HomeMy WebLinkAboutP-2011-2193.Binda.12-03-09 DecisionPublic Service
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P-2011-2193
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE PUBLIC SERVICE ACT
Before
THE PUBLIC SERVICE GRIEVANCE BOARD
BETWEEN
Oral Binda Complainant
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The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of Environment) Employer
BEFORE Kathleen G. O’Neil Vice-Chair
FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Oral Binda
FOR THE EMPLOYER Cathy Phan
Ministry of Government Services
Labour Practice Group
Counsel
HEARING
SUBMISSIONS
December 14, 2011.
February 2, 2012.
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Decision
[1] This decision deals with preliminary issues raised by the employer in regards to the
grievance of Mr. Oral Binda in which he complains that he has been the subject of a reprisal
for disclosing wrongdoing by his superiors. The employer takes the position that the Board
should dismiss the case without a hearing on the merits, either because it is not a complaint
over which the board has jurisdiction, or because it is untimely. As to jurisdiction, the
employer says that the complainant has not provided proper notice to the deputy minister as
required by the Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006 (abbreviated below as PSOA), and has
not provided sufficient allegations of reprisal that would allow the board to take jurisdiction
pursuant to Part VI of the PSOA, sometimes referred to conversationally as the
"whistleblower provisions". Mr. Binda, the complainant, urges the Board to hear the matter.
[2] Excerpts from statute and regulations considered in this decision are appended to these
reasons for ease of reference.
Procedural Context and Nature of the Complaint
[3] At this stage, we are dealing only with the preliminary motion from the employer challenging
the Board’s jurisdiction to proceed further. The question to be answered in this decision is
whether the Board has the power to proceed with the resolution of the complainant’s issues
as he requests. In dealing with motions of this kind, the Board, in line with its usual practice,
treats the facts as asserted in the complaint as if they were true and would be provable at a
hearing where evidence was heard under oath, but does not make any findings of fact. If
there were a hearing on the merits, there is the possibility that the Board would find that the
facts were different from those asserted by the complainant, especially as the employer
would also have an opportunity to put in evidence that might put a different light on the
complainant’s view of the facts, as the employer has denied all the allegations made by the
complainant. The facts set out below do not represent all that Mr. Binda wrote in his
complaint and said at the hearing, but are those most relevant to this decision. For the
purposes of this decision, which only deals with the jurisdictional issue, it is not necessary to
name those to whom the complainant attributes wrongdoing.
[4] Mr. Binda, a Senior Manager in the Ministry of Environment, has complained to the Board to
the effect that he has been harassed, bullied and is the victim of reprisals because he
reported wrongdoing. He states that he is a member of a minority, and has been treated
with a lack of respect, while observing favouritism towards individuals of non-diverse
cultures. He also finds the human resources practices in his branch to be unfair, and to
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include favouritism, for example, in respect of hirings, promotions and career development
opportunities. He states that he made complaints verbally and in writing to his Assistant
Deputy Minister and shared the struggles he faced as a minority with a Deputy Minister from
another Ministry with whom he was paired in a mentorship relationship. He later met with
his own Deputy Minister about the issues. The complainant said he had not requested the
Deputy take action for fear of repercussions, but he became convinced action was taken
nonetheless and that he was now a “walking target” for members of other ranks of the
management team. He states that he is a minority who worked very hard to get where he is
and feels he is being taken advantage of and has had racial slurs directed at him by a
manager.
[5] In the material filed with this Board, Mr. Binda alleges that, as a result of having reported
wrongdoing to upper management, his superior constructed claims to launch a WDHP claim
against him, which led to a suspension pending investigation of which he was advised on
November 23, 2010. As of the hearing date of this matter, he had been on paid leave for
more than a year, but states that he has nonetheless suffered both monetary and other
losses. Mr. Binda describes stress, anxiety and other negative health effects from the
WDHP process following the complaint against him as well.
[6] Those of the allegations set out in the complainant’s material which are associated with
specific dates range from 2009 to January 2011. This complaint was filed with the Board on
September 26, 2011, on a form entitled “Political Activity/Disclosing and Investigating
Wrongdoing.” Part VI of the PSOA provides for directives to be established and
disseminated to public servants for how such disclosures are to be made. Counsel advises
those directives have established that disclosures would normally be made in the first
instance to the Ethics Executive. The designation of the Ethics Executive varies according
to the level and type of public servant making the disclosure. Further to s. 60(2) of the
PSOA, the Ethics Executive for the complainant would be the Deputy Minister, as Mr. Binda
is an employee of a Ministry.
[7] On April 28, 2011, about five months prior to filing this complaint with the Board, Mr. Binda
wrote the Office of the Integrity Commissioner, although that letter was not entered in
evidence. That office responded in writing, indicating the file was under review, and then
communicating the results of that review. These letters, dated May 12 and September 28,
2011, respectively, were produced at the hearing of this matter. The second letter indicates
that the Commissioner had determined that she did not have jurisdiction to deal with Mr.
