HomeMy WebLinkAbout2004-0005.Griffiths.06-06-30 De
Commission de
Crown Employees
Grievance Settlement
règlement des griefs
Board
des employés de la
Couronne
Suite 600 Bureau 600
180 Dundas St. West 180, rue Dundas Ouest
Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z8 Toronto (Ontario) M5G 1Z8
Tel. (416) 326-1388 Tél. : (416) 326-1388
Fax (416) 326-1396 Téléc. : (416) 326-1396
GSB# 2004-0005, 2004-3234, 2004-3235
UNION# 2003-0103-0011, 2004-0103-0007, 2004-0103-0008
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLEC TIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SE TTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
(Griffiths)
Union
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Ministry of the Environment)
Employer
BEFORE Vice-Chair
Michael Watters
FOR THE UNION
Jim Paul
Grievance Officer
Ontario Public Service Employees Union
FOR THE EMPLOYER
Felix Lau
Counsel
Ministry of Government Services
HEARING
May 10, 2006.
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Decision
Following a full day of mediation on September 23, 2005, the parties signed the
following Memorandum of Settlement:
“ MEMORANDUM OF SETTLEMENT
IN THE MATTER OF A NUMBER OF GRIEVANCES
BETWEEN:
ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION
(Ron Griffiths)
MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT
AS RE FERENCED BY GSB FILE NUMBERS
(2004-0005; 2004-3234; 2005-3235)
Without precedent or prejudice, and without admissions expressed or implied, the
parties agree to the following terms as full and final resolution of the above
referenced grievances:
1. The letter of reprimand dated October 25, 2004 shall be removed
from the grievor’s personne l file and replaced with a letter of
counsel, inserted in the Regional administration file.
2. The letter of October (date i llegible), 2004 as referenced by the
grievance and the response of November 5, 2004 shall be removed
from the grievor’s personnel file and inserted in the Regional
administration file.
3. Management is prepared to author ize and institute the reinstatement
of three (3) days vacation leave as referenced in the respective
grievance, within thirty (30) days.
4. The union and the grievor shall with draw the above noted grievances.
5. The parties agree that Vice-Chair Michael Watters will remain seized
of the terms and implementation of this agreement in its entirety.
6. The aforementioned letter of counsel shall be drafted by the grievor’s
manager. The content of the letter shall be subject to the approval
of the parties.
rd
Signed at London, Ontario this 23 day of September 2005.”
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I note from the face of the handwritten Me morandum of Settlement that paragraph 6
thereof initially read as follows:
“6. The aforementioned letter of co unsel shall be draf ted by the grievor’s
manager subject to consul tation through the mediator. The contents
of the letter shall be s ubject to the approval of the mediator.”
I was informed that the change to the second se ntence of paragraph numbe r six (6), namely the
change from “subject to the appr oval of the mediator” to “subject to the approval of the parties”,
was made at the insistence of the Union. To be clear, this change was agreed to by the
Employer.
On October 6, 2005, Mr. R. Younger of the Employer’s Human Resources Branch
forwarded a draft letter of counsel to Mr. J. Paul, the Union’s re presentative in this proceeding,
for his and the grievor’s review. By e-mail of October 14, 2005, Mr. Paul advised Mr. Younger
that the draft was not acceptable. It appears that the wording of th e letter of counsel was still an
outstanding issue between the parties as of mid-January, 2006. On January 31, 2006, Mr.
Younger advised Mr. Paul that the “offici al version on record” was as follows:
“ October 5, 2005
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Ron Griffiths
Environmental Assessment Co-ordinator
Southwestern Region
FROM:
Claude Lafrance
Manager, Technical Support
Southwestern Region
Re: Memorandum of Counsel
Subject to the events which took place in Barrie, Ontario on October 13, 2004, I
wish to advise you that this memorandum of counsel will be attached to and form
a part of your file record in terms of your duties a nd responsibilities in future.
During the October 13, 2004 meeting in Barrie relating to the Class
Environmental Assessment for the Barri e Sewage Treatment Plant expansion, you
took it upon yourself to make comments to Lake Simcoe Environmental
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Management Strategy stakeholders, (econom ic and otherwise interested parties)
which were contrary to the ministry’s in terests, intentions, and undertakings under
approved provincial commitments. Your co mments denigrated the work of other
ministry employees who had compiled a study related to the Lake Simcoe
initiative. It was further reported th at your remarks brought the ministry’s
involvement in this project into question.
When I spoke to you later in my office on October 19, 2004, you conducted
yourself in an (sic.) belligerent manner by evading responsibility, not
acknowledging that your conduct was unacceptable and placing blame on others
for your outspoken behaviour.
