HomeMy WebLinkAbout1982-0198.Whitehead et al.82-08-09IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
138/82
133/82
200/82
201/82
202/82
Between:
Before:
For The Griever:
For the Employer:
Hearing:
OPSEU (Lee Whitehead et al)
Griever
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources)
Employer
R. J. Roberts - Vice Cha.~rmm
E. J. 3ounsall - flei?lSer
t!. Roberts - Member
N. LUCZay Grievance/Classification Officer
Ontario Public Service Err,p:syees irnion
ii. J. Gorchinsky
Chief Staff Relations Officer
Civil Service Commission
June 8, 1382
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INTERIM AWARD
I. Summary of Submissions oft the Parties:
At the outset of the hearing in this case, the Employer,
the Ministry of Natural Resources, made a preliminary
objection to jurisdiction. It was agreed at the hearing
that the matter raised in this preliminary objection
would be dealt with in an Interim Award before any evidence
was heard on the substantive case.
A. The P,relimin~ary Objection:
Essentially, the Employer contended that this Board
was withoutjurisdiction because the matter complained
of by the grievors involved the exercise by the Employer of an
-exclusive management right. This exclusive management right,
submitted the Employer, was the allocation of the grievors
to an hours-of-work schedule entitled Schedule 6, which
was set forth along with-other similar schedules in
Article 7 of the Collective Agreement. Counsel for the
Employer contended that because no express provision in
the Collective Agreement or in any applicable statute
fettered thee Employer in allocating, classes of employees
to various of these schedules, including Schedule 6,
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the Employer possessed complete discretion to make these
determinations as it saw fit, and the Grievance Settlement
Board was without jurisdiction to review such decisions.
B. The Response of the, Union:
The Union, the Ontario Public Service Employees Union,
contended that it was within the power of this Board to
review the "administration", etc., of the Collective
Agreement by the Employer, including Article 7, relating
~. to the hours-of-work schedules. The Union submitted that
all of the schedules set forth in this Article of the
Collective Agreement were ambiguous, and as such, their
application to various classes of employees was reviewable
for conformity to the past practise of the Employer at
the time of negotiation of the Collective Agreement. It
was in the light of this past practise; the Union contended,
that the Collective Agreement was reached.
it The Union submitted that if the Board agreedthat
had jurisdiction upon the above basis, the Union would
introduce evidence of past practise as to the criteria
applied by the Employer in allocating classes of employees
to the various hours-of-work schedules in Article 7 of
the Collective Agreement, and how the Employer had changed
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the working conditions of the grievors to such an extent
as to bring them outside the most significant of the
criteria applicable to Schedule 6: The Union indicated
that in a hearing of the substantive case, it would seek
either restoration of working conditions appropriate to
Schedule 6 employees or reassignment of the grievors to
a more appropriate hours-of-work schedule.
II. Summary of.Award:
Upon due consideration of the arguments. of the
parties we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to
make the review that the Union indica~ted it was seeking.
We cannot accept the evidence of past practice that the
Union seeks to introduce here. A prerequisite for the
admission of such evidence is that there must be an
ambiguous provision of'the collective agreement that
such evidence might assist in clarifying. Hire, the
collective agreement contains no such ambiguity. Moreover,
Article 7.7 of the collective agreement indicates that it
is an exclusive right of management to transfer employees
from one hours-of-work schedule to another. It seems that
this carries the necessary implication that it is an
exclusive management right to make the initial. assignment
of an employee to an hours-of-work schedule, unless that
’
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right is limited by clear language of the collective
agreement. NO such express limitation was pointed.
out to us in this case.
III.. Detailed~ Consideration of 'then Is'sues Raised by the Parties:
The grievers in this case all were classified in a
classification known as Resource Technician Senior. Until
March 1, 1980, they were not included in :the bargaining unit.
On March 1, 1980 the Resource Technician classification,
along with a number of other classifications, was transferred
to the bargaining unit by agreement between the parties.
