HomeMy WebLinkAbout1991-1465.Mohamed.92-05-05 ONTARfO EMPLOYES OE LA CO,bW~
CROWN EMPLOYEES DE L 'ONTARiO
....GRIEVANCE C,OMMISSlON DE
SETTLEMENT ' REGLEMENT
BOARD DES GRIEFS
TBO CttlNDAS STREET wEST, SUITE 2100, TORONTO, ONTARIO. MSG lZ8
180, RUE DUNDAS OUE~, BUREAU 21~, TO~O~O ~ONTA~tO}. MSG IZ8 FACStM&E/T~COPlE (416) 326-~396
1465/91
IN T~ ~TTER OF ~ ~IT~TION
Un,er
T~ CRO~ ~P~YEE5 COLLECTI~ B~G~INING ~CT
Befure
~ GRI~CE SETTLE~
BE~EN
OPSEU (Mohamed)
Gr~ evo r
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Mini~t~ of Co.unity & Social Se~ices)
Employer
BEFO~: M. Gorsky Vice-Chai~erson
M. Vorster Me. er.
~. O'Toole Me.er
FOR THE M. McFadden
GRIEVOR Counsel
Koskie & Minsky
Barristers & Solicitors
FOR THE S. Mason
EMPLOYER Counsel
Legal Services Branch
Ministry of Community & Social Services
HEARING February 4. 1992
D F. C I S I ON
The grievance dated June 24, 1991 states:
I am discriminatorily and improperly placed on the salary
grid in my position as a Community Development Officer 2.
The settlement desired states:
That I be properly classified and placed (that is at the
maximum rate for my classificationt on the salary grid
retroactively with interest effective April 1, 1991.
Counsel for the Union indicated that no claim was being made
for a different classification and t~at the only settlement desired
related to the request for placement at the maximum rate for the
Grievor's classification on the salary grid.
At the outset of the hearing counsel for the parties indicated
that they had arrived at an agreed statement of facts, to which are
attached three appendices which are annexed to this decision as
Appendix "A". After filing the agreed statement of facts, the
parties indicated that paragraphs four, five and six thereof were
to be amended by changing the number"six" to "five" in paragraph
four; the numbers "five" and "six" in paragraph six to the numbers
"four" and "five" respectively; and the word "sixth," in paragraph
seven to the word "fifth."
By further agreement, the parties added the following agreed
statements of fact:
9. The difference between the Grievor's salary and the
salaries of the other employees described above was
not due to any differences in merit, ability or
work performed. The basis for salary increases for
the other employees described above was in
accordance with the circumstances set out in
. paragraph six herein.
10. Pay equity increases to employees in the Welfare
Field worker 2 classification were significantly
greater than pay equity increases to employees in.
the Community Development Officer 2 classification
during the relevant time.
The Union does not challenge the propriety of the change in
classification of the five Income Maintenace/Handicapped Children's
Benefits Officers who were formerly classified as Welfare Field
Worker 2's, who, effective April 1, 1991, were assigned to new
positions as Special Agreements Officers, classified as Community
Development Officer 2's. Nor is there a claim that the Employer
behaved in bad faith based on invidious grounds of discrimination
as are described in article A.1 of the collective agreement:
A.1 There shall be no discrimination practised by
reason of race, ancestry, place of origin, cotour~
ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual
orientation, age, marital status, family status, or
handicap, as defined in section 9(1) of the Ontario
Human Rights Code (OHRC).
Counsel for the Union argued that sections 18(1)(a) and (b) of
the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act R.S.O., 1980, Chapter
108 do not address the subject of an employee's placement on the
wage grid. The narrow position argued on behalf of the Grievor is
that when the five Income Maintenance/Handicapped Children's
Benefits Officers classified as Welfare Field Worker 2's were
assigned to new positions as Special Agreement Officers, classified
3
classified as Community Development Officer 2's and were placed at
step 6 of the wage grid, it was incumbent on the Employer to place
the Grievor at the same level.
