HomeMy WebLinkAbout1981-0361.Stoyles.82-03-18IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATICN
Unde;
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
Between: OPSEU (Anna Stoyles)
and
Griever
The Crown in Right of Onrario
(Ministry of the Attorney Generai)
Mployer
Before: K. Swinton - Vice-Chairman
L. Rohinson - Member
A. G. Stapleton - Member
For the Griever: J. Miko
Grievance/Classification Officer
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
For the Employer: D. Brown, Q.C., Counsel
Ministry of the Attorney General
Hearings: August 27, 1981
October 30, 1951
January 15, 1952
-2-
This is a case in which the Griever, who was released from her
employment with the‘rMinistry of the Attorney General under the authority of
s. 22 of The Public Service Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 108, claims that she was
unjustly discharged and asks that slie be reinstated.
It is well-established in this Board that our jurisdiction is limited in
reviewing the release of an Employee in the first year of employment.
Section 22(5) of The Public Service Act sets out a broad authority for a Deputy
&Minister -
A deputy minister may release from employment any public
servant during the first year of his employment for failure
to meet the requirements of his position.’
I
The Grievance Settlement Board has had to interpret that provision in
conjunction with s. 18(2) of The Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 108, which states:
In addition to any other rights of grievance under a
collective agreement, an employee daiming
. . . . . . .
(c) that he has been disciplined or dismissed or suspended
from employment without just cause,
may process such matter in accordance with the grievance
procedure provided in the collective agreement, and failing
final determination under such procedure, the matter may be
processed in accokiance with the procedure for final deter-
mination applicable under Section 19.
Probationary employees are barred from filing a grievance under Article 27.6.1
of the collective agreement.
,
.- --_
-3-
Nevertheless, in a series of cases, this Board has held that it has a
limited jurisdiction to review the release of an Employee in the first year or
probationary year of employment. Although the Board cannot review a bona
fide release for failure to meet the requirements of the job, it can review a
release motivated by disciplinary reasons pursuant to s. 18(2) of The Crown
Employees Collective Bargaining Act. Therefore, it will scrutinize the release
of any probationary employee to determine whether the release is colourable,
masking disciplinary action (Re Leslie, ‘80/77 (Adams); Re Haladay, 94/78
@Ku-d).
In this case, Counsel for the Ministry asserted that the Griever had
been properly released, while the Union argued that her release was
disciplinary, motivated by her refusal to work voluntary overtime. We have
‘jurisdiction to review the release only if the Union’s position is correct.
The Griever was hired on tMay 1, 1980 to act as a Clerk 3 in the
Newmarket Sheriff’s Office. That office was a new one, set up to handle the
York County work formerly carried out by the Toronto Sheriff’s Office. All the
staff were new to the office, although the Sheriff, George Taggart, his Deputy
and the Office Manager had worked in other Sheriff’s Offices. The Office was
to come into full operation on October 14. Prior to that date, the Office was in
partial operation, and the staff made an effort to establish acceptable and
workable procedures.
The Grievor was to act as the Fi Fa Clerk, while Ann Tidman,
another Clerk 3, would be primarily responsible for Process: The Griever’s
responsibilities included accepting writs of execution filed in the Sheriff!s
-4-
Office, typing up an executions card and a flex strip to put in the Exe=utions
Register used for searches, and searching for various periods in the day. She
estimated the searching time to have been one-half day to start, declining to
one to one and one-half hours per day in January, 1981. She was responsible for
levies, which are instructions from lawyers usually given at the time a writ of
execution is filed, to seize assets to satisfy a judgment. At one time, she was
also responsible for bank seiiures, but these were subsequently assigned to the
Office ,Manager- in October. She also answered questions at the counter
frequently.
The Grievor’s training consisted of five days at the Barrie Sheriff’s
Office observing and learning procedures. From this, she prepared a iManual of
Procedures. The Sheriff also testified that he and the Deputy aided her in
establishing procedures.