Binda’s allegations. Explaining the process, the letter indicated as follows:
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Upon receipt of a disclosure this Office must first determine whether the
subject matter is a disclosure of potential wrongdoing. “Wrongdoing” is
defined in section 108 of the PSOA. While a discloser may feel that a matter
is a wrongdoing as it relates to them personally, it may not be a wrongdoing
as defined in the PSOA. If the matter is not a potential wrongdoing as defined
in the PSOA, this Office cannot receive the disclosure.
If this Office can receive the disclosure of potential wrongdoing, an initial
assessment under section 117 of the PSOA must be performed. If any of the
circumstances listed in section 117 apply this Office is required by the PSOA
to refuse to deal with the disclosure. There are no override powers or
discretion in this regard.
[8] The letter from the Commissioner's office, while emphasizing that it had made no finding
about whether a wrongdoing had occurred, found that, although the allegations had been
received as a disclosure of potential wrongdoing, it must refuse to deal with Mr. Binda’s
disclosure. This was based on a finding, pursuant to s. 117.2 of the PSOA, that it was an
employment matter that could be dealt with by a dispute resolution mechanism, such as the
Human Rights Tribunal or the Public Service Grievance Board. Their summary of the
allegations noted that they included allegations of contravention of the Ontario Human
Rights Code and the Occupational Health and Safety Act involving bullying and
discriminating against Mr. Binda in employment on the basis of a prohibited ground. As
well, they included allegations to the effect that the employer failed to deal properly with a
complaint regarding workplace discrimination and harassment and the encouragement by
representatives of the employer to other public servants to file complaints under the
Workplace Discrimination and Harassment Prevention Policy (WDHP) against him as a
consequence of verbal complaints he had made to two deputy ministers concerning his
superior’s conduct toward him.
[9] At the hearing of this motion, the Board afforded both sides time to make further
submissions in writing on the timeliness aspect of the complaint, all of which I have reviewed
in coming to this decision.
* * *
Jurisdiction under Part VI of the PSOA - Disclosing and Investigating Wrongdoing.
[10] Since Mr. Binda made clear that he intended this complaint to be filed under Part VI as a
complaint of reprisal for disclosing wrongdoing, it is appropriate to deal first with that portion
of the employer’s motion related to Part VI.
[11] Counsel for the employer argued that the complaint is really a general allegation of
harassment, which does not fit within the definition of wrongdoing set out in Part VI of the
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PSOA. The Board is invited to conclude that no report of wrongdoing as defined in Part VI
of PSOA had been made by the complainant, and therefore, there could be no reprisal of
the sort governed by those provisions. It is the employer’s position that in order for the
Board to have jurisdiction under the reprisal sections, there must be a disclosure of the sort
provided for in Part VI of PSOA. Counsel submits that the consequence of a lack of the type
of disclosure contemplated by Part VI is that the reprisal sections are not triggered, and
therefore, there is no proper complaint under Part VI before the Board, so that the complaint
should be dismissed. Further, counsel notes that it is not evident that the person accused of
carrying out the reprisal even knew of the complainant’s conversations with the Deputy
Minister or the issues discussed.
[12] By contrast, Mr. Binda maintains that he did report wrongdoing, and discussed it with his
Deputy Minister in the summer of 2010, having earlier spoken to the Assistant Deputy
Minister and a Human Resources representative about the problems he was facing. He is
convinced that his disclosure got back to the people about whom he complained and that he
has suffered various negative consequences at work because of his disclosure, including a
suspension as a result of the encouragement of a contrived WDHP complaint.
[13] The definition of wrongdoing in the PSOA is as follows:
108. (1) In this Part,
“wrongdoing” means,
(a) a contravention by a public servant, a minister or parliamentary
assistant of an Act of the Assembly or of the Parliament of Canada, or
of a regulation made under such an Act,
(b) an act or omission of a public servant, a minister or parliamentary
assistant that creates a grave danger to the life, health or safety of
persons or to the environment, where the danger is unreasonable
having regard to his or her duties, powers and functions and any other
relevant circumstance,
(c) gross mismanagement by a public servant, a minister or
parliamentary assistant in the work of the public service of Ontario,
(d) directing or counselling wrongdoing within the meaning of clauses
(a) to (c) by a public servant, a minister or parliamentary assistant.
2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 108 (1).
[14] The statute then provides how a disclosure of wrongdoing may be made:
114. Where a public servant or former public servant has reason to
believe that there has been wrongdoing, he or she may disclose the
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wrongdoing in accordance with the procedures established under
section 115. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 114.
Directives, Public Service Commission
115. (1) The Public Service Commission may by directive establish
procedures to deal with disclosures of wrongdoing by,
(a) a public servant who works in a ministry;
…
[15] The section of Part VI of PSOA dealing with reprisals is s. 139, which reads as follows:
139. (1) No person shall take a reprisal against a public servant because
he or she has,
(a) sought advice about making a disclosure about wrongdoing
accordance with this Part;
(b) made a disclosure about wrongdoing in accordance with
this Part;
(c) co-operated in an investigation or other process related to
a disclosure of wrongdoing made in accordance with this Part;
(d) acted in compliance with this Part; or
(e) sought enforcement of this Part. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s.
