HomeMy WebLinkAbout1976-0020.Cloutier.76-12-21CROWN EMP~.OYEEL .- 416 964-6426 Suite 405
CRWANCE SETTLEMENT 77 Bbor Street Wei
BOAR0 TOiiO.TTO, Ontario~
MS.9 lM2
Between:
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Undet- The
CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
TNE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
.
Mr. R. C..Cloutier (The Grievor
And
Ministry of Revenue (The Employer) _
D. M. Beatty - Chairman
G Griffin
0: Anderson
- Member
- Member
Before:
For the Grievor:
R. Houlahan - Ontario Public Service Employees lkion
For the Employer:
E. C. Farragher - Ministry of~Revenue
Hearing:
December 7, 1076
Provinces Room, Inn of the Provinces
Ottawa, Ontario
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In the grievance which he brought before the Board,
Mr. A. Cloutier, employed as a Property Assessor 3, grieves
that he was, by letter dated January 21, 1976 unjustly accused,
by his Valuation Manager, of not performing certain'dutles.
By this grievance, Mr. Cloutier has requested that this letter
and all of the documentation referred to therein, be removed
from his file.
At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Farragher, for the
employer, argued that Mr. Cloutier's grievance was not arbitrable
either under s.17(2) of The Crown Employees Collective Bargaining
Act or under the collective agreement between the parties, and
that accordingly this Board has no jurisdiction to entertain it.
Very simply, it was Mr. Farragher's position that because the
letter did not purport In any way to discipline the grievor,
because there was no allegation that any provision fn the
agreement had been violated and because the letter did not
purport to actually effect an appraisal of him, that Mr. Cloutier's
complaint could not properly be referred to this Board.
Following Mr. Farragher's preliminary objection; and after
ensuring ourselves that the procedure we outlined in RE Erikem iU’7.5
had been complied with, we adjourned our hearing into Mr. Cloutier's
grievance pendlng our resolution of this preliminary issue. After
careful consideration of this matter we are of the view that
Mr. Farragher's objection to our jurisdiction has, for the
reasons tnat follow, merit both ‘;n law and in lcgic and that
accordingly we are without jurisdicticn to hear the merits of
IV. Cloutier's ccmp!ain:.
I
As this Board has noted on.numerous occasions, our
jurisdiction to pass on the grievances of persons falling within the
scope of The Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act is founded in
s.s.17(2) and s.lB~of that legi~slation. Those sections provide:
17. (2.1 In addition to any other rights of grievance
under a EoZZective agreement, an empZoyee
claulting,
(a) that his position has been Lvpoperiy classified;
Ib) that ke kus’been appmised cont+rary to the
governing princip2es and standards; or
W that he has be& discip2ined or dismissed
‘. or suspended froni his employment titkout
just cause, mzy process suck matter in
accordance with the hevance procedure
provided in the co2 2ective agreement, and
fai2ing fin& detezminution under such
procedure, tti nritter may be .processed in
accordance titk the procedure for final
Zetermination appl;icable under section 18.
18.(l) Every colZective-agreement shc22 be deemed to
provide that in the event the parties are unab2e
to effect ca 8ettkmQnt of any difference8 between
them &sing from tke interpretation, appZication,
udministmtion or a22eged contmvention of the
.afleement, including 6ny question as to whether
-..a matter is arbitrabl&, suck matter may be
referred for arbitration to .tke Grievance Sett2ement
Board and tke Board after’ giving fuZ2 opportunity
‘to the parties to present their evidence and to
make their submissions, sF4tt decide the matter
and,its decision is final and binding upon the
parties and the employee5 covered by the agreement.
From those iections it is, to this Board, clear that for a
grievance to properly come before us, it must either fall within
the terms of the collective agreement or, alternatively, within
one of the lettered paragraphs of s.17(2) of the Act. With regard
to the former, Article 30 of the collective agreement, provides:
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30.2
30.3.1
30.3.2
30.3.3
30.4.1
30.4.2
30.4.3
30.5
An employee,wko believe8 he kas a complaint
or a difference with the Employer hall first
di8cuse tke complaint or difference with
his or ker supervisor within tuenty (201 days
of first becoming auare of tke complaint or
difference. If uny compluint or difference
ie not sati8factorily sett2ed by the eupezvi8or
within seven 17) days it may be processed in
tke fo2Lming tmnner:
STAGE -0h’E
Tke employee my file u pievunce in miting
with his or ker supervisor. Tke supervisor
skczl~ give tke gri%Vor his decision in writing
within seven 17) days of tke submission of the
grievuncs .
