HomeMy WebLinkAbout1983-0287.Hooper.83-09-27IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
Between:
Before:
OLBEU (P. Hooper)
and
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Liquor Control Board of Ontario)
P.M. Draper Vice Chairman
S. Schachter Member
W.A. Lobraico :Member
For the Crievor: A.M. Heisey, Counsel
Blake, Cassels J( Graydon
.For the Employer: R.J. Drmaj, Counsel
Hicks Morley Hamilton Stewart & Storie
Hearing: AUQJSI II, 1983
Crievor
Employer
-2-
DECLSION
By memorandum dated February 14, 1983, the Employer
initiated a new procedure for recording and reporting breakage to become
effective March 1, 1983. We are concerned only with the introduction of a
new form, Form LCB-608, to be used where three or more bottles are
broken. The form is to contain an explanation of the breakage (in practice
provided by the employee and written by the foreman) and is to be signed
by both. It is a part of the Employer’s inventory control measur.es and has
no disciplinary connotation.
The Crievor, Philip Hooper, ls a fork-lift truck operator,
classified Warehouseman 4. He has been employed by the Employer since
.April, 1975, and has worked at the Kipling warehouse since 1977. On
<March 7, 1983, he had a spill, which he reported to his foreman. When
asked to sign a completed LCB-608 form a short time later, he refused.
J. Bowser, Supervisor,. Kipling warehouse, the senior manager at that
location, by letter of the same date, notified the Griever that his continued
failure to sign the form “may result in disciplinary action” and by letter of
the following day repeated that notice and demanded a written statement
from the Grievor explaining his action. The Grievor rep!ied on March 10th
claiming not to have been aware of the new procedure. A letter dated
March 29, 1983, and signed by D.F. Wilcox, Assistant General Manager,
Warehousing and Distribution, notified the Griever of his suspension
without pay for one day, to be served on April 6th, as a result of the March
7th incident. The Grievof grieved the suspension on April 15th.
:
-3-
On April 5th the Grievor had another spill and.again refused to
sign a completed LCB-608 form. As with the earlier incident, he received
letters signed by Bowser, this time dated April 5th and April 7th. His reply
(incorrectly dated April 6th) claimed infringement of his “personal and
constitutional rights”.
On April 11th the Griever was called to the warehouse office
where he found W. Anderson, OLBEU Zone Representative and employed as
a Warehouseman 4 at Kipling; G. DeLuca, Acting Assistant Supervisor
(normally General Foreman); and L. Holt, Acting .General Foreman. He
was told by DeLuca that if he now signed the form he had refused to sign
on April 5th (the form had beenkept in DeLuca’s office) no discipline would
be imposed. With that assurance and on Anderson’s advice, he s&tied.
Bowser was informed of the April 11th settlement but whether or not he
took any action as a result is not known to us.
A letter dated April 19, 1983, and signed by Wilcox, notified the
Grievor of his suspension without pay for three days, to be served on April
26th, 27th and 28th, as a result of the April 5th incident. The Griever
grieved the suspension on May 16th.
As to the March 7th incident, it is admitted for the Griever,
and we so find, that he committed a disciplinable offence in refusing to
sign a Form LCB-608. There remains the question whether or not the
penalty imposed should be modified.
-4-
The Grievor has some eight years of service. Nd disciplinary
record has been cited. Although we are satisfied that the Crievor had
notice of the new procedure at some time prior to his refusal to sign, that
refusal occurred less than one week after it had come into force and when
the purpose and effect of the form had not yet been adequately
communicated to employees. There was no altercation and no disruption of
work. The Crievor appears to have acted without discussion or
consultation with anyone. While we acknowledge the necessity of securing
compliance by employees with properly instituted rules and regulations,
there is no showing here of special need to bring home to the Grievor, or to
other employees, the importance of the new procedure by means of an
exemplary penalty to the Crievor. We do not find in the Grievor’s refusal a
calculated challenge to managerial authority or an intention to obstruct
the operation of the new procedure. There is no evidence of empioyee
resistance to the introduction of the new procedure or (except for one
quickly resolved instance) of other employee refusals to sign the forms.
Breakages requiring the use of Form LCB-608 take place at i<ipling up to
twenty times dairy without any refusals to sign resulting.
We have concluded that, in all the circumstances present here,
the Griever’s offence does not warrant the penalty of suspension.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that all reference to the one-day
suspension of the Grievor arising from the March 7th incident be deleted
from the Employer’s records; that the wages and benefits lost by the
Griever as a result of that suspension be restored to him; and that a
-5-
written reprimand in respect of the said incident be issued to the Grievor
and placed in the Employer’s records.
As to the April 5th incident, this second, identical offence by
the Griever clearly warranted a more severe penalty than that appropriate
to the earlier incident. But before the penalty decided upon by the
Employer had been imposed, the April 11th meeting of DeLuca and Holt .
with Anderson and the Grievor intervened. In the result, the Grievor was
disciplined after he had signed the form.
Counsel to the Employer argues taht the Griever’s April 5th
refusal to sign the form was not cured by the signing on April 11th and
remained a disciplinable offence. Assuming, for the moment, the validity
of the settlement reached, it is our view that the Employer, by forgoing
disciplinary action, must be taken to have effectively nullified the offence
itself.
Counsel argues further that because Anderson knew that no one
at Kipling had authority to discipline employees and that DeLuca had no
role in the Employer’s disciplinary process, he also either knew, or ought to
have known, that DeLuca had no authority to settle the matter. DeLuca,
as a general foreman, is not a member of the bargaining unit and on the
date in question was Acting Assistant Supervisor and in charge of Kipling.
He initiated the discussion of April 11th. The .position in which he had
been placed by the Employer gave grounds for the presumption that he was
clothed with authority to prevent disciplinary action against the Griever on
- 6-
condition that the form was signed. In our opinion, given those facts, it
was not unreasonable for Anderson to take DeLuca at his word and to
accept what was, on its face, a mutually beneficial resolution of the
matter. There is the additional consideration that it was not established in
evidence that DeLuca, who did not testify, did not, in fact, have the
requisite authority for the action he took, and that his action has not been
explicitly repudiated before the Board.
We have concluded that the Employer is bound by the
settlement of the April 5th incident reached on April 11th and that there
did not exist thereafter an offence for which the Grievor could be
disciplined. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that all reference to the
three-day suspension of the Griever arising from the April 5th incident be
deleted from the Employer’s records and that the wages and benefits Jest
by the Grievor as a result of that suspension be restored to him.
When the Board convened at IO:00 a.m. on August Ilth, counsel
to the Grievor requested an adjournment of the hearing. ~The Crievor,
having mistakenly attended at another address, was not present and it was
not known when he would arrive. In addition, William Anderson, who was to
testify on behalf of the Griever, was present but would have to leave t0
attend a relative’s funeral taking place at :I:00 a.m. Counsel to the
Employer objected, arguing that there were no proper grounds for granting
an adjournment.
%
-7-
The Board, after consideration, denied the request. The
Crievor had received formal notice of the hearing and had otherwise been
informed of the address of the Board’s offices. Anderson had attended
\ under the Board’s subpoena and was at counsel’s disposal.
’ The Board further ruled that the hearing must go on (it being a
disciplinary matter the Employer would lead off) or the case must be
dismissed. Counsel elected to continue and the hearing proceeded.
DATED at Toronto this 27th day of September, 1983.
P.M. Draper Vice Chairman 1
-
S. Schachter Member
. .4- .
W.A. Lobraico Member
7:1200
7:3610
7:3612
7:4400
I