Under these circumstances and in order to prevent further such incidents of
unprofessional behaviour contra ry to the ministry’s code of professionalism, this
occurrence is hereby documented as a me morandum or counsel and advice. My
expectation in future is that you will ta ke careful note of this correspondence and
govern yourself accordingly.
Claude Lafrance
CFile
M. Parker, APEP Unit Supervisor
R. Younger, Human Resources Branch ”
The Union continued to view the language of th e above letter as unacceptable. As the Employer
was not prepared to make any changes to it, the Union requested in February, 2006 that the
matter be referred to arbitration before this Vice-Chairperson.
A hearing was subsequently scheduled for May 10, 2006 in London, Ontario. At the
outset thereof, the Union’s repres entative advised that the Union and the grievor did not agree to
the content of the Memorandum of Counsel, as reproduced above, a nd that I was being asked to
address the issue pursuant to the reservation of jurisdiction provided fo r by paragraph number
five (5) of the Memorandum of Settlement.
As noted previously, paragraph number six (6) of the Memorandum of Settlement
provides that the letter of c ounsel drafted by the grievor’s ma nager “shall be subject to the
approval of the parties” with re spect to content. The threshol d question in this proceeding is
whether the Union acted reasona bly in withholding its approval of the content of the
5
Memorandum of Counsel as prepar ed by the Employer. The parties did not present any viva voce
evidence at the hearing. They were content, rath er, to have the issue resolved on the basis of
their submissions and the exhibits filed. The ex hibits include the Letter of discipline dated
October 25, 2004 and the Employer’s Stage 2 re sponse dated February 11, 2005 signed by Mr.
Dale Henry, Director, Standards Development Branch, Environmental Sciences and Standards
Division.
It is the position of the Un ion that its refusal to approve the content of the letter of
counsel was reasonable in all of the circumstan ces. The argument presented by the Union’s
representative may be summarized as follows:
i. it is not apparent to the Union that the letter of counsel was placed in the
Regional administration file, as required by paragraph number one (1)
of the Memorandum of Settlement. The Union’s representative noted,
in this regard, that the first pa ragraph of the letter si mply references the
grievor’s “file record” and that the letter was copied to the “C File”.
As a consequence, the Union is not satisfied that the Employer has fully
met its obligations under the settlement with respect to where the letter
should be placed;
ii. the Union questions why the le tter of counsel was copied to
Mr. Younger and to Mr. M. Parker, APEP Unit Supervisor. I was
informed at the hearing that Mr. Parker is the grievor’s immediate
supervisor. From the perspe ctive of the Union, the letter of counsel
appears to have been more widely circulated than intended when
the settlement was reached;
iii. the Union objects to the tone of the language contained within the
second and third paragraphs of the letter of counsel. On its reading,
the language is prejudicial, accusatory and intrusive. Reference was
made, inter alia, to the fo llowing excerpts from the letter: “Your
comments denigrated the work of other ministry employees…”;
“…you conducted yourself in an (sic.) belligerent manner by evading
responsibility…”; and “….not acknowledging that your conduct was
unacceptable and placing blame on others for your outspoken behaviour.”
The Union’s representative submitted that such language is premised on
unproven allegations that the gr ievor engaged in culpable conduct. He
suggested that the wording of the letter of counsel is intended to create a
negative and prejudicial docume nt for purposes of the grievor’s record.
Indeed, he asserted that the letter is harsher in certain respects than the
original letter of reprimand. The Union’s representative further claimed
that the letter of counsel co ntains statements which the Employer’s
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Designee at Stage 2 was prepared to delete from the letter of discipline;
iv. on the Union’s analysis, the letter of counsel is unduly retrospective, in
the sense that it focuses on pa st conduct, which the Employer perceives
as culpable. It was argued th at, instead, the letter should be crafted in
a more productive and forward looking manner so as to better advise
and instruct the grievor as to the Employer’s expectations relating to what
is either appropriate or inappropriate conduct; and
v. it is unnecessary, at this juncture, to determine if the letter of counsel
is a true letter of c ounsel or, rather, a letter of discipline. The Union’s
representative argue d that I do not have to a ddress this question, and the
related jurisdictional issue, at this stage in the proceedings. He reiterated
that I am here cal led upon to decide whether the Union could reasonably
decline to approve the content of the letter of couns el pursuant to
paragraph number si x (6) of the Memorandum of Settlement. He observed
that the Union atte mpted, albeit unsuccessfully, to address its concerns
prio r to referring the case to arbitration.
By way of remedy, the Union asks that the Employer be ordered to revise the letter of
counsel so that it better conforms with the parties’ intent at the time they executed the settlement.