STAGE TWO
If tke grievance irr not resolved under Stage
hi?, the employee nxzy submit the gheVUnC% to
tke Deputy Minister or his designee within
seven (7) &ye of tke date that he received
the decision wzder Stuge One or in the event
that no decieicm in writing is received in
accordance vitk tke epecified time limits in
Stage One. Tke griever my 6ubnit tke grievance
ti tke Deputy Minister or his desigxze within
.eeven (7) &ys of the date that the supervisor
GUE required to g-ive hCe decirtion in writing
in accordance with Stage One.
Tke Deputy Minister or hi8 designee Shall koZd
a meeting with the employer witkin fifteen (15)
day8 of tke receipt of tFz tievance and &all
give the grievor his decision in oriting vitkin
seven
(71 &ye of the meeting.
If the griever is not satisfied titk the decisb~
of the Deputy Minister or his desiyee or if
ke does not receive the decision vzthin the
specified timQ the griever may cpp2y t0 the
&iQVan&? Settlement Soarc? for (I hearing of the
grievance:
&thin fifteen (151 days of tFa dcte he received
the decision; or
I
. . ;i
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30.6.1 DISMISSAL
Any p~obatiomry empZoyee who ie dismissed or
FeZeased e&X not be entitl.ed to fiZe a
/_ grievance.
30.6.2 Any employee other than a pro?xtionary empzoyee
who is dismissed sha?Z be entitled to file a
griev@ce at the second stage of the grievozce
procedure provided he does so within twenty 1201
day8 Of the date of thie diti88az.
30.7.1 UIION GREVMCE
Where my difference between the Bnployer and
the Union arises from the interpretation,
application, a&hi&ration or alleged
contravention of the Agreement, the Union ehuZ1
be entitled to file a grievmrce at the second
stage of the grievance procedure provided it
doe8 80 Within thirty (30) day8 fO&7hg the
occurrence or origination of the cimstances
giving rise to the grievance. _
30.11 The Grievance Settikment Board shall have no
,jurisdiction to alter, change, anend or
enhge any provision of the Collective
Agreement.
_’
From those provisions, which in this respect parallel the
direction contained ins.lS,of the Act, it i.s clear that for a
grievance to be arbitrable under the,agreement it must, at the
very least, allege that there is a difference between the parties
"arising from the interpretation, application, administration or
alleged contravention of this Agreement? In the present case, on
.the facts before this Board, it is manifest that Mr. Cloutier~i
grievance does not raise such a difference. Accordingly and if
it is to be arbitrable before this Board it must follow, from .
what we have sa<d above, that Mr. Cloutier's grievance would ,..
have to fall within the terms of one of the lettered paragraphs
1
of s.17(2) of The Act. More specifically, and there being no
, .
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,.
allegation that he has been improperly classified, to be
arbitrable before this Board. Mr. Cloutier must satisfy us that
the letter of January 21. 1976 about which he complained, raises
an allegation either that he has been improperly appraised under
s.l7(2)(b) or that he has been unjustly disiplined under
s.l7(2)(c) of the Act.
Yith regard to the former provision it is, to this Board,
manifest on its face, that the letter of January 21, 1976 could
not be characterized as an improper appraisal. To the contrary,
on its plain terms, the letter of January 21, 1976 advises that
"unless there is a marked improvement" in the future with respect
to the matters raised in the letter, the griever's next "merit
increase will not be forthcoming" (emphasis added). Very simply
where, as in the letter of January 21, 1976, an employee is
advised that he may in the future receive a negative appraisal
which could result in his merit increase either being denled or
delayed, it is implicit in such an admonition that such an
appraisal is not being made at that time. Rather the employee
is simply being forewarned that such an appraisal is a distinct
possibility if certain conduct about which the employer complains
is not rectified. Clearly, however, and until such time as it
is determined that the employee's conduct has not changed, and
the merit increase is actually withheld or delayed,it Cannot,
in our view, be said that the employee has actually received an
appraisal about which he could grieve.
Put somewhat differently we do not believe that every
critical letter or memorandum sent to 2n employee about his work
performance, which indjcates that future acticn is being conterplated
F.