Counsel for the Union argued that the collective agreement did
not address an issue such as the one before us, except in the
circumstances set out in article 5.
The parts of article 5 referred to by counsel for the Union
are:
5.1.1 Promotion occurs when the incumbent of a
classified position is assigned to another
position in a class with a higher maximum
salary than the class of his former position.
5.1.2 An employee who is promoted shall receive that
rate of pay in the salary range of the new
classification which is the next higher to his
present rate of pay, except that:
- where such a change results in an
increase of less than three percent (3%~,
he shall receive the next higher salary
rate again, which amount will be
considered as a one-step increase;
- a promotional increase shall not result
in the employee's new salary rate
exceeding the maximum of the new salary
range except where 'permitted by salary
note.
5.1.3 Where an employee:
(a) at the maximum rate of a salary is
promoted, a new anniversary date is
established based upon the date of
promotion;
(b) at a rate less than the maximum in the
4
salary range is promoted and receives a
promotional increase:
- greater than a one-step increase, a
new anniversary date based on the
date of promotion is established;
- of one step or less, the existing
anniversary date is retained.
5.2,1 When the duties of an employee are changed as
a result of reorganization or reassignment of
duties and the position is reclassified to a
class with a lower maximum salary, an employee
who occupies the position when the
reclassification is made is entitled to a
salary progression based on merit to the
maximum salary of the higher classification
including any revision of the maximum salary
of the higher classification that takes effect
during the salary cycle in which the
reclassification takes place.
5.2.2 An employee to whom the above section applies
is entitled to be appointed to the first
vacant position in his former class that
occurs in the same administrative district or
unit, institution or other work area in the
same ministry in which he was employed at the
time the reclassification was made.
5.3 Where a position is reassessed and is
reclassified to a class with a lower maximum
salary, any employee who occupies the position
at the time of the reclassification ~ha]l
continue to be entitled to salary progression
based on merit to the maximum salary of the
higher classification, including any revision
of the maximum salary of the~ higher
classification what takes effect during the
salary cycle in which the reclassification
takes place.
5.4.1 Where, because of the abolition of a position,
an employee is'assigned:
. (a) from one position in a ministry to
another position in the same ministry, or
(b) from a position in one ministry to a
position in another ministry,
and the position to which he is assigned is in
a class with a lower maximum salary than the
maximum salary for the class of the position
from which he was assigned, he shall continue
to be entitled to salary progression based on
merit to the maximum salary of the higher
classification including any revision of the
maximum salary of the higher classification
that takes effect during the salary cycle in
which the assignment takes place.
5.4.2 Sub-section 5.4.1 applies only where there is
no position the employee is qualified for, and
that he may be assigned to, and that is:
(a) in the same classification that applied
to the employee's position before the
position was abolished, or
(b) in a classification having the same
maximum salary rate as the maximum salary
rate of the classification that applied
to the employee's position before the
position was abolished.
5.5 Where, for reasons of health, an employee is
assigned to a position in a classification
having a lower maximum salary, he shall not
receive any salary progression or salary
decrease for a period of six (6) months after
his assignment, and if at the end of that
period, he is unable to accept employment in
his former classification, he shall be
assigned to a classification consistent with
his condition.
5.6 Except as provided above, an employee who is
demoted shall be paid at the rate closest to
but less than the rate he was receiving at the
time of the demotion, effective from the date
of his demotion.
5.7 It is understood that where an employee is
assigned to a position pursuant to Section
5.4, 5.5 or 5.6, the provisions of Article 4
6
(poSting and Filling of Vacancies or New
Positions) shall not apply.
5.8.1 When a new classification is to be created or
an existing classification is to be revised,
at the request of ~ither party the parties
shall meet within thirty (30) days to
negotiate the salary range for the new or
revised classification, provided that should
no agreement be reached between the parties,
then the Employer will set the salary range
for the new or revised classification subject
to the right of the parties to have the rate
determined by arbitration.
Counsel for the Employer identified articles 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and
5.1.3 as dealing with what happens when an employee is p~omoted.