The Grievor was unable to keep up with the work flow in her job,
both before and after October 14, 1980 when the Newmarket Office became
fully operative. There was some dispute as to the number of writs of Fi Fa
which she was required to process, which she feLt was unduly large. The
following numbers were calculated by Paul Nowak, the Deputy Sheriff:
May, 1980 0 November 150
June 18 December 187
July 127 January, 1981 233
August 128 February 231
September 157 ,March 245
October 174 April 226
-5-
Mr. Taggart testified that iroblems began before the critical
October 14 date. He recalled a <meeting of the staff held October 7 at -which
discussion was directed to delays in processing lawyers’ letters of instrudons
with regard to levies. This was part of the Crievor’s job. Tne Griever
complained that she was faced with an unreasonably high volume of ,xork. Tne
Sheriff felt that her problem was one of organization, and it was suggested inat
she organize her work station better. He testified that he helped her process
documents, although she testified, that she had no recollection of this.
A further meeting was held on November 24. Again, there were
lawyers’ complaints, and again the Griever asserted that her workload was too
heavy. The Sheriff again felt that the problem was organization, and he
suggested that the, Griever work voluntary overtime to complete her tasks.
-
On December 10, the Griever received her six-month appraisal.
“Improvement Needed” was noted under quality of work, operation and attitude,
organizing ability and initiative. The Sheriff added a memo to the effect that
the Griever was faced with “an exceptionally high volume of work”, but that she
could be more effective if she took time to organize and if she worked more
voluntary overtime.
Despite this appraisal, a follow-up dated February 17, 1981 was
more positive, and Mr. Taggart recommended that the. Crievor be appointed to
permanent staff. There is some confusion as to the significance of this
recommendation. The Crievor believed hat she was then appointed to
-6-
permanent status and that her probationary period had ended while -Mr. Taggarr
said that she knew the recommendation was conditional on further
improvement. Even if the Griever’s view was correct, it was not within ilr.
Taggart’s authority to appoint to permanent staff, and his recommendation
cannot be taken as an interference with the authority of the Deputy .Minister to
release an employee during the first year of employment.
In iMarch, there were further complaints from lawyers about delays
and failure to comply with instructions to levy. A meeting was held on
[March 12, and the Grievor W’as told to organize her work. Throughout ,March,
the Sheriff was more and more concerned about delays, as two lawsuits for
failure to proceed with a levy or seizure had commenced. On .&larch 23, the
Sheriff reviewed about 25 of her files, some with up to 30-day delays in levies.
The Sheriff “took over” the files, in .Ms. Stoyles’ words, and she was warned
that she had one last chance.
/ The work was still not being done to ,Mr. Taggart’s satisfaction in
April, and he felt that others in the office were doing the Griever’s work, even
on an overtime basis, and this was not fair. This led him to recommend release,
which occurred on April 22.
\ Subsequently, more errors were discovered - in withdrawals of writs
of execution, in the information recorded on file cards, and .in the information
in the flex system used for searches. These were attributed to the Griever,
either personally or by people to whom she had delegated her work. The Sheriff
” ,
,
-7-
admitted that some errors ,are inevitable, but the magnitude of those discovered
was unacceptable.
The Grievor believes that the volume of work was too great for one
person to do, particularly if the Employee refused or resisted working overtime, ‘_
as she did. She admitted that she made errors, al.though not to the extent
alleged by Mr. Taggart,. and ‘that she’couid be two to three days behind in
withdrawing writs on lawyers’ instructions and up to a week behind in preparing
the files for writs of Fi Fa. This delay in filing writs meant that action on
instructions to levy could be delayed up to a \?eek as well.
I
As stated at the outset of this award, the Board has jurisdiction over
‘this grievance only if the release masks disciplinary action. Other panels of
this Board have mentioned the difficulty of drawing the line between a release
for failure to meet the requirements of a position and disciplinary action
(Haladay, 94/78, p. 19). In this case, however, .ge have concluded that the
Grievor was released for failing to meet the requirements of her position.
