprovidedanyrighttoanemployeeoriginallyhiredonapart-timebasistobe determinedtobeafull-timeemployeebasedontheagreedupondefinitionofregularly working30hoursperweekoveranextendedperiodoftime.Therewouldbenopurpose toArticle2.03if,onceanemployeeishiredonapart-timebasis,shecouldneverbecome full-timeregardlessofwhethershemeetsthedefinitionoffull-timestatusagreeduponby thepartiestobeworkinganaverageof30hoursperweek.Surelyanemployeehiredona fall-timebasiswouldnotneedtoresol"ttotheprovisionsofArticle2.03toestablishher status.Agreementsaretobereadasawholeandinterpretedtogivemeaningtoall provisionswherepossible.IconcludethatitwouldnotbevaEcingthetermsofthe collectiveagreementtointerpretArticle2.03asprovidingthegrievorwithanopportunity tomeetthedefinitionofbeingafull-timeemployeebaseduponherregular30hours/ weekworkscheduleovermorethana3yeartimeperiod. Itisundisputedthatthegrievorwastheonlypart-timeemployeewithaconsistent 30hourperweekworkscheduleandwasneverreviewedquarterlytodeterminewhether shefluctuatedbetweenregularandcasualpart-timestatus.Acarefulreadingofthework schedulesfortheperiodJune,1999toApril,2003revealsthatthegrievorworked MondaythroughThursdayfrom8:30a.m.to4:00p.m.Atmostthereweretwoother part-timehousekeepersonthescheduleduringthisperiod.Oneworkedconsistentlyonly Saturdays.Theothernormallyworkedonceaweek,onThursdays,duringthesamehours asthegrievo;betweentheperiodSeptember2,2000andNovember23,2001,waslisted 10 asbeingonatemporaryleavefromNovember24,2001toNovember8,2002,anddid notappearontheschedulethereafter.Theschedulealsolistsbothpart-timeandfull-time PCAs.Duringdifferentlimitedtimeperiods,onefull-timePCAandanotherpart-time PCAwerelistedasbeingontemporal3,ormaternityleave. TheEmployer'sargumentthattheMemorandumofAgremnententeredintobythe partiesinJuly,2006supportsanestoppelinthiscasemustberejected.First,that Memorandumwasenteredintoover3yearsafterthefilingoftheinstantgrievanceand cannotformthebasisforaffectingtherightsofthegrievorencompassedwithinher grievance.ByitstermstheMemorandumrelatestoArticle2.02ofthecollective agreementinforcefromApril1,2005toMarch31,2008,theagreementsubsequentto theoneunderwhichthisgrievancearose.Second,theMemorandumindicatesthatitwas enteredintotoresolvegrievancesfiledbytwoothernamedemployees.Thepartieshad knowledgeofthegrievor'soutstandinggrievanceatthetimeanddidnotspecifically includearesolutionofhersituationintheMemorandum.Thereisnoshowingof detrimentalreliancebytheEmployerwithrespecttothisgrievanceorthestatusofthe grievorinMarch,2003.See,MetropolitanToronto,su_Rp. Third,thetermsoftheMemorandumrelatetothehoursworkedbyapart-time employeeforthepurposeofbackfillinganincumbentwhoisoffworkonanauthorized temporaryleave.AsnotedbytheUnion,andestablishedbythewrittenschedules,the30 hoursperweekworkedbythegrievorwerenottheresultofherbackfillinghoursof anotheremployee.Therewerenofull-timehousekeepers,andnopart-timehousekeepers regularlyscheduledforthedaysandhoursworkedbythegrievor.Infact,theonepart timerwhowasonaLOAin2000-2001,workedonlyonThursdayspriortoherleave,and thegrievorwasscheduledtoworkthesamedaysandtimes(Monday-Thursday)when thispart-timehousekeeperwasthere.Thereisnoevidenceinthisrecordtolendcredence totheargumentthatsomeofthegrievor's30hoursperweekwereasaresultofher 11 backfillinganemployeeoffworkonanauthorizedleaveorduetoreplacementorextra shifts. EvenifthetermsoftheMemorandumareappliedtothegrievor'scase,itwould notchangethefactthatnoneofher30hoursperweekareattributabletobackfilling anotheremployeeorobtainingreplacementshifts.Thus,theymayall"beincludedinthe numberofhoursdefininganemployee'whoregularlyworksanaverageofthirty(30) hoursperweek'asstipulatedinArticle2.02ofthecollectiveagreement..."Thefactthat theMemorandumspecificallyexcludescertainhoursofpart-timeemployeesfrom inclusioninthenumberofhoursdefiningfull-timestatusindicatesthepartiesintentionto includeotherpart-timehoursnotspecificallyexcludedincalculatingwhetherthepart timeemployeemeetsthedefinitionoffull-timestatusunderArticle2.02.Thissupports theinterpretationthatthisprovisionwasintendedandunderstoodtoapplytopart-time