HomeMy WebLinkAbout1982-0070.Pelletier.82-07-21IN T:iE h!ATTER OF AN ARBITRATIOh’
3nde:
THE CRIEV.ViCE SE?TLE?dENT !?OOARZ
Between:
Before:
For the Grikvor:
For the Employer:
Hear&:
CsLS5.C (X. Pe!:etier)
ano
The Crsw in Right cf c’nrxio
(Jijuor Control Bo:r3 3i ;)ntirio! ^ - -’ -..~iu:c)‘eT
J.R.S. ?richarti Vice Chair-z
!.J. Thcmson !vkmber
.i.C. Sta$eton ~Slembe:~
E. Shiimn iennor., Cc-r.s&
Golden, Levinson
R .j. Drrnaj, Counsel
Hicks, Slcriey, Hamii;x, Stewar: 1: S<S:ie
IGle 2 2, 10s:
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INTERIM AWARD
In this case, the zrievor. Rager Pe!lecier yleves IY~CI ne -55
un:usrly disciplined for wearing blue jeans to work at the 1L6r3 s::re
u-?.tre he is employed. !: partim!ar. he alleges :I:at he receiver .a
dicciplinary warning in Janzr::, 19Si. a&king ?im :;k: if he ‘i~ere to ~i?;r
bi-e jeans again he woulc receive a suspension. Se cia!~: ina: :-.s
’ *arning was without just ca:ie.
.A; the outset of :ae hearing the eSmn-,loyer entered 5 ;:elim!r:r:~
objection to the arbitraoili:? af the matter and reoues., -ad wr::ren reas:?s
on the issue of arbitrabili? ,oricr to proceeding tc hear Ce evide:.:?.
iIi:er hearing argument :n the %.sue of arbiirinility s;d on :?e
appropriateness of adjourning to prepare written reasons. the 6csrd
cocluded that we should acjxrn to prepare these reasons. In sd:itisn. ‘ie
imited counsel to submit written argument on one aspect ,-i me :is;e
be:cre us.
The employer’s preliminary objection cannot ;roperly 5e
considered apart from the factual and arbitral background :a this case.
Therefore, in this award w’? have summarized the backgrounc to tne case
prior to evaluating the legai arguments made by counsel.
The background :f the case as it u~as exoiained to is by cc~xe!
a5 as was set out in an earlier decision of this Beard dea;.-.g xi:? :?e
scene issue Sullivan, 573/S: .Keather:il)) is as :~llows:
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1. In July I974 the employer published,certain dress require-
ments including a provision requiring: “Trousers - clean
and pressed”. The employer understood this proP&ition to
encompass blue jeans.
2. fin April 1981 an employee, Mr. PelIetier, was directed
not to wear blue jeans at work, under threat of discip-
line. Mr. Pelletier filed a grievance. That grievance
was referred to arbitration but then withdrawn on the
basis of a form of settlement reached between tie
parties in the Board’s mediation procedures. (See
Sullivan, pp. 2-3, supr.$
3. The union considered the effect of that settlement to
be that employees would be allowed to wear jea-s at
work “provided that they were not tom or had patches”,
asitwas announced in the union newspaper. The
employer, however, had a’different understanding of
the matter and on September 29,1981 set out its
policy as follows:
Re: Store Employees Dress Code
Despite a mlsunder.5tanding which has arisen re,zently,
the ,Board’s policy concerning personal dress as out-
Lined in the Store Operating Manual..., namely trousers
or slacks clean and neatly pressed, has not changed.
This policy of course will apply to female attire a
well. Jeans are not considered appropriate dress for
store employees, while on duty.
4.
On September 29,1981, Mr. Sullivan in his capacity as
unxm President filed a policy grievance concerr.ing
the employer’s “denial of right to wear blue jeans
and general enforcement of unreasonable rules about
personal deportment”. That grievance was referred to
arbitration and on February 4th, 1982 was heard by a panel of the Grievance Settlement Board composed of
Mr. I.F.W. Weatherill (Chairman), Mr. L. Robin and Mr. C. Peckham (Members).
5. On January ll,1982 Mr. Pelletier filed the grievance
which~& before us alleging that he had been unjustly warned. The existence of this grievance was noted by
the panel chaired by Mr. Weatherlll although it was not before that panel for decision (see Sullivan, pp. 2-3,
supra).
