HomeMy WebLinkAbout2009-2699.Hyland.12-04-12 Decision
Crown Employees
rieva
nce Settlement
oard
1Z8
l. (416) 326-1388
x (416) 326-1396
t des griefs
es employés de la
t
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l. : (416) 326-1388
léc. : (416) 326-1396
GSB#2009-
UNION#2009-0368-0161,
2010-0368-0019, 2010-0368-0020, 2010-0368-0021, 2010-0368-0022
IN THE MATTER ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
ETWEEN
G
B
Suite 600
180 Dundas St. West
Toronto, Ontario M5G
Te
Fa
Commission de
règlemen
d
Couronne
Bureau 600
180, rue Dundas Oues
Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1
Té
Té
2699, 2009-2700, 2009-2701, 2010-0572, 2010-0589, 2010-0590, 2010-0591,
2010-0593
2010-0592,
2009-0368-0162, 2009-0368-0163, 2009-0368-0202, 2010-0368-0018,
OF AN
Before
B
Ontario Public Sployees Union
(Hyland) Union
(Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) Employer
ervice Em
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
BEFORE Ken Petryshen Vice-Chair
FOR THE UNION
lmes LLP
FOR THE EMPLOYER
David Wright
Ryder Wright Blair & Ho
Barristers and Solicitors
vitch
Services
ractice Group
Suneel Bahal and Jonathan Rabino
Ministry of Government
Labour P
Counsel
HEARING March 19, 2012.
Decision
he
es of bargaining unit
members who they observed contravening the smoking policy.
’s
prior to the next scheduled hearing date. My
reasons for dismissing the motion are as follows.
[1] In a proceeding arising from grievances filed by Mr. B. Hyland, a Correctional Officer
(“CO”), the Union alleges that management has failed to properly accommodate Mr. Hyland at the
Central East Correctional Centre (“CECC”) at Lindsay. Mr. Hyland has asthma, with a particular
sensitivity to cigarette smoke. He requires a smoke free environment. Thus far the Union has called
two witnesses, including Mr. Hyland. The Union wants to call Mr. Moss, the Local Union President,
and Mr. Butsch, the Local Union Vice-President, to testify about their observations concerning
smoking at the workplace and management’s failure to enforce the smoking policy. These witnesses
will not volunteer to testify and the Union will not compel them to do so if they are required to
provide the names of bargaining unit employees who they observed smoking at the workplace
contrary to the smoking policy. The Employer takes the position that it would ask the Union officers
during cross-examination to disclose the names, given its view that this evidence is relevant and
necessary for its defense to the allegations made by the Union. The parties agreed to address this
evidentiary issue on March 19, 2012. This decision addresses the motion by the Union that t
Local Union officers be permitted to testify without disclosing the nam
[2] After considering the submissions of counsel and in balancing the competing interests
that are at stake, it is my conclusion that it is appropriate in the circumstances to dismiss the Union
motion. I advised counsel by email of my decision
[3] Mr. Hyland has filed similar grievances in the past while employed at other provincial
correctional institutions, resulting in many decisions which determined that the Employer had failed
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avened the smoking policy and they
ere not compelled to disclose names by senior management.
claims
e
se
to properly accommodate him. Although smoking is now prohibited at correctional facilities, there
is evidence in this preceding that staff at the CECC smoke at the institution contrary to the smoking
policy. The Union takes the position that management’s failure to adequately enforce the smoking
policy at the CECC has contributed to an environment where cigarette smoke is often present at the
workplace, with the result that the Employer has failed to properly accommodate Mr. Hyland. The
issue of whether management reasonably enforces the smoking policy has been an important feature
of the previous cases involving Mr. Hyland. The Union intends to rely on aspects of the testimony
of the two witnesses who have testified already to support its position that the management at the
CECC does not adequately enforce the smoking policy. If called, the Union officers would testify,
among other things, about bargaining unit employees smoking in the presence of a manager without
any action being taken against the employee. They would also testify about their efforts to bring the
prevalence of staff smoking in the workplace to the attention of senior management. Their efforts in
this regard did not include disclosing names of those who contr
w
[4] The Union submitted that I should allow its motion for essentially two reasons. It
that providing the name of an employee who contravened the smoking policy is of marginal
relevance at best in the circumstances of this case. Counsel argued that managers can be called to
testify about their efforts to enforce the smoking policy without being advised of the name of an
employee who contravened the policy. He therefore submitted that the Employer does not require
the Union officers to provide the names of these employees in order for it to defend the grievances.
The Union also takes the position that I should exercise my discretion under Section 48(12)(f) of th
Labour Relations Act to not admit evidence of the names even if this evidence is relevant becau
there is a labour relations interest at stake here worth protecting. The Union maintains that the
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s are
re to
s an approach which does not
ndermine the confidence of the membership in its representatives.
the right to fully cross-examine witnesses outweighs that interest in
e circumstances of this case.