Counsel for the Union also identified articles 5.2.1, 5.2.2,
5.3, 5.4.1, 5.6, and 5.8.1 as dealing with cases where an employee
is demoted or has her position reclassified or where the employee
is reclassified, and identified article 5.4.2 as a qualifying
clause affecting article 5.4.1.
Although articles 5.'5 and 5.7 were referred to, it was
acknowledged that neither of them affect the determination of the
issue before us.
Counsel for the Union' argued that there was nothing in article
5, or elsewhere in the collective agreement, that explicitly
indicated what was to be done by an employee in an existing
classification who felt that she had been improperly placed on the
wage grid. Although no cases could be found dealing with the issue
7
before us where the matter had come before the Grievance Settlement
Board, it was the position taken on,behalf of the Grievor that if
no compelling distinctions could be made between employees within
a classification, there was no reason to distinguish between them
for pay purposes.
As is noted from the agreed statement of facts, counsel for
the Union does not argue that the placement on the grid in the case
of the Grievor and the five other employees was contrary to the
provisions of any part of article 5 and in particular with article
5.1.2 (see paragraphs two and six of the agreed statement of
facts).
In support of his position, counsel for the Union viewed the
Employer as having a discretion to exercise in arriving at the
proper placement of an employee on the salary grid.. ~n the absence
of any cases directly on point, counsel for the Union referred to
the principles in a number of cases involving' the exercise of
employer discretion and argued that they had significance in the
case before us.
Reference was made to the case of Re United Electrical
Workers, Local 523, and Union Carbide Canada Ltd. (1967), 18 L.A.C.
109 (P.C. Weiler). The Union Carbide ease was a job posting case
in which certain junior employees were placed in a millwright job
over senior employees who had also applied for the position.
8
Counsel for the Union referred us to the following quotation
from pages 117-8 of the Union Carbide case:
It should be noted that this does not mean (as the
company appeared to advocate in its brief) that the
employer's responsibility to decide on employee ability
and qualifications is untrammelled and completely un-
reviewable. Rather, the company's decision must be non-
discriminatory, and subject to the terms of the contract
(including the seniority clause) in two senses: first,
the judgement of the company must be honest, and un-
biased, and not actuated by any malice or ill will
directed at the particular employee, and second, the
managerial decision must be reasonable, one which a
reasonable employer could have reached in the light of
the facts available. The underlying purpose of this
interpretation is to prevent the arbitration board taking
over the function of management, a position which it is.
said they are manifestly incapable of filling~ Yet the
managerial discretion to decide has been limited by the
terms of the agreement and it is the duty of the
arbitration board to ensure that it is exercised in the
light of proper principles and criteria, that all
relevant considerations have been adverted to, and that
all irrelevant factors have been excluded from the
process of decision.
In the Unign Carbide case, the employer had imposed on it a
discretfon to assess the ability and qualifications of employees in
a promotion contest. In the case before us there is no question of
imposing a limitation on the Employer's discretion in placing an
employee on the salary grid, because there is no discretion to be
exercised in following the provisions of article 5.
Counsel for the Union also referred to another case before a
board chaired by Professor wailer; Re Sudbur¥ Mina, Mill and
Smelter WQrkers' Union and Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. (1969),
20 L.A.C. 45. In the Falconbridge case, the grievor claimed that
9
he had been elevated to the position of painter on a temporary
basis but had been only paid at his normal classification rate as
a repairman. Counsel for the Union referred to the statement of
the board found at page 50:
One of the main purposes of a wage classification
system, particularly if supplemented by a specific
temporary assignment provision as here, is to create
uniformity and equality in payments for the same kind of
work. It is simply unfair for two employees who are
doing the same kind of work, perhaps even working
together, to be paid substantially different rates where
no differencas in skill are exhibited. Hence the
presumption must be that the range or family of tasks
associated with different jobs, carrying different wage
rates, should be mutually exclusive as far as is
practicable (for purposes of payment, not assignment).
