HomeMy WebLinkAbout1978-0085.Murray.78-09-29CROWN EMPLOYEES CSLLECTIVi EARGAiNiNG ACT
Sefore
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEXENT BOARD
Between:
Before:
For the Grievor:
For the Employer:
Searing:
KS. Heather A. !lurray ( Griever)
And
Ministry of Eealth (Employer)
Prof. K. P. Swan - Vice-Chairman
Mr. P. E. Coupey - yember
Mr. e. Swjtzmar. - Me&er
!Is. L. Stevens
Ontario Pubiic Service Employees Union
1901 Yonge St.
Toronto, Ontario M4S 225
i4r. I. Freedman
Counsel, Legal 3ranch
Ministry of Health
10th Floor, Hepburn Block
Queer,'s Park
June 22nd, 1078
Suite 2100, 180 Oundas St. West
Toronto, Ontario
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This matter came before the Board on the basis of an
agreed statement of facts which, following some discussion of
other matters which might also have been placed before us, was
left to constitute the entirety of the case on which we are to
decide this issue. That statement reads:
in the matter of a grievance before the
Grievance Settlement Board between.,Ys. H. ,Yurray
and the Ministry of Health, the parties agree
that:
1) Ms. Murray is employed at the North Bay
Psychiatric Hospital as a Unit Secretary
-which is a bargaining unit position.
2) MS. Murray was elected as an official
union delegate to attend an Office Services
Negotiation meeting in Toronto on.Friday,
March 31, 1978.
3) Leave of absence to cover the March 31, 1978
meeting was requested and approved under
Article 28.2 of the 1977-78 Working Conditions
Collective Agreement.
4) Ms. Murray also requested travel time with pay
and no loss of credits for the afternoon of
Thursday, March 30, 1978 (& day). This request
was denied and Ms. Murray subsequently utilized
a + day vacation credit to cover her absence
on that date.
5) MS. ~urray's grievance is properly before the
Board and the Board has jurisdiction to hear the
matter.
Although there was some discussion about the matter, it
appears that the parties are content to have this case decided on
the basis that (as may be inferred from the agreed statement) the
travel time requested was in respect of actual and reasonable
travel time to permit Ms. Murray to attend the negotiation meeting
in Toronto on Friday, March 31, 1978.
.The collective agreement applicable to this dispute is the
Working Conditions Agreement for the period Jan. 28, 1977 to Jan. 31,
1978 which, by virtue of its own terms, remained in effect on the
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material date. The relevant provisions of that agreement are
the following:
ARTICLE 28 - LEAVE - UNION ACTIVITIES
28.1 Upon at least fourteen (14) days written
notice by the Union, leave-of-absence
without pay but with no loss of credits shell be
granted for not mre than four (4) consecutive
days for each employee delegate for the purpose
of attending the Annual.Convention.
28.2 Leave-of-absence with no loss of pay and
with no loss of credits shall be granted
to a member of the Union who participates in neqoti-
ations, mediation or arbitration, provided that not
mre than five (5) employees et any one time
shall be permitted such leave for any one set of
negotiations. Provided however, the Union
may et its discretion require up to five (5) addi-
tional nembers to participate in negotiations,
mediation or arbitration who shall be grated
leaves-of-absence without pay but with no loss of
credits.
28.3 At .the written reqllest of the Union of at
least fourteen (14) days, leaves-of-absence
without pay but with no loss of credits shall be granted
to en employee for the purpose of setting demands for
negotiations. It is understood that such meetings will
be held on Saturdays or Sundays and that the total time
granted for each instance shall not exceed two (2) cons-
ecutive days for each employee.
28.4.1 Upon request by the Union, confirmed in writ-
ing, end provided that reasonable notice is
given, leave-of-absence with no loss of pay and with no
loss of credits shall be granted to employees elected
as Executive Board Members and Executive Officers of the
Union, for the purpose of conducting the internal busi-
ness affairs of the Union.
28.4.2 The Union will advise the Directors of Personnel
of the affected Ministries, with copies to the
Executive Director, Staff Relations Division, of the names
and locations of such employees, imediately following
their election.
28.4.3 Leave-of-absence with no loss of pay and with co
loss of credits shall be granted to accommodate
reasonable travel time.
28.4.4 The Union will reimburse the Treasurer of Ontario
for the salary paid to members of the Executi'Je
Board end the Executive Officers granted leave under L-k
Article.
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There are other provisions in Article 28 relating to long-term
leaves for elected officers of the Union, but those do not
directly relate to the matter before us.