139 (1)
.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a reprisal is any measure
taken against a public servant that adversely affects his or her
employment or appointment and includes but is not limited to,
(a) ending or threatening to end a public servant’s employment
or appointment;
(b) disciplining or suspending or threatening to discipline or
suspend a public servant;
(c) imposing or threatening to impose a penalty related to the
employment or appointment of a public servant;
(d) intimidating or coercing a public servant in relation to his or her
employment or appointment. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 139 (2).
[16] It can be seen that this part of the PSOA prohibits a reprisal, defined broadly to include any
measure with an adverse employment consequence, because a public servant has made a
disclosure alleging wrongdoing “in accordance with this Part”. The phrase “in accordance
with this Part” incorporates a number of the provisions of Part VI. Since the complainant is
an employee of a Ministry, it would appear that disclosing alleged wrongdoing in accordance
with Part VI would involve elements such as: making a disclosure that alleges wrongdoing of
the kind defined in s. 108, and in accordance with the directives established under s. 115 (1)
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which provide for disclosure in most circumstances to the Deputy Minister. There are also
circumstances in which disclosure directly to the Integrity Commissioner is contemplated.
[17] The Board’s jurisdiction over reprisal complaints comes from subsections 140
(1) and (3) of PSOA, which read as follows:
140. (1) A public servant described in subsection (2), (3) or (4) may complain
under this section that he or she has suffered a reprisal prohibited by
section 139. …
(3) A public servant employed under Part III who is not subject to the
terms and conditions of a collective agreement may file the complaint
with the Public Service Grievance Board.
[18] I note that, although the provisions of Part VI have been in effect for a few years now, the
Board has not received many complaints of reprisal under that Part, and thus its
jurisprudence on the subject is in its infancy. This is the first case considering whether the
subject matter disclosed is of a kind sufficient to base a complaint under Part VI. As noted,
it is the employer’s position that the complainant is alleging general harassment, something
not covered by the definition in s. 108, set out above, so that the Board has no jurisdiction
over the matter under Part VI. The complainant disagrees.
[19] In order for the Board to be able to hear a reprisal complaint under Part VI, it must be
brought by a public servant not subject to a collective agreement and it must allege a
reprisal prohibited by section 139. It is not disputed that the complainant is excluded from
collective bargaining as a manager, and thus this is a proper forum if the other elements of a
complaint within the Board’s jurisdiction are present. One of the triggers for prohibited
reprisals is a disclosure of wrongdoing under Part VI. The kinds of wrongdoing by public
servants listed in section 108 of Part VI of PSOA are divided into four categories which can
be summarized as:
(a) breach of a statute or regulation, whether provincial or federal;
(b) an act or omission that creates a grave and unreasonable danger ;
(c) gross mismanagement;
(d) directing or counselling such wrongdoing.
[20] The complainant’s case is based on the disclosure of wrongdoing by public servants to
upper management, including his deputy minister, which he alleges resulted in negative
targeting at work, including the mounting of a WDHP complaint against him. There is much
in the complaint that falls within employer counsel’s characterization of general harassment,
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and which would not obviously fall into any of the four broad categories of wrongdoing set
out in section 108. However, the complainant also states that he disclosed matters of
favouritism associated with “non-diverse cultures” and difficulties at work which he attributes
to the fact that he is a member of a minority. The Form 1 filed with the Board, in which he
set out his complaint, does not refer explicitly to a breach of statute as part of the
disclosures of wrongdoing that he made. However, what I understand to be the same
disclosure is described in the summary of the allegations made by the complainant in the
context of his later contact with the Office of the Integrity Commissioner, contained in the
correspondence presented at the hearing, as involving allegations of breaches of both the
Human Rights Code and the Occupational Health and Safety Act. Allegations of negative
employment consequences based on distinctions based in race, place of origin or ethnicity
are reasonably viewed as allegations of a breach of the Human Rights Code, in any event.
[21] The letter from the Office of the Integrity Commissioner, as noted above, communicated the
decision that, although it had received his allegations as a potential disclosure of
wrongdoing, that office would not deal with the matter as it was an employment issue better
dealt with either at the Human Rights Tribunal or this Board. I note that the Commissioner
did not find that what had been disclosed fell outside the definition of wrongdoing in the
PSOA or that there had been such a substantial delay between the disclosure and the
incidents that were the subject matter of the disclosure, that proceeding would serve no
useful purpose, an option available under s. 117.7.