It was the Union’s Tosition that the Grievor was discharged for
refusing to work overtime. The evidence was clear that the Grievor had a
demanding position, particularly once the Newmarket Office became fuily
operative. By early 1981, she was faced with approximately II to 12 writs of Fi
Fa each day. Ann Tidman said that each writ took her about 45 minutes to
process when she filled in for the Griever. If the Griever took that long, she
would be faced with nine-hours work each day on writs plus one to one and
. .._
-8-
one-half on searching. The Griever was not asked how long she took for each
writ. One suspects, however, that it would be less than for Ms. Tidman, as this
was her full-time job and experience with the writs should have increased her
speed. The task was a routine one, with the Grievor required to process certain
designated pieces of information from the writs, rather than to exercise a great
deal of discretion.
Nevertheless, the Grievor was faced with a heavy workload, and one
that required her to work overtime periodically. Did her reluctance to .work
overtime lead to punitive action disguised as a release? We have concluded
that the Griever was released because she failed to meet the requirements of
her job. She did, in’fact, work overtime during the year: 89.5 hours compared
to LMs. Tidman’s 83 hours. However, her work performance was far from
adequate. This is particularly clear if one considers the evidence of her
inability to set priorities and to process levies as they came in. A failure to act
promptly on an instruction to levy could easily result in the sale of the property
to be seized or its movement out of the jurisdiction, leaving the Sheriff
vulnerable to a lawsuit. Immediate action in filing or withdrawing writs is
extremely important to the efficient operation of a Sheriff’s Office, and .Mr.
Taggart appears to have emphasized this fact to the Griever.
In addition, the Grievor showed.an unwillingness to -work sufficient
overtime to allow her to catch up with a serious backlog as the months wore on.
This was a new office and, according to Ms. Tidman, Sheriff Taggart had
warned her that overtime would be necessary in the first few months while
routine was established. Overtime is not stated to be voluntary under the
Collective Agreement (Article 13), leading to the conclusion that the Employer
-Y-
could have insisted on overtime (Brown and Beatty, Canadian tabour
Arbitration, 5:3210). The Sheriff did not, however, insist on overtime - he
advised ,Ms. Stoyles to work overtime so as to catch up with and organize her
work. This was not an unreasonable suggestion in the circumstances.
We would be concerned if an Employer placed totally unreasonable
demands for job performance on an individual and then released the Employee
for~failure to meet such requirements. It was suggested in Haladay (supra) that
such action might be characterized as contrary to s. 18(2)(b) of The Crown
Employees CoUective Bargaining Act, appraisal contrary to the governing
principles and standards. That was not argued in this case, and has been
doubted by other panels of this Board (Tucker, 206/78 (Weatherill) at 5);
(Pecoskie, 95/80 (Barton) it 9). In any event, the Union seemed to stress that
release resulting from unreasonable demands for work performance, which an
Employee cannot meet, constitutes constructive dismissal without just cause.
While Sheriff Taggart is clearly a zealous worker, understandably very
committed to making the Newmarket Office function successfully, we do not
conclude that he placed unreasonable demands on the Grievor. She showed
serious errors in judgement in delaying action on the levies. Other errors in
accurate recording of information from writs came to light after her release,
which also showed a failure to meet the requirements of her job. Undoubtedly,
the workload was a heavy one, requiring periodic overtime to keep up.
However, we do not feel that she was disciplined for failure to work overtime.
Rather, she was released pursuant to s. 22(5) of The Public Service Act.
For these reasons, the grievance is dismissed.
- 10 -
DATED at Toronto this 18th day of (March, 1982.
K. SwiFXon ‘@-Chairman
(See Dissent attach&)
1. Robinson Member
i’ ,f ! .’ ,,,‘^
; ., S.‘. ,,<..’ :.~.
A. G. Stapleton Member
/lb
DISSENT
The employer claims that the griever, who was within the first year
of her employment, was released under Section 22(5) of The Public Service Act.
There is a very narrow line in this case between a disciplinary discharge without
just cause under the guise of a release, and a release not for failure to meet the
reasonable requirements of her job, but the requirements which the evidence
showed to have been unreasonable.