It is coronon ground that the grievor requested leave
both for the March 31 meeting and for travel on March 30 under
Article 28.2, and that leave for March 31 was duly granted pursu-
ant to that provision. It is the Union's position that Article
28.2 is also broad enough to cover the additional request for
travel time, and that the Employer was in breach of the collective
agreement in refusing to allow the grievor Lz day on March 30,"with
no loss of pay and no loss of credits." It is clear that the
Employer did not deny a leave-of-absence, since the grievor was
permitted to travel at that time; but the leave granted was without
pay. It is also possible, from a reading of Article 13 of the
Employee Benefits Collective Agreement, that the grievor would have
stood to lose attendance credits by reason of her absence on this
occasion, had she not chosen to use C, day of her vacation. Thus,
although the only question to be resolved before us is whether the
Employer, having granted "leave-of-absence", was wrong in not
providing that this leave be "with no loss of pay," it may be that
in a similar case where an employee cannot or does not choose to
use vacation time to travel the question of loss of credits might
also be involved. We do not, however, make any determination here
'as to the interpretation of Article 13 of the Employee Benefits
Agreement; our determination is restricted to Article 28.2 of the
Working Conditions Agreement.
The Employer's case is based on a reading of Article 28
*as a whole, and basically relies on the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio al terius. Thus the Employer argues that, because the
parties had clearly directed their minds to the issue of'travel time
.in Article 28.4.3, they must have intended, by their silence in
Article 28.2, to have excluded travel time from the effect of
that latter provision.
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The problem of construction which faces us is a diffi-
cult one since, as is often the case, there is no direct clue to
the real intention of the parties at the time of concluding the
Agreement. Indeed, it is possible that the parties had never
previously di-scussed the limitations of the language which they
have used, at least not in the context of circumstances like the
present. Our duty, therefore, although arbitrators often speak of
divining "the intention of the parties", is better described as
placing on the words which the parties have chosen a construction
which best carries out the reasonable expectations persons using
those words must be considered to have had. Although the science
of contractual interpretation is often expressed in terms hallowed
by legal use but incomprehensible to the casual reader, we consider
that our duty can be simply described: we must ask what limits to
reasonable expectations are imposed by the language used, and
whether the present case is within those limits.
We begin, therefore, with Article 28.2, which deals
explicitly with the griever's circumstances, and which provides
that "IlIeave-of-absence with no loss of pay and no loss of credits
shell be granted to a member of the Union who participates in
negotiations." This is extremely broad language to describe the
provision of leaves-of-absence. No time limits are'placed on the.
length of leave, nor is there any attempt to limit the ambit of
what participation in negotiations might entail. Nor, indeed,
is there any direct relationship expressed between the duration of,
the negotiations and the duration of the leave. Read literally,
this clause.would authorize leaves for all activities which reasonably
relate to participation in negotiations, since the operative part of
the clause is that there shall be %O 10s~ of &' and *no loss of
credits." If the clause stood alone, therefore, we would have no
hesitation in finding that reasonable travel time required for
participation in negotiations would be available as a part of the
leave-of-absence with pay to be granted under Article 28.2.
What, then, is the effect of Article 28.4.3? Does it, by
inference, reduce the ambit of Article 28.2? Certainly, were the
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two main provisions for leave-of-absence found in Article 28.2
and 28.4.1 otherwise perfectly parallel, that conclusion would
be irresistible. The parties have not, however, chosen to use
precisely parallel language, and an examination by juxtaposition
is in order. Both provisions are mandatory, and both provide that
"leave-of-absence with no loss of pay and with nd loss of credits
shall be granted" to specified employees. Here the parallelism
ends, however. Article 28.2 provides leave for employees "who
participate in negotiations", while Article 28.4.1 provides that
the leaves must be "for the purpose of conducting the internal
business affairs of the Union". Are these expressions sufficiently
different to avoid the usual consequences in contractual interpreta-
tion of specifying a right in one place and not in another?
The issue.is not an easy one to determine, and there are
no real guidelines to assist the Board. Upon reflection, however,
we think that there is not sufficient difference between the two
clauses to justify a finding that the expressio unius rule does not
apply. Article 28.2 describes the general purpose of leave in
somewhat different terms from Article 28.4.1, but all our attempt
to identify contractual significance in that difference have pro-
duced strained and illogical results.
In the result, then, having provided specifically for
travel time in Article 28.4.1, the parties must be taken to have
intended to omit it from the time for which leave-of-absence
without loss of pay or credits is provided under Article 28.2.
This may not appear in circumstances like the present to be a
particularly fair resolution of this grievance, but it is the
resolution most consistent with the language of the agreement the
parties themselves have signed.