[22] I am persuaded that to the extent the complainant’s disclosure to the Deputy Minister
included allegations of breach of a statute such as the Human Rights Code, it qualifies as a
disclosure of wrongdoing under PSOA. It was not argued that the disclosure did not follow
the relevant directives, or that his disclosure to the Deputy Minister, who is also the relevant
Ethics Executive, did not qualify procedurally as a disclosure under Part VI. In the
circumstances, it is my view that there is a sufficient basis to find that the complainant did
make a disclosure of alleged wrongdoing in accordance with Part VI.
[23] I am also persuaded that some of the allegations set out in the complaint amount to
allegations of reprisal for disclosing allegations of wrongdoing to upper management. Most
centrally, a WDHP investigation, resulting in his removal from the workplace and associated
losses, is alleged to have been contrived in response to his disclosures of wrongdoing. This
qualifies as an adverse employment consequence of the type contemplated by subsections
139(2) (b) and (c), set out above. In sum, I am of the view that there is a sufficient basis for
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the Board to entertain this complaint in accordance with its jurisdiction under Part VI of the
PSOA.
[24] The complaint as written makes a variety of other allegations about improper behaviour and
lack of fair process which are undated and not all in a time sequence in which they could be
part of a reprisal for the disclosures in the summer of 2010. Rather, a number of them
appear to be part of a narrative of events which the complainant sees as the wrongdoing
which lead to his disclosures to the two deputy ministers. The complainant only asked the
Board to entertain his complaint under Part VI. Thus, it is not strictly necessary to address
the employer’s submissions about the status of this complaint under the Board’s more
general jurisdiction to hear complaints concerning terms and conditions of employment.
However, given the employer’s detailed submissions, the Board finds it appropriate to
address them to the extent necessary to illustrate the difference in the legislature’s approach
to the two different sources of the Board’s jurisdiction under Part VI and Regulation 378/07.
Timeliness and Procedural requirements of Regulation 378/07
[25] The Board’s more general jurisdiction to hear complaints concerning terms and conditions of
employment of provincial government employees excluded from collective bargaining is
subject to the provisions of Regulation 378/07 under the PSOA. Employer counsel
submitted that, by lodging his complaint under Part VI, the complainant had attempted to
bypass the mandatory requirements of Regulation 378/07 in terms of both timeliness and
the required period for dispute resolution, something the Board should not allow.
[26] In this second prong of its preliminary submissions, the employer submits that the complaint
should be dismissed on the additional basis that the mandatory provisions of Sections 8 and
9 of the regulation have been ignored. These provisions require that notice of proposal to
file a complaint must be given to the Deputy Minister and that a complainant is not eligible to
file a grievance until the expiry of the period of at least thirty days prescribed for internal
dispute resolution. In support of this argument, counsel refers to the Board’s recent
decisions in Muldoon v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2011 CanLII
83724 (ON PSGB) and Jackson v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services),
2011 CanLII 36564 (ON PSGB), which held that if the prescribed process is not followed,
there is no jurisdiction for the Board to hear the matter.
[27] As to the requirement under s. 8(1) of Regulation 378/07 that a complainant give notice to
his or her deputy minister, the employer argues firstly that Mr. Binda’s meeting with the
deputy minister of another ministry as part of a mentorship program, does not amount to
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notice under the regulation, as she is not his deputy minister, meaning the deputy minister of
the complainant’s home ministry. As to Mr. Binda’s meeting with the Deputy Minister of the
Environment in the summer of 2010, counsel submits that this is not proper notice, as notice
is required to be in writing. Counsel submits that the fact that section 8(3) of the Regulation
states that the notice must set out the reasons for the complaint, suggests writing, since
reasons cannot be set out in a verbal statement. This is supported by Section 3(1) of the
Board’s rules, in counsel’s submission, which requires that an application to the Board shall
be delivered to the Board in Form 1 and must include a copy of the complaint that was filed
with the deputy minister.
[28] In the further alternative, counsel argues that even if one were to give credence to the idea
that a verbal meeting could amount to notice, the complaint is almost a year out of time, and
should be dismissed as being grossly out of time.
[29] Further, the employer argues that the Board has no jurisdiction to extend the time limits,
making a very similar argument to the one outlined, but not decided, in the Board’s decision
in Lee v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2011 CanLII
49517 (ON PSGB) as follows:
Further, counsel for the employer argues that the timelines in section 8 (1) of Regulation
378/07 are mandatory timelines that are not able to be extended by the Board. Counsel
refers to Section 54 of the former regulation 977, no longer in effect, which provided the
Board with jurisdiction to extend time limits. Counsel argues that when the new
regulation 378/07 was implemented, it contained no similar provision, and thus any
jurisdiction the Board had to extend time limits is no longer applicable.