;
tal
confidence of the membership in their bargaining agent will be undermined if the Union officer
required to disclose names, thereby detrimentally affecting the Union’s statutory obligation to
represent its members. Counsel argued that highly relevant testimony about management’s failu
enforce the smoking policy will not be presented if the Union officers are compelled to provide
names, thereby hampering the Board’s ability to get at the truth in this case. Counsel argued that an
appropriate balancing of the competing interests at stake here favour
u
[5] The Employer takes the position that allowing the Union’s motion would deny it the
opportunity to fully cross-examine the Union officers on a matter which is relevant to an important
issue in this case. It maintains that denying it the right to fully test the evidence of these witnesses
would hamper getting at the truth and in effect would serve to endorse the code of silence that exits
at correctional institutions. Mr. Rabinovitch argued that even if there is a labour relations interest
here that the Union can rely on,
th
[6] In support of his submissions, Union counsel referred me to the following decisions: Re
Thunder Bay Regional Health Sciences Centre and O.N.A. (2010), 192 L.A.C. (4th) 442 (Simmons)
Merriman v. MacNeil, [2011] C.P.S.L.R.B. No. 88 (Steeves); Re Centre for Addiction and Men
Health and O.P.S.E.U. (2004), 133 L.A.C. (4th) (Nairn); Re Toronto, Transit Commission and
A.T.U., Local 113 (1999), 80 L.A.C. (4th) 53 (J. Johnston); and, Re Hercules Moulded Products Inc.
and U.F.C.W., Local 1993 (2001), 94 L.A.C. (4th) 176 (Crljenica). Counsel for the Employer relied
on the following decisions: Michael Garfield Lyttle v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193;
Regina v. Conrad Huber, [2007] BCSC 1074; Re R. Laidlaw Lumber Co. Ltd. and I.W.A., Local 2-
- 4 -
mbia
Ministry of Community Safety and
orrectional Services (2008), GSB Nos. 2003-1520 (Abramsky).
n by the
in
bers
f union
700 (1975), 10 L.A.C. (2d) 330 (Weatherill); Re Kawartha Pine Ridge District School Board and
O.S.S.T.F., District 14 (2010), 197 L.A.C. (4th) 83 (Knopf); OPSEU (McCormick) and Ministry of
Transportation (2006), GSB Nos. 2002-2964 et al. (Abramsky); Re Government of British Colu
and British Columbia Government Employees Union (1997), 68 L.A.C. (4th) 440 (Greyell); Re
McRae Waste Management Ltd. and I.U.O.E., Loc. 115 (1998), 73 L.A.C. (4th) 174 (McEwen);
OPSEU (Beltrano et al.) and Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (2008), GSB
Nos. 2003-3597 et al. (Petryshen); and, OPSEU (Gillis et al.) and
C
[7] I have no difficulty in accepting the principles set out in the decisions relied o
Union. One of them recognizes that communications between union members and their
representatives can be protected by a privilege. I also agree that I have the power under Section
48(12)(f) of the Labour Relations Act not to admit evidence that is relevant if there is a compelling
labour relations reason for doing so. The Union’s cases which address this issue involve the
admission of video surveillance evidence. The labour relations interest the Union seeks to protect
this case is the confidence of its membership in the Local Union officers at the CECC. As Union
counsel noted in his submissions, there is no case on point which deals with this particular union
interest in an evidentiary context. As a general proposition, I am not convinced that confidence of
members in their Local Union officers is a compelling labour relations justification for not admitting
relevant evidence in the circumstances of this case. It is not obvious that the confidence of mem
in their Union officers would be affected if they are compelled by law during their testimony to
provide the names of members who contravened the smoking policy. I am also not convinced that
the ability of these key Union officers to represent their members will necessarily be affected if there
is loss of confidence in them by members. In any event, if preventing a loss of confidence o
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members in their representatives is a sound labour relations goal, the reason for the loss of
confidence in any case is worth some consideration. In my view, it is not reasonable for members to
lose confidence in representatives who are compelled to honestly and completely testify abou
observations about smoking in the workplace in order to advance the grievances of a fellow
bargaining unit member. A loss of confidence that is not reasonable does not justify the exclusion of
names in this case. Indeed, the effect of finding a labour relations justification on the basis advanced
t their
y the Union would indirectly endorse the code of silence, which would not be a desirable outcome.
f
Union
t
in
by the Employer’s right to cross-examine Union
witnesses on a very relevant issue in this case.
] It is for the above reasons that I dismissed the Union’s motion.
ated at Toronto this 12th day of April 2012.
Ken Petryshen, Vice-Chair
b
[8] Even if I were to assume that protecting the confidence of Union members in their
representatives is an interest worth protecting in this case, that interest must be considered in light o
the competing interest of the Employer’s right to fully cross-examine witnesses. Although
counsel argued otherwise, it is my view that the names of bargaining unit employees who
contravened the smoking policy in the presence of managers is very relevant to the significant issue
of whether the Employer adequately enforced the smoking policy. The Employer is entitled to tes
the assertion that a manager ignored a violation of the smoking policy and it would be difficult to
effectively do so without having the name of the employee involved. Therefore, even if the Union
had succeeded in establishing a labour relations basis for the Union officers not to provide names
these circumstances, that interest is outweighed
[9
D