One further matter must be discussed. Ms. Stevens, for
the Union, advanced the decision in .ee International Nickel co. of
Canada Ltd. and United Steelworkers, Local 6500 (1?77)', 13 T,.A.C. (22)
13 (Shim) as requiring the present Employer to act "reasonably"
in the interpretation of Article 28.2. With respect, we do not think
that that case is applicable, since it deals with discretionary
leaves and the reasonable exercise of the Employer's discretion.
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Here the leaves are mandatory, and so the Employer's
obligation is to bring itself within the meaning of the
collective agreement, whether that is reasonable or not.
Ms. Stevens also referred us to Article 30, which does provide
for discretionary leaves, and to which the INCO case might
arguably apply. There is, however, no evidence that any leave
was applied for under Article 30, which requires intervention
by the Deputy Minister and the Civil Service Commission, and
is thus procedurally quite different.
In the result, therefore, the grievance is
dismissed.
Dated at Toronto this 29th day of September 1978.
K. P. Swan Vice-Chairman
I concur
P. H. Coupey Member
I dissent (see attached)
B. Switzman Member
AX3iTXATiON
OPS3J (Xrs. Seather A. Xurray)
Ministry of iiealth
DISSENT
In the resolution of this grievance my colleagues
have employed the "expressio unius..." maxim.and based
on a comparison of Article 28.4 to Article 28.2 they
have dismissed this grievance. Xith respect I cannot
agree with my colleagues' conclusions.
In the first instance Article 28.2 is clear and
unambiguous. The parties have turned their minds
to the question of compensation for employees involved
in negotiations. They have determined that such an
employee will not suffer a loss of pay or credits.
There is no dispute that the grievor was such an employee
and fell squarely under the operation of Article 28.2.
Yet by my colleaguesf award, the grievor will suffer
the losses precisely prohibited by this article.
Thus I would respectfully submit.that in examining
the effects of my colleagues' award they have imposed
an interpretati,on which the contract cannot reasonably
bear,
I would further submit that-should the "exjressio
un1us...'( maxim be required, then this board should,
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examine the operation of this maxim as the Farties
employed it in Article 28.2.
The parties beganwith a general proposition
that included all union members who participate in
negotiations, mediation or arbitration. These
employees are to be given leave-of-absence ,,+ith no
loss of pay and with no loss of credits while they
are engaged in these activities.
The parties then commenced to place restrictions
or exclusions uponthis general-proposition. In any
one set of negotiations only five employees shall be
fully compensated. The union may receive leave for
five additional employees but their leave-of-absence
will be 7Mithout pay.
These were the exclusions that the parties
imposed. They .chose not to exclude required travel
time from the full compensation proposition of
Article 28.2. Yet the effect of my colleaguesf
award is to add this further exclusion which the
parties themselves had chosen not to do. rirticle 27.12
of the collective agreement expressly denies such
jurisdiction to our board.
My'colleagues have determined that the "expressi
unlus..." maxim is to be applied through a comparison
of Article 28.4 to Article 28.2. In the majority award it
states that, . ..Vpon reflection, however, we think
that there is not sufficient difference between the
two clauses to justify a ~finding that the exotessio
unius rule does not apply.*
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iiith respect I cannot agree with this conclusion.
Article 23.4 encompasses eledted members of the executive
board and elected executive officers of the union.
Article 28.2 does not deal with full time union officers.
More importantly kticle ,2S.4 deals with union
oificers engaged in conducting the internal business
affairs of the union. Article 28.2 deals with employees
engaged in negotiations, mediation or arbitration.
These are totally different situations and cannot
be compared. It is reasonable that in the conducting
of internal union business that the union through its
own finances pay the salary and travel costs of its
officers as established in Article 23.4.
However, in Article 28.2 it is reasonable that
employees not suffer a loss 0f.earning.s or credits for
participation in negotiations, mediation or arbitration.
Unlike the one-sided nature of internal union business,
these three above.named activities establish the
conditions by which services are to be provided to
the public. It is therefore reasonable that the
public pay for the expenses required to~effect these
conditions. Government supervisors, managers, etc.
are not 'docked travel from their salaries for participating.
in negotiations, mediations or arbitrations. If the
public is to cover their salaries while required to
travel for these activities, then it is reasonable for
employees to also be covered. This, I would submit
was the intention of the parties when they stated in
ilrticle 2S.2 that there was to be no loss of pay and
no loss of credit.
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.&s stated by Xis iionour Judge Lang re Valiace
aarnes, 2 WC 417, at DE. 419:
"There is a presumption in lav that where
language admits of more than one construction and if
one construction would lead to obvious injustice
the document should not be (so) interpreted."
In this instance the interpretation which my
colleagues have applied allowsthat the public would
fully cover the costs for one side in the negotiations --
the government side, while denying full compensation
to the union side.
For all of the above reasons I respectfully
dissent from the award of my colleagues.
Hamilton, Ontario.
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