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unless the.employee is able to alter his work habits, can properly
be regarded as an appraisal'under s.l7(2)(b) of the Act. To
the contrary we believe that provision anticipates that some formal
action, as for example, when an employee receives his annual
appraisal, or in the event he or she is actually denied a merit .,.
increase has,actually been, taken by the employer. Such an
interpretation we believe not only accords with the plain
meaning of s.l7(2)(b) which, by its terms, is directed to appraisals
which have been made and not to ones which are contemplated in
the future, but as well ensures that the' grievance and arbi.tration
procedures contemplated by the parties~ and by the Legislation
are permitted to function as efficaciously as possible. That is
to say if this Board were to accept any other construction of
s.l7(2)(b), it would ensure that every letter or memorandum sent '
by an employer to an employee, which cotinted critically on the
latter's work performance, could be made the subject of grievance
to be brought before this 'Board. As a consequehce,'such a ,~
construction, by bringing anticipated but not yet rehTized decisions
of the employer before this Board, could well result in the
grievance procedure being 'clogged with, and this Board's attention
being diverted to, matters which are at most of marginal significance
and which may, in the final analysis, be only o,f hypothetical ~
interest to the parties. \
Nor do we believe that such a ruling as to the meaning of
s.l7~(2)(b) .in any way prejudices the rights of an employee who
may,be the recipient of such a letter.or memorandum-which is
critical of his or her work performance. To the contrary, when,
as here, an employee receives such a letter he or she may
-a-
l
she deems expedient, discuss, respond to, and/or challenge any
allegations made by the employer. In the result, and only in
the event that the employer subsequently relies on such a
document as forming part of the basis on which to appraise or
evaluate that employee,-in a manner the latter feels to be
improper, hill that document, together with the employee's response,
become a material and relevant part of the appraisal which can
properly be reviewed by this Board.
Finally and although it was not seriously pressed by
the grievor that the letter of'January 21, 1976 could be
characterized as a disciplinary sanction, we would note again that
there is nothing which, on the face of that document, would support
such a conclusion. To the contrary, on its plain terms that
letter was concerned with the grievor's work performance only as
it might relate in the future to his not receiving his merit
increase. There is no indication that the letter of January 21,
1976 was intended or regarded by the employer as forming or
establishing the basis for further dfsciplinary action. Indeed,
and to the contrary, Mr. Farragher plainly stated at the hearing
that this letter was intended by the employer only as a non-
disciplinary consnunication. Accordingly where, as here, the
letter was not intended to have a prejudicial effect on the
grievor's position in future grievance proceedings, we cannot
accept the characterization of it as being disciplinary in notice.
Fe Pir3p: Vatker 8 Sons Ltt. (lP731, 4 L..Z.C.(?Z:‘l 251 CXzrS);
2e Ki.tier?v-Clark of Ccc& Lt,‘. (:,C?2) 1 L.A.C. !2?1 44 (&s)/k.J;
PC Cm5crct~or: 0-F the Coovrt:i 0: ,.,kr-iZ> (IS?.?) I - ’ - (?c:.: .‘?? <.z-;Fe,a.!, i . .T . I .
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Moreover and even if it could be said that the letter of
January 21, 1976 contains an fmplict warning that disciplinary
action might be taken in the future, again we would note that
implicit in such a warning is the admission that disciplinary
action is not being invoked at that time. Accordingly and in
such circumstances we do not believe such a notation could properly
be characterized as being disciplinary in nature, Re De RmiZZund
. Aircmft of Ccnu& Ltd. ‘11971) 22 L.A.C. ,159 IVeatheriZl). In
that regard and with respect to a letter directed to an employee
by her employer.in which the~latter 'complained that unless the
employee altered,her conduct, it woul'd have "no alternative but
to take whatever disciplinary action is deemed necessary", another
board of arbitration has written: 1' :
'_
iirot every criticism which~an empZoyer
a@.resses to an employee constit&es a
discipZinary action, LhZess dis&pZinqj
action is ;invoZved, however, the &evcme
procedure does not contempZate.the
‘processing 0f’cZaims .that criticism Witi&
haS been expressed was not wetl-founded.....
It &.x&d be added that one distinguishing
characteristic of discipZinazy action is
that it stakes unZess set ~aside in the
course of the grievcme.or crbitration
procedure. A letter such as that of Cctober 25,
hoyever, serves not as a~record of any inprqer
conduct ti the griever ‘s pm-t, but rather
simpty as an expression of the employer’s
concern. At most, it "puts the employee on
notice" with respect tom certain cor&ct.
It is not, however, the imposition, of a
penaZty for any pcrti-mlar offence.