In support of the employer’s arguments on timeliness, counsel relies on the following
case law: Daniel Beauchamp, 2010 Can LII 6691 and 11287, (ON L.R.B.), Service
Employees International Union, Local 204 v. Leisureworld Nursing Homes Ltd., [1997]
O.J. No. 1469, 99 O.A.C. (Divisional Court), affirmed by the Court of Appeal with brief
reasons reported at [1997] O.J. No. 4815, 75 A.C.W.S. (3d) 854 (Ont. C. A.) and Kris
Persad v. TTC et. al., 2009 HRTO 325 (CanLII), 2009 HRTO 325 (Can LII). In the
Daniel Beauchamp decisions, the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) found that in
dealing with its jurisdiction over appeals under the Occupational Health and Safety Act,
there was no language allowing for the extension of the timelines. In the result, despite
sympathetic facts, which included a one day delay caused by solicitor inadvertence, the
appeal was dismissed as untimely. In doing so, the OLRB also found that its broad
power to control its own procedure did not give it jurisdiction to amend the timelines set
by statute.
In the Divisional Court's decision in Leisureworld, affirmed on appeal, cited above, the
Court found it to be unambiguous that when words relating to the power to extend time
limits in provisions of collective agreements related to arbitration procedures were
dropped from the Labour Relations Act, arbitrators lost jurisdiction to grant relief from
time limits for referral to arbitration, as opposed to steps within the grievance procedure
leading to the referral to arbitration. Counsel argues that the amendment to the
regulation resulting in the absence of the provisions providing for the extension of time
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limits in Regulation 378/07 has similarly removed this Board’s jurisdiction to extend time
lines. Without a statutory authority to extend the time limits, such as that in the Labour
Relations Act or the Human Rights Code, an example of which is in the Persad case,
cited above, counsel argues that there is no general equitable jurisdiction to extend time
limits.
[30] Counsel also refers to Re Metropolitan Toronto Separate School Board and O.E.C.T.A. (Re)
[1996] O.L.A.A. No. 593, 44 C.L.A.S. 239, to support the argument that the Board has no
jurisdiction to amend time limits in the absence of provisions such as those in the Labour
Relations Act. This was a case decided under the School Boards and Teachers Collective
Bargaining Act, which did not grant the arbitration board the authority to relieve against the
mandatory times limits, leading the arbitration board to dismiss the grievance.
[31] The complainant responds to the employer’s position that any disclosure at a meeting with a
deputy minister does not meet the mandatory notice requirements under section 8 of
Regulation 378/07 and that the complaint was not filed to the Board in a timely manner with
the submission that he was not required to comply with the mandatory notice requirements
or timelines, as his complaint was made under Part VI of the Act. Noting that Section 8 (1),
concerning notice of proposal to file a complaint, does not apply with respect to a complaint
under Part VI of the Act, Mr. Binda asked the Board to dismiss the employer’s argument and
find that the case law cited is not applicable to this matter.
[32] As the Board found in Jackson, cited above, where a matter does not fit within Part VI, a
complainant must follow the process set out in the regulation for the Board to be able to
hear the matter. Since no notice had been given to the Deputy Minister in that case, the
Board dismissed the complaint. In Muldoon, there had similarly been no notice, leading to
the same result, although no issue related to Part VI had been raised. The crucial difference
between the circumstances of this case and those in Jackson and Muldoon is that Mr. Binda
has only asked the Board to consider this as a complaint of reprisal under Part VI, and has
not asked that the Board consider it under its more general jurisdiction which remains
subject to the procedural and timeliness provisions of Regulation 378/07. I have found
above that this complaint is within the Board’s jurisdiction under Part VI. Subsections 8(2)
and 9(2) of Regulation 378/07 provide that the Notice to the Deputy Minister and the
requirement to allow a period of dispute resolution prior to referral to the Board are not
applicable to a complaint under Part VI. Given those specific provisions, it is clear that, for
the purposes of the viability of a complaint under Part VI, it is not necessary to consider the
extent of compliance with subsections 8(1), 9(1) and 10(1) of the regulation, which provide
for notice to the deputy Minister, a period of internal dispute resolution, and time lines for
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referral to the Board, which are computed with reference to section 9. In the result, it is not
necessary to determine in this case whether notice under subsection 8(1) of the regulation
can be given to the Deputy Minister verbally, or to address the employer’s argument
concerning the lack of jurisdiction to extend the time lines. Moreover, I note that the
Legislature did not insert any provision related to intent to avoid the timelines and procedural
requirements under Regulation 378/07 when it directed in subsections 8(2) and 9(2) of
Regulation 378/07, respectively, that subsections 8(1) and 9(1) did not apply and did not
affect complaints under Part VI of the PSOA.
[33] With that said, it is perhaps important to be clear that, in the circumstances of this case, a
finding that the matter may proceed under Part VI relates to the allegation of reprisal for the
reporting of wrongdoing, and does not mean the Board will separately adjudicate any non-
reprisal allegations, which would be subject to the provisions of Regulation 378/07. It is the
allegation of reprisal for reporting of wrongdoing which must be the Board’s focus under Part
VI. What evidence is relevant to that issue will be determined as necessary, if the matter
proceeds to a hearing.
