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HomeMy WebLinkAbout1982-0270.Union.82-09-1511% THE MATTER OF.AN ARBISRATION Under THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT Before / TRE GRIEVANCE SETTLEUENT BOARD Between: Before: For the Union: Mr. G. Richards For the Employer: Hearing: OPSEU (Union Grievance) 'Griev~or - And - The Crown in Right of Ontario (Civil Service Commission) Employer Mr.E.B.Jolliffe,Q.C. Vice-Chairman Prof. T. Traves Member ifr. A.G. Stapleton Member Grievance/Classification Officer Ontario Public Service Employees Union Xr. 14.J. Gorchinsky Chief Staff Relations Officer Civil Service Commission June 14, 1982 ._ ‘- -2- DECISION 'L '_. ., .I This case had its origin in a complaint by Ms. H. Pakcsta that she had not received severance benefits, i.e. severance'pay,, on her resignation from her post with the Ministry cf Health. Actually, the matter came on for hearing in the fcrm cf : '- .- . a "Union Grievance" ‘before a panel of.this -Board ,chaired by Mr. M. b Teplitsky;Q.C.,.on,March 8 , 1982.“ It was.d,ismissed or deemed to have been'withdratin-on the 'ground that it ,h~ad not been proceeded .,~ :' with in accordance with the time requirements of Article 27.9 in the applicable Collective Agreements. Howetier, it was said: "Ml?. Gcrchinsky (representing the Civil Service Commission) concedes that there is no ban .to the Union's grieving again." It was also said: "It appears that an important-question, is raised by the Union which requires'the resolution of prior decisions of the Grievance Settlement Board which are said to be conflicting." .. On consent. of the parties (of tihich'the Registrar was notified on May 19) the matter again came on fcr hearing before this panel of the Board on-June 14. No witnesses were--called, but three exhibits were filed,. together with several previous decisions. There being no dispute about the facts, arguments were made by the representatives of the parties in relation to the interpretation cf certain language in the collective agreement, and in the applicable - 3 - statutes as well as the import of two decisicns cf this Board wr,ich are alleged by the Union (but denied by the Employer) to be in conflict. The follcwing provisicns appear in Section 19(l) of the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act: , Every collective agreement shall be deemed tc prcvide tha: in the event the parties are unable to effect a settlement cf any di'ferences between them arising from the interpretation, applicaticn, xbninistraticn or alleged ccntravention of the agreement, including any questicn as to whether a matter is arbitrable, such matte: may ba referred for arbitraticn to the Grievance Settlement Board and the Board after giving full cpport&ty to the parties tc present their evidence and to make their submissicns, shall decide the matter and its decision is final and binding L&XX the parties and the employees covered by the agreement. rn this case it is clear that the parties have been unable to effect a settlement of a certain difference between them arising from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged con- travention of .Article 25 in the Collective Agreement. We think it important, however, tc define precisely what the issue is, and to confine our approach to the rescluticn cf that particular issue. In the course of argument we were referred tc a great many different clauses in the agreement. Of these, very few relate directly to the issue, which involves entitlement tc severance pay under Article 52. .Article 25 is alsc important because it states how an employee's "length of continuous service" 1s to be accom.ulate3, ‘, .- 4 - computed and determined. .) i: 1 On examining the agreement as a whole i= is apparent that there are many di,fferent co'ntingencies which can arise requiring the . interpretation.and application of "continuous service" (as defined in Article'ZS) to various entitlements under' ether' Articles cf the .- ~.., Agreement, including Article 52. owe think it prudent to limit the scope of this decision to the contingency.in which Ms. Pakcsta was denied ,severance pay. It would be rash to attempt the determinaticn of other issues, which at the moment are hypothetical, althcugh.they may require references to arbitration in future. We shall therefore not venture to deal with every problem mentioned to us in argument. The.scope of this particular case will become clearer by reference to the circumstances surrounding Ms. Pakosta's claim tc. be entitled t'o severance pay. The Employer's statement of the facts (and its interpre- tation) is summarized in a letter from Mr. G. Kytayko, Regional Personnel Administrator, to Mr. M. Campbell, a Staff Representative .' of-O.P.S:E.U.,dated February-4, 