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6. On April 23,1982, the panel chaired by Mr. Weatherill
released its decision on the SulIivan case. ln that
decision t! Board decided:
1. the grievance was a policy grievance; and
2. that the grievance did not allege a breach
of any particular substantive provision of
the collective agreement between the parties;
and
3. that the provisions of The Crown Employees
Collective Bargaining Act and the collective
agreement between the parties do not contem- piate prospective adjudikation of rules
promulgated pursuant to the management rights provisions that do not violate specific pro-
visions of the collective agreement; and
4. that as a result the matter was not arbitrable
in this fam at this stage.
However the Board also stated:
1. that the issue of the reasonableness of the employer’s rule against the wearing of blue
jeans by store employees would properly arise in the individual circumstances of an indivi-
dual grievance agaimt a disciplinary act by
the employer. Indeed, the Board referred to
Mr. Pellet&% grievance as an example of this
type of case.
2. that an earlier decision of the Grievance
Settlement Board, McKay (265/80) reached the
correct result but for the wong reason. In
that case, an employee had been wamed that if
he did not stop certain political activity he might be dismissed from the public wvice.
The employee grieved the warning but resigned
w the public service prior to the arbitra- tion hearing. The employer’s preliminary
objection that the Board lacked jurisdiction
sirre the issue was moot was rejected by the
Board stating it was “of the opinion that we do have jurisdiction to entertain the matter
on the basis that the union has a legitimate
interest in questioning the propriety of the
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order given”. In Sullivan the Board said
of McKay: “that case was properly heard on the
merits providing as it did a particular direction
to a particular employee, and where what was in
substance a disciplinary decision had arisen.
(In light of the direct relevance and importance of the Suhivan
case to t:be case before us, we have appended that decision :o ours. 5~1s
making it a part of our decision).
7.
8.
9.
Following the release of Sullivan, the grievance before
us we& scheduled for arbitration.
On June 22,1982;at the outset of the hearing in the
case before us, counsel for the employer stated that
anything said to the griever in January, 1982 concern-
ing blue jeans should be construed as a clarification
of the employer’s policy and not as a disciplinary
warning. Counsel for the union suggested that the comments were properly construed as a discipljnary
waming.
On June 22,1982, at the outset of the hearing before
us, counsel for the employer also stated that.if the
comments made to the grievor were a disciplinary
warning, the employer was hereby withdrawing that
warning. As a result counsef took the position
that the issue before us was moot and that we had no jurisdiction to proceed to hear and decide the merits
of the case.
In considering the implications of the factual backsround in the
absence of having heard any evidence, we have assumed that the evidence
will support the grievor’s allegation that the employer’s conduct in January,
1982 amounted to a disciplinary warning. That issue is, of course, a
question of fact. However, for purposes of determining whether or.not the
employer’s decision to withdraw any warning deprives us of jurisdiction! it
is necessary for us to assume that there was a warning. If :ne hear:n; is
reconvened, the employer would then be in a oositicn to disotite t!lis
factual assumption on the basis of the evidence adduced.
In essence, then, :be issue 5efore us Is ,wne:oer 3: not :ve -.a’ic.
juriscicrion to %ar the griever’s allegation that he ‘was ti:jusTiy ~:rn?s
against wearing blue jeans to work. This issue arises in tne context of a
dispute 5etween the employe: and union that has existed for at least a yea:
and a half concerning the propriety of wearing 51ue jeans at ~.vor:.
Furtnermore, t7is individual grievance against a disciplinary act o!’ ::-.e
emoloye: follou~s earlier findings by another panel of tne Boa::‘:
1. that the propriety of tne pronibition cannot 5e
challenged in a policy grievance, and
2. rhat the propriety of the rule would ,orooe:ly
5e put in issue in the context of an individual
grievance disputing a disciplinary decision.
If ::;e employer had not purported ?o withdraw the disciolinar:
warning during the preliminary arguments in tne case before us, there can
be no doubt that we would have had jurisdiction. The case would 5e an
individual grievance and we would have had jurisdiction pursuant to .\rticle
21.5 of the co!lective agreement and section 18(2)!c) of The Crown
Employees CoIlective Bargaining Act. Both of these provisions grant
jurisdiction to the Board to hear and decide individual grievances
concerning disciplinary acts.