The position taken on behalf of the Grievor was that as there
were no differences in the work done or level of skill of the
Grievor and that of the other five employees similarly classified,
there should be no difference in their placement on the salary
grid. It was submitted that once the Grievor requested that she be
placed on the same level on the salary grid as the other five
employees, then it was unreasonable to maintain the difference in
the placement on the grid between the Grievor and the other
employees who were doing the same kind of work where there were no
other differences which warranted the disparity.
In the ~alconbrid~e case there was no provision such as
article 5.1.2 in the case before us that represents the parties
agreement as to what is to be done" in the circumstances there
described.
10
Counsel for the Union also relied on Re Ontario Human Rights
Commission et al. and Simpsons-Sears Ltd. (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th)
321 (S.C.C.). The Simpsons-Sears case dealt with an alleged
violation of the Ontario Human Rights Code, where it was held that
an employment rule honestly made for sound economic or business
reasons, equally applicable to all to whom it. is intended to apply,
may be discriminatory under the Code if it treats one group of
employees differently because of some special characteristic which
they possess:
The Code aims at the removal of discrimination.
This is to state the obvious. Its main approach,
however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather
to provide relief for the victim of discrimination. It
is the result or the effect of the action complained of
which is significant. If it does, in fact, cause
discrimination; if its effec~ is to impose on one person
or group of persons obligations, penalties, or
restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of
the community, it is discriminatory. (at p.329)
To take the narrower view and hold that intent is a
required elemeht of discrimination under the Code would
seem to me to place a virtually insuperable barrier in
the way of 'a complainant seeking a remedy. (at p.331)
~ounsel for the Union argued that it is irrelevant.that there
was no intention on the part of the Employer to discriminate
between the Grievor and the other employees. The question ought to
be: was there an unwarranted distinction between the Grievor and
the other employees?
In the case before us, the alleged discrimination is the
result.of the application of the agreement between the parties and
does not represent the unilateral decision of the Employer.
Counsel for the Union also relied upon re Chrysler Canada Ltd.
and United Automobile Workers, Local 444 (1986), 23 L.A.C. (3d) 366
(Kennedy). In the Chrysler case, the grievor, a member of the
Seventh Day Adventist church, refused to work on any Friday night
and Saturday shifts, this refusal being in keeping with a basic
tenet of his church. The legitimacy and bona fides of the
grievor's religious convictions were not challenged. After various
efforts had been made .to accommodate him within the company's
existing scheduling practices and procedures, there were several
instances where this could not be done and on those occasions he
was absent without permission for scheduled shifts on Friday night
and Saturday. After progressive discipline based on these
absences, he was dismissed. .The union relied on an argument based
on the adverse effects of discrimination rather than intentional
discrimination, and relied on the Simpsons-Sears case, arguing
that:
Within the rationale of that decision the company was
Qbliged to take reasonable steps to accommodate the
grievor's shift requirements short of undue hardship in
the operation of its business and that the company had
not done so.
It was submitted that:
... past attempts at accommodation had not included any
hardship or expense to the company, and the evidence
indicated that the company could accommodate the
grievor's needs without undue hardship,
(at. p.373)
The arbitrator concluded, at p.378, that:
Discrimination within the language of article 4 of
the collective agreement [before] would include adverse
12
effect discrimination as analyzed by the supreme Court of
Canada in [the Simpsons-Sears case] and that the company
could accommodate the grievor without undue expense or
hardship. The company must exercise its right of
management and its application of the collective
agreement between the parties in a manner tha~ is
consistent with the Human Rights Code, 1981 and the
provisions of the Code were not complied with in the
scheduling of the grievor ....
In the case before us, the "discrimination" ag~nst the grievor
was a result of an agreement between the parties, and it is not
inconsistent with any statutory obligation imposed on the Employer.
.In summarizing his position, counsel for th~ Grievor argued
that the purpose of the grid was to recognize distinctions between
employees within a classification. Placement of the Grievor at a
step below the other five employees, it was submitted, represented
a distinction not based on any fact relevant to job considerations.