1981, as follows:. Mrs. Pakosta started work with the Ministryof Health on July 21, 1975. She resigned on Septenbar 4, 1980.. &it-g the period cf her employment, she was absent from duty Githcut pay for a total cf 269. days. Since this- absence was related to a workmen's ccmpensation -j- claim, the first six months of the absence did net affect severance benefits or entitlement (Refer Collective Pqrement. .3rtic?e 52.7). "Jhe bahce of her absence wlthcut pay amcunted to 86.5 days. It is the Ministry's interpretaticn that the pericds cf absence specified in Article 52.7 affect both the amount cf ani qualifying period for severance pay. lhsrefcre, Mrs. Pakcsta's absence cf 86.5 days was applied against her. full-time pericci cf service. Tt,e net effect of th.i..s was that she had less tbn five years continucus service and as a result did net qualify for severance benefits. The Union does not dispute the facts on record, but con- tests the Employer's interpretation of .Article 25 and Article 52,as they apply to a case such as that of Ms. Pakosta. Strictly speaking, t,he issue relates tc the so-called "qualifying period." It is now necessary to qucte the applicable wcrds in the Collective Aqreement. Article 52 (made effective April 1, 1978) provides fcr severance pay upon various terms and conditions. Relevant wcrds are the following: 52.3 An employee who is appointed on or after the first day cf January, 1970 is entitled to severance pay fcr each year of continucus service up tc and includirg the 31~ day of .Yarch, 1978 . . . . . (b) where the emplcyee has completed five (51 years cf continuous service .a& ceases to be an employee fcr any reason other rhan, (i) dismissal fcr cause under section 22 of the .%ct, or (ii) abandcnwnt cf position under section 20 cf the .*t. in the amount equal tc one (1) week cf salary fcr each year cf service. - 6 - .’ : :. . . . : % 52.4 Sn employee, . . . . . .' : ': (b) who has completed a minimum of five (5) years of continuous service and who ceases to be an employee for any~‘reascn~other than, (i) dismissal for cause under section 22 of the .kt,,or (ii).kendonment of position under section 20 of the Act, is entitled to severance pay for continuous service frcm and titer the first day of April, 1978 equal to one (1) week of salary for each year of service from,and after the first day of April,, 1978. '/. Also relevant is an exceptionset out in Article 52.7: ,. 52.7 .. An employee is not entitled to severance pay in respect of - a period, . . . . . . .;,' .1 '(c) after the first six (61 months that he is receiving benefits pursuant to an award under Rie Workmen's Compensation Act, but this clause shall,mt apply durirq a period when the accumulated credits 'of the employee are being convertedarx~paid to the employee,at a rate equal to the difference between the regular salary of the employee and the ccsipensation awarded. It will- have been noted that the-terti "'continuous service" was used in both 52-3 .and 52.4'. The'Union relies 'on-the definition of that term in Article 25, in which the relevant words are as follows : 'Y'- : ._ ‘, 25.1 An employee's length of continuous service till ac&mulate upon ccmpletion of a probationary paricd cf not more than one (1) year and shall commence from: (a). the date of~appointment to~the Classified +rvice.for those employees with no prior service in the Ckario public Service; . . . . . _' 25.3“ Continuous~ service shall be deemed to have 'terminated if: ‘(a) an employee resigns or retires: . . . . . - 7 - The Employer's case rests on the exception set cut in Article 52.7 above. The Union, on the other hand, contends that the definition of "continuous service" given by Article 25.1 governs the matter. To give effect to its interpretaticn the Employer has issued revisicns cf certain pages in the Manual of Administration, Exhibits 2 and 3. While these cannot over-ride the provisions cf the Collective Agreement, they throw some light on the positicn taken by the Employer. In particular, the Emplcyer has developed a device known as the "Benefit Credits Date," which is explained in Exhibit 3.. It is not necessarily the same as the date of appointment. It represents an adjustment.forward frcm the date of appointment to take.account of pericds fcr which the Collective Agreement has made exceptions in respect cf a "hiatus" in Service --- e.g. a period of lay-off --- which in the employer's view must be 1 i, subtracted from the employee's qualification period. Exhibit 2 was issued on January 21, 1980, and was in force when Ms. Pakosta retired on September 4, 1980. The relevant i : passages therein must be quoted: 'the effective date cf ccmmencement cf continuous service: a) is the date of appointment to the classified service, for those employees with no prior service in the Cntario -Public Service: . . . . . -8- 'Ihe following constitute a hiatus or break in ser~vice:. leaves+f-absence without pay of greater than thirty (301 calendar days: . . . . . ENTITLEMENP - Eligibility for termination pay is determinedby actual date of commencement as determined-by: a.) the dates of appointment to .the classified service, for these employees with noprior service in the Ontario Fublic Service; . . . . NOTE: . . . . . .