[34] At this juncture of the proceedings, the parties are directed to discuss whether any issues
can be resolved without the necessity of a further hearing, in aid of which mediation may be
scheduled.
[35] For the reasons set out above, the complaint may proceed under Part VI of the PSOA. The
Board remains seized of any other issues necessary to the determination of this matter.
Dated at Toronto this 9th day of March 2012.
Kathleen G. O’Neil, Vice-Chair
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APPENDIX A
Excerpt from the Public Service of Ontario Act, PART VI
62. (1) The ethics executive for a public servant is determined as follows:
1. The ethics executive for a public servant employed under Part III who works in
a ministry, other than in a minister’s office, is the deputy minister.
…
108. (1) In this Part,
…
“wrongdoing” means,
(a) a contravention by a public servant, a minister or parliamentary assistant
of an Act of the Assembly or of the Parliament of Canada, or of a regulation
made under such an Act,
(b) an act or omission of a public servant, a minister or parliamentary
assistant that creates a grave danger to the life, health or safety of persons or to
the environment, where the danger is unreasonable having regard to his or her
duties, powers and functions and any other relevant circumstance,
(c) gross mismanagement by a public servant, a minister or parliamentary
assistant in the work of the public service of Ontario,
(d) directing or counselling wrongdoing within the meaning of clauses (a) to
(c) by a public servant, a minister or parliamentary assistant. 2006, c. 35, Sched.
A, s. 108 (1).
…
110. This Part applies to wrongdoing associated with the public service of Ontario and
its work. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 110.
…
112. The Integrity Commissioner and every person or body to whom a matter is referred
under subsection 118 (2), 122 (2) or 123 (1) shall carry out their functions under this Part
in a manner that,
(a) is fair and is as informal and expeditious as possible; and
(b) protects the identities of persons involved in disclosures of wrongdoing,
including persons who make disclosures, witnesses and persons alleged to be
responsible for wrongdoing except where the interests of fairness require that a
person’s identity be disclosed to one or more persons. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s.
112.
…
116. A public servant or former public servant may disclose wrongdoing to the Integrity
Commissioner if,
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(a) the public servant or former public servant has reason to believe that it
would not be appropriate to disclose the wrongdoing in accordance with the
directives issued under section 115;
(b) the public servant or former public servant has already disclosed the
wrongdoing in accordance with the directives issued under section 115 and has
concerns that the matter is not being dealt with appropriately; or
(c) directives applying to the public servant or former public servant have not
been issued under section 115. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 116.
Initial assessment by Integrity Commissioner
117. Where the Integrity Commissioner receives a disclosure of wrongdoing under
section 116, the Commissioner shall refuse to deal with the disclosure if one or more of
the following circumstances apply:
1. The subject matter of the disclosure is being dealt with by another person or
body as a matter of law enforcement or in accordance with a procedure
established under this or any other Act.
2. The subject matter of the disclosure is an employment or labour relations
matter that could be dealt with through a dispute resolution mechanism, including
a grievance procedure, established under this or any other Act, under a collective
agreement or under an agreement of another kind.
3. The subject matter of the disclosure is a matter that could be dealt with under
Part V of the Police Services Act.
4. The subject matter of the disclosure is the subject of,
i. a decision made in the exercise of an adjudicative function by a court or
other tribunal under this or any other Act, or
ii. deliberations that have led or may lead to a decision made in the
exercise of an adjudicative function by a court or other tribunal under this
or any other Act.
5. The subject matter of the disclosure is related to the exercise of discretion by a
prosecutor in relation to the prosecution of an offence.
6. The subject matter of the disclosure is not sufficiently important or the
disclosure is frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith.
7. There has been a substantial delay between the disclosure and the incidents
that are the subject matter of the disclosure and because of the delay the
proceeding would serve no useful purpose.
8. The subject matter of the disclosure relates solely to a public policy decision.
9. There is a valid reason, other than a circumstance described in paragraphs 1
to 8, for not proceeding with the disclosure. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 117.
….
118. (1) This section applies where the Integrity Commissioner receives a disclosure of
wrongdoing under section 116 and does not refuse to deal with the disclosure
under section 117. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 118 (1).
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(2) The Integrity Commissioner shall determine, from among the persons
mentioned in subsection (3), the person who, in the opinion of the Commissioner,
is in the best position to investigate the disclosure and shall,
(a) provide the person with a written summary of the disclosure and any
other information that the Commissioner has received in relation to the
matter that the Commissioner considers may assist the person in dealing
with the matter;
(b) direct the person to cause an investigation to be conducted into the
subject matter of the disclosure; and
(c) direct the person to report the results of the investigation to the
Commissioner. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 118 (2).
Report after referral
120. (1) A report from a person who has received a referral under subsection 118 (2)
shall be in writing and shall include:
1. A summary of the subject matter of the disclosure.
2. A description of the steps taken in the investigation conducted by the person to
whom the referral is made.
