HomeMy WebLinkAbout1984-1350.Union.85-08-27IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under,
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
Between: OPSEU (Union Grievance) Grievor
- and -
The Crowr'in Right of Ontario
~'-" (Ministry of Community & Social Services)
Before:
For the Grievor:
'For the Employer:
Hearing:
Employer
R. J. Roberts Vice Chairman
L. Robinson Member
F. T. Collict Member
D. I. Bloom
Counsel Cavalluzzo, Hayes & Lennon Barristers & Solicitors
R. B. Itenson Senior Staff Relations Officer Staff Relations Branch Civil Service Commission
March 21, 1985
.
2.
INTERM DECISION
At the outset of the hearin? in this ratter, the Ministry
raised a preliminary object tc jurisdiction. The objection was
based upon two grounds: the first.was that the Frievance was
untimely because it was filed after the expiration of 30 days
"followin? the occurrence or origination o f then circumstances civinc ,-
rise to the grievance", within the meanin? of Article 27.8.1 of
the Collective Agreement; the second grrour&was that .the present
grievance was barred by the Unlon's withdrawal of an earlier qrie-
Vance raisin? the same:issue. For reasons which follow, both of.
these cuesticns are resolved against the'Ministry, and,hence, the
Prelimina~ objection must be dismissed.
-'-At the hearin?, the parties called.one witness each to
testify to the circumstances touchins the questions raised in
the preliminary objection. Mr. R. Marsden,, the Area Administrator,
Human Resources, for the Southeast Region of the Ministry, testified
that in April, 1984, the President of the Local Union,, Mr. B.
Casey, advised him~that the Union believed that there was a
violation of the Collective Ageement, in that the Ministry was
nenotiatinp directly with one of its meders and not the Union.
Th:s alleged violation involved a compressed work week which had
been established for a contract employee, Ms. Toni Senoff. Under
this compressed work week schedule, Ms. Semoff.was workin? 12 hours
per day on some days and 8 hours per day on others. The usual work
week for full -time staff was 9 hours ner day, 5 days per week. Mr.
-, i - . . . . . . I -_.^I ~,_c,._L .:- --*-hlichi-c thie cc-mnressed
3.
work week for Ms. Semoff, alone, the Ministry had violated the
recognition clause of the Collective Agreement, Article 1.1,
which established the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining
agent for all public servants falling within the applicable definition
of the Crown Employees Collective Eargaining Act.
Fr . Farsden stated that in response to this advice from
Mr. Casey, he performed an investigation. This ,.resulted in a finding,
that !!s. Semoff had worked more than .40 hours in one week pursuant
to this compressed work week's schedule, and he arranged for her to .-
be paid overtime for the hours that she put in which exceeded 40
hours per week. Kr. Marsden, however, did not conclude that in
establishing a compressed work week for KS. Semoff, there had been
any violation of Article 1.1. He took the position that it was.within
the exclusive rights of the Health Services Co-ordinator, Ms. Gerry
Gerrow, to establish Ms. Semoff's hours of work.
On April 6, 1984, a Union grievance was filed. ,,This
Frievance claimed "that the Management of.Durham Centre is violating
Article 1 of the Collective Agreement, Article 7.6, Article 35 and
Addendum to the Collective Agreement." The "settlement required" in-
cluded a claim for "immediate resumption of B-hour work shifts for
ail unciassified nurses" and "oVertime payments for any nurses pre-
viously scheduled to 12-hour shifts."
According to Fr. !?arsden, there followed a Union-kanagement
.nen+i-,c +-n r?i~?,,~s t-he arievance.
In attendance were b!r. Marsden,
4.
Representative for the Union, Mr. B. Casey, and Kr. F. Purificati,
the &pu~ Minister's designate. At this meetinc, there was discussion
of payment of overtime to Ms. Semoff for all hours worked in excess
of 8 hours per day. Management,denied the grievance, stating that
the Ministry had already arranged for payment of overtime to Ms..~
Semoff for any hours that she,had worked in excess of 40 hours per
week. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Grievance Settlement
Board.