- 2) Amunt of Benefit - The amcunt of the benefit is determined by actual length of service (as adjusted for hiatuses) at the date cf separation..... Exhibit 3 was issued on December 1, 1981, more than a year after Ms. qak'osta's resignation. However, it further illus- trates the Employer's view of the requirements of Article 25and Article 52. It contains much clearer recognition of the exceptions which the Employer considers necessarily reduce the length of "continuous service" for certain purposes. The following are,the relevant passages: 'IS period of continuous service determines vacaticn entitlements and the amount of severance pay. In addition, the date cf commence- ment of continuous service governs the entitlement to .an attendance gratuity ai-d/cr severance pay..... Continuous service is the pried of full-time, unbroken service between the recognized date of commencement of continucus service and the date the employee ceases tc be a civil servant, reduced by absences which constitute a hiatus in service..... The date of ccmmencement cf an emplcyee's continucus service is either: a) the date of appointment to the classified service for those employees with no prior service in the Ontario public Service. ,..... - 9 - WE: . . . . . 21 'll-e date cf ccmmancement of continucus service does net change once it is established (see Banefits Credit Bate. this secticn)..... lhe following leaves or separaticns constitute a hiatus or gap, bA do not break an emplcyee's ccntinucus service: leaves-of-absence without pay cf greater than 30 days excluding maternity leave and adopticn leave;..... NOTE: &rids of full-time, unbroken service befcre and after a hiatus are deemed to be a single period cf continucus service..... 'Fe following absences do net affect an emplcyee's parrod cf ccntinuous service:..... leaves-of-absence without pay of thirty days or less..... The IPPEB System has teen set up tc accept a Benefits Credit Bate which is used to determine an employee's vacation &/or severance pay entitlements. 'D-e Benefits Credit Bate is the date of ccmnence- avant cf cmtinuous service adjusted forward to reflect any hiatus in service. 'Were there is no hiatus, the Benefits Credit Bate ti the date cf comwncement cf continucus service are the sane..... In different circumstances the problem has ccme before this Board on previous occasions. In this case there was much controversy about the effect of Bickerstaff and Turner 90/79 and 74/79, decided unanimcusly cn February 12, 1980, with a "Supple- mentary Award" dated April 16, 1980, and a "pclicy grievance" brought by the Union (with the Civil Service Commission respcnding) ccmmonly kncwn as the "Barton decision", 263/80, alsc unanimcus. The Union argues and the Emplcyer denies that the twc cases are in conflict. If they are, and if they bear directly cn the issue here, .~ _-. this panel of-the Board would be in some airriculty. i;e .think, however, that confusicn has arisen as to exactly what the .issues were in those two cases and exac:ly what was decided. it - 10 - thus beccmes necessary to examine the decision authcred by Vice- Chairman Swinton (dated February 12, 1980) and the later decisicn authored by Vice-Chairman Barton (dated May 7,,1981). . . . . _~. . .'. In Bickerstaff the facts were very different fr.om the facts here. It follows that the issue was different and the reascns leading to the decision were dist,inct and distinguishable. / . Unlike Ms. Pakosta .' bcth Mr.~ Bickerstaff and Mr. Turner had worked for some years in the unclassified service before being appointed tc the civil service in 1972. They retired in 1979. It was on these facts -that a dispute arose as to their severance pay entitlement. .._ :' The applicable language at the time was in Article 14 cf the Benefits Agreement which was effective from October 1, 1977, to September 30, 1978. When the Benefits Agreement was combined with the Working Conditions Agreement, the former Article 14 became Article 52. The question faced by the Board in Bickerstaff was whether the word "appointment" in Article 14 of the Benefits Agree- ment included appointment in the unclassified service or was limited to appointment as a civil servant in the classified service. NC '. .' such problem arises in this case. The other questicn considered by - 11 - the aoard was the meaning of "ccntinucus service" as defined in what was then .Article 25 of the 'rlcrking Ccnditicns Agreement. Further, it must be clearly understccd that no part cf the Sickerstaff decision dealt with the exception which was then in Article 14.7 of the Benefits Agreement and is now in Article 52.7 of the 1980-1981 agreement, i.e. the provisicn that an emplcyee is net entitled to severance pay in respect of a pericd on leave of absence without pay in excess cf 30 days. The Board was simply not addressing the issue which arises in this case: it was concerned with a different issue. In Bickerstaff the Board concluded that the grievers' entitlement came under 14.3 of the then Benefits Agreement and no: under 14.1 because they were not "appointed" to the classified service until 1972. The Board also concluded, however, that their "continuous service" dated from their earlier employment in the unclassified service, having regard tc the definiticn in Article 25, notwithstanding the fact that in the earlier pericd the grievers had been outside the bargaining unit. The reasons for which the Board arrived at those conclusicns deserve tc be read with care, dut they do not bear direc:ly on the issue in this case. The seccnd decision which must also be read with care is what was referred tc as "the Barton decisicn", 263/80. We are tcli -'12 - . that in,.the.course of argument in that ~case, no mention wasmade of Bickerstaff. Be that as it may, we find it necessary tc con- sider exactly what was decided by the panel, Vice-Chairman Barton and Messrs. Co~llict and Collom. The Union, as we have said, argues that the decision.conflicts with Bickerstaff, which is denied by the Emplcyer. ~A comment made at the.end of the Barton decision is wcrth .quoting: We cannot close without indicating our dissatisfacticn with the position which we have been required to take. Any Agreement which has different methods of calculating continuous service fcr the purpose of different benefits is,bound to-ha hard to administer. ,The comment illustrates the need to define precisely the issue arising in each case, and to decide each on its own merits. Any other course can only lead to ccnfusion.' In the Barton case, then Union grieved because a Mrs. Fcden had been advised that her Benefits Credit Date had been adjusted forward from her hiring date due to an absence without pay fcr 236 calendar days. As she had much.more than five years cf service, her eventual eligibility for severance pay was not affected (unlike the case'of Ms. Pakosta) but the "calculation" of both severance pay and vacation credits was said to be affected. - 13 - The decision dealt explicitly with the severance pay . issue (at pages 6 and 7) by qucting Article 14.7 of the Senefits ' Agreement --- now .4rticle 52.7. It was said: Clearly this Article ex;rressly covers the prcblem cf calculation of ccntinuous service fcr the -*es of severance pay entitlements and provides that a leave cf absence withcut pay for more than 30 days is net ccunted as ti,ne in service. In relation to that finding, .4rticle 25 was not mentioned and the decisicn went on to consider vacation credits, a problem which (it was said) is not dealt with by Article 25. Vacaticn credits is not an issue in the case now before us. The 9artcn decision also reviewed a number of other matters, such as absences for educational purposes and absences while receiving L.T.I.P. benefits. Presumably these had been raised by the Union in a general way: Mrs. Foden had not been on L.T.I.P. The decision concluded by saying that the grievance (in relaticn tc severance pay) was being dismissed but that "the policy grievance cf the Cnron is allowed in part, insofar as L.T.I.P. benefits recipients are concerned and to the extent indicated." It will have been ncted that the aartcn decision referred to the "calculation0 cf ccntinuous service for the purposes of severance pay entitlement*. It is necessary to recognize a - 14 - distinction between the calculation of the qualifying period for the purpose of establishing eligibility --- which is the problem for employees like Ms. Pakosta --- and the ca'lculaticn of the amount of benefits receivable by eligible'emplcyees on retirement, as seems to be an anticipated problem in cases such as that cf Ms. Fohen. It is conceivable, for example, that an employee could retire on April 1,' 1983, after 13 years at work, interrupted by 13 months' absence on leave.without pay. Such an employee wculd : obviously be eligible for severance pay. But would the am,ount be I calculated at the rate of one-week's pay for each of 13 years cf L. service --- or each of 12 years of service? In the case of Ms. Pakcsta, which is probably unusual, the Emplcyer's interpretation means that she