During ten months of her employment, the griever worked a total of
90 hours overtime. Ann Tidman, a fellow employee, worked 83 hours overtime,
and Nancy Barber, who as a Clerk 4 was Office .Manager, worked a scarcely
credible 423 hours. It may readily be concluded:
i) that the requirements of the job. were in excess of
what would be found in a normal and adequately
staffed office, and
ii) that had the grievor been willing to work even more
overtime than she did, she would not have fallen
behind in her work.
Under less pressure than she was, she would also no doubt not have made a good
many of the errors attributed to her.
Hence, if the release is regarded as a disciplinary discharge in
disguise, the evidence suggests that the reason was Mr. Taggart’s annoyance at
the griever’s reluctance (refusal is too strong a word) to work additional
overtime. This would not be just cause, and the grievance should accordingly be
upheld.
-2-
Alternatively, if the only way the grievor could have kept up with
her work was to work even more overtime, then the requirements of the job
should be regarded as unreasonable. In a memorandum attached to the griever’s
Six month Appraisal Report, Mr. Taggart stated:
To our knowledge, in surrounding Sheriff’s offices there are
three employees performing the responsibilities and maintain-
ing the volume of work assigned to this one employee. . . .
Because of her diversified responsibilities, ever-changing
priorities and an exceptionally high volume of work to be
processed according to strict time limits, Miss Stoyles has
little or no time available to organize her major respons-
ibilities.
It is also suggested that this employee work more voluntary
overtime on a regular basis in order to maintain the basic
levels of acceptability in her work area.
With reference to first of these three paragraphs, Mr. Taggart in
his evidence told the Board that iMinistry officials “jumped me on it”. However,
the reported opinions of employees in other offices, in particular in Barrie
where the grievor and others went for five’days of orientation before the York
Region office opened, were to the effect that the York office wasvery much
understaffed. The second and third paragraphs were not disputed and speak for
themselves.
The griever’s Nine month Appraisal Report was much better than
the Sixth month one. Three of the four headings which had been marked
“Improvement Needed” were now deemed to be “Satisfactory”, and the griever
was recommended for appointment to the regular staff. Although the griever
felt that this was tantamount to actual appointment, I accept the view that the
final decision remained open until the full year of her probationary period was
- 3-
up. Nor was ,Mr. Taggart overridden by his superiors in this matter; between
February and April 1981, he changed his mind, and the recommendation that the
griever be released came from him.
Both the griever and Ann Tidman gave estimates of the number of
writs having to be processed each day. Counsel for the employer felt that these
estimates were too high, and ~submitted figures calculated by the Deputy
Sheriff; these however turned out to be higher than he apparently expected.
From January through April, a total of 935 Fi Fa wits were received, making an
average of Ilh per working day. Ann Tidman stated that, with interruptions to
answer the phone and speak to people coming to the office counter, it took her
an average of’ 45 minutes to process and file each writ. This evidence was
uncontradicted. Even if the grievor, after some experience, was able to do it in
somewhat less time, this work would still have taken her at least six hours a
day, leaving only one hour for her other duties, which was clearly insufficient.
Hence, the unrelenting need and pressure on the griever for overtime, which
was frequently reiterated to her. As noted, this pressure can reasonably be
considered to have been the cause of many of the errors attributed to her.
In Re Leslie (94/78), the Board found that:
the bona fides release of an employee from employment
made in good faith during the first year of his employment
for failure to meet the requirements of his position cannot
be considered’to be a dismissal as that term is used in both
The Public Service Act and The Crown Employees CoUective
Bar@ining Act.
-4-
The employer must however act properly and fairly. If the release
results from failure to meet unreasonable requirement of the job, then, although
the release may not perhaps be considered a dismissal in the strict sense of the
word, it can nevertheless be concluded that it was improper and unfair. This
seems to me on the evidence to be the appropriate conclusion in this case.
Accordingly, I would have upheld the gkevance.
” -
7
H. L. Robinson Member