.Te Strc2*orc! Cewral Scscitat Ccr%7rct-:or. 197:, ?cnreq-tee * (kc;he&iZ),
Finally, and although we recognize that in certain
circumstances certain memoranda nay, even to the ex_tent that
they only forewarn of future action that may be taken by tre
.
i
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employer, be properly regarded as being disciplinary In
nature, where as here, it was expressly stipulated that the
‘...
letter was only Intended to induce conformity to acceptable
conduct, and was not to be regarded as part of a record being
built-up against the grfevor, we do not think that the letter
of January 21, may properly be characterized as being a
dlscipllnary notation. In that regard we would refer the
parties to the distinction, often cited in the private sector,
which was drawn by one arbitration in these terns:
"At the hearing in thJe mtter, come2 fo’ar
the company took the uoeitia that the cmd
merely doawnented a discuesion vith the
griever, that it I&Z8 intended to dmu the
grievor '8 attention to the confpmg '8 conc8rn
ouer hi8 job perfornwze and thereby provide
him vith incentive to *rove that
perfonmnce, md that the card m8 not dmwn
up for the purpose of TmiZding a record”
against the g7ievor.
To the extent that any '~ng" ir, disciptinmy,
of course, the sanction inflicted upon tFa
t?nIpibyee 80 disciptined <8 not %nediate,
but pote?tticZ. The employee concerned OiZZ
have in mind that if u diacipZi?zcry wm?ring
i.8 Mt Sk& t)le Subject Of 0 8UCCeSSfUt
grievance, the wrning y222 go to "b&Zd a
record” that may be used against him at a Zcter
time shodd he sub8equentZy be &:smissed or
suspended or wzjezted to some other form of
dk?ipZi?&?. A wlm?ing ccx fairZy be characterized
a8 a di8cip%ary ming, that ts to say, when
it my have ca prejudicial effect upon the emptoyeea'
position in future grievance proceedings to
catest a dismi88aZ or 8wpen8ion or other
diacipZinaq action.
h the other hand, conpmy persoznet records might
weZZ incZude Q memo& of some sort containing
un.%,zttering remrks &out FT. empkyee, but &ich
could wt be vie-.ed as 2 dCscip2ir~ ucm?im
in ;he serve cf Zaytng the ksis fcr, or stCppcr’fir<;,
ether discipttnc-j meas-we8 zf c 2ater &te - eitkcr
hcmse of t;ts nc+xx 0.7’ tire .:*ocrent, 3 3ecmse
.
the ‘ixrning” w& not brought to the
attention of the empzoyee in such a way aa
to afford him the oppormity of chaZZenging
‘it through the grievance procedure, or because
it is cZear for some -other reason that the
enrpzoyee wacZd not be prejudiced in any future
proceedings by hzvkg faited to grieve the "waning'r imnediateZy foZtan’ng its issuame.. . .
Gn the tisic issue, however - that is, whether
or not the card of Januaq 7, 1972, can be taken
to comtitrcte a discipZi?my measure - we are
not confined to the face of the docwnent. As
suggested above, in our vim the witid feCi%De
distingui8hir.g a wornring which can property be
+nucterized as discipiirzq wrn other (non-
wyievabZel expression8 of empZoyer di8cpprovtiZ
28 that in the case of the former an employee
who fai2.s to br+ng a ‘grievmzce mCy be prejudiced
in future proceedings of a discipli- nature.
In the case at hand, as we understand zt, the
compmty ha.9 cleanly taken the position tfiat the
card of January 7, 1972, ms not intended to be
discipZinaq in this sense of t&CbZCshiizg a
basis for further action. By 80 charactex&ing
the card, and unequivocaZZy representing it as
a non-disciplinary commoticction, tie eve of the (
opinion that the compcmy wouZd be estopped from
8ubsequentZy tendering it in any future proceeding8
of a d+ipZirxzry nature that might be taken
against the griever”.
Re KimberZu-CZurk of Cunudu Ltd. (supra).
Accordingly and having.determined that Mr. Cloutier's
grievance does not raise a dispute with regard to the interpretation,
application, administration or alleged contravention of the
agreement and does not, for the reasons given, fall within the
parameters of s.17(21 of The Crown Employees Collective Bar$aining
Act, we mustconclude that we are without jurisdiction to entertain
the merits of his complaint. In the result, and for those reasons,
this grievance is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
‘. L
. , .,*
.
Dated at Toronto this Zlst day of December 1976
b M Beatty
Chairman
I wncur
. Gnffln
~Member
I concur