had less than five years' service and was therefore not eligible for severance pay. 1f'th.e emplo'ier is wrong, it would seem that she 1s eligible, but another question would arise: is there a distinction between the qualifying period fcr purposes of eligibility and the applicable 'period for purposes of calculating the amount receivable? In other words, would she be entitled to the equivalent cf five weeks' pay --- or less having regard to her absences without pay? In his submissions on behalf cf the union, Mr. Richards suggested that there is a distinction. Specifically, he said that Ms. Pakosta "qualified" (i.e. became eligible) with over five years - 15 - or ccntinucus service, but "cnly at the rate of fcur times her weekly salary, which depends on 52.7." He pcinted out that Ms. Pakcsta had been absent withcut pay fcr 269 wcrking days, which is the equivalent of a calendar year --- or a little more. He said: "We ccncede that you dcn't earn severance pay under the 52.7 exceptions." On the other hand, he con:ended that Article 2jf with its definiti-n of " - "continucus service," gcverns the "qualifying period" --- i.e. the minimum required to establish eligibility for severance pay. He argued that the Swinton reasons in Bickerstaff recognized the over-riding effect of .4rticle 25, which is viclated by the practice of adjusting the appcintment date forward to the so- called Benefits Credit Date. The distincticn (if it is a distinction) between the "qualifying period" and the "earnings period" is not admitted by the Emplcyer, which takes the position that the whole matter is expressly covered by the exception in 52.7 and that it was correctly interpreted and applied in the Barton decisicn. In that case, hcw- ever, the distinction was not discussed, for the simple reason that the point did not arise. The issue was net whether Ms. Fcden was eligible but rather how much time shculd be ccunted in future when computing her entitlement. For this reason, we cannot accept the submission of Mr. Gorchinsky on behalf cf the Emplcyer, that the issue decided by the Barton panel was precisely the same as the issue here. .4.s far as we know, this is the first case in - 16 - which only the "qualifying period" is in contention. Mr. Richards conceded he'was asking us to find that the Barton decision was "wrong." We do not think'this'really,necessary or'even relevant. The'~case was decided on.an entirely different set of facts and resolved a different problem. If it were applicable here~ (which it is not) we would be reluctant to depart from such a precedent for the reasons set out-in Barnfield 67/76. To the extent that the Barton decision recognized the binding effect of the I~ .~ exceptions set out in 14.7 of the.Benefits Plgreement, now-52.7 of the current'agreement, we agree-with the result. 'We also'agree with the Union's contention that Article 25 defines the meaning of *:an employee's length of continuous service." That definition, however , is not the .end of the smatter. Just as the rather sweeping language of a "management rights clause" .can be qualified or moderated.by other provisions in a collective agreement, so t6o the definiticn in Article 25 must be read in conjunction ~with the'provisions for certain benefifs~appearing in -.4rticles 39 to,'5.6 inclusive. Those benefits are ofcoursesubject to the terms and co~nditions expressly stated inthe applicable~ clauses. The terms and ccnditions, agreed to by the parties, in Article 52.7 are no Lticle 25. .I less binding on them 'than the definition in ,. - 17 - It is true that 52.2, 52.3 and 52.4 specify "ccntinuous service" as the standard by which the computation of severance pay is to be measured, but the implementation thereof is clearly made ,subject to certain exceptions, which are set out in 52.7. To summarize in other words: (1) Article 25 defines "length of continuous ser.Jice," a term used elsewhere in the agreement. . (2) Article 52.2, 52.3 and 52.4 provides for severance pay to an emplcyee resigning after ccmpleting a minimum of five years of "continucus service." (3) .4rticle 52.7 specifies exceptions to the general rules set out in 52.2 52.3 and 52.4, and has as much force and effect as any othqr clause in the agreement. If exceptions were not specified in 52.7, we would cf course be prepared tc find that an employee in Ys. Pakcsta's position would be entitled to severance pay according to the general rules in 52.3 and 52.4, with her continuous service as.ciefined in ,'.4rticle 25. au: exceptions do appear in 52.7, and any employee coming within any of those exceptions is affected accordingly. ,This may seem unfair in the case of Ms. Pakosta, but we have no power to disregard the plain meaning of 52.7. We are net called on to decide how her entitlement