In the alternative, and in recognition of the delay which has occurred, this Vice-Chairperson was
invited “to void” the letter of counsel.
In response, it is the positi on of the Employer that the Union cannot reasonably reject the
letter of counsel, as presently worded. The argument advanced by counsel for the Employer may
be summarized as follows:
i. the grievor will not be prejudiced or disadvantaged by the letter of
counsel as it is not disciplina ry, and cannot be used in future as the
foundation for more serious discipline;
ii. the Memorandum of Settlement is sile nt as to the content of the letter
of counsel. More specificall y, it does not preclude the Employer from
being retrospective. C ounsel submitted that the Employer could
properly look back in time and reference those events leading to the
need for a letter of counsel. On his analysis of the authorities, letters
of counsel frequently address pa st events so that th e affected grievors
are better able to understa nd how to conduct themselves in future.
Counsel further suggested that the cases also reflect that such letters
may address issues of fault and culpability, and that an Employer may
pass judgment on an employee’ s behavior therein. On his reading,
the tone of the language found in the instant letter of counsel is not
dissimilar to that used in other letters referenced in the jurisprudence; and
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iii. from the perspective of the Employer, it made “huge efforts to
downgrade” the language initia lly used in the letter of reprimand.
Counsel noted that the letter of counsel is just one (1) page in length,
while the letter of reprimand was two and a-half (2 ½) pages in length.
On his reading, the former document represents an efficient effort at
summarizing the detail contai ned within the le tter of reprimand.
Counsel for the Employer referenced the fo llowing authorities dur ing the course of
argument: Naik (Now Taharally), 108/77 (Swinton); Sundberg, 1998/86 (Devlin); Bacchus,
0911/88 (Watters); Fitzgerald, 1489/88 (Samuels); and Black, 885/90 (Dissanayake).
In reply, the Union’s representative submitted that what is material, for purposes of this
case, is the content of the letter of counsel, not its length. He noted that the letter of counsel
captures most of the content of the letter of re primand “in a more concise but offensive way”.
He also claimed that there is no need to address the jurisprudence as I do not, at this point, have
to determine whether the letter of counsel is, in fact, disciplinary. Ra ther, the sole issue for
decision, given the wording of the Memorandum of Settlement, is whether the Union acted
reasonably at the time it refused to approve the contents of the letter. The Union’s
representative, nevertheless, referen ced the following authorities: Blake, 313/82 (Kennedy); and
Kennedy, 357/96 (Briggs).
The starting point for analysis is the Me morandum of Settlement of September 23, 2005.
Paragraph number six (6) thereof, as noted, provides that the c ontent of the letter of counsel,
initially to be drafted by the grie vor’s manager, shall be “subject to the approval of the parties”.
It follows from this provision th at the Union has a righ t to not approve the content, as long as
such right is reasonably exercise d. Additionally, in paragraph numb er five (5) of the settlement,
the parties agreed that this Vice-Chairpers on was to “remain seized of the terms and
implementation of this agreement in its entirety”. There is, therefore, no question relating to my
jurisdiction in this case, as the parties have e xpressly provided for it in their agreement. Put
another way, I find that I possess the present authority to determine whether the Union has
8
reasonable grounds to reject the letter of counsel pr epared by the Employer. In this respect, this
dispute is distinguishable from all of the awards relied on by the parties. There is no equivalent
to paragraphs five (5) and six (6) in any of thos e cases. The issue in all of the prior awards was
whether the letter of counsel was, in fact, disc iplinary and whether the dispute was arbitrable.
While this may subsequently become an issue in this case, it is not the issue I am now called
upon to address. The simple question before me, at this point, is whether the Union reasonably
exercised its rights under th e Memorandum of Settlement.
I accept the Union’s submission that it is not clear from a reading of the Memorandum of
Counsel that the document was to be inserted into the Regional administration file, as agreed to
in the Memorandum of Settlement. The first pa ragraph of the Memorandum of Counsel simply
states that it will be attached to and form pa rt of the grievor’s “file record”. It does not
specifically reference the Regional administration file. Additionall y, that file is not expressly
copied at the bottom of the Memorandum of Counse l. Rather, reference is there made to the
“C File” only. As a consequence, it is not ap parent from a review of the content of the
Memorandum of Counsel that the Employer has comp lied with the terms of settlement relating to
the placement of the former document. While this may initially appear to be a minor matter, I
note that it was a point of so me significance for the parties, as evidenced by the language
contained in the first two (2) paragraphs of the Memorandum of Settlement. Having said this, I
think that the uncertainty around where the document was to be placed should have been
clarified by the parties early on in their discussi ons. Unfortunately, it wa s not until the hearing,
and in response to a question from this Vice-C hairperson, that it was learned the Employer had,
in fact, placed the Memorandum of Counsel in the Regional administration file.