3. A summary of the evidence obtained during the investigation.
4. A statement of the findings resulting from the investigation of the disclosure,
including a statement about any wrongdoing that was discovered.
5. A description of any corrective action that has been taken or that is proposed
to be taken as a result of the investigation. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 120 (1).
…
No reprisals
139. (1) No person shall take a reprisal against a public servant because he or she has,
(a) sought advice about making a disclosure about wrongdoing in accordance
with this Part;
(b) made a disclosure about wrongdoing in accordance with this Part;
(c) co-operated in an investigation or other process related to a disclosure of
wrongdoing made in accordance with this Part;
(d) acted in compliance with this Part; or
(e) sought enforcement of this Part. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 139 (1).
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a reprisal is any measure taken against a
public servant that adversely affects his or her employment or appointment and
includes but is not limited to,
(a) ending or threatening to end a public servant’s employment or appointment;
(b) disciplining or suspending or threatening to discipline or suspend a public
servant;
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(c) imposing or threatening to impose a penalty related to the employment or
appointment of a public servant;
(d) intimidating or coercing a public servant in relation to his or her employment
or appointment. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 139 (2).
Complaint about reprisal
140. (1) A public servant described in subsection (2), (3) or (4) may complain under this
section that he or she has suffered a reprisal prohibited by section 139. 2006, c.
35, Sched. A, s. 140 (1).
…
Public servant not subject to collective agreement
(3) A public servant employed under Part III who is not subject to the terms and
conditions of a collective agreement may file the complaint with the Public
Service Grievance Board. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 17, s. 10 (15).
…
Order
(8) If the Public Service Grievance Board, the Ontario Labour Relations Board or
the Grievance Settlement Board determines, on the completion of an inquiry into
a complaint filed under subsection (2), (3) or (4), that a reprisal has been taken in
contravention of subsection 139 (1), the Board may make an order that it
considers just and reasonable in the circumstances, directing the relevant
ministry or public body or a person acting on behalf of the ministry or public body
to do or refrain from doing anything in relation to the contravention. 2006, c. 35,
Sched. A, s. 140 (8).
Same
(9) Without limiting the generality of subsection (8), an order under that
subsection may direct that the ministry or public body, or a person acting on
behalf of the ministry or public body, do one or more of the following:
1. Cease doing an act or acts complained of under subsection (1).
2. Take steps to rectify harm related to a complaint under subsection (1).
3. Reinstate the employment of a public servant whose employment was
terminated.
4. Compensate the public servant for loss of any remuneration, including
benefits. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 140 (9).
(10) Without limiting the generality of subsection (8), where the board is of the
view that continuation of the employment relationship is inappropriate, the board
may direct the ministry or public body, or person acting on behalf of the ministry
or public body to terminate the public servant’s employment and provide
compensation in lieu of reasonable notice of the termination. 2006, c. 35, Sched.
A, s. 140 (10).
(11) A board may not make an order under subsection (8) for punitive
damages or for costs. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 140 (11).
(12) Where a board has made a finding under subsection (8) that a reprisal
has been taken, the board shall inform the Integrity Commissioner of the finding.
2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 140 (12).
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Onus of proof
(13) On an inquiry into a complaint filed with the Public Service Grievance
Board, the Ontario Labour Relations Board or the Grievance Settlement Board
under this section, the burden of proof that an employer or a person acting on
behalf of an employer did not act contrary to subsection 139 (1) lies on the
employer or the person acting on behalf of the employer. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A,
s. 140 (13).
Excerpts from Regulation 378/07 under The Public Service of Ontario Act:
4. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a public servant who is aggrieved about a
working condition or about a term of his or her employment may file a
complaint about the working condition or the term of employment with the
Public Service Grievance Board,
(a) if the public servant is eligible under sections 5 and 7 to file such a
complaint;
(b) if the public servant gives notice in accordance with section 8 of
his or her proposal to file the complaint; and
(c) if the public servant complies with the filing requirements set out in
section 10.
(2) The following matters cannot be the subject of a complaint about a
working condition or about a term of employment:
1. The term or duration of the public servant's appointment to
employment by the Crown.
2. The assignment of the public servant to a particular class of
position.
3. A dismissal without cause under subsection 38 (1) of the Act or a
matter relating to such a dismissal.
4. The evaluation of a public servant's performance or the method of
evaluating his or her performance.
5. The compensation provided or denied to a public servant as a
result of the evaluation of his or her performance.
Eligibility generally
5. (1)Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a public servant or other person is
eligible to file a complaint if he or she was appointed by the Public Service
Commission under subsection 32 (1) or (2) of the Act to employment by the
Crown. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 5 (1).
(2) If any of the following circumstances existed at the material time, a
public servant or other person is not eligible to file a complaint:
1. He or she was a member of a bargaining unit represented
by a bargaining agent under the Crown Employees
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Collective Bargaining Act, 1993 or under the Ontario
Provincial Police Collective Bargaining Act, 2006.