should be calculated --- if she . - 18 - were eligible 1-i because we have been obliged to f~ind that she was deprived of eligibility by the absences on leave without pay which brought her within the-exceptions in 52.7. We have also directed our attention to the opening words in 52.7: "4n employee is not entitled to severance.pay in respect The core of Mr. Richards' argument, . '. of a pericd....." as we understand it, is that these words relate to the calculation of the _I ~amount payable and not to the calculation of the "qualifying period." Whether that distinction is valid appears to be the real issue in this particular case. .1t To recognize the distinction would lead to the resu stated by tir. Richards, i.e. that the amount of Ms. Pakosta's severance pay would be computed at‘about "four times) her week .lY salary. " On similar reasoning, other retiring employees affected by the exceptions in 52.7 would have their severance pay computed to an amount less than five times weekly salary. This., it seems to us would be an anomalous result, wholly inconsistent with the scheme contemplated by 52.3(b) and 52.4(b) which is that "an employee who has completed a minimum of five (5) years of ccntinucus service . . . . . is entitled to severance pay for continuous service..~... equal to one (1) week of salary Car each year of service....." The scheme is clearly designed to assur,e severance pay - :9 - equivalent to five weeks salary or more to an employee who has completed a minlmum of five years of continuous service. There 'is nothing to suggest that the parties had in mind the payment of a lesser amount than the minimum specified in 52.3(b) and .52.4(b). On the other hand, 52.3(a) and 52.4(a) --- which differ from 52.3(b) and 52.4(b) --- expressly provide for severance pay ,(at the rate of one week for each year of service) in respect of those who have completed a minimum of one year of continuous service. However, these provisions apply only to certain classes: 1.e. those whose employment has ended for special reasons --- e.g. death or release under Section 22 of the Public Service Act. Such provisions represent a distinct and separate scheme .in respect of such terminations and have no application to a case such as that of Ms. Pakosta. There is not one severance pay scheme under Article 52: there are several, but 52.1 appears to qualify all of them. It is worthy of note that this Union grievance (Iike the claim of Ms. Pakosta herself) seems to have been framed as an alleged violation of Article 25. That approach can be easily understood but, strictly speaking, It is not correct. Article 25 is In the nature of a "definition clause:- it states the meaning tb be ascribed to the term "continuous serv:ce" or . : is ~"length of continuous serv.ice."~ .The effective or operati.ve pro- viSions,Y..in respect pf. severance pay are to be f.ound'in Article ~52, not Article 25. In effzect, the Union's re,al allegation -is that there has been. a.violatioq of Article 52 ins that its provisions, having regard to the definition in Article 25, were-incorrectly applied in the case of Ms. Pakosta and would no doubt be similarly applied i-n, similar cases. ~The point has been noted because,.as Mr. Richards demon- strated in. his: argument , .the~re are other provisions ~for,other benefits in other Articles of; the -collective agreqmen,t_ (e.g. Article 46, "Vacations and Vacation Credits"1 dependent upon "continuous service." It should be kept in mind that such Articles p contain the.effective or, operative provisions in respect of benefits, and that Article 25,m'erely defines the meaning, of .",continuous ,. service."". , .,, . -~~_. .' In this case,, the meaning and application of the term .. "continuous service 0, i.3 not the real problem. The issue turns on the meaning andapplication of the opening words in 52.'7: ! ., "An employee is not entitled to severance pay in respect of a " -. period. . :" The Un~ion'-as-case is that these .wor,ds refer only to -. . the calculation df the 'amount pf pay to which an eligible person isentitled. The Employ~er argues that such language includes - 21 - !calculation of the period required to attain eligibility. The language used is general and does not lend itself to the kpecific or restrlcted interpretation advocated by the Union. 'It it had been intended to draw a distinction between the calcu- lation of an amount and the calculation of the qualifying period, 'that distinction could,have been and ought to have been clearly stated. For the reasons heretofore given, we are unable to con- clude that the distinction has any validity. In our opinion, .the opening words of 52.7 inrll>de the calculation of the qualify- ;ing period as well as the calculation 'of the amount payable. The igrievance therefore cannot be upheld. Dated at Toronto, this 15th day of 'September, 1982 "I dissent" (See attached) 'T. Traves ?ember A.G. Stapleton k&er EBJ:jce , . _ _: DIS.Srm .