I further accept that the Uni on could reasonably have some c oncern over the future use of
the Memorandum of Counsel. The first paragraph of same advises the grievor that it will form
part of his file record in terms of his duties and responsibilities in future. Further, and as
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previously noted, the document was copied to Mr. Younger and Mr. Parker. I am satisfied that
the content of the Memorandum of Counsel is somewh at vague as to its futu re effect and that the
Union could have some legi timate concern about that.
I have considered, at some length, the conten t of the second and third paragraphs of the
Memorandum of Counsel. On balance, I am unable to find that the language and the tone thereof
is objectionable, as claimed by the Union. Clear ly, the content of the two (2) paragraphs is
retrospective. However, I think that past events can be referen ced in a letter of counsel for
purposes of setting the context for the Employer’s concerns. Put another way, such a reference
brings to a grievor’s attention specific conduct which the Employer wishes to address short of
discipline. I note that in most, if not all, letters of counsel, the conduct complained of is
unproven in any formal sense.
I have compared the Memorandum of Counsel to the letter of reprimand. I do not accept
the Union’s submission that the former document is harsher in tone and content. Rather, I
simply consider the Memorandum of Counsel to be a briefer summary of the events and, to a
lesser extent, the Employer’s co ncerns. Without doubt, there is some overlap between the two
(2) documents as both strive to capture the alle gations made against th e grievor surrounding his
participation in the meetings of October 13 and October 19, 2004. I do not view this as
objectionable. In a general sense, conduct per ceived as improper is described in a letter of
reprimand to set the context and provide the reasons for the resulting discipline. In contrast, the
conduct is described in a letter of counsel in order to instruct the employee as to what the
Employer sees as problematic conduc t to be avoided in future. Simply put, conduct cited in a
letter of counsel is, and should be, done for a di fferent purpose. I thi nk that this distinction
applies here.
I have also reviewed the Employer’s Stage 2 response. I have not been persuaded that
much turns on this document. On the face of the wr itten response, there is some uncertainty as to
10
precisely what the Designee would have deleted from the Letter of discipline. Mr. Henry was
not called as a witness to expl ain the ambiguity. In all of the circumstances, I remain
unconvinced that the Stage 2 response has much to offer vis a vis the ultimate resolution of this
dispute.
After a consideration of the Memorandum of Counsel, in its en tirety, I conclude that it
should be crafted in a more forward looking manne r so as to better advi se and instruct the
grievor as to how he should c onduct himself in future. The do cument, as presently worded,
focuses almost exclusively on the incident in question and on th e subsequent meeting with Mr.
Lafrance. While it speaks to the grievor’s conduct on those occasions, the Memorandum of
Counsel fails to clearly establis h the Employer’s expectations for the future. I find it somewhat
ironic that a statement of such expectations was addressed, in a prospectiv e sense, at pages two
(2) and three (3) of the letter of reprimand. Having spent a full da y in mediation and another day
of hearing with the par ties, I think it important that the Empl oyer’s expectations for the grievor’s
future conduct be clearly expressed. This form of counselling and instruction is necessary in
order to ensure that the grievor has a full understanding and appreciati on of the Employer’s
position as to how he should conduct himself in future when out in the public domain on
Ministry of Environment business. In short, I find that the Union can reasonably reject the
content of the Memorandum of C ounsel given that it does not su fficiently set out the Employer’s
expectations for the grievor’s futu re conduct. To be clear, this, in my judgment, is a fundamental
purpose of a letter of counsel.
In summary, I conclude that the Unio n reasonably exercised its rights under the
Memorandum of Settlement when it declined to approve the content of the Memorandum of
Counsel as prepared by the Employer. Accord ingly, the Employer is ordered to revise the
Memorandum of Counsel for presen tation to the Union. Given the difficulty which has arisen in
this case, it may be prudent to craft the draft in consultation with the Union. I trust that the
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parties will be able to resolve this outstanding issue without the need for fu rther arbitration. I do,
however, remain seized under the terms of the Me morandum of Settlement. I decline to void the
Memorandum of Counsel, as requested by the Union. In the circumstances of this case, I think it
would be wrong from a labour relations perspect ive to void a settlement provision which was
freely negotiated by the parties. In this instance, the more appropriate order is one which gives
effect to the terms of that agreement.
th
Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 30 day of June, 2006.
M.V. Watters
Vice-Chair