Furthermore, absent the employer’s withdrawal, there coulc
have been no question of res judicata arising from the Sullivan case. The
Sullivan case disposed of the jurisdictional issue: Could a policy grievance
brought by the ,union raise the propriety of the orohi5ition an blue jeans”
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The issue before us wo?ld be simply: Was the discipliner:: ivarning .%8i:hc,-:
just cause? In that context, the propriety of the prohibition on blue jes.::
would be put in issue as part of the analysis of just cause. Ratner t?~
hearing a case that \vould be res judicata, it would, in our opinion, be a
case of just the type that was contemplated in the Sullivan case as ::.e
proper way to test tne propriety of a rule.concerning a dress code, b-:
which was not in any ‘xay considered on the merits in Sullivan. Thus, :^,e
doctrine of res judicata has no application to the issues before us.
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In addition. absent the employer3 withdrawal, there could be -3
question of the union obtaining ‘indirectly what it failed to obtain direc:l:J
in the Sullivan case. The issue for us in an individual grievance would :e
the correcmess of the disciplinary act in the particular circumstances.
The result of the case lnay or may not have a more generalizea effec:.
The breadth and nature of the impact of the individual case would de?e:o
on the appropriate application of stare de&ii in an arbitral context. Th.3,
the employer’s suggestion that the bringing of the individual grievance ‘Xas
somehow improper in light of Sullivan is ill-founded.
These conclusions bring us to the only remaining issue before
us: Does the employer’s purported withdrawal of the warning during the
proceedings at the outset of the case deprive us of the jurisdiciion ‘Ee
would otherwise have had? ‘Ue received written submissions from counsel
for the union on this issue and have considered those submissions ir in
addition to the oral arguments in reaching our decision be!ow.
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Before ionsldering the relevant 1a.u. it ,s ;sei,Jl to out ;n i -:r?
relief exactly what accepting the employer’s ocsitlzn would mean. T-e
issue of blue jeans a. - 3ork is a contentious one for :~-.e parties. For o:e: a
year the union has Ceen artemoting :c out the prohib;:;sn against blue ~?~.ns
in issue before the 3oard. The Board has rejectee tne policy grieve:ce
route. The Board +.rs suggested that an incividual grievance ;uould oe :-le
appropriate route. An indiv:dilal grievance is tnen orought and oroc?ised
through the grievance proce&re, referred to arb;:rs:ion and scher-:eo
before us. The issue is now ready to 5e tested. Ho&ever, at the last mi::;:e
the employer atterrots to eiiminate any “difference” bet*ween the pa.-:es
by withdrawing rhe suspension. As a result the employer says the ,mz::er
cannot be arbitrate;. It can only be arbitrated, the employer claims. 1.7 a
new individual grievance. Thus rhe grievor or some otner employee -zus:
again wear blue jeans to work, attract discipline, grieve that discip!ine and
have the matter referred to arbitration. On the emoloyer’s argumen:. tile
employer could then once again withdraw the disci?line and the process
would start once more. The employees would, as a result, be deprived of
the opportunity to nave a determination of whether or not discipline could
properly be imposed for wearing blue jeans to work. Furthermore, percing
such a determination, the employees Would forever >e at risk in that if they
failed to obey an order to not wear blue jeans (whetner the order is orooer
or not), they woulc be guilty of the offence of insubordination quite roar:
from the issue of biue jeans itself.
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.The weft known dicrcn, “obey now, grieve later” is ;a:?3 uor~n
the efficacy of the grievance and arbitral process for dis;:s:n: oi
differences between the parties. If. the efficacy of that me&;:..ism is
undermined by depriving the employees of an oooortunity for an arbitrel .
,determination of the propriety of an em?loyer’s Ssciplinary decis::?s, t5.e
foundarion of the commitment to arbitration instead of seLf-helo .:ouid be
weakened.