We were asked to find that there had been a breach of the
administration of the wage grid because of the improper exercise of
discretion on the part of the Employer in failing to act reasonably
on the evidence before it. That is, having found no distinguishing
feature between the Grievor's position and that of the other
employees, it was unreasonable to distinguish her situation from
the others by placing her one step below them on the salar, y grid~
Notwithstanding the ingenious arguments of counsel for the
Grievor, the principles enunciated in the cases cited by him have
no application to article 5 for the reasons set o~t above. While
it is easy to see why the Grievor would regard the distinction that
13
exists between herself and the other employees relative to their
placement on the salary grid as being invidious, this is not a case
where some discretionary choice must be made by the Employer in
deciding where an employee who has been promoted within the meaning
of article.5.1.1, is to be placed on the salary grid. This is not
a case where the Employer has an untramme]led right free from
review to place an employee on the salary grid as it chooses
provided it has acted in good faith. Nor is this a case where the
employer, as in the Union Carbide case, must make a choice under
the collective agreement relying on relevant evidence, ignoring
irrelevant evidence, which decision must be made, not only in good
faith, but in a way that stands up to the test of reason. Where an
employee winds up on the grid is a function of the' mechanical
application of article 5.1.2. The mere existence of such a
provision opens up the door to distinctions which may disadvantage
an employee.
What happened in this case is set out in paragraph 10 of the
agreed statement of facts: "Pay equity increases to the welfare
Field Worker 2 position were significantly greater than pay equity
increases to the Community Development Officer 2 position during
the relevant time period."
As counsel for the Employer pointed out, the placement of an
employee on a wage grid is not solely dependent on merit or
experience. Article 5 says that the placement on the grid also
14
depends on the employee's previous salary prior to promotion~ The
placement on the grid may be the result of fortuitous events. For
example, two persons promoted to the same job at the same time
where neither of them has experience on that job could be paid
different amounts based on their previous position where their two
jobs were paid at disparate rates. What has happened in this case
is that the r~su]t was dictated by the application of the clear
language of article 5 which the parties ~egotiated and which result
was a necessary consequence of such application.
As a result of a decision arrived at by the Employer and the
Union, the pay equity adjustment of the Welfare Field Worker 2 and
Community Developmen~ Officer 2 positions were different. This
resulted in the other five employees being transferred to the
Community Development Officer 2 classification with a higher
placement on the salary grid. In performing its function, the
Employer was not exercising any discretion and the language of
article 5 cannot be seen as imposing on it the obligation to
exercise a discretion or to afford it any discretion in placing an
employee on the salary grid. Nor is there any other provision, of
the collective agreement, as was acknowledged, that did so and
there cannot be any abstract obligation to create a fair result in
the absence of reliance upon some provision in the collective
agreement that imposes such a burden.
The wage grids and an employees placement thereon have been
15
established through negotiation and agreement. Any apparent anomaly
said to exist in this case can only be remedied through agreement.
In the absence of such agreement, the seeming anomaly in which the
Griever is caught cannot be resolved by this Board. Accordingly,
although we sympathize with the Griever's position, %he grievance
must be denied.
Dated at Toronto this 5th. day of May, < 1992.
M. Gorsky Vice Ch rperson
~~'~ Addendum attached
M. Vorster - Member
Member
ADDENDU_M BY UNION NOMINEE - MFNNO VORSTER
0~o_ P~blk: Servic~ EoTpI~ Uoion and ~h~ Mioistl;y c~ Community
Grievance of Moharned
While it may not be within the jurisdiction of the Grievance Settlement Board
to correct what is an obvious injustice, it is certainly within the authority of the
employer to act in fair and just manner to an employee it values enough to promote.