2. He or she was represented by the Ontario Crown
Attorneys’ Association or the Association of Law Officers
of the Crown under an agreement between the Crown and
one or both of those Associations.
3. He or she was employed in a position that was classified
under subsection 33 (1) of the Act as a term classified
position.
4. He or she was employed for a fixed term,
i. on a non-recurring project,
ii. in a professional or other special capacity, or
iii. on a temporary work assignment arranged by the
Public Service Commission in accordance with a
program for providing temporary help.
5. He or she was employed for a fixed term for fewer than 14
hours per week, employed for a fixed term for fewer than
nine full days in four consecutive weeks or employed for a
fixed term on an irregular or on-call basis.
6. He or she was employed for a fixed term during his or her
regular school, college or university vacation period or
was employed for a fixed term under a co-operative
educational training program. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 5 (2).
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not affect the right of a public servant or other
person to file a complaint under Part V of the Act (Political Activity) or a
complaint under Part VI of the Act (Disclosing and Investigating
Wrongdoing). O. Reg. 378/07, s. 5 (3).
…
Restrictions, complaint about a working condition or a term of employment
7. (1) A public servant is eligible to file a complaint about a working
condition or a term of employment only if he or she had been employed
continuously for at least six months before the deadline for giving notice in
accordance with section 8 of his or her proposal to file the complaint.
O. Reg. 378/07, s. 7 (1).
…
Filing a Complaint
Notice of proposal to file a complaint
8. (1) A person who proposes to file a complaint shall give notice of the
proposal to the following person or entity:
1. A complainant who, at the material time, worked in a ministry shall
give the notice to his or her deputy minister.
2. A complainant who, at the material time, worked in a Commission
public body shall give the notice to the chair of the Public Service
Commission. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 8 (1).
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(2) Subsection (1) does not apply with respect to a complaint under
Part V of the Act (Political Activity) or a complaint under Part VI of the
Act (Disclosing and Investigating Wrongdoing). O. Reg. 378/07, s. 8
(2).
(3) The notice must set out the reasons for the complaint. O. Reg.
378/07, s. 8 (3).
(4) The notice must be given within the following period:
1. For a complaint about dismissal for cause, within 14 days
after the complainant receives notice of the dismissal.
2. For a complaint about a disciplinary measure, within 14
days after the complainant receives notice of the
imposition of the disciplinary measure.
3. For a complaint about a working condition or a term of
employment, within 14 days after the complainant
becomes aware of the working condition or term of
employment giving rise to the complaint. O. Reg. 378/07,
s. 8 (4).
Period for dispute resolution
9. (1) A complainant is not entitled to file a complaint with the Public Service
Grievance Board until expiry of the period provided under this section for
dispute resolution. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 9 (1).
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect the right of a public servant or other
person to file a complaint under Part V of the Act (Political Activity) or a
complaint under Part VI of the Act (Disclosing and Investigating
Wrongdoing). O. Reg. 378/07, s. 9 (2).
(3) If the complainant was required to give a deputy minister notice of the
proposal to make the complaint, and if the deputy minister or his or her
delegate meets with the complainant within 30 days after the deputy minister
receives the notice, the period provided for dispute resolution expires on the
earlier of,
(a) the day that is 30 days after the meeting; or
(b) the day on which the deputy minister gives written notice to the
complainant of his or her decision about the proposed complaint.
O. Reg. 378/07, s. 9 (3).
(4) If the complainant was required to give the chair of the Public Service
Commission notice of the proposal to make the complaint, and if the chair or
his or her delegate meets with the complainant within 30 days after the chair
receives the notice, the period provided for dispute resolution expires on the
earlier of,
(a) the day that is 30 days after the meeting; or
(b) the day on which the chair gives written notice to the complainant
of his or her decision about the proposed complaint. O. Reg. 378/07,
s. 9 (4).
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(5) If the deputy minister or chair of the Public Service Commission, as the
case may be, or his or her delegate does not meet with the complainant
within 30 days after receiving the notice, the period provided for dispute
resolution expires 30 days after the notice was given to the deputy minister
or chair. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 9 (5).
Filing a complaint
10. (1) Within 14 days after the expiry of the period, if any, provided for
dispute resolution under section 9, the complainant may file the complaint
with the Public Service Grievance Board by delivering it to the chair of the
Board. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 10 (1).
(2) The complaint must set out the reasons for the complaint and must
include the notice of the proposal, if any, to make the complaint and such
other information and documents as the Board may specify. O. Reg. 378/07,
s. 10 (2).
Excerpt from Regulation 977, under the Public Service Act, now superseded
54. The Board or a Classification Rating committee may, of its own
motion,
(a) abridge the procedure set out in this Part and hear the
grievance at any time under section 48: or
(b) extend the time limits specified in this Part, RO 1980, Reg,
881, s. 61.
Excerpt from the Board’s rules.
3(1) An application to the Board shall be delivered to the Board in Form 1 and
must include a copy of the complaint that was filed with the deputy minister.