In essence t,he difficulty ,wi:h the employer’s ?osi?io: -. tha:
withdrawing the warning eli-ninates any “Sfference arisi:; frcm
tne...application, administration or alleged contravention” of the coi!e&ive 1
agreement - is that it leaves unresolved the.core “difference” her-eon the
grievor and the employer: Can the griever properly be disci;;ined for
wearing blue jeans to work? If the employer’s~submissions were accepted!
that issue would remain in exactly the same for-n as it was prim to tfiis
hearing. Indeed, during the hearing, in response to a question irsm, the
Vice-Chairman, counsel for the grievor answered the Board that if the
employer’s submission were accepted and a new warning were issued ant
then grieved, the substantive issue at the subsequent arbitration woi;lC;
remain exactly the same as the issue before us. In the meantine, however,
another year would have passed, the employees would have been deorivec
of a resolution on the merits for that time and :he employees wo~:ld ail be
at risk with respect to a charge of insubordina:ion. Such a restit makes
Iittle sense. Fortunately, the arbitral jurisprcAence that we ?sve bee?.
referred to and a common sense reading of .the collective agreeTeni an:
the statute does not dictate such a result. Indee?, it supports dismiSS3f 2:
the employer’s position. These natters are reviewed belou’.
During the preliminary proceeci~.gs, the em?lojer s;J;:?s:?~.
that it shwld be free to de&e which cases i: wishes to iiriga:e before ::..s
Board and thar it should be free to wir:raw cases unilaterally :.v
‘. withdrawing the penalty s? as to deprive us oi jurisdiction over cases . .
does not wish us to hear. Three comments on :~-.:s proposirion are in order.
First, the grievance procedure is ::e place to dispose of casts
that the employer does not wish to litigate further. In this case, :ze
employer denied the grievor’s position througksut the multi-step grievance
procedure. As a result, the matter was referred to this Soard and we ‘were
proqerly seized of it. At tkis stage, it is too late for the employer to
express its concerns as to the sui?ability of 5s case and these facts for
litigating the dress code rules as they apply to a oarticular individjual.
Second, the employer’s suggestion that the particular facts of
this case made it an inappropriate one tc se.v l e as the test of the orsoriery
of the discipline for wearing blue jeans was no: persuasive. Dnce the issues
betKeen the parties were made clear throug? the submissions of counsel,
we were not persuaded that there was anything particular or peculiar about
the theory of the griever’s claim that would provide a rational basis for 3e
employer’s sudden decision to withdraw tcie warning so as to avoic a
hearing on t,he merits.
hlrd, once we were seized of t?e caseQ it is no longer ooen to
the ornployer to determine unilaterally the szitability of this case I<:
arbitration. Ra:?er, the decision at this stage ~:;st be 2 mutaa! xc-,
reflecting a genuine settlement of the en:ire dispc-e between the pa:ties,
and not a unila:eral attempt to avoid ac;., --ssing :ie meri:s of t:.e real
issue in dispute between tI?e griever and the employer by setliing a posizion
sf the dispute be:.ueen the parties.
There are a n;lmber of reporrec cases cealing vii:.-, ihe issue of
:he arbitrability si a grievance where the employer has conceded s?eci:!c
relief, or where r.ie issue for some ‘other reason !z.s become moot: The
seminal case is Re United Steelworkers and International Nickel Co. of
Canada Ltd. (1972), 24 L..-\.C. 51 (Weiler). In that.case, the griever grieved
a decision which made his position’redundsnt and ssught mcnetary reiief.
The company conceded t?e relief requeste: in the grievance zf:ei the first
day of hearing on the merits. Tine company objected to the continued
arbitration of the matter, on the grounds rhat the -nafter was “acadeT&?‘,
and “the~Board was without jurisdiction because it would grant no soecific
relief to the employee” (page 56). The arbitration joard focnd that i? had
not lost jurisdic:ion because of the fat: that s-,ecific reiief had been
granted. The Board stated:
Our conclusion, then, is that there is no rule of law or
of this contract which bars an individual grievance for a
declaration that company conduct affecting him was illegal.
.Moreover, there are good reasons why an individual may have real interest in grieving for such a declaration and arbitra-
tion boards should not develop an “implied” rule excluding
such claims . . . . Hence, when’ an employee grieves zking for
specific~relief the employer cannot deprive him of his right to adjudication of the nature of the contract breach by con-
ceding the specific relief. For this~reason also, the juris-
dictional objection must fail. (page 57)
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Since ?ro!essor ‘Xeiler’s decision in LVCO, (supra)! ::>:;:a::-:
have substantially followed this line of reasoning. Re Union Gas Co. ef
Canada Ltd. and International Chemical Worker’s Uniorr, Local 721 (1973) j
L.A.C. (2d) 132 (Rayner) deals with a’situation in which the griever wis
sent a cheque for the sick pay claim involved in her grievance
approximately one week before the scherfufed date of arbitration. She did
not casn tne cheque, but the company took the position ::.z: it %r
tendered the amount af her claim on her, and therefore the ‘::isn x:.i
“estopped” from proceeding with the grievance. The .Arbitra::an Boar:.