employees. HavingdeterminedthatArticle2.03appliestoallemployeescoveredbythe collectiveagreement,includingpart-timeemployees,andthattheJuly,2006 MemorandumofAgreementdoesnotactasanestoppeltothepursuitofthegrievor's rightsunderhergrievancenornegatethecountingofthehourssheregularlyworked duringthe3yearperiodpriortothefilingofthegrievanceforpurposesofascertaining whethershemeetsthedefinitionoffull-timeemployeeunderArticle2.03,Imustnext determineifthegrievormeetsthatdefinitionandisentitledtobeconsideredfull-timefor purposesofwagesandbenefitsunderthe2002-2005collectiveagreement. Clearly,thegrievor"regularlyworkedanaverageof30hoursperweek,"asset forthinArticle2.03.However,shealsotechnicallymeetsthedefinitionofaregularpart timeemployeeunder1.01(a)oftheAddendum,sinceshewas"regularlyemployedfor notlessthan20hoursperweekandnotmorethan30hoursperweek."Withminor 12 exception,whenshewasfillinginforanotheremployeeonvacationorleave,thegrievor didnotexceed30hoursperweekofwork.Shealsodidnotworklessthan30hoursper week,asherscheduleconfirms.Whileitappearsthatthe30hoursperweekthresholdcan beameasureofbothfull-timeandregularpart-timestatus,areadingofArticle2.03and 1.01oftheAddendumrevealsaschemewherebytheEmployerretainsandexercises certainflexibilitywithrespecttopart-timeschedulingandbenefitsforemployeeswho "areregularlyemployed"for30hoursorlessperweek.Ontheotherhand,ifan employeeisscheduledand"regularlyworks"anaverageof30hoursperweek,shemeets thedefinitionofafull-timeemployeeentitlinghertotheadditionalbenefitsprovidedin thecollectiveagreementthatareexcludedfi'omtheAddendum. IaminagreementwiththeUnionthattheuseoftheterm"regularlyemployed"is notsynonymouswith"regularlyworks."Theformer("regularlyemployed")focuseson theamountofhourstheEmployernormallyschedulesanemployeetoworkandthe fluctuationthatmayoccurwiththatscheduling.Thisisseeninthereevaluationofactual hoursworkedevery3monthperiodtoclassifyapart-timeemployeeaseitherregularor casual.Thelatter("regularlyworks")focusesontheactualhoursconsistentlyworkedby anemployee.Tomeetthe30hoursperweekregularityofworkrequirement,therewould belittlefluctuationinschedulingbytheEmployel,asinthecaseofthegrievorherein. Onthebasisoftheentirerecord,Iconcludethat,atthetimeofthegrievancein 2003,thegrievormetthedefinitionofafidl-timeemployeecontainedinArticle2.03,and wasentitledtoenjoythebenefitsassociatedwiththatstatus.However,areviewofthe laterschedulesindicatesthatthegrievormayhavechangedherjobclassification,and maynolongerbeinhousekeeping.WhiletheUnionallegesthattheEmployertook1/2 houroffofthegrievor'sscheduleinanattempttodefeatherentitlementtofull-time 13 status,1Iamunabletoverifythisfactormotivationfromthedocumentsinevidence. Since,atthetimeofthegrievance,andforaperiodofoverthreeyearspriorthereto,the grievormetthedefinitionofafull-timeemployeecontainedinArticle2.03,iwillsustain thegrievanceanddirectthatshebecompensatedthedifferenceinpay(ifany)and benefitsshewouldhavereceivedhadshebeenproperlyclassifiedasfull-timeunderthe provisionsofthe2002collectiveagreement. Sinceasubstantialperiodoftimehaspassedbetweenthefilingofthegrievance andthedateonwhichithasbeendeterminedthatthegrievormetthedefinitionofafull timeemployee,subsequentcollectiveagreementshavebeennegotiatedandapplied,and therehavebeenchangedcircumstances,Idonotdeemitappropriatetoorderthe conversionofthegrievortofull-timestatusatthistime.Iremandthiscasetotheparties forthepurposeofdeterminingtheappropriateremedygivingdueconsiderationtothe changeinpositionorcircumstanceofthegrievorsubsequenttothefilingofthe grievance,andwiththeunderstandingthattheremedialauthorityofthisawardderives fromtheparties'2002-2005collectiveagreement.Iwillremainseizedtodealwithissues thatmayarisewithrespecttotheinterpretationandimplementationofthisaward. DATEDatTorontothis18thdayofOctober,2010. MargoR.Newman,Arbitrator 1IdonottakesuchconducttobeanadmissionbytheEmployerthatthegrievermetthefull-time employeedefinitioninArticle2.03priortothehalfhourchangeinherschedule,andthatsuchactionwas anattempttodefeathercontractualrights.