The fads of this case make the unfairness to the grievor clear to even the
most casual observer. The grievor was one of six employees in her group of
Income Maintenance/Handicapped Children's Benefits Officers. She alone was
promoted to the position of Special Agreements Officer 2. The grievor went from
the top of her existing pay grid to the starting grid p{acement in her new
classification. Since the collective agreement requires that there be an increase of
at least 3% in her salary upon promotion, she received the latter amount. Almost
three years later, her former fellow workers were reclassified from Benefits Officers
to the grievor's position of Special Agreements Officer. Because the reclassified
employees were at the maximum of their pay grid, they received the maximum wage
in their new position. In other words, by now making less than her former fellow.
· employees, she would have been better off by not being promoted at all.
The Provincial Government's classification system and wage grids have been
constructed by the employer so as to most accuratety reflect the way in which it
considers it's employees interrelate' in terms of job duties and resulting wages, in
making the decision to t~eat the 9rievor with disdain, 'the employer has made a
mockery of its own classification system.
This grievance should never have come before us. What the employer has
won on a technicality it has lost in the respect of its employees.
Respectfully submitted,
Menno Vorster
APPENDIX "A"
GSB No. 1465/91
BETWEEN:
OPSEU (S. MOHAMED)
Grievor
- and -
Ministry of Community
and Social Services
'Employer
AGREED STATEMENT OF FACT~
1. Effective May 2, 1988, the grievor was promoted from
the position of Handicapped Children's Benefits Officer
(classified as Welfare Field Worker 2) to Special Agreements
Officer 2 (classified as Community Development officer 2). She
remained in the latter position until the grievance was filed
on June 24, 1991.
2. Before the promotion, the grievor was.paid $628.73 per
week, whic~ was the highest step in the WFW2 salary range. UDon
promotion, her salary increased to $664.01 per week, which was
the lowest step in the CDO2 salary range. The parties agree.
that this salary increase was in accordance with the "3% rule"
in Article 5.1.2 of the Collective Agreement.
3. The ~grievor received the following salary increases
between the date of the promotion and the date of the grievance
(as shown in her Employee Service Record, which is attached as
Appendix A)
January l, 1989 - annual' revision to $703.12/wk.
May 1, 1989 - merit increase to $726.08/wk.
December 31, 1989 - pay equity adjustment to
$72S.26/wk.
January 1, 1990 - annual revision to $774.87/wk.
May 1, 1990 - accelerated merit increase (2
steps) to'$826.64/wk.
December 31, 1990 - pay equity adjustment to $836.43
January 1, 1991 -. annuaI revision to $884.94/wk.
May 1, 1991 - merit increase to $922.23/wk.
4. Effective April 1, 1991, the Income
Maintenance/Handicapped Children's Benefits and Special
Services at Home programs were amalgamated. As a result,
Income Maintenance/Handicapped Children's Benefits officers
(classified as Welfare Field Worker 2) were reassigned to new
positions as Special Agreements Officers (classified as
Community Development Officer 2).
5. The employer and the union agreed that these reassigned
employees would be compensated according to the promotional
rules in Article 5 of the Collective Agreement (see employer's
letter of March 20, 1991, and union reply of March 26, 1991,
attached to this statement as Appendix B).
6. ~ of these s~ employees were earning $911.54/wk. at
the top step of the WF2 salary range-before reassignment. After
reassignment, they earned $960.31/wk. at the top step of the
CD02 range. The parties agree that this increase was in
accordance with the "3% rule" in Article 5.1.2.
7. The s~xth employee was on an acting assignment as a
social Worker 2 before reassignment. Her salary was increased
from $880.00/wk. to~$960.31/wk. (the highest step ih the CDO2
range) due to a clerical error. The error was later rectified
and her salary was adjusted to $922.23/wk. (the second highest
step). The parties agree that, apart from the temporary impact
of'the clerical error, this increase was in accordance with
Article 5.1.2.
8. The relevant salary schedules for Welfare Fieldworker 2
and Community Development officer 2 are attached as Appendix C.