citing Professor X’eiler in INCO, found that:
Since the grievor might well have interest in deter-
mining her rights under the collective agreement, the
payment of the cheque is not sufficient to openly
dispose of aff matters fn dispute of the parties. 1”
other words, there is still a Yfs” fn existence
between the par-ties, and thaefore this board should
determine the issue. (page 1344) (emphasis added)
Arbitrator ‘Weatherill took the same approach inRe Imperial
Tobacco Products (Ontario) Ltd. and Tobacco Workers’ Iotemational Union,
Local 323 (19751, d L.&C. (2d) 38g. In that case, tbe matter was heard an
its merits, but before the Arbitration Board cou!d render a decision, the
union nominee died. A new Board vith a new union nominee was
reconvened to hear the case again, since the two remaining members of ??e
Board were not able to come to an agreement. before the second hearing.
the company tendered on the griever the amount claimed in the jrievante.
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and took the position that there was “no xatter remain:?.3 :a ?P
determined by the board” (page 389). The .?,r5i:ration Soard refuse: 12
accept that submission. The Beard !ound instead zhat:
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This tendered payment of the relief asked is not, in
our view, tantamount to an “allowing” of the grievance.
There is no suggestion that the company was prepared to.
acknowledge the validity, in principle, of the union’s
position in this case. If that had been the case, :hen
such acknowledgement, together with payment, might in-
deed be considered to constitute a complete answer to
the matter, and proceeding before this board might be
thought to be a pointless exercise which should not be
be allowed.
Having regard to then circumstances in which the
company’s tender of payment has been made, however, we
can only conclude that the company has sought to avoid
the determination by this board of the merits of a case
of which it is already seized. While we agree that it
would be open to parties, by a true settlement, to
put an end to this board’s jurisdiction, it is not,
in our view, open to one of the parties to avoid
in thii way the outcome of a procedure already
under way. (page 390) (emphasis added)
The issue arose again at NC0 in Re INCO and United
Steelworkers, Local .6500 (1975), 9 L.A.C. (2d) 83 (SiTlmons), where the
grievor, at the time of the arbitration, had alread! been awarded the
position he sought. Since his grievance sought only the: he be awarded the
position, and no other specific relief, the company took the position that
there was nothing left to arbitrate. The arbitrator reviewed both
American and Canadian arbitration law on the iss,Je, and uitbnately
concluded. that it should hear the grievance. It sets out its reasons for
doing so at some length;
There are two basic reasons for our decision. One, at the
time of filing the grievance the grievor was directly
affected by the decision of the employer and had a valid
(as opposed to a hypothetical) complaint because of same. WhiIe he does not now seek the position for which he claimed in his grievance, we ‘&a unable to conclude that
he no longer has any interest in having the complaint determined through arbitration.
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There has been no settlement of his complaint e
and because of the evidence presented in this
connection it would be dangerous for this board to
conclude that his complaint had disappeared in ab
respects. Secondly, it is this board’s view that in
the absence df a settlement, all valid (as that word
is intmrled to be interpreted) grievances should be
resolved through arbitration. We are supported in
thii result by the Ontario Labour Relations Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 370) which reads:
37(l) Every collective agreement shaff
provide for the final and binding settle-
ment by arbitration, without stoppage of work, of all difference between the
parties arising from the interpretation,
application, administration or alleged
violation of the agreement, including any
question as to whether a matter is arbitrable.
It appears to this board that unless it is absolutely
clear that the difference that had existed has totafly
disappeared a board of arbitration should decide the
isrue rm its merits. In the circumstances of this
case the board is not certain that the difference has
totally disappeared. (page SS) (emphasis added)
The decision reported as Re American Can of Canada Ltd. and
Sheet Metal Workers International Aasociation, Local 487 (1975). :: LAC.