On September 5, 1964, the matter went to mediation. Present
at this mediation session were Vs. Joanne Yiko, a Staff Grievance
Officer for the Union, Ms. L. Rock, a Representative from the Local,
-and Ms. S. Stephen, who represented the Yeinistry. According to I-3.
+!iko, who"'iias the only witness with direct knowledge of what occurred
at this mediation, there were two topics of discussion. One topic
centered upon some technical irregularities in the grievance. The
other dealt with the m.erits of the issue of overtime for unclassified
nurses who worked more than 8 hours in one day. The r.ecommendation
of the mediator was that this latter issue should be referred by the
parties to the Local Employee Relations Committee (ERC) for potential
resolution.
ES. Viko stated that she and Ms. Rock agreed with this
recommendation, but it never was agreed that the merits of the issue
were resolved. Ms. Kiko added that KS. Stephen for the Finistry was
well aware that the issue was not finished.
5.
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the, meetinc, the Union
representatives drafted and signed the following letter:
405/84 and
Re: 430/84 OPSEU ,(Union Grievance) and,Ministry of Community and Social Services
The Union hereby agrees to withdraw the captioned Srievance on the recommendations of the mediator.
On behalf.bf OPSEU
Lois Rock local 332
Joanne Mike
Witnessed at Toronto, Ontario, this 5th day of September,
1984, by H. J. Waisglass
As can be seen, the document was witnessed by the Mediator, Mr.
H. J. VJaisglass.
Ms. Miko stressed in her testimony that the forecoin?
memorandum in which the Union aFreed to'withdraw the gievance, did
not reflect that the cJrievance was settled. She stated that the
grievance was withdrawn because there were technical irregularities
in it. It did not co to what.the real issue was. Noreover, it was
we<& understood between the parties that they both would attempt to
reach some kind of a resolution at the next meetinq of the E.R.C.
The E.R.C. meeting was held on October 30, 1984. F?r .
Marsden testified that the discussion was not fruitful. He stated t
that management told the Union that there was no way +he matter was
i
6.
-demanded that if Ms. Semoff was to work more than 8 hours on a given
shift, she was to be paid overtime. Management, according to Mr.
Marsden, flatly refused to do SO. Thereafter, Management continued
to set a compressed work week for Ms. Semoff, which required~her to
work two 12-hour shifts per week, and two 8-hours shifts per week for
a total of.40 hours.
Finally, on December 11, 1984, the Union filed the grievance
leading to the present proceeding. The grievance stated that "Durham
Regional Center has violdted Article 3.3 by not paying overtime to
certain unclassified employees." As a settlement; the grievance
claimed~ inter e, "proper payment in accordance with Article 3.3
and all monies owing to the affected employees retroactive to the
..> _i . . . . date of the shift change."
Turning first to the question whether this second grievance
was untimely, within the meaning of the Collective Agreement, it
must be concluded that, at least for purposes other than retroactivity,
the grievance was not filed out,of time. Article 27.8.1 of the' J
Collective Agreement, which governs the filing of Union grievance&,
reads as follows:
Where any difference between the Employer land the Vnion arises from the interpretation, application, administration br alleaed contravention of the Agreement, the Unicn shall be entitled to file a grievance at the. second state of the grievance procedure provided it does so.within thirty (30) days following the occurrence or origination of the circum- stances giving rise to.the grievance.
7.
As can be seen, this provision requires a Union grievance to be
filed "within thirty (30) dalls following the occurrence or oricination,
of the circumstances giving rise to the grievance" (emphasis supplied).
Essentially, it was the position of the Ministry that the
above-puoted wording meant that, regardless of the nature of the
alleged breach of the Collective Agreement, the Union was reeuired
to file its gr'ieva,nce within 30 days of the moment the breach first
began. In particular, it was submitted, the use of the word
"origination" tended to-indicate that even in the case of a continuing
violation of the Collective Agreement, a Union grievance had to be
filed within, 30 days.of the time the violation commenced. On this
- view of the Article, it was submitted that the grievance was at. least
6 months-lout of time because the "occarion or origination" of the
circumstances giving rise to the grievance-took place prior to May,
1984, when Ms. Semoff first commenced her compres~sed work week
schedule.