(~ Community a.o Se[vices sociaux
Social Se[¥ice$ et communau~ai~es
Ontario
Toronto Bureau 2195 Yonge Street 21§5, rue Yonge
Area de secteur Torot~tOo Ontario Toronto [OnterioJ
Office de Toronto M7A 1G1 MTA 1G1
Mrs. Carol Deschamps ' March 20, 1991
OPSEU Staff Representative
Queen's Park Office
.300-56 Wellesley Street West
Toronto, Ontario
M5$ 2S3
Dear Mrs, Deschamps:
Re: Amalgamation of Income Maintenance/handicapped Children's
Benefits and Special Services at Home Progr, ams
This will confirm the discussions of Our meeting on January 30, 1991 regarding the
proposed amalgamation of the above-noted programs. In attendance were Miss
Esther Kulman, Manager of Human Resources and the undersigned.
In accordance with our agreement, the following principles, will be used to
accomplish the transaction:
1. The amalgamation of the positions of Income Maintenance/Handicapped
Children's Benefits. 9fflcer and the Special Agreements Officer will be treated
as a reorganization.
2. The reorganization wiil result in the creation of four Special Agreements
Officer positions in the Special Services Un~t; four Income Maintenance Officer
positions in the Local Offices; and'the abolishment of eight Income
Maintenance/Handicapped Children's Benefits Officer positions.
3. The position of Special Agreements Officer carries the classification of
Community Development Officer 2, Atypical.
4. In order of their seniority, the CUrrent full-time permanent incumbents of the
Income Maintenance/Handicapped Children's Bener-~cs Officer positions are:
2G2B 102/89;
5. An offer'of reassignment to the new positions of Special Agreements Officer will
be made on the b.asis of seniority to the' current full-time permanent incumbents.
6. Those employees who agree to the reassignment to the pos~on of Special
Agreements Officer will be compensated according to the promotional rules
established.by Article 5 of the Collective Agreement.
7. ThOse employees that decline reassignment or to whom an offer of
reassignment is not made will be transferred laterally to a vacant Income
MaJntenanc~ Officer position which carries the same classification as their
previous position.
We would like your written concurrence to the principles described above before
implementing the reorganization. -A reply by March 25, 1991 would be appreciated.
It should be noted that any challenge to the preceding conditions may cause
Management to reconsider its reorganizational strategy.
Thank you for taking the time to ensure that OPSEU's concerns were incorporated
into our plan.
Andre lannu'zzie[lo Jack Ray-
Manager, Income and Family Support Manager, Services to the Disabled
/.. ' ~pendix B
· 'Ontario ?ublicServic Emplouees Union ....... ..
March 26, 1991
pY COURIER
Mr. Andre Iannuzziello
Manager, Income and Family Support
Ministry 9f Community and Social Services
2195 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M7AjGI
Dear Mr. Iannuzziello:
Re: Amalgamation of Income Maintenance/Handicapped
Children's Benefits and Special Services
at Home Proqrams
In response to your letter of March gO, 1991, this correspondence
will.serve to confirm that we are in concurrence with the principles
as outlined'~n your letter to be used,to facilitate the amalgamation
of the positions as outlined above.
We understand that receipt of this'letter is essential before
implementation occurs, but at the same time would like to hear back
from you as to dates when we could expect the amalgamation to occur.
In response to your statement, "any challenge may cause management
to reconsider its reorganizational strategy",-I can advise you that
at this time we have not heard of an~ plans wMch would challenge
this agreement.
Let me take this opportunity to thank you'for taking our mutual
concerns into. consideration in the development of this plan.
Yours truly,
Carolyn 'Desch. amps
Staff Representative
CD:las
Queen's Park Olfice, 56 Wellesley Slre(:l West. S,,ile300. Toron[o. Or, tar,o M5S 2S3 Phone 904-11IG
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The Provincial Government's classification system and wage grids have been
constructed by the employer so as to most accurately reflect the way in which it
considers it's empioycc~ interrelate in terms of job duties and resulting wages. In
making the decision to treat the grievor with disdain, the employer has made a
mockery of its own classification system.
This grievance should never have come before us. What the employer has
won on a technicaJity it has lost in the respect of its employees,.
Respectfully submitted,
Menno Vorster