Prior to this transfer, the Resource Technician class.
was allocated to-schedule 6 of the Employer's hours-of-work
.schedules. (Apparently, the schedules have been used by
the Employer over a considerable period.of time for both
management and bargaining unit employees.) Section 7.3
of the Collective Agreement sets forth as follows the hours
of work for Schedule 6:
7.3 SCHEDULE 6
The normal hours of work for employees on this
schedule shall be a minimum of thirty-six and
one-quarter (36-l/4) hours per week.
It will be noted that employees allocated to this schedule
are required to work a minimum of 36-l/4 hours per week
but'there is no maximum.
The effect of this is that
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employees allocated to this schedule are not entitled to
overtime, either in the form of monetary compensation or
compensatory time off.
Counsel for the Employer explained that generally,
classes of employees which are allocated to Schedule 6
involve employees who have duties which place irregular
demands upon their time. They might not have set hours
or be required to work the same.length of time each
day. Because of this, they are paid on a weekly, instead
of hourly, basis.
At the hearing; counsel for the Employer made an
extensive review of the Collective Agreements affecting
the qrievors and the legislation dealing with the
jurisdiction of the Grievance Settlement-Board. We
were impres~sed with the thoroughness of this review
and followed the submissions of counsel for the Employer
with considerable interest. We agree that this review
amounted to a substantial showing that no provision of
the Collective Agreement and no provision of the Crown
Employees Collectiye~ Bargainin Act expressly gives an
employee the right to grieve a decision by the Employer
to allocate him or his class to a particular hours-of-
work schedule.
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We also agree that in allocating individual employees
to various hours-of-workschedules, the.Employer is not,
in fact, administering .the provisions of Article 7 of
the collective agreement. The Union submitted that in
so doing'the Employer did administer Article 7. This
p~rovision of the collective agreement is patently
ambiguous, the Union submitted, in that it merely sets
forth~the hours of work of the various schedules and
does not describe the criteria for allocating employees
among the various schedules. This ambiguity, the Union
contended, entltled the Union to bring in evidence of past
practise in this regard and ask the Board to rule as to
-whether the working conditions of the qrievors had changed
to such an extent to bring them outside the most significant
of the criteria applicable to Schedule 6.
y-i
As indicated, we cannot agree that in allocating
employees among the various hours-of-work schedules, the
'Employer is engaged in administering Article 7 of the
collective agreement. In this regard we note that
Article 7 is devoid of any language indicating that ~,.,,yy
any agreement was reached between the parties on
how this allocation function ought to be performed;
rather, the hours-of-work s.chedules in the Article are
descriptive, .with no directional content whatever.
.
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Section 7.7 of Article 7 does contain some directionre-
garding the transfer of employees between hours-of-work schedules.
Xather than assist the case of the Union, however, the
presence of this provision appears to assist the case
for the Employer. Section 7.7 'provides as follows:
7.7 Where the Employer intend to transfer
employees or an employee from one schedule
to another schedule, the Employer will
discuss the transfer with the Union"@rior
i to such tmasfer. When the trans'f,er~ occurs,
the employee's weekly salary based on his
basic hourly rate shall be adjusted accord-
ingly.
This provision appears to contemplate that.there will
be discussion between the Employer and the Union prior to
a transfer from one schedule to another. Implicit in this
is,the notion that the decision to transfer is within the
exclusive riqh,t of management, the sole limitation thereupon
being the requirement for prior discussion.
The above observations reinforces the conclusion that wehave
reached that in allocating employees among its various
schedules, the Employer is executing an exclusive
management right and is not administering an ambiguous
provision of the collective agreement. In such circumstances,
evidence,of past practise can be.of no assistance to the
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Union. Unless fettered by the Collective Agreement the
Employer remains free unilaterally to perform this allocation
function. This includes the freedom to alter'its prior
.practise with respect to allocation to hours-of-work
schedules, so long as it acts ingood faith and does not
jeopardize the integrity of the bargaining unit. There
was no indication that the actions~ of the Employer with
respect to the grievors herein were taken in bad faith.
The grievances ,are dismissed. We lack jurisdiction to
make the review requested by the Union.
DATED AT London, Ontario this .$a day of
1982.
R. J. Roberts, Vice Chairman
"I concur"
H. Roberts, ‘??ember
" issent." (dissent to follow)
E:G. Jounsall, PIember