It must be .concluded, however, that it would take afar more
orerise language than reference to "occasion or. origination" to
convince the Board that the parties intended in Article 27.e.l to
reverse the usual rule with respect to the grievance of continuing
violations of a Collective agreement. As was stated in Re United
Steelworks and Trianc?le and C'onduit & Cable C'anada (1968) Ltd.'
(1978), 21 L.A.C. 333 (Weiler), that rule is that "The company's
continuing breach (if any) entitles the union to grieve for each
I-,* -,..-qm".,-,n+n T? at ". 333. The only
.
8.
retroactively in such circumstances may be limited by the time
limits". Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, at p. 96.
l?ere, the subject matter of the grievance undoubtedly
rested upon an allegation that the Company was committing a
continuing violation of the Collective Agreement by failinc to pay
KS. Semoff overtime for the days .in which she worked in excess of
8 hours per shift. The evidence disclosed that from I?ay, 1984, onward,
MS. Semoff continued to work at least two 12-hour shifts per week
without receiving any avertime pay. Each such 12-hour shift con-
stituted a fresh basis for an arhitrable allegation of violation of
the Collective Ageement. Each constituted a fresh "occurrence
or origination" qiviny rise to a right to grieve in the Union within
the meanino of Article 27.8.1. In this sense, the 30-day time-limit
solely operates as a potential restriction upon the raantum of any
relief or damaces awarded retroactively.
Turning to the second issue; it cannot be concluded that I
the withdrawal of the first grievance acted as a bar to consideration
of the grievance at hand. It has been well settled that the with-
dr$wal of a grievance is not necessarily fatal to a later Grievance
raising the identical issue. This was recognized by the Board in
Re Snider and Ministry of Transoortation and Communications (1984),
G.S.B. No. 509/83 (Brandt), which 'stated, in pertinent part:
A review of a number of cases would appear to indicate a determination by arbitrators to require more than conduct
from which a mere inference can be drawn. Thus, in terms ._...._
9.
withdrawal or aba~ndonment of a grievance, without
more, is not sufficient to prevent a subsequent grievance from being filed.(See Re County of Paintearth (1973) 3 L.A.C. (2d) 429 (Newman); Re Gibraltar Xines
(1975) 8 L.A.C. (2d) 22.5 (Larson); Re City of London (1976) 13 L.A.C. (2) 213 (Hinnegan)). These results are
supportable on .either the doctrine Of res judicata or Promissory estoppel. The act of s;ithdrabral or abandonment
of a grievance is not a representation which is sufficiently
unambiguous to create an estoopel; nor does it permit any conclusion that the parties are prepared to treat the matter as having been resolved or settled in such a way as to bind them in the future. . ..g. pp. 9-10.
To act as a bar, the act of withdrawal or abandonment must constitute
an unambiguous representation that the matter has been resolved or
settled in a binding fashion.
In the'present case, all of the evidence indicated that ..__.
when the first grievance was withdrawn, both parties understood
that nothing had been resolved in a binding fashion: ,In fact, the
matter was to be referred for possible resolution to the E.R.C.
Committee. Moreover, according to the testimony of P-r. Marsden, the
matter was raised and discussed in the E.R.C. meeting of October 30, 1984
and this discussion according to his testimony, left little doubt that
the matter was treated by both parties as unresolved. It was,the
fact that the matter remained unresolved at the conclusion of~this
meeting which ultimately led the Union to file the second,grievance.
In the face of this evidence, .it would be imoossible to conclude that
either party regarded the withdrawal .of the first grievance at the
end of the mediation session to be an unambiguous representation
that a binding settlement had been achieved. The issue was still
_.. 1
10.
The preliminary objection is dismissed.
DATED at London, Ontario, this 27th day of August,
.-
Vice-Chaimai:
T n-ki --on, Member