(?d) 73 (O’Shea) might be viewed as taken; a contrary ap;roach. however,
in that case it appears that the Union was attempt?.; to c::.vert an
indivic;lal grievance into a policy grievance, an attern;; the arbitrator
refused to permit. That is not the case 5efore us. Here an ind:vidual is
seeking clarification of whether or not k is permitted :o wear b:de jeans
at & store in his circumstances. -
In summary, the cases aooear to upnold tre ar51:rzoilit)’ of
zrievsnces in circumstances like this en two :ases. FLrst. uere :he
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underlying issue which was raised in ::e grievance remains, the arbitration
board will be prepared to issue .a .deciaration, even if specific relief is no
longer appropriate. Secondly, the more narro,wly, if the relief granted by
the employer does not exhaust the relief asked for or available in a
particular case, then the fact that . *:e employer has granted some relief
wiil not deprive an arbitration boarc of jurisdiction to hear the merits of
the case. Both of these grounds independently support the arbitrability of
the case before us although, in light of Sullivan (57S/Slj, the second ground
is the more a?p:opriate one to rely or..
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.A consideration of the collective agreement and The Crown
Employees Collective Bargaining Act similarly supports the proposi<ion
that the employer’s withdrawal of Ihe. ‘warning does not deprive us of
jurisdiction fo continue to adjudicste the remaining issues before us.
Article 21.5(e) of the collective agreement provides that in failing
settlement of an employee’s grievance, the grievance may be submitted to
this Board, and that a determination by this i3oard shall be final and
binding. Article 21.1(c) defines a grievance as “a difference arising from
the interpretation, application, administration, or alleged contravention of
the provisions of the agreement”. Therefore, the griever’s complaint was a
grievance and remains a grievance despite the employer’s withdrawal of
the warning as the grievor alleges that the employer’s warning was a
contravention of the collective agreement. By withdrawing the warning
the employer has “0’ concedeh tha: allegation and thus the “differer?c=“,
thus the “grievance” remains, and thus our jurisdiction remains.
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.\iorr;?g in The Crown Empbyees Collective Bargaining Act 3
incons;i:ent wuir; this conclusion since 1: +xoliciti! preserves any ;r.evance
rights arising c.-,ier the collective agrs*-en:. Section :5 provides: “!n
additic: to any xner rights of griex~ance ::der a ccllective agreement”, an
emplo! e-2 may grieve and have arb.:rsted certain specific matters.
Therefore, our jurisdiction found unrtr the collective agreement is
unimpa:red by :?e Act. Indeed, the sim,..z:ity ;n stxcture of this .Act ant
the Onrario L&our Relations Act with respect 1; arbitration procedures
emphasres the direct relevance of the srbitrai jsispruieace referred to
above.
Cx:.sel for the union sumrsrized ner written silbmission by
stating: “It is t-e position of the cnior :.xt by xlthdraxing the specific
oral wxning imposed in this case with;-: concec:ng that :ne grievsr is in
fact er.:itled tc wear blue jeans to work .n his store, the employer nas not
resolved the issue raised by the grievsnce, ant that the griever is sti!l
entitle4 to a declaration as to his righz under the collective agreement”.
In sur.mary, Ee ag:ee: there remalx a grievance to be adjudicated
althou@ the relief claimed no longer yeed inc:-de a withdrawal of the
warning. We have therefore asked the Registrar :a schedule a continuation
of this matter ior the first available mc:.Jally com’enient cate.
Be!sre closing the interim award we should ?ote that cWnse1
for t:-s emplcb~er indicated during h:r yelimirzry sub,n,issions :hat he
intenced to re:y upon Re Metropolitan Toronto &xvd of Commissioners of
Police v. Metropolitan Taonto Police hnociatior, et al (;?Sl). 12: 3.L.R.
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(3d) 684 (On:. C.,l. and Bank of British Columbia V. Union of i3ank
Employees, Local 2;OO (unreported judgment of the British’ Columbia
Supreme Court date: March 9, 1982). Ccunsel agree< ,xith the chair%?.
that these cases we:? relevant, if at al!, to the merirs sf tne case anti in
particular to the sc:?e of arbitra? ieviw of :5e reasc3abIeness of rules.
and rnat they did no: affect the preliminary issues. Therefore, we >ave XT
considered the impac: of these cases in :?Gs awar< and ‘xe~ will wan: to hear
submissions at the :ert hearing before making army findings concerni?~
their relevance to tbz case before us.
DATED at Toronto Cis’21st day of July! 1982.
‘I.R.S. Prichard Vice Chairmin
1.3. Thomson Memoer
A&. Stapleton \\emoer
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