~. ._ With respect I fir@ I must dissent,.from fhe majority in this difficult case. As I read the contract, the Union is correct"iii claiming that anployees like es. U. FQkcStaare entitled-t% Mminkionpaymnts. Myrekisom are as follows: 1) Article 25.la defines the notionof mntinuous service sirirp1ya.s C~mn&ciq Oil the e@oyeek?.date of~aphdinime.nt to the Classified Service.~ 'I& definition bs On all~mtitlenients Siich'ai vacation credits andtemCnation,$y except where i&contract specifies otherwise. It should be noted-here-that the parties to the contract agreed ti specify in 25.2 that ke an employee was laid off uxkr the provisions of ?&i.cle 24, Job Security, ?dYS FX2?ZiC&O~’ absence shall ‘not be Computed in de-g the’lq& Of continuous service”. Obvious& conscious of the need to qualify the length of the COIlthlOUS service paricd in s&e in&an&s, the~parties did xrt'fa whatever reasons. agree to in&de abs&es without pay due tc~ill,ness‘&&ch a clause. .' . 21, There are other ins*es throughout the c&&&where the parties agreed to sualify further the employees .entiti&ts. I_ Artidles 29y1, 46.3 49.1 end SU.,l.all q@fy _' instance~whereGenployeemaybe absemtwithoutthe aocmulationof cred.its,,buthohe -, specify that such periods (maternity k&e, adoption leave, and the like) do"&tkar on the accumulation, as it were, of continuousservice. _. 3 . ' .: _ '+rticles 52.3 a& 52.4's& out the'qualifi&tion &&eknts for btioi paynents'in cases such as:'+e one raised ix~this grievance. : It simuld be no? here 'tit neither clause in?&uces the w of restrictions regularly ~in+xc@xed ki‘29.1; 46.3, 49.1 xd'50.1 on the acommlation of credits and conti.nuous s&i&. Itshouldbe-noted further that 52.3 and 52.4 are subdivided in tsm clauses bear& on those employees who have at least one year of continuous service and are entitled to termination pay of one week of pay for each yeax of swice under very limited cirm+%kances (52.3a and 52.4a) and tlmsewhohaveatleastfivey~sofcontinuous serviceand are entitled to termi- hation pay of one week of pay for each year of service under much less restrictive cirmstances (:52.3b ami 52.4b). r.h&r these corvlitions it strikesme thatthemjority's viewthattheparties to thecontractdid not~n'cemglate tenninationpayments of less tham five weeks is unwarranted since 52.3a and 52.4a set out conditions under which much less is ~ssible. 41 Articles 52.3 and 52.4 set out the yeneral qualification requirements and the payment schedule of one week of pay for each year of continuous service, but clearly the parties felt itnecessaryto refine further the conditions governihypaaymentrates. Article 52.6 sets out a maker of instructions concerning the canputation of pyment inoludirq 52.6.3: I . . .’ 2. 'Where aanputatiotio~ severance pay imulves part of a year, t&e ~ccmputation of that part shall be mde on a mnthly basis, aml (a) my part of a mnth that is less ti fif'm (15) days shall be disregarded; ad (b) any part of a mnti'that is fifteen (15) or nnredays shall bedeened to be amnth. In my view this clause bears directly on the issues raised by this grievance as we .shauseeina-t. 5., Article 52.7 qecifies a nunber of instances where ar~employ~ is not entitled to sevenme pay in respect of a perid of absence. In my view this clause sixxld be read as a further ref inement of the canpltation of payment ?rccedures first raised in 52.6. The language of the clause does not bear on the issue of the aaxnulation of continuous service. Gnceagain it should ix noted IAdtwhere the parties wished '& CmitsuchaccumAationof other credits sxhas vacation-pay they said 50 in cl= bquage as in Articles 29.1, 46.3; 49.1 and 50.1. T$e lancjuage of Article 52.7 speaks only to thelinitationof severaxepay for pzricds actxallywxked. It does rstbea.r on.the ammarlation of conti.nKus service. 6) ‘In this grim t! arrployer intrcduuced a Nrmber of cikxments 0utLinirg t!!ei?z procedures for calculating aBenefits CreditDate. Thesedo cmnents have co staroing within thi prov+sions of the Collective Agreanent. Obviously, the language of the contract must prAi1. On the readirq of thatwgeoutlinei abze, theUnion's claim that a distinc- tion must be nnde between qualification for severance pay as q~'~ernei by Articles 25.1, I 25.2, 52.3 ani 52.4 ad the rate of payment as cjoknd by 52.3, 52.4, 52.6and 52.7 appears p me to bs valid. For thatreasonIwulduplnld thegrievance in this case. l&ofaras.Xrs.H.Pakostais concerned, I wuld have foundher eligible for severance pay der Articles 52.3 and 52.4 and I wcllld have paid ixx- for four years and